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Summary 
 
This study examines the development of artillery used in and around the Latin 
East during the period of the crusades. It begins with an examination of the 
broader historiography of medieval artillery, an overview of the spread of 
swing-beam siege engines (trebuchets) across Europe and the Levant in the 
Early Middle Ages, and the mechanical physics that govern such machines. 
From these foundations, the development and significance of the engines are 
investigated. Incorporating as much textual and archaeological evidence as 
possible, the use of artillery by Frankish and Muslim forces is examined on a 
case-by-case basis. With an appreciation of the power of these machines, the 
influence of artillery on the design of twelfth- and thirteenth-century-
fortifications is analysed. 
Both Frankish and Muslim forces were familiar with the traction 
trebuchet by the end of the eleventh century. While these engines remained 
relatively light throughout the period of the crusades, the counterweight 
trebuchet appears to have been introduced by the end of the twelfth century. 
Initially rather primitive and little stronger than the traction variety, these 
engines developed fairly quickly. The appearance of new vocabulary for 
identifying these engines in the early thirteenth century indicates their 
increasing strength and physical evidence from the middle of the century 
confirms that they had become much more powerful by the start of the 
Mamluk period. Although counterweight trebuchets appear to have grown 
steadily throughout the thirteenth century, these had a relatively limited 
impact on the design of most fortifications. Trebuchets, large and small, were 
an important part of Frankish and Muslim siege arsenals in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, but even the largest were not effective breaching engines 
by the time the Franks were pushed out of the Holy Land. 
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Names 
 
 
 
Place names used in this study Alternatives 
Ajlun al-Rabad 
Akkar Gibelacar / Akkar al'Ariqa 
Apamea Afamiya / al-Mudiq 
Arima 'Areime 
Arqa Arcas 
Arsuf Arsur 
Ashdod Minat al-Qal'a 
'Atlit Pelerin / Peregrinorum 
Baghras Gaston 
Baysan Beit She'an 
Beaufort Belfort / Shaqif Arnun 
Belmont Suba 
Belvoir Kawkab 
Bethgibelin Beit Gibelin / Bait Jibrin 
al-Bira Birecik 
Blanchegarde Tell as-Safi 
Bourzey Qal'at Barza, Rochefort (likely the same) 
Caco Qaqun 
Cafarlet Kafr Lam 
Castellum Regium Chateau de Roi / Mi'ilya 
Castle of Figs Castrum Ficuum / Qal'at al-Burj 
Castrum Arnoldi Yalu 
Chastel Blanc Safita 
Chastel Neuf Hunin 
Chastel Rouge Castrum Rubrum / Yahmur 
Crac des Chevaliers Hisn al-Akrad 
Cursat al-Qusayr / az-Zau 
Darum Dair al-Balah 
Jabala Gibellum / Gabula 
Jubayl Giblet / Byblos 
al-Habis Petra 
Habis Jaldak Cave de Suet / 'Ain al-Habis 
Harim Harrenc / Harran / Harem 
Ibelin Yabna 
Jacob's Ford Chastellet / Vadum Iacub / al-'Atra / Metsad 'Ateret 
al-Jundi Sadr 
Kerak Petra Deserti / al-Karak 
Latrun Toron de les Cabelleros / Toron des Chevaliers 
Le Destroit Dustray 
Li Vaux Moise al-Wu'ayra 
Maraclea Maraqiyya 
Margat Marqab 
Mirabel Majdal Yaba 
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Mont Pelerin Mont Peregrinus / Sangil / Tripoli 
Montferrand Barin / al-Bari'ah 
Montfort al-Qurain / Starkenburg 
Montreal Shawbak 
Mount Tabor Qal'at al-Tur 
Ruad Arwad 
Rumkale Qal'at al-Rum / Ranculat / Hromgla 
Safed Saphet 
Saone Sahyun / Qal'at Salah al-Din 
Scandelion Iskenderun 
Sidon Sagette / Saida 
 Sidon Land Castle   al-Mu'azza 
 Sidon Sea Castle  al-Bahr 
Subayba Nimrod 
Turbessel Tell Bashir 
Toron Tibnin 
Tortosa Tortouse / Tartus / Antartus 
Trapessac Darbsak 
 
(Frankish names have been italicised) 
 
 
 
Personal names have been spelled according to their most popular form in Western 
scholarship, i.e. 'Alexius Comnenus' is given in the Latin form whereas 'Niketas Choniates' 
is given in the Greek; similarly, 'Zanki' and 'Tughtakin' will be used rather than 'Zangi' and 
'Tughtagin', while 'Qaraqush' will be used rather than 'Karakush'. European names have been 
anglicised where possible. 
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Medieval Weights and Measures2 
 
 
 
dirham Egypt  3.125 g 
 Damascus  3.09 g 
 Iran  3.2 g 
 
ratl Iraq  0.40625 kg 
 Egypt  0.4375 kg 
  fulfuli  0.450 kg 
  kabir  0.500 kg 
  laythi  0.620 kg 
  jarwi  0.967 kg 
 Damascus  1.85 kg 
 Aleppo  2.27-2.28 kg 
 Hama  2.062 kg 
 Homs  2.7 kg 
 Sahyzar  2.137 kg 
 Tripoli  1.968 kg 
 Palestine  2.2-2.5 kg 
 
qintar of gold  42.33 kg 
 Egypt  43.75 kg 
 Damascus  185 kg 
 Aleppo  228 kg 
 Hama  228 kg 
 Rum (100 lodra)  56.44 kg 
 Cyprus  226.4 
 
oka Cyprus  1.85 kg 
 
cane Cyprus  2.2 m 
 
cubit Egyptian/ordinary/al-sauda' (black)  0.5404 m 
 al-yad (hand)  0.49875 m 
 bi'l-najjari/al-mi'mariyyah (building/carpenter's) 0.789 m 
 hashimi/al-'amal/al-malik (practical/royal) 0.665 m 
 al-bazz (cloth) - Egypt 0.58187 m 
   - Damascus 0.63035 m 
   - Aleppo 0.679 m 
   - Tripoli 0.64 m  
                                                 
2 The Islamic measures are taken from Hinz, Islamische Masse und Gewichte, trans. Marcinkowski, 
Measures and Weights in the Islamic World. The Cypriot qintar has been taken from Coureas, The Assizes 
of the Lusignan Kingdom of Cyprus, p. 58 - my thanks to Peter Edbury for this reference. The Cypriot oka 
has been taken from Crawford, The 'Templar of Tyre', p. 24 n. 4. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Siege artillery has interested historians for centuries. But while technical treatises, 
detailed descriptions and illustrations survive from the classical and Renaissance periods, 
evidence of artillery from the medieval period is more limited. In the absence of lucid 
contemporary descriptions, medieval artillery (mechanical stone-throwers) tends to be 
studied in a very broad context. Using anecdotal scenarios, often the most sensational, 
from wide geographic areas and across many centuries, historians have been able to put 
forward various theories regarding the development of artillery and what stage it had 
reached by certain points in the Middle Ages. Not surprisingly, such a broad approach 
has led to a fairly poor understanding of the nature of these engines, how they were 
tactically employed and the development of the mechanical system. In order to avoid the 
generalisations that have accompanied previous studies, the focus here will be on a 
specific region and a definite period of time: the Levant, from 1097 to 1291. To produce 
as complete a picture as possible, archaeological evidence will be examined alongside the 
textual evidence whenever possible. 
 Among the best studies of medieval siege warfare to examine this region and 
period, are those of Randal Rogers, Christopher Marshall and John France. While the first 
two deal with only half of this period, one study conducted by France is extremely specific 
and the other very broad. None of these, however, focuses on artillery.3 Contrastingly, 
Paul Chevedden has examined medieval artillery closer than perhaps any other modern 
scholar. His theories, however, tend to be built around a selection of anecdotes, often at 
the expense of appropriate context, which has led to a skewed interpretation of the 
                                                 
3 Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare; Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East; France, Victory in the East; France, 
Western Warfare. Rogers devotes the most attention to artillery; however, his primary concern is siege 
towers when dealing with Frankish sieges in the Levant during the twelfth century. He claims that the use 
of artillery was better suited to the Normans of South Italy and examines it in this context, despite its more 
frequent appearance in sources dealing with the Latin East. 
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development of these engines.4 The present study is, in part, a response to the ideas of 
exaggerated power popularised by Chevedden. When all of the evidence is considered, 
mechanical artillery (trebuchets) do not appear to have developed into breaching engines 
before the late thirteenth century. 
 Many sieges were conducted in the Levant between 1097 and 1291 and 
individuals of various ethnicities have left records of these events. Before the 
contemporary evidence is addressed, Part One will establish certain basic premises. 
Chapter 1 will examine the development of artillery up to 1097, touching on various 
historiographical interpretations. Understanding the disparity of evidence and academic 
disagreement over the form and spread of artillery in the Early Middle Ages is critical 
because judgements relating to the use of artillery in this earlier period often influence 
interpretations of later engines. Chapter 2 will then outline the mechanical properties of 
a trebuchet. Only by understanding the mechanics can the source material be intelligently 
interpreted. To date, few studies have competently integrated a sound appreciation of 
mechanical physics with the contemporary accounts. This, perhaps more than anything 
else, has allowed certain misguided conclusions to come to be popularly accepted. Once 
these two basic components have been addressed, Part Two will examine the main body 
of source material. 
 This study will not be the first to examine the use of artillery during the crusades; 
however, it will be the first to examine all of the available evidence critically, dividing it 
into five parts. Chapter 3 will examine the First Crusade and establish a baseline by 
answering certain questions: What was Frankish artillery like at the end of the eleventh 
century? How powerful was it? How familiar was it to the various Frankish personalities 
who took part in the crusade and the Muslim defenders whom they encountered? Did 
either side possess a technological advantage? Chapter 4 will then examine how artillery 
was used during the twelfth century and how it developed during this period. Chapter 5 
will cover the period between the Battle of Hattin (1187) and the end of the Third Crusade 
(1192). The number of sieges and wealth of sources demand that this five-year period be 
examined closely. It is around this time that counterweight trebuchets appear to have been 
developed and employed with increasing effect. Although no contemporary account 
                                                 
4 See Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus; Chevedden, "Artillery of King James I," pp. 47-94; Chevedden, 
"The Hybrid Trebuchet," pp. 179-222; Chevedden, "Fortifications and the Development of Defensive 
Planning," pp. 33-43; Chevedden, "Invention," pp. 71-116 ; Chevedden, "Black Camels," pp. 227-77; 
Chevedden, "King James I," pp. 313-39. 
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clearly proves that such engines were used at any particular siege, there are strong 
indications that they were. Moving forward, Chapter 6 will deal with the first half of the 
thirteenth century, in which new terms for identifying artillery appear, as does the first 
archaeological evidence. Terminology and physical evidence become vitally important in 
Chapter 7, which attempts to discern the strength and diversity of artillery in the second 
half of the thirteenth century. Stratigraphically datable projectiles provide sound material 
evidence while the Muslim sources increasingly classify the engines that they mention. 
Combining these elements allows one to make a reasonable estimation of the scale and 
power of certain machines. On some occasions, topographical conditions can be 
incorporated to render quite accurate ballistic models, revealing necessary energy 
minimums and thus a quantitative sense of power and scale, something that has never 
before been attempted in this field. 
After all the evidence has been examined, Part Three will assess its broader 
significance. Taking account of the power, diversity and method of employment of 
artillery, Chapter 8 will address the influence that offensive engines had on the design of 
fortifications. Complementing this, Chapter 9 will assess the degree to which a desire to 
incorporate artillery as a defensive weapon may have influenced fortification design. 
Critically, the matter of whether or not certain large towers dating to the early thirteenth 
century were meant to resist or support the heaviest counterweight trebuchets of the day 
will be considered. 
To conclude, a final assessment of the development and use of artillery will be 
offered. It is hoped that this study, in its entirety, will contribute to a sounder 
understanding of the trebuchets employed in and around the Latin East in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. 
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1. Artillery before the Crusades 
 
 
 
At the end of the eleventh century, the stone-throwing artillery used by Western 
Europeans and most Byzantines and Arab armies appears to have been of the 'trebuchet' 
type. The torsion-powered engines of the classical era seem to have fallen from use 
sometime in the Early Middle Ages. These engines were replaced directly, or after a 
period of delay, by the simpler swing-beam or lever family of artillery broadly referred 
to today as trebuchets. The matter of when, or even if, torsion artillery was replaced by 
trebuchets is a contested one; however, the latter appear to be the engines used most 
commonly, if not exclusively, by Latin, Greek and Muslim forces on the eve of the First 
Crusade. Initially these were light traction engines, powered by the pulling force of a team 
of operators. At some point around the late twelfth century, these engines came to be 
supplemented by an increasingly heavy variety that was powered by a falling 
counterweight. Whereas the traction trebuchet remained a largely antipersonnel weapon, 
counterweight trebuchets were increasingly used to target the bulk of fortifications as they 
were built ever larger and more powerful through the thirteenth century. 
 
 
 
Classical Artillery 
 
The first stone-throwing engines used in Europe and the Near East appear to have been 
adapted from earlier arrow-shooting machines. Construction of the earliest of these 
arrow-shooters is generally attributed to Dionysius the Elder of Syracuse. Developed at 
the start of the fourth century BC, the gastraphetes, or katapeltikon/katapeltes, was a 
defensive weapon. It was little more than a composite bow mounted on a wooden stock 
and operated by a mechanised draw and release, quickly developed to incorporate a winch 
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to increase the potential tension energy of the bow.5 Even more energy could be drawn 
from the two-armed torsion bow, which dates from about the middle of the fourth century 
BC. Horizontal arms were inserted into vertically mounted coils of hair and sinew, and 
an arrow or bolt was placed in a grooved stock that extended backwards from between 
the two coils. The potential torsion energy stored in the coils was far greater than that in 
a tension bow of comparable size, allowing for stones to be used as projectiles as larger 
engines of this type were built. 
 Vitruvius (d. c.15 BC) divided torsion bows into two categories: bolt-throwing 
catapultae (or scorpiones) and stone-throwing ballistae.6 Even at this early point, there 
are modern historians who rush to view early stone-throwing machines as breaching 
weapons.7 Although Vitruvius provides figures for a machine capable of throwing a stone 
projectile in excess of 150 kg, he himself concedes that such an engine may never have 
been (previously) built. His figures are instead more of an exercise in demonstrating a 
supposed ideal proportional relationship between the various mechanical components and 
the corresponding size of the projectile they were intended to throw. As in the medieval 
period, it seems that most classical projectiles weighed no more than about 20 kg.8 
 Torsion bows were employed throughout the Roman period and were used by the 
Greek defenders of Massalia (Marseilles) during Caesar's Civil War in the first century 
BC and by both the attackers and defenders during Titus's siege of Jerusalem in the first 
century AD.9 These weapons became such an intrinsic part of Roman poliorcetics that 
Frontinus (d. c. 103) deemed their development to have reached its peak long before his 
own time.10 Centuries later, these same weapons are referred to in the works of Ammianus 
(d. c. 395) and Vegetius (fl. 4th century).11 It is noteworthy that Roman historians mention 
                                                 
5 Marsden, Historical Development, pp. 48-85; Soedel and Foley, "Ancient Catapults," pp. 150-60; 
Chevedden, "Artillery in Late Antiquity," pp. 134-36; DeVries, Medieval Military Technology, pp. 127-29; 
Campbell, Greek and Roman Artillery, pp. 3-15; Campbell, "Ancient Catapults," pp. 678-82. 
6 For a full contemporary description, see Vitruvius, De Architectura Libri Decem 10.10-11, ed. F. Krohn, 
pp. 245-50, trans. Morgan, pp. 303-8. 
7 For example, Soedel and Foley, "Ancient Catapults," pp. 150-60; DeVries, Medieval Military Technology, 
pp. 128-29. 
8 For surveys of classical projectiles at various sites, see Campbell, Greek and Roman Artillery, pp. 19-22; 
Nossov, Ancient and Medieval Siege Weapons, pp. 137-42; Holley, "Ballista Balls," pp. 349-65; Syon and 
Yavor, "Gamla," pp. 40, 42-44; Adan-Bayewitz and Aviam, "Iotapata," pp. 131-65; Aviam, "The 
Archaeological Illumination," pp. 376-77; Wilkins, Barnard and Rose, "Roman Artillery Balls," pp. 66-80; 
Savage and Keller, "Archaeology in Jordan," p. 478. 
9 Caesar, De bello civili 2.1-2, ed. and trans. Peskett, pp. 124-27; Josephus, The Jewish Wars 5.6, trans. 
Whiston, pp. 810-11. 
10 Frontinus, Strategmata 3.preface, ed. McElwain and trans. Bennett, p. 204. 
11 Ammianus, Res gestae 23.4.1-3, ed. Eyssenhardt, p. 270, trans. Yonge, p. 322; Vegetius, Epitoma rei 
militaris 4.9, 22, ed. Lang, pp. 134-35, 143-44. 
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these engines more often in a defensive capacity than in an offensive one, although they 
clearly served both functions. 
 To complicate matters, a change occurred in the terminology used to describe the 
torsion bow around the fourth century AD. Catapulta, traditionally denoting an arrow-
shooting machine, was generally replaced by ballista, formerly used to identify a stone-
throwing type.12 Ammianus clearly states that the torsion bow remained in use through 
the late imperial period, a point confirmed by archaeological evidence dated to the late 
fourth century.13 Two-armed torsion catapults were used almost exclusively as bolt-
throwers in Europe by the fifth century, although by this point metal tension bows may 
have come into use.14 As arrow-firing engines developed into precision rather than power-
based weapons, they were occasionally used by medieval forces, as the Romans did 
before them, to propel incendiary arrows.15 It is important to acknowledge that through 
this cyclical course of development and transitioning use of terminology, it is often 
difficult to discern whether later medieval authors, who adopted these classical terms, 
intended them to refer to a bolt-throwing engine or one that threw stones. 
 The other type of torsion engine described by Vegetius is the onager or 'wild ass', 
so called on account of its kick. In the fourth century, this was the heaviest ballistic 
weapon in the Roman arsenal, used to target personnel as well as other engines.16 This 
one-armed stone-thrower used the power of a single large horizontal coil, against which 
the perpendicularly extending throwing arm was drawn back. Upon release from its 
relatively horizontal loading position, the arm was abruptly stopped at a desired angle of 
release by a sturdy crossbeam, allowing the projectile, held in a cup at the end of the arm, 
to fly free along a desired parabolic path. Although not as accurate as the flat trajectory 
of two-armed torsion bows, the advantage of the one-armed engine was its power and 
                                                 
12 For interpretations of this shift in terminology, see Marsden, Historical Development, pp. 188-89; 
Marsden, Technical Treatises, pp. 25-51; Campbell, "Ancient Catapults," p. 690; Chevedden, "Artillery in 
Late Antiquity," pp. 137-42. 
13 For a brief summary of archaeological remains of Roman artillery, see Bishop and Coulston, Roman 
Military Equipment, pp. 58-61, 88-90, 168-70, 206-8; Baatz, "Recent Finds in Ancient Artillery," pp. 1-17. 
14 The tension-powered arcuballista was possibly the predecessor of the medieval siege crossbow or 
springald. Such an engine may have been used at the siege of Pairs in the eighth century, see Abbo, Bella 
Parisiacae urbis, ed. Pertz, pp. 9-10. 
15 This often involved fitting a metal basket filled with flaming material behind the tip of a bolt or simply 
heating the heads of standard bolts or arrows in a fire. Robert of Normandy used such to set fire to the roof 
shingles of Brionne, Orderic Vitalis, Historiae ecclesiasticae 8.13, ed. and trans. Chibnall, 4:4:208-11. Cf. 
Ammianus, Res gestae 23.4.14-15, ed. Eyssenhardt, p. 272, trans. Yonge, p. 324. 
16 Vegetius, Epitoma rei militaris 4.22, ed. Lang, pp. 143-44. 
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comparative simplicity.17 These factors, as well as the decline of the administrative 
infrastructure and technical expertise, probably contributed to the decline of stone-
throwing torsion bows under the Romans and the eventual abandonment of all torsion 
weapons in Western Europe sometime around the sixth century or perhaps the seventh. 
 The range of the onager was increased at some point during the Roman imperial 
period when a sling replaced the cup at the end of the arm. The sling effectively elongated 
the throwing arm, without adding any notable mass. This allowed the projectile to travel 
farther in the same amount of time before release, increasing acceleration and release 
velocity without retarding the angular velocity of the throwing arm or increasing the 
potential energy in the coil, which would have required the whole structure of the engine 
to be strengthened. Thus the whole system was made more efficient. 
 
 
 
Torsion Artillery in the Early Middle Ages: Continuity or Replacement 
 
Fundamental to the question of what type of artillery was employed by the earliest 
crusaders, is the debate concerning the extent to which torsion power remained in use 
through the Early and High Middle Ages and at what point, if any, it was replaced by a 
new type of engine unknown in classical Europe and the Middle East. At the root of the 
debate is the lack of clear source descriptions, illustrations or material evidence to support 
either the continued use of torsion engines or the emergence of a new type from about the 
end of the sixth century. 
 Certain classical texts that describe torsion engines are known to have survived 
and circulated during the High Middle Ages. For instance, Geoffrey Plantagenet appears 
to have had access to a copy of Vegetius at the siege of Montreuil-Bellay in 1147.18 
Although it is tempting to see him looking to the ancients for inspiration, there is little to 
suggest that he, or any of his contemporaries, ever constructed a torsion engine. At 
Montreuil-Bellay, Geoffrey's solution was the use of some kind of incendiary, which was 
thrown from what seems, from its description, to have been a traction trebuchet, a 
machine-type unknown to Vegetius and his contemporaries. When analysing the use of 
                                                 
17 Two-armed catapults required constant adjustment to balance the resistance of the two spring coils. 
18 John of Marmoutier, Historia Gaufredi ducis Normanorum, ed. Halphen and Poupardin, pp. 215-19. 
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any siege engine, it is important to bear in mind the broader context: Geoffrey, like his 
predecessors a millennium before him, was a seasoned campaigner, familiar with 
poliorcetics and the construction of siege engines. If there is any truth in this story, it 
seems he was simply interested in exploring his options during what was evidently a 
difficult siege. Geoffrey's ingenuity is evident, as in addition to artillery, he is said to have 
used both towers and rams at this siege. 
 The survival of such classical texts, the use of unclear terminology by medieval 
sources and the reappearance of the onager in fifteenth-century illustrations have fuelled 
over two hundred years of debate concerning the medieval use of classical engines.19 The 
primary issue is the lack of clear descriptions and the inconsistent use of terminology. 
Some scholars have chosen to avoid the linguistic issues and have found it sufficient to 
conclude that the barbarian societies that filled the power vacuum in the wake of the 
collapse of the Roman Empire were too simple to have supported the continued use of 
complex torsion weapons. Building upon this somewhat simplistic notion, certain others, 
notably Hill, Gillmor and Chevedden, have vigorously argued that a new form of artillery, 
the swing-beam type, or trebuchet, simply replaced the more complex torsion engines. 
 
The Historiographical Debate 
In the eighteenth century, Francis Grose concluded that the one-armed torsion engine was 
the dominant mechanical stone-thrower used during the medieval period until it was 
replaced by gunpowder weapons. He ambiguously grouped together an array of terms 
that he found in certain sources and was content to conclude that some threw darts and 
others stones, and that many threw both.20 In the mid-nineteenth century, Colonel 
Guillaume Dufour concluded the opposite, arguing that the difficulties posed by 
procuring and arranging the sinews necessary for the coils of torsion engines made them 
an unattractive option. Instead, Dufour suggested that the simple counterweight trebuchet 
replaced the onager and the tension siege-crossbow replaced the torsion bow.21 Matters 
took a step forward in 1850 when Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte had trials conducted with a 
reconstructed counterweight trebuchet built by Captain Favé at Vincennes. On the basis 
                                                 
19 For summaries of the historiography, see Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, Appendix 3, pp. 254-73; 
Chevedden, "Artillery in Late Antiquity," pp. 131-34. 
20 Grose, Military Antiquities, 1:380-84. 
21 Dufour, Mémoire sur l'artillerie des anciens, p. 97. 
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of his research, Louis-Napoleon also expressed the opinion that torsion machines were 
not used during the Middle Ages.22 
At the start of the twentieth century, Sir Ralph Payne-Gallwey also favoured a 
replacement model. Payne-Gallwey believed that the loss of classical knowledge led to 
the rise of trebuchet technology: "If the knowledge of constructing the great [torsion] 
catapult of the ancients in its original perfection had been retained, such a clumsy engine 
as the medieval trebuchet would never have gained popularity." In his opinion, the range 
of torsion engines was so superior to that of the trebuchet that had they remained in use 
they would have considerably delayed the development of early cannon.23 
Much of Payne-Gallwey's logic is flawed. Besides neglecting that certain classical 
texts circulated relatively widely in the Middle Ages, he approached issues of range by 
assuming that any engine must have been capable of outranging contemporary archers, 
placing this distance at 360-450 m. While Grose had concluded that torsion engines could 
not manage reported ranges of 5 stadia (about 900 m), even if firing from an elevated 
position, noting the frequency with which twelfth-century English castles were 
overlooked by hills only 400-500 yards (360-450 m) away, Payne-Gallwey accepted that 
a 25 kg projectile could be thrown over 2 stadia (about 360 m), as stated by Josephus (fl. 
c. 70 AD) or even 3½ stadia (about 630 m), as recorded by Athenaeus Mechanicus from 
the original work of Agesistratus (fl. c. 50 BC). By comparison, Payne-Gallwey judged 
it doubtful that a counterweight trebuchet, with a beam of 17 m, could ever have thrown 
stones over 90 kg to a distance of 315 m, the distance that he believed necessary for an 
engine to fire from to clear an opposing wall while remaining beyond the range of any 
archers on it.24 Payne-Gallwey drew many of his conclusions from trials with small-scale 
models. Full-scale reconstructed replicas of torsion engines have proven less effective. 
A century ago, Schramm's reconstructed onager managed to fire a small 1 lb 
projectile about 300 m.25 In 2002, a much larger one-talent two-armed catapult, designed 
and made according to Vitruvius's specifications, which required 20,320 kg of oak and 4 
km of rope, could not fire a 26 kg (about 1 talent) projectile more than 90 m.26 The range 
of the latter engine is roughly the same as that of the smaller one-armed reconstructed 
                                                 
22 Bonaparte, Études sur le passé et l'avenir de l'artillerie, 2:26-54. 
23 Payne-Gallwey, A Summary of the History, pp. 7-8. 
24 Payne-Gallwey, A Summary of the History, pp. 9-10, 27. 
25 Schramm, Die antiken Geschütze der Saalburg, pp. 29, 30. 
26 Purton, Early Medieval Siege, pp. 362-63; Campbell, Greek and Roman Artillery, p. 33. 
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catapult at Caerphilly Castle, which fires 3-4 kg projectiles.27 In her recent analysis of 
torsion engines, Rihll advocates against underestimating the range of classical artillery 
and although she is weary of concluding that Josephus exaggerated the range of the 
Roman engines used at Jerusalem, she notes that the one-talent engine that he mentions 
was probably considered quite exceptional.28 
 By the end of the nineteenth century, the theories of replacement put forward by 
Dufour, Bonaparte and Payne-Gallwey had been challenged by Gustav Köhler, a Prussian 
general and artilleryman. Köhler contended that torsion-powered engines remained in use 
throughout the medieval period in Western Europe and were only challenged when 
counterweight trebuchets were introduced, at a date that he placed around 1200. The 
thirteenth century was then dominated by this new type of engine.29 While many siege 
historians since Köhler have tended to reject the notion that torsion engines remained the 
standard, Köhler's dating of the emergence of the counterweight trebuchet has largely 
retained popular favour. Like many of those before him and since, Köhler attempted to 
support his theory by wading into the terminology slough. He interpreted petraria as a 
traction trebuchet, asserting it had Islamic origins and arrived in the West during the 
twelfth century. He believed that mangana referred to the one-armed torsion engine and 
manganella to a smaller two-armed rock-throwing torsion machine, rediscovered through 
the course of the First Crusade. The influential English historian, Sir Charles Oman, 
followed Köhler in large part, concluding that the siege equipment of medieval Europeans 
was of the same form as that of their Roman predecessors, the counterweight trebuchet 
being the only notable addition.30 
 Köhler's study left room for improvement and his theories were challenged by a 
line of scholars, led by Rudolf Schneider. In Die Artillerie des Mittelalters (1910), 
Schneider rejected the continuation argument primarily on the basis that the Latin sources 
of the medieval period are devoid of any descriptions of the essential component of 
torsion artillery: the coil of twisted sinews.31 In this regard, Schneider returned to the 
model of Louis-Napoleon and Dufour, asserting that torsion-powered siege weapons fell 
from use with the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West. He went as far as to suggest 
                                                 
27 Humphries, Engines of War, p. 4. 
28 Rihll, The Catapult, pp. 205, 228-31. 
29 Köhler, Die Entwickelung des Kriegswesens, 1:139-211. 
30 Oman, A History of the Art of War, p. 543, for his discussion of classical machines, pp. 131-49. 
31 Schneider, Die Artillerie des Mittelalters, pp. 1-60, esp. pp. 1-26. 
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that no artillery at all was used in Latin Europe during most of the Early Middle Ages, 
arguing that it only re-emerged at the end of the ninth century with the development of 
swing-beam engines. Schneider connected this technological jump with certain nautical 
traditions and nominated the Vikings as the inventors of the trebuchet, leaning heavily on 
accounts of the siege of Paris in the ninth century. From this point in history, he proposed 
that all of the various terms used to describe artillery referred to trebuchets. Although he 
postulated that certain terms corresponded with particular types, as his investigation was 
source-based, he recognised the complexity and possible futility of attempting to apply a 
firm terminological framework. 
 Source-based investigations were drastically widened by the Finnish scholar 
Kalervo Huuri, whose Zur Geschichte des Mittelalterlichen Geschutzwesens (1941) 
included Greek and Arabic sources along with the Latin. Huuri saw little evidence to 
support the continued use of the torsion bow in Latin Europe following the withdrawal of 
Roman influence but allowed for the continuation of the simpler one-armed catapult. The 
latter, he argued, remained in use through to the seventh century, when its employment 
became obscured in the terminology as the traction trebuchet came into use. Herein lies 
the real strength of Huuri's contribution: given his wider use of sources, he was able to 
identify the use of swing-beam technology outside Europe long before there is firm 
evidence of its use in the West. Huuri revealed that trebuchets were used in Asia centuries 
before the collapse of the Roman Empire and that the technology appeared to migrate 
westward, permeating Byzantine and Arab societies by the seventh century and the 
Eastern Mediterranean by the eighth. Counterweight propulsion, however, was not to 
make its appearance until the twelfth century and did not make a real impact until the 
thirteenth.32 
 Huuri offered an uneasy framework for the Latin terminology. By trying to 
balance the continued use of torsion catapults with the integration of swing-beam 
trebuchets, he came up with a classification system, almost arbitrarily defining 
mangonella as an engine that threw projectiles up to 5 kg while petrariae and mangana 
threw projectiles of 50-70 kg. He judged the heavier engines to be trebuchets while the 
weaker machines could have been light traction trebuchets or one-armed torsion catapults. 
                                                 
32 Huuri, Zur Geschichte des Mittelalterlichen Geschutzwesens, pp. 51-65, 212-17. See also Chevedden, 
"The Hybrid Trebuchet," p. 179. 
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A third, heavier, category was added with the development of the counterweight 
trebuchet.33 
 As a broader understanding of trebuchet dynamics developed during the later 
decades of the twentieth century so too could a better mechanical appreciation be injected 
into the debate. Randal Rogers has since criticised Huuri's judgement that swing-beam 
artillery was easily constructed and transported; although true of lighter engines, this is 
hardly the case when dealing with the heavy and long beams required by counterweight 
engines.34 While Schneider appreciated the benefits of the simple light traction 
trebuchet,35 this simplicity appears to have discouraged Latin forces in the Near East from 
prefabricating artillery through much of the twelfth century as the burdensome tasks of 
moving and storing such could be avoided if even moderately sized local timber was 
available.36 
 More than any other document, Abbo's account of the ninth-century siege of Paris 
has become a battleground for scholars arguing for and against the existence of swing-
beam and torsion technology in Europe prior to the crusade period. Abbo repeatedly 
mentions various siege engines, including catapultae, mangana and ballistae, but at no 
point does he clearly describe them, thus allowing for various interpretations.37 Paul 
Chevedden has emerged as the predominant champion of those presently arguing for the 
existence of trebuchet technology in Europe throughout most of the Early Middle Ages. 
Building on Huuri's approach, he has attempted to take into consideration as many sources 
as possible to trace the westward migration of the trebuchet. Chevedden argues that these 
engines had replaced classical torsion engines around the eastern Mediterranean by the 
sixth century and had been adopted in Northern Europe by the ninth.38 
 Some, arguing against this view, have rallied around the work of the late Lynn 
White Jr. White supported the argument for the absence of torsion engines during the 
Dark Ages but downplayed the significance of trebuchet technology.39 To be fair, White 
dedicated little attention to poliorcetics and was clearly not an expert; however, the degree 
to which his arguments have been included in the subsequent historiography warrants his 
                                                 
33 Huuri, Zur Geschichte des Mittelalterlichen Geschutzwesens, pp. 57-65. 
34 Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, Appendix 3, pp. 269-70. 
35 Schneider, Die Artillerie des Mittelalters, pp. 50-60. 
36 See Fulton, "Development of Prefabricated Artillery," pp. 51-72. 
37 Abbo, Bella Parisiacae urbis, ed. Pertz, pp. 6-46. 
38 Chevedden, "Invention," pp. 73-74; Chevedden, "King James I," pp. 315-16. 
39 White, Medieval Technology, pp. 101-3; White, "The Crusades," pp. 97-112. 
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inclusion here. More recently, Jim Bradbury has taken up the argument of continuity, a 
sentiment supported in previous decades by D. J. Cathcart King.40 Resurrecting Köhler's 
position, Bradbury suggests that Roman-style torsion engines remained in use throughout 
the Middle Ages.41 Despite the arguments of his predecessors, Bradbury maintains that 
there is little to suggest that torsion engines were not used throughout the Middle Ages, 
although he concedes that 'mangonel' might have referred to a type of trebuchet by the 
twelfth century. 
 Following a path similar to that of Bradbury, Christopher Marshall, admittedly 
influenced by Oman, also supports a continuation model, believing that both the 'petrary' 
and 'mangonel' were torsion weapons.42 Bernard Bachrach sidesteps the issue of 
continuity by highlighting the endurance and superiority of Roman military science. He 
argues that even if particular components of military technology changed through the 
Early Middle Ages, the institutions and methodologies of the Romans remained.43 His 
son, David Bachrach, has directly argued that torsion engines remained in use, ignoring 
essentially all evidence except thirteenth-century English administrative documents.44 
 Many who support the idea of the continued use of torsion weapons do so as part 
of broader arguments relating to the continuity of classical technologies and scientific 
knowledge, fundamentally refuting any supposition that the Early Middle Ages were a 
period of decline in Europe. Ironically, those championing the replacement model also 
tend to refute any notion that this was a period of backwardness, focusing on the 
continuation of trade links and other cross-cultural interactions that could have introduced 
Asian swing-beam technology into Europe before the infamous siege of Paris. As many 
scholars suggest that counterweight trebuchets were used during the Third Crusade, this 
debate has drawn the attention of many historians of the crusades. 
 In his culturally thematic study of twelfth-century siege warfare, Randal Rogers 
highlighted certain technological and methodological approaches that he argued were 
favoured by various ethnic groups around the Mediterranean.45 Although he provides an 
                                                 
40 King, "The Trebuchet," p. 459. 
41 Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, pp. 253, 259. The more obvious root is the Latin petra (stone), similar to 
the more frequently appearing petraria, see Fulton, "The Diffusion of Artillery Terminology." 
42 Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p. 213. 
43 B. Bachrach, "Medieval Siege Warfare," pp. 119-33. 
44 D. Bachrach, "English Artillery," pp. 1,408-30. See also Bachrach, Warfare, pp. 160-64. 
45 Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare. Rogers associates artillery predominantly with the Hauteville Normans of 
southern Italy, whose fluid and mobile style of warfare he sees as suited to the use of artillery. The sources, 
however, do not appear to emphasise the use of artillery in southern Italy any more than in contemporary 
Outremer and expose how his approach may be criticised for oversimplifying matters and stereotyping 
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excellent historiographical summary of the debate in an appendix and appears to favour 
the replacement side, he largely avoids the issue in the body of his work. Hugh Kennedy 
has taken a position in favour of Chevedden and Huuri, rejecting Marshall's assertion that 
torsion engines were used by or against Latin forces in the Near East.46 John France has 
approached the issue with a more self-assured and considerably pragmatic attitude, given 
the relatively limited discussion that he dedicates to artillery. Acknowledging the 
founding contributions of Donald Hill and Carroll Gillmor, France argues that although 
the principles of torsion power were likely not forgotten, the flexibility, manoeuvrability 
and general pound-for-pound superiority of swing-beam engines made them preferable. 
He concludes that it was traction trebuchets that were used during the First Crusade.47 
France suggests that the wide array of terminology probably reflected the variety of 
artillery sizes and he is content to postulate, like Huuri, that petraria and mangana may 
have referred to larger machines while mangonella and tormentum denoted smaller ones. 
 The best arguments for the continued use of torsion artillery in Europe after the 
sixth century are the continued use of classical terms and the lack of conclusive evidence 
that they were not used; but neither of these arguments is particularly strong. Such engines 
were less powerful, more complicated, and far more dangerous to operate than swing-
beam engines, given the pent-up stresses within the coil and then violent stop of the arm 
against a component of the framework when fired. Traction trebuchets, by comparison, 
were capable of a much higher rate of fire and were far simpler to construct, use and 
maintain. Heavier counterweight models, although larger in scale, are still simplistic in 
principle, requiring more labour rather than skill to construct. For present purposes, it will 
be assumed that all stone-throwers were of the swing-beam type during the period of the 
crusades, which the sources suggest was a near certainty. The mathematical 
representations of power that are included, however, are just as appropriate to torsion 
engines as to swing-beam engines. 
Whether favouring a continuation or replacement model of torsion power, all 
historians tend to agree that trebuchets were the dominant form of artillery in Europe and 
                                                 
various cultures, paying insufficient attention to the unique context of each siege. See Amatus of 
Montecassino, Ystoire de li Normant; William of Apulia, Gesta Roberti Wiscardi; Geoffrey of Malaterra, 
De rebus gestis Rogerii; Alexander of Telese, Ystoria Rogerii regis; Hugo Falcandus, Liber de regno Sicilie. 
46 Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 107. 
47 France, Western Warfare, p. 119. 
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the Near East by the twelfth century. But when and where were they first used by 
European and Arab-Turkish armies? 
 
 
 
Terminological Issues 
 
The most significant issue confronting anyone attempting to discern whether the stone-
throwing engines of the Early Middle Ages were classical torsion engines or newer swing-
beam engines is the terminology used by contemporary sources. This is the same issue 
that confronts any effort to identify when trebuchet technology arrived in the West. To 
obscure matters further, very few European or Muslim illustrations of medieval artillery 
survive from before the twelfth century.48 
 Most references and descriptions of pre-fourteenth-century artillery are found in 
the chronicles, annals and letters of churchmen who, in most case, had little if any 
expertise in siege warfare and the diverse pool of terminology appears to reflect this. Until 
the term 'trebuchet' and its variants appear near the end of the twelfth century, most 
vocabulary used to identify siege machines was drawn from ancient sources. Rather than 
providing an accurate description of a siege or precise details of a piece of equipment, 
many authors appear to have used stock terms derived from classical sources. This may 
have been done to convey a sense of imagery to an audience that would probably have 
been familiar with the same classical texts, as part of an attempt to present their work in 
a classical style to give it greater authority, or simply out of ignorance of 'correct' 
terminology employed by those who operated such machines.49 The terms funda, 
catapulta, manganum and balista are all found in Abbo's account of the siege of Paris, 
while tormentum, another classical term, as well as petraria, which first appears in the 
Early Middle Ages, were also used widely in the centuries leading up to the First Crusade 
and through the twelfth century. Matters can be further complicated when a single term 
is used to identify a machine that appears to take on a combined nature, such as a siege 
                                                 
48 For medieval illustrations of artillery, see Appendix 1. 
49 My thanks to Denys Pringle for some of these ideas. 
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tower that incorporates a ram or some kind of ballistic machine.50 In this way the lack of 
consistent nomenclature expands beyond artillery. 
 In some instances, such as Rahewin's account of Emperor Frederick I's wars, not 
only terminology but also writing style was heavily influenced by Greek and Latin 
authors, such as Vegetius, Josephus and Sallust.51 This use of classical terms to describe 
medieval machinery makes any attempt by modern historians to provide vocabulary 
guidelines or date technological advancements extremely challenging, if not impossible. 
This, however, has not stopped some from trying. Much as Grose, Köhler and Huuri had, 
Cathcart King and others since have attempted to propose strict terminological 
guidelines.52 The vague and inconsistent descriptions found in various Latin and 
vernacular European sources before the thirteenth century are sufficient to expose the 
pointlessness of such efforts. 
Shifts in vocabulary and their meanings are known to have occurred. Catapultae 
and tormenta appear less frequently from the ninth century, while petrariae, mangana 
and mangonella are found more often. This, however, does not necessarily imply that 
there was a technological change at this point. Manganon, used by Greek authors from 
the fourth century, gradually permeated into Arabic as manjaniq and Latin as 
manganum.53 During the Early Middle Ages, Arabic sources seem to have use manjaniq 
and 'arrada interchangeably to describe the same type of ballistic machine, most likely a 
traction trebuchet. Like their Latin counterparts, most Arabic sources were content to 
mention the presence of one or more engines without providing a description or many 
details. Hill has suggested that the term manjaniq, which occurs more often, was a general 
one applied to the artillery of Arab forces,54 similar to the way that manganum appears to 
have been used interchangeably with petraria in Latin Europe. 
Chevedden disputes that such terms were often used as synonyms. In a Byzantine 
context, he has argued that manganon and manganikon were used to identify pole-framed 
trebuchets by some authors and as broader terms for trebuchets by others. He suggests 
that the lambdarea, or labdarea, was a trebuchet with a lambda-shaped trestle frame 
                                                 
50 One such example is the Norman siege tower used at Brevol, Orderic Vitalis, Historiae ecclesiasticae 
8.24, ed. and trans. Chibnall, 4:288-91. See also France, Western Warfare, p. 118. 
51 For example, Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Gesta Friderici I 4.46, ed. Waitz, pp. 285-87, trans. Mierow, 
pp. 278-79. See also Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, pp. 127-28; Fino, "Machines de jet médiévales," p. 25. 
52 King, "The Trebuchet," pp. 461-62. 
53 Gillmor, "The Introduction of the Traction Trebuchet," p. 7; Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, p. 253. This 
is contrary to the belief held by A. W. Lawrence noted above. 
54 Hill, "Trebuchets," p. 100. 
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while helepolis, petrobolos, petrarea and sphendone were all used to refer to trebuchets 
with triangular-shaped trestle frames. Chevedden concludes that Anna Comnena thus 
identifies separate machine types when noting the use of petrobolos and smaller 
lithobolos in the twelfth century, equating these with trestle and pole varieties of trebuchet 
respectively.55 In an Arabic context, he equates 'arrada with the simple pole trebuchet 
and manjaniq with those with a trestle framework,56 which seems probable by the end of 
the eleventh century. 
 Neither the search for etymological roots nor the picking and choosing of terms, 
which the sources fail to demonstrate were consistently applied to singular mechanical 
forms, are an adequate basis upon which to establish a terminological typology. Latin 
sources frequently equate various terms and existing terms were almost certainly 
reapplied to new technological developments. For example, Otto of Freising mentions a 
stone-throwing balista, which he also calls a manga, during his account of the siege of 
Tortona in 1155.57 Although classical balistae were arrow-shooters, such engines are 
again described as stone-throwing machines during the siege of Ascalon in 1153.58 It is 
hard to identify any intended difference between the mangana and predeirae in Caffaro's 
account of the siege of Almeria in 1146 or the petraria and mangonella in Roger of 
Wendover's account of the siege of Lincoln in 1217.59 However, this does not rule out the 
likelihood that certain sources intended to draw distinctions between certain terms, only 
that this was not done uniformly. William of Tyre identifies the artillery at the siege of 
Jerusalem in 1099 as mangana and petrariae, grouping them as if synonyms, but later 
notes that mangana threw smaller stones than certain other engines, which he does not 
identify.60 
 Like manganum, the Latin term petraria also has Greek roots. First appearing in 
seventh-century Byzantine sources, petrarea appears to have become synonymous with 
manganon by the late ninth century. Gillmor has suggested that the term could then have 
infiltrated Latin from the eighth century through Frankish interaction with the Greeks of 
                                                 
55 Chevedden, "Invention," p. 79. 
56 Chevedden, "King James I," pp 321-22. 
57 Otto of Freising, Gesta Friderici I 2.21, ed. Waitz, p. 124, trans. Mierow, p 135. 
58 Auctarium Aquicinense, ed. Bethmann, p. 396. See also Auctarium Affligemense, ed. Bethmann, pp. 401-
2. 
59 Caffaro, Annales, ed. Belgrano, 1:34-35, trans. Hall and Phillips, pp. 69-70; Roger of Wendover, Flores 
Historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:214-15, trans. Giles, 2:393-94. 
60 machinas iaculatorias, quas mangana et petrarias vocant, William of Tyre, Chronicon 8.6, 13, ed. 
Huygens, 1:392-93, 403, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:350-51, 362. 
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Italy.61 Paul the Deacon, writing in the eighth century, records the Byzantines' use of a 
siege engine, which he claims was commonly called a petraria, to throw the head of a 
certain Lombard leader over the walls of a besieged city in 663.62 If those favouring 
theories of replacement are correct, petraria may have referred exclusively to swing-
beam engines in a Latin context. Regardless, petraria (literally 'stone thrower') became 
the most common term used to specify artillery in Latin sources by the end of the twelfth 
century. 
 While the use of more specific vocabulary became more common with time, 
ambiguous terms appear at least as frequently up to and throughout much of the twelfth 
century. Whereas William of Tyre mentions machinae at one point in his account of the 
siege of Jerusalem in 1099, the Eracles translation replaces this with the terms perriers 
and mangoniaux.63 Roger of Wendover calls these same engines petrariae and trebuculi, 
the latter being a term that would not have been understood by those taking part in the 
siege.64 While terminological specificity may help clarify the use of later artillery, it 
remains unclear at what point swing-beam artillery was first used in Europe and the Near 
East. Although many cultural interactions have been put forward as the possible catalyst 
for this westward transference, there is little solid evidence to attribute credit to any of 
them. 
 
 
  
The Early Use of Traction Trebuchets in the West 
 
The traction trebuchet appears to have been developed in Asia centuries before the first 
of such engines were employed in Europe. Links between swing-beam artillery 
technology and China were drawn in the mid-nineteenth century by Louis-Napoleon, and 
have since been developed by scholars such as Huuri, Needham and Yates.65 In his 
assessment of these Chinese engines, Donald Hill estimated that a typical beam, whether 
                                                 
61 Gillmor, "The Introduction of the Traction Trebuchet," pp. 7-8. 
62 Paul the Deacon, Historia Langobardum 5.8, ed. Waitz, p. 189, trans. Foulke, p. 221. 
63 For example, William of Tyre, Chronicon 8.6, ed. Huygens, 1:392-93, cf. Eracles 8.6, RHC Oc 1, p. 563. 
64 Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, ed. Coxe, 2:137-38, trans. Giles, 1:430. 
65 Bonaparte, Études sur le passé et l'avenir de l'artillerie, 2:35; Huuri, Zur Geschichte des Mittelalterlichen 
Geschutzwesens, pp. 56-65, 212-27; Needham, "China's Trebuchets," pp. 107-45; Yates, "Siege Engines," 
pp. 414-19; Needham and Yates, Science and Civilization in China, pp. 203-40. 
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consisting of a single mass or several spars lashed together, was between 5.6 m and 8.4 
m long, tapering from a diameter of 12.5 cm to 7 cm at the tip of the long arm, suggesting 
that light engines had a beam ratio of 5:1 or 6:1 and heavier engines about 2:1 or 3:1. The 
ammunition, Hill suggested, was probably 1-60 kg and was fired 75-120 m.66 These 
Chinese machines appear to have been developed between the third and fifth centuries 
BC. By the seventh century AD, there is evidence that engines of this type had infiltrated 
the Arab world and illustrative evidence places them in Turkmenistan by the eighth 
century.67 By the ninth century, they may have been employed in Western Europe.68 
 At its simplest, this type of weapon was little more than a vertical forked pole with 
another, fitted with a sling, laid across it, using the fork as a fulcrum point.69 Although 
relatively light, it could throw heavier projectiles than a staff sling to greater distances, 
while still manned by a single operator. These 'pole trebuchets' could easily yaw around 
their y-axis and their minimalist structure allowed them to be moved with relative ease, 
making them the most flexible type of trebuchet. This light engine was an antipersonnel 
weapon but it is when the single supporting pole is replaced by a trestle frame and manned 
by a team of men that some scholars rush to suggest that it was intended to damage 
masonry.70 Evidence from Asia confirms that traction trebuchets had reached a complete 
level of development centuries before the technology arrived in the West. Although there 
are sensationalised accounts of extremely large and destructive traction trebuchets, these 
appear to have remained quite light. Ahead of the First Crusade, the traction trebuchet 
was clearly embraced by Latin, Greek and Muslim armies, but when and through whom 
the technology was transmitted from Asia remains unclear. 
 
The Greek World 
The Byzantines are most commonly nominated as the first to use swing-beam artillery 
technology in the environs of the Mediterranean, but it is an account of the siege of 
Thessalonica by the Avaro-Slavs in the late sixth century that is often proposed as the 
earliest definitive description of the use of traction trebuchets in Europe.71 According to 
                                                 
66 Hill, "Trebuchets," p. 102. 
67 See Fig. B1. 
68 Gillmor, "Introduction of the Traction Trebuchet," p. 1; Chevedden, "Invention," p. 74; Chevedden, 
"King James I," pp. 315-16. 
69 See Fig. B2. 
70 For example, Gillmor, "Introduction of the Traction Trebuchet," p. 4. 
71 For the defences of Thessalonica, see A. W. Lawrence, "A Skeletal History of Byzantine Fortification," 
p. 185. 
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the first-hand account found in the Miracles of St Demetrius, the besiegers spent the first 
and second days of the siege constructing stone-throwers, as well as rams and a shelter 
for mining. The artillery was ready on the third day and was then used to throw stones 
until the siege was lifted on the seventh day, the rams and mining efforts having been 
thwarted by the defenders.72 
The ballistrae of the Avaro-Slavs are described as tetragonal, the frames tapering 
as they rose. To these were affixed beams, clad in iron at their ends, and to them were 
fashioned very long framing timbers. Slings were hung at the back ends of these beams 
and ropes from the front, which when pulled, released the sling and propelled the stone 
couched within into the air with a loud noise. The framework was covered on its three 
exposed sides with boards to protect those firing them within from arrows, indicating they 
were within range of the city's archers.73 Apart from the 'loud noise' at release,74 all factors 
suggest that these were traction trebuchets. As for their size, when the protective panelling 
of one of the engines was set alight by a flaming arrow, the machine was simply carried 
away by its operators, repaired and then carried back into place to resume firing the 
following day. To be moved with such ease again suggests that these were light machines 
of an antipersonnel scale. 
 The source, however, claims that the garrison hung cloth curtains and mattresses 
in front of their battlements to lessen the impact of the Slavic artillery and that a large 
section of wall was destroyed by these engines. While this suggests that these were quite 
powerful machines, this may not have been the case. The practice of padding battlements 
against the ballistic engines of besieging armies was not unique. This had precedent in 
classical sieges and was subsequently undertaken by the defenders of Mayet in 1098, 
against William II, by the defenders of Jerusalem in 1099, during the First Crusade, and 
by those defending Mesoten in 1219, when besieged by the Teutonic Order.75 At 
Thessalonica, the padding is described as only cloth hung from thin rods, suggesting that 
this was not a significant barrier. Furthermore, the author's assertions that fifty engines 
                                                 
72 Miracles of St Demetrius, ed. Lemerle, pp. 148-54. 
73 Miracles of St Demetrius, ed. Lemerle, p. 154. While Vryonis argues for a literal reading of this 
description, Lemerle suggests otherwise in his edition, Miracles of St Demetrius, ed. Lemerle, p. 154 n. 65; 
Vryonis, "The Evolution of Slavic Society," p. 384 n. 23. 
74 Cf. Seneca, Qaestiones naturales 2.16, ed. Monfrè, p. 558; trans. Clarke, p. 67. Nam balistae quoque et 
scorpiones tela cum sono expellunt. See also Marsden, Historical Development, p. 97. 
75 Orderic Vitalis, Historiae ecclesiasticae 10.10, ed. and trans. Chibnall, 5:258-59; Ralph of Caen 124-25, 
RHC Oc 3, pp. 692-93, trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, pp, 140-42; Albert of Aachen 6.17.19, pp. 424-29; 
Fulcher of Chartres 1.27.8, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 297-98, trans. Ryan, pp. 120-21; Henry of Livonia, 
Chronicon 23.8, ed. Prutz, pp. 156-57, trans. Brundage, p. 181. 
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were arrayed against the eastern wall, that they were constructed within two days, and 
that they threw 'mountains' are incongruent. Even with modern equipment, to build a 
machine of this type with dimensions sufficient to threaten classical walls would take a 
number of days; to compound this by fifty is unimaginable even if the whole army were 
skilled craftsmen. The destruction that is noted appears to have been added to illuminate 
the perceived 'mountainous' size of the projectiles that were thrown: an emotive 
expression of the experience rather than an accurate description of the reality. By 
comparison, it is unlikely that early modern siege guns could not have breached these 
impressive walls in so short a period. While much has been made of this account and its 
significance, all of these observations rely on the accuracy of a single source.76 
 Speros Vryonis Jr. has concluded, primarily on the basis of Procopius's 
descriptions, that the Slavs were lightly armed fighters who lacked siege equipment and 
until the mid-sixth century took towns by ruse or escalade.77 Vryonis places the Slavs' 
first use of siege equipment in 587 at the siege of Appiareia in Moesia Inferior. According 
to the account of Theophylact Simocatta, a captured Byzantine soldier betrayed the 
methods of building a ballistic siege engine, a helepolis, to the Avars: in a single day, the 
Slavs jumped from constructing ladders to building machines able to reduce cities.78 For 
this theory to work, however, Vryonis must contend that the siege of Thessalonica took 
place in 597 rather than in 586.79 
 To base the entire technological ability of an ethnicity and its near instantaneous 
diffusion upon the instruction of a captured soldier is to stretch credulity. The mechanics 
of a swing-beam engine are so straightforward that merely seeing the beam pivot on its 
axis, noting the presence of a sling and its rough proportions, is enough for anyone with 
any kind of carpentry background to build something of this type. This simplicity allows 
crews to become quickly familiar with the firing process and designers to adjust the sling 
length to achieve a desired range through nothing more than a brief period of trial and 
                                                 
76 Although he appears to have been an eyewitness, the author may have written out his account decades 
after the events that he witnessed, Purton, Early Medieval Siege, pp. 29-32. 
77 Vryonis, p. 385-87. At no point does Procopius ever explicitly declare that the Slavs lacked siege 
equipment. Vryonis's presumption is based entirely on this omission. 
78 Theophylact Simocatta, History 2.16.1-11, trans. Whitby and Whitby, pp. 65-66. 
79 The siege is reported to have been carried out on a Sunday, 22 September, during the reign of Maurice, 
leaving only 586 and 597 as candidates. For the broader context and likelihood of the latter date, see P. 
Yannopoulos, "La pénétration Slave à Argos," pp. 339, 359, 364. 
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error.80 The machines built at Thessalonica seem to reflect this tradition rather than a 
secret weapon bequeathed by a traitor. Furthermore, there is little to suggest that the 
helepolis was a ballistic engine; the term was more often used by Greek sources to denote 
a siege tower. The story seems little more than a racially motivated explanation of how a 
supposedly 'barbaric' people were able to replicate and incorporate a piece of 'civilised' 
technology, comparable to Henry of Livonia's similar explanation of how the Estonians 
acquired trebuchet technology in the early thirteenth century.81 
While it appears possible that the Avars were responsible for importing this 
technology from Asia, it seems more likely that it had reached the Byzantines ahead of 
their arrival. If the episode of acute betrayal is set aside, it would appear that the Avaro-
Slavs acquired their knowledge of the trebuchet from the Byzantines. Tracy Rihll has 
even expressed scepticism towards the theory that Byzantine trebuchet technology 
originated in Asia, suggesting it may have been developed from the staff sling.82 Although 
known in the Greek world since at least the seventh century, the traction trebuchet appears 
to have remained a fairly light weapon, used in a supporting role, over the following 
centuries.83 
 Eric McGeer has analysed the siege weapons available to the Byzantines between 
the tenth and eleventh centuries on the basis of four surviving texts.84 His work highlights 
the pre-eminent use of mining and even siege towers rather than artillery, which was 
generally employed in a defensive context or grouped with the assailing archers and 
slingers in a supportive position. McGeer concludes that despite the wealth of theoretical 
works on siege warfare, technologically and tactically it was a fairly simple art, especially 
concerning artillery. Attrition, guile and tunnelling were the most popular Byzantine siege 
techniques.85 The chroniclers seem to confirm this. 
 While most descriptions of artillery present it as a light supportive weapon, the 
accounts of Tughrul's siege of Byzantine Manzikert in 1054 suggest the use of a much 
                                                 
80 This is quite unlike the Byzantine monopoly of the recipe for Greek fire, which required particular 
materials and proportions unrecognizsable when utilised. Similar, if less effective, naphtha-based 
incendiaries were widely used. 
81 See Fulton, "The Diffusion of Artillery Terminology." 
82 Rihll, The Catapult, pp. 263-64, esp. n. 71. 
83 It is predominantly historians of Western Europe who have credited the Byzantines with developing 
trebuchet technology once it reached the Mediterranean. Cf. A. W. Lawrence, "A Skeletal History of 
Byzantine Fortification," p. 222 and n. 137. 
84 McGeer, "Byzantine Siege Warfare," pp. 123-29. The sources are Hero of Byzantium, the anonymous 
De obsidione toleranda, the Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos and the Strategikon of Kekavmenos. The first 
two are from the classical poliorketika tradition, the latter two were composed by contemporary soldiers. 
85 McGeer, "Byzantine Siege Warfare," p. 129. 
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more powerful engine. Aristakes Lastivertc'i describes how the attackers' initial catapult 
was counteracted by a defensive counterpart that would shoot the stones of the Turkish 
engine out of the sky. In response, the assailants prepared another engine, a baban, that 
required four hundred men to pull certain ropes and threw stones weighing 60 litrs (about 
20 kg) from its sling. From a position fortified against the defenders' artillery with cotton 
loads, the baban opened a breach with its first shot, although it was later burnt in a ruse 
by the Byzantines.86 In his slightly later account, Matthew of Edessa emphasises that the 
attackers focused on mining; it was only after the garrison had successfully countermined 
that Tughrul brought up a large engine, said to have been built by Emperor Basil. Matthew 
claims that this engine weighed 15 adil (about 3,400 kg) and inflicted a number of 
casualties among the town's sentinels. In this account, the engine was temporarily put out 
of action by a defensive machine, before it was burnt in a sally.87 
 In his assessment of this siege, Paul Chevedden assumes that this engine was a 
traction trebuchet. Although this is probable, Chevedden takes the figure of four hundred 
pullers at face value. This leads him to disregard Aristakes' measure when assessing the 
supposed mass of the engine's projectiles and adopt the Syrian ratl instead, rendering a 
mass of 111 kg.88 Chevedden appears to exaggerate the scale of the engine in this way so 
that it fits into his linear theory of trebuchet development, this machine representing a 
supposed 'hybrid trebuchet'.89 When considering Matthew of Edessa's account, written 
about ninety years after these events, it is unclear how he acquired his figure of the 
engine's weight, or how such a value would be determined accurately. But whereas 
Aristakes clearly presents this as a breaching engine, Matthew describes it as being 
directed against the defenders along the parapet and not at the mass of the wall. When 
taken together, both authors agree that a notable stone-thrower was used by the Turks and 
that the defenders also made use of artillery. This event actually appears to support 
McGeer's theory that artillery, while known to the Byzantines, was generally used as a 
supportive weapon, hence why the presence of a large assailing engine is notable and why 
the defensive stone-thrower is even portrayed as something of a novelty.  
                                                 
86 Aristakes Lastivertc'i, Patmut'iwn, trans. Bedrosian, pp. 100-5. 
87 Mathew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn 2.3, trans. Dostourian, pp. 86-88 (p. 87 n. 5 for the weight conversion). 
88 Chevedden, "King James I," pp. 323-24, esp. p. 324 n. 43; Chevedden also allows for Huuri's suggestion 
that the intended measurement was 600 litrs, Huuri, Zur Geschichte des Mittelalterlichen Geschutzwesens, 
p. 170. 
89 For this stage of Chevedden's theory, see Chevedden, "The Hybrid Trebuchet," pp. 179-222, for the 
engine employed by Tughrul at Manzikert, see pp. 187-88, 203. 
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The Muslim World 
As swing-beam technology appears to have been present in the Balkans by the end of 
sixth century, so too are there indications that it had reached the fringes of the Arab world 
by this time or shortly thereafter. In 630, a manjaniq is said to have been used when 
Muhammad besieged the town of Ta'if,90 but there is little evidence that the Arabs 
employed any advanced siege equipment during their conquest of Byzantine Palestine 
and Syria in the first half of the seventh century. The tactics employed at the sieges of 
Damascus, Homs, Tikrit and Mosul seem to have been restricted to guile and blockade, 
staples of Muslim siege warfare throughout the centuries to come. Artillery was used to 
bombard Persian Ctesiphon; however, these engines seem to have been constructed by 
Persian deserters.91 The Arabs' ability to launch a fleet and deploy artillery at the siege of 
Lapathos (Lapta) in 648, suggests that by this point certain Muslim armies possessed the 
technology to build and operate their own siege machines. The link between artillery and 
naval technology appears evident by the presence of artillery on board the ships from 
Alexandria that attacked Chalcedon in 653,92 two centuries before the Vikings' siege of 
Paris. Artillery was used by both the Muslim defenders and Byzantine attackers during 
the siege of Chandax (Heraklion) by Nicephoras Phocas in 960-61.93 
 Like the story about the Slavs at Appiareia, the Syriac Maronite Chronicle relates 
how a master carpenter from Paphlagonia offered to build 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Khalid a 
stone-thrower at the siege of Synnada (Suhut) in about 664.94 The engine seems to have 
been a traction trebuchet, but in this case the story serves to illustrate the disparity in 
expertise and experience between the Arabs and the Byzantines. After the Arabs had fired 
three shots that failed to reach the walls, the defenders let fly a shot from their own 
defensive engine that smashed the Arabs' machine to pieces. This suggests that by the 
third quarter of the seventh century this technology was known in at least parts of the 
Arab world but that it may still have been quite new and not fully appreciated. 
 The manjaniq described by al-Tabari at the siege of Mecca in 683 appears to have 
been a traction trebuchet, while a similar engine appears to have been used at the siege of 
Daybul in Sind in 708 – supposedly operated by a crew of five hundred men and a single 
                                                 
90 Hill has judged this to be a classical torsion weapon, Hill, "Trebuchets," p. 100. Setting terminology 
aside, it seems slightly more likely that this was an early swing-beam machine. 
91 Purton, Early Medieval Siege, pp. 37-41. 
92 Sebeos, History 36, trans. Bedrosian, pp. 169-70; Purton, Early Medieval Siege, p. 47. 
93 Michael Attaleiates, History 28.4.6, ed. and trans. Kaldellis and Krallis, pp. 410-17. 
94 Purton, Early Medieval Siege, p. 47. 
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skilled operator. Hill has suggested that the increasing frequency with which descriptions 
of swing-beam engines are found in accounts of the Arabs' eastern campaigns is indicative 
of an exchange of knowledge that occurred in central Asia during the Umayyad offensive 
from 660 and that all earlier mentions of artillery refer to torsion engines.95 Despite its 
increasing use, artillery rarely had a direct influence on the outcome of Eastern sieges in 
the Early Middle Ages; successfully concluded sieges were most often the product of 
blockade or escalade, while most breaches were opened though mining. When viewed 
more broadly, frontier warfare tended to be light and mobile as the Muslim world rapidly 
expanded during the Umayyad period and the use of light traction trebuchets seems to 
reflect this. 
 
The Frankish World96 
The apparent use of trebuchets by the Slavs in the Balkans, a Byzantine presence in Italy 
and Arab incursions across the Pyrenees from Iberia, provide three possible routes by 
which trebuchet technology could have been introduced to Western Europe. Carroll 
Gillmor has suggested that the exchange might have happened in Muslim Spain and 
spread to Aquitaine in the ninth century while Peter Purton has suggested that this 
exposure might have resulted from the Muslim siege of Toulouse in the eighth century.97 
Although Gillmor notes that it was during the ninth century that there was a noticeable 
shift in terminology and the manganum was incorporated into the Carolingian siege 
arsenal, according to the Vita Hludowici, the notion that Charlemagne and Louis the Pius 
travelled with a siege train on occasion is not direct evidence that they employed swing-
beam engines.98 
 The south of France hosted many of Europe's most significant eighth-century 
sieges; but successful or otherwise, there is very little evidence for the actual use of 
artillery by the Carolingians. Although simple engines employed during the classical 
period were used, notably the ram, it is possible that the Carolingians ruled over a domain 
where the heavy bow was the most powerful ballistic weapon, supporting Schneider's 
theory of an era in Europe devoid of siege artillery. As there seems to be evidence that 
                                                 
95 Hill, "Trebuchets," pp. 100-3. 
96 Throughout this study, the term 'Frank' will be used broadly to designate Latin Europeans throughout this 
study. 
97 Gillmor, "Introduction of the Traction Trebuchet," pp. 6-8; Purton, Early Medieval Siege, pp. 57-59. 
98 Gillmor, "The Introduction of the Traction Trebuchet," pp. 6-7. The ease with which traction trebuchets 
can be constructed exposes this to question if nothing else. 
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the Visigoths were employing swing-beam technology by this time, Purton similarly 
suggests that this might reflect a period between the torsion catapult's fall from use and 
the introduction of swing-beam artillery from Iberia or southern Italy.99 Like the Arabs, 
the late Merovingians and Carolingians appear to have found the blockade to be their 
most effective siege tactic; however, the limited sources available and their rare 
description of sieges cast a degree of doubt on any interpretation. 
 During the relative stability that accompanied the peaceful years of Carolingian 
rule, the enthusiastic clergy often took advantage of the readily available supply of stone 
tied up in civic defences to build new cathedrals. Unknowingly, this exposed their flocks 
to new dangers in the ninth century with the onset of Viking raids up many of Europe's 
rivers. Although the sources remain extremely poor for the most part, the Vikings are 
noted as employing some form of artillery in certain instances. Reciprocally, Charles the 
Bald is recorded to have used "new and sought out types of machines" against a Norse 
army pinned in Angers in 873.100 It is tempting to jump to the conclusion that this 
indicates the use of a new type of stone-thrower; however, this is the extent of the 
description and the machines could just as easily have been a new type of ram or even a 
siege tower. Casting caution aside, historians such as Ferdinand Lot have argued that this 
represents the first definitive use of swing-beam artillery in Europe, in no small part 
influenced by references to the presence of Byzantine engineers, indicating the source of 
this new technology.101 This obscure but enticing reference gains further significance 
when considered in the context of the siege of Paris twelve years later. 
Abbo's eyewitness account of the siege of Paris in 885-86 provides a small 
moment of clarity amidst the narrative fog of the Early Middle Ages. In the autumn of 
885, a composite Viking force laid siege to Frankish Paris, which controlled access along 
the Seine.102 Although this is a rare example of a detailed siege account during this period, 
the degree to which it has been used as evidence for both the continued use of classical 
                                                 
99 Purton, Early Medieval Siege, pp. 66-68. Purton concludes that torsion siege weapons likely fell from 
use during the Merovingian period and that if trebuchet technology was known in the West, the Franks 
seem to have lacked the skill to employ it. 
100 Igitur ex omnibus partibus urbe obsidione circumdata, multis diebus undique summa virtute dimicatur, 
nova et exquisita machinamentorum genera applicantur; sed conatus regis prosperitatis effectum non 
optinuit, quia et loci facies non facilem prebebat accessum et paganorum valida manus, quia pro vita res 
erat, summo resistebat conamine. Regino of Prum, Chronicon, ed. Kurze, p. 106. Cf. Annals of St Bertin 
and St Vaast, ed. Dehaisnes, p. 235. 
101 Lot, L'Art Militaire, pp. 221-22. 
102 Abbo, Bella Parisiaca urbis, ed. Pertz, pp. 6-46. Cf. Annals of St Bertin and St Vaast, ed. Dehaisnes, pp. 
322-27. 
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torsion artillery and its replacement is entirely unjustified. While Oman claimed that the 
arsenal of Vegetius was clearly employed by the Vikings, having acquired this technology 
through a half-century of raiding against the Franks, Schneider saw sufficient evidence to 
conclude that the Vikings had invented swing-beam artillery, fostered by their nautical 
tradition.103 Like Schneider, Gillmor regards the use of the term mangana as indicative 
of a new type of engine, but also suggests that torsion engines were used, associating 
these with the catapultae because of their supposedly slower rate of fire.104 
 Such arguments hinge primarily on one paragraph of text. Abbo relates, 
 
Our men prepared heavy beams each with an iron tooth at its end, so as to damage 
the machines of the Danes more quickly. With upright frames of the same length 
they built what are commonly called mangana, from which they threw vast stones, 
which could crush the low race of savages.105 
 
Although Abbo claims that such stones could crush men and shields, this is far from 
conclusive evidence that the machines in question were either torsion or swing-beam 
engines. The iron prong affixed to the end of the throwing arm strongly suggests that this 
was used to hold a sling, a feature of both types of engine. At one point during the early 
winter, Abbo claims that the defensive engines in the city were used to support the 
bridgehead tower on the north bank of the river; however, he later describes this as being 
beyond their effective range following the tower's capture. Such inconsistencies, along 
with the absence of a clear description of either the structure of a stone-throwing machine 
or its firing process, and the single mention of the term mangana, compared to six 
mentions of catapulta and two of balista, unfortunately allow for no definite conclusions 
regarding the form of these engines.106 
 Following the siege of Paris the muted nature of the sources resumes and 
references are rare through the tenth century and into the eleventh. Little more can be 
discerned regarding the nature of swing-beam technology in Europe up to the departure 
                                                 
103 Oman, A History of the Art of War, pp. 141-48; Schneider, Die Artillerie des Mittelalters, pp. 53-54, 60-
61. 
104 Gillmor, "The Introduction of the Traction Trebuchet," p. 5. 
105 This author's translation, Magno cum pondere nostri / Tigna parant, quorum calibis dens summa 
peragrat, / Machina qup citius Danum Quisset terebrari; / Conficiunt longis aeque lingis geminatis / 
Mangana quae proprio vulgi libitu vocitantur, / Saxa quibus iaciunt ingentia, seo iaculando / Allidunt 
humiles scaenas gentis truculentae. Abbo, Bella Parisiacae urbis 1 ll. 360-66, ed. Pertz, p. 18. 
106 For variants of catapulta, see Abbo, Bella Parisiacae urbis 1 ll. 157, 236, 535, 2 ll. 238, 252, 385, ed. 
Pertz, pp. 11, 14, 23, 34, 35, 39, for ballista, 1 l. 87, 2 l. 242, ed. Pertz, pp. 9, 34. 
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of the First Crusade.107 There is little evidence to suggest that stone-throwing torsion 
engines were employed beyond the sixth century and such engines had few advantages to 
support their continued use following the introduction of the traction trebuchet. While 
relying on isolated events in particular sources, like the sieges of Thessalonica and Paris, 
is hardly a good historical practice, in most cases they are the only bits of evidence 
available. Suffice it to say that when the sources become more numerous and more 
detailed at the end of the eleventh century, the lack of any evidence to support the use of 
torsion artillery by Latin armies implies that this type of artillery had fallen from popular 
use prior to this. Likewise, the emergence of conclusive evidence for the use of traction 
trebuchets, described in terms which give no indication that this is a new type of machine, 
strongly suggests that these machines had already been in use for some time previously. 
 Most twelfth-century descriptions of artillery continue to depict these engines as 
antipersonnel weapons. For example, the balistae, which Otto of Freising claims were 
now called mangae, used by Frederick Barbarossa at Tortona in 1155 appear to have been 
used to clear the besieged battlements of defenders, similar to Matthew of Edessa's 
description of the Turkish engine at Manzikert.108 In the second half of the century, 
suggestions of a new type of engine begin to appear. The first shot loosed by William the 
Lion of Scotland's periere at Wark in 1174 was discharged early and flew backwards 
hitting a Scottish knight.109 A similar event took place in 1206 when a Russian engine 
misfired at the siege of Holm.110 These accidents seem to imply that the form of the 
machines that were used were not new but that the physics of the firing process were still 
somewhat unappreciated by the engine's operators: the slings were probably of an 
incorrect length or the projectiles fell out of their couched position before being lifted off 
the ground. While these events may simply speak to the inexperience of the operators, the 
nature of these accidents is more suited to a counterweight trebuchet than a traction 
variety. At Wark the victim is described as being unscathed and at Holm the Russians are 
described as wounded rather than killed, suggesting that the responsible engines were not 
large. While such instances hint at the development of the counterweight trebuchet, they 
are far from conclusive evidence. Ammianus describes a similar accident in which a 
                                                 
107 For example, Peter Vemming Hansen has dated the arrival of swing-beam artillery in Denmark no earlier 
than 1134, Vemming Hansen, "Experimental Reconstruction," p. 189; Vemming Hansen, "Witch with 
Ropes for Hair," p. 15. 
108 Otto of Freising, Gesta Friderici I 2.21, ed. Waitz, p. 124, trans. Mierow, p. 135. 
109 Jordan Fantosme, Chronique ll. 1,245-55, ed. and trans. Hewlett, pp. 306-8.  
110 Henry of Livonia, Chronicon Lyvoniae 3 (10.12), ed. Arndt, p. 37, trans. Brundage, p. 63. 
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Roman soldier was killed when a torsion engine misfired at the Roman siege of 
Maogamalcha (in Mesopotamia) in 363.111 
 
 
 
The Emergence of the Counterweight Trebuchet 
 
The counterweight trebuchet appears to have been developed during the period of the 
crusades. The earliest known surviving illustration of a counterweight trebuchet is that 
drawn by al-Tarsusi around 1180,112 arguably predating any clear textual description of 
such an engine. Although this is strong evidence that this type of technology was known, 
and likely employed, in the Near East before the Third Crusade, there is little consensus 
among scholars as to when and where the counterweight trebuchet was first developed. 
Using al-Tarsusi's illustration as a reference point, most scholars assume that 
counterweight artillery was developed in the mid- to late twelfth century, most likely 
somewhere around the Mediterranean. By the early thirteenth century there is strong 
evidence that such engines were being employed across Western Europe and by 1218 
trabuculi are noted at the crusaders' siege of Damietta.113 
 
Origin of the Counterweight Trebuchet 
There are numerous theories as to where and when the counterweight trebuchet was first 
invented. Most place the inception of this engine-type in the twelfth century though 
opinions vary on where it was first used geographically. For example, Randal Rogers has 
suggested that the increasing professionalism of the experts employed by Roger II of 
Sicily and his successors might have contributed to the development of the counterweight 
power system in south Italy, though he does not rule out the possibility that counterweight 
trebuchets might also have developed in the realm of Islam. Wherever the counterweight 
trebuchet was first invented, Rogers suggests that a powerful incentive for its 
                                                 
111 Ammianus, Res gestae 24.4.28, ed. Eyssenhardt, p. 308, trans. Yonge, p. 362. 
112 See Fig. C1. For a discussion of this illustration and its accompanying description, see Appendix 1. 
113 See Chapter 6. See also, Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 12, 38, 39, ed. Hoogewed, pp. 181, 
237-38, 239, trans. Gavigan, pp. 64, 94, 96; Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:229, 
243, 250, trans. Giles, 2:406-7, 418, 424-25.  
ARTILLERY IN AND AROUND THE LATIN EAST MICHAEL S. FULTON 
  
 
33 
development was the consolidation and expansion of monarchical powers during the 
twelfth century and the military rivalry that this produced.114 
 According to some scholars, the earliest description of a counterweight trebuchet 
can be found in Niketas Choniates' account of the Byzantine siege of Zegminon in 
1165.115 Andronicus Comnenus is said to have employed engines (petrobolous 
mekhanas) that threw stones weighing a talent. Each made use of a sling (sphendone), 
winch (strophalos) and screw press (or beam) (lugos) and, in conjunction with mining, 
were able to cause the opposing fortifications to begin to crumble.116 Niketas seems to 
describe Andronicus's use of a similar engine at the siege of Nicaea in 1184.117 Rather 
than the apparent power of these engines, it is the winch, a component not found on a 
traction trebuchet, that has drawn scholarly attention. It is possible that Niketas is leaning 
on classical sources and his description reflects earlier descriptions of torsion-powered 
engines; however, it seems at least as likely that he is describing a counterweight 
trebuchet. As he was writing somewhat after these events, it is also possible that the 
descriptions provided by Niketas more accurately reflect Byzantine artillery used at the 
very end of the twelfth century or start of the thirteenth. According to Paul Chevedden, 
however, the origins of the counterweight trebuchet are to be found earlier than this, 
though still with the Byzantines. 
 Prior to the development of the counterweight trebuchet, Chevedden argues that 
there was a 'hybrid' model of traction trebuchet, which dates back as far as the ninth-
century siege of Paris.118 According to Chevedden, it was Emperor Alexius Comnenus 
who invented the counterweight trebuchet, postulating that Alexius's eastward campaigns 
against the Seljuks might have been the impetus for this supposed development. The first 
of these new engines were then provided for the crusaders to use at Nicaea in 1097.119 
This theory, however, rests entirely on the account of events given by the emperor's 
daughter decades later. 
                                                 
114 Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, pp. 247-48. 
115 Niketas Choniates, Historia, trans. Magoulias, p. 76. For suggestions that this is the earliest evidence of 
the use of a counterweight trebuchet, see, for example, DeVries, Medieval Military Technology, p. 138 and 
Kennedy, Crusader Castes, p. 107. See also Chevedden, "Invention," pp. 86-87. 
116 For the Greek terms, see Chevedden, "Invention," pp. 86-87. 
117 Niketas Choniates, Historia, trans. Magoulias, p. 156. 
118 Chevedden, "The Hybrid Trebuchet," pp. 196-98; Chevedden, "Invention," p. 99. 
119 Chevedden, "Invention," pp. 86-87; Chevedden, "King James I," p. 316. Cf. Anna Comnena, Alexiad 
11.2.1, trans. Sewter, pp. 335-36. The context of this description bears resemblance to the engines 
supposedly invented by Alfred of England in the ninth century, Florence of Worcester, Chronicon ex 
chronicis, ed. Thorpe, 1:89, trans. Forester, p. 66. 
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 Many have hypothesised that counterweight artillery was used at Tyre in 1124.120 
Using William of Tyre's later account of events, Chevedden has suggested that Havedic, 
the Armenian summoned by the Franks to improve their artillery, brought the Byzantine 
knowledge of counterweight technology, which had been developed less than thirty years 
earlier by Emperor Alexius, with him to Tyre.121 Ronnie Ellenblum has rejected 
Chevedden's theory that counterweight engines were first used at Nicaea, citing a lack of 
evidence to support this, but using William of Tyre's account alone and focusing on the 
presence of Havedic, asserts that a counterweight trebuchet was used at Tyre in 1124.122 
Chevedden has since refuted Ellenblum's criticism and defended his theory that the origin 
of the counterweight trebuchet is to be found in 1097.123 Searching in other directions, 
some scholars have looked to the Islamic world for the origins of the counterweight 
trebuchet. 
 David Nicolle favours a theory that counterweight artillery developed under Islam 
during the tenth century and has suggested that the presence of wall-mounted artillery at 
the Byzantine siege of Tarsus in 965 might be the earliest reference to such.124 But like 
Chevedden to an extent, Nicolle's interpretations fall victim to over-literal readings of 
certain sources at times, unquestioningly accepting Usama's description of millstones 
being thrown against Shayzar in 1138 for example.125 Like discerning when or whether 
torsion stone-throwers fell from use during the Middle Ages and when traction trebuchets 
came into use in certain areas, terminology offers little to pin down exactly when the first 
counterweight trebuchets were used. 
 
Frankish Terminology 
In Europe, the first surviving variants of the term 'trebuchet' date to the late twelfth 
century. Trabuchellus is found alongside manganum and prederia in an agreement of 
fealty made in Vicenza on 6 April 1189.126 A decade later, trabucha can be found 
alongside predariae at the siege of Castelnuovo Bocca d'Adda in the account of Iohannes 
                                                 
120 For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 4. 
121 Chevedden, "Invention," p. 92. Cf. William of Tyre, Chronicon 13.10, ed. Huygens, 1:597-98, trans. 
Babcock and Krey, 2:15-16. 
122 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 193-94, 208-10. 
123 Chevedden, "King James I," p. 317 and n. 9. 
124 Nicolle, "Early Trebuchet," p. 270. 
125 Nicolle, "Early Trebuchet," pp. 270-72. 
126 Nec cum mangano, nec Trabuchello, aut cum Prederia, vel Balista vel Archu traham, nec aliquem 
trahere permittam, nec faciam, si vetare potero usque ad finem sue consularie, in Verci, Storia degli 
Ecelini, no. 52, 3:97. 
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Codagnellus.127 Despite the eagerness of some scholars to view this as clear evidence of 
the presence of counterweight trebuchets in northern Italy, John France has astutely 
pointed out that Codagnellus does not describe the engine that he identifies with this term 
and even seems to indicate that they are fairly light in subsequent references.128 Cathcart 
King even discarded this reference in his study of trebuchets because it is listed along 
with other machines in an effort to secure a ditch.129 
The origin of the term trebuchet is not clear. King has suggested that it comes 
from trebucher, to rock or tilt,130 while William Sayers has provided a more thorough 
etymological study.131 The variety of forms that this term takes in the early thirteenth 
century, including trabocco, tribok, tribuclietta, trubechetum, and numerous other 
vernacular renderings, appear to obscure any certainty.132 
 From about the late 1210s, variations of 'trebuchet' appear more frequently in the 
sources and seem to identify more definitely counterweight trebuchets. In the Chanson 
de la Croisade Albigeoise, Simon de Montfort's northern crusaders as well as the 
defenders of Toulouse are said to have employed trabuquetz and there are indications that 
these engines were exceptional. A French trebuchet apparently required only one shot to 
smash a tower of Castelnaudary and one more to destroy its great hall in 1211.133 The 
power of the Toulousians' trebuchets is also emphasised during their preparations and 
defence of the city in 1217-19: 
 
Inside Toulouse so many carpenters were busy building strong fast-firing double 
trebuchets that no tower or hall, rampart or merlon was left undamaged in the 
Narbonnais castle confronting them.134 
 
However, other engines are also characterised in this way: Simon de Montfort's calabres 
and peirers are credited with breaching one of the towers and granted the crusaders 
                                                 
127 Iohannes Codagnellus, Annales Placentini, ed. Pertz, p. 420, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 25. See also France, 
Western Warfare, pp. 121-23; Huuri, Zur Geschichte des Mittelalterlichen Geschutzwesens, p. 171. 
128 France, Western Warfare, p. 122, p. 273 n. 33. 
129 King, "The Trebuchet," p. 461. 
130 King, "The Trebuchet," p. 461. 
131 Sayers, "The Name of the Siege Engine trebuchet," pp. 189-96. 
132 For more on the appearance of these terms, see Huuri, Zur Geschichte des Mittelalterlichen 
Geschutzwesens, pp. 63-64. 
133 Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise 92, ed. Meyer, 1:93-94, trans. Shirley, pp. 51. 
134 E lains en Toloza ac aitans carpentiers / Que fan trabuquetz dobles e firens e marvers, / Qu'el castel 
Narbones que lor es frontaliers / No i remas tor ni sala, dentelh ni murs entiers, Chanson de la croisade 
Albigeoise 192, ed. Meyer, 1:285, trans. Shirley, p. 141. 
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temporary access to Toulouse.135 Rather than the notion of increased power, it is the 
mention of certain technicalities that suggest something new. In one instance it is recorded 
that "more than ten thousand tallied on the ropes" of these engines as they assailed the 
Narbonnais castle,136 possibly suggesting that these were traction engines, but soon 
afterwards the defenders "ran to the ropes and wound the trebuchets",137 suggesting the 
winching back of the main beam of a counterweight trebuchet. The latter appears to be 
the more accurate reading, as to fire the engine the defenders "then released their 
ropes."138 Although there are few indications that these engines were significantly 
stronger than the traction trebuchets next to them, they appear to have been quite accurate. 
Their slings were loaded with well-dressed stones, which on one occasion destroyed an 
assailing penthouse.139 Worthy of note also are Bernard Parayre and Master Garnier, two 
men whose task it was to "manage the trebuchets as they were accustomed to this 
work".140 The presence of these apparent experts is significant, but so too is the limit of 
their charge, which appears not to have extended to the calabres, engenhs and peirers that 
are mentioned only one line above. While references to "fast-firing double trebuchets" 
are enough to leave doubts as to how much we can read into this episode, the terminology 
clearly took root. In 1226, the defenders of Avignon are noted to have made use of 
trabucheta as well as petrarie, and mangonella.141 
The earliest surviving use of the term trebuchet in British context accompanies 
Prince Louis' invasion of England and his siege of Dover in 1216-17. According to the 
Historia des Ducs de Normandie, Louis brought and set up a trebuket against the castle.142 
Richard of Morins similarly notes the use of a tribuclietta along with many other 
engines.143 Although Roger of Wendover does not give an account of the second portion 
of the siege of Dover, during which the other sources use the new term, he may be 
referring to the same engine when he claims that Louis summoned a particular petraria 
                                                 
135 Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise 198, ed. Meyer, 1:311-13, trans. Shirley, pp. 156-57. 
136 Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise 198, ed. Meyer, 1:310, trans. Shirley, p. 155. 
137 Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise 203, ed. Meyer, 1:332, trans. Shirley, p. 167. 
138 Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise 204, ed. Meyer, 1:333, trans. Shirley, p. 168. 
139 Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise 204, ed. Meyer, 1:333, trans. Shirley, p. 168. 
140 Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise 213, ed. Meyer, 1:377, trans. Shirley, p. 191, see also 198, ed. 1:310, 
trans. p. 155. 
141 Chronico Sancti Martini Turonensi, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 73. 
142 Histoire des ducs de Normandie et des rois d'Angleterre, ed. Michel, pp. 188, 192-96. 
143 Richard of Morins, Annales Prioratus de Dunstaplia, ed. Luard, pp. 48-49. 
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before beginning the siege in 1216.144 Although Roger uses the term trebuculus to identify 
engines at the sieges of Jerusalem in 1099 and Damietta in 1218, he at no point uses this 
term in a European context, notably omitting it during his discussion of the Albigensian 
Crusade.145 
German sources also begin to employ this new terminology at this time. Otto IV 
is reported to have used a tribok, or tribracho, in 1212 against Weissensee.146 Henry of 
Livonia, writing in the Baltic region in the 1220s, does not employ any new terminology 
but it is possible that he used machinae maiores, distinguished from the patherelli and 
machinae minores, to identify counterweight trebuchets.147 
 The relatively sudden appearance of this new terminology does not rule out the 
likelihood that counterweight artillery was employed in Europe before large contingents 
of crusaders began arriving in the Levant in 1189. Likewise, the earliest appearances of 
these new terms is not enough to allow one to state conclusively that they were used 
exclusively to refer to counterweight trebuchets. After returning home from the Third 
Crusade, Philip II Augustus may have used counterweight trebuchets at Verneuil in 
1194148 and Château Gaillard in 1203-4,149 though the sources do not use any new 
terminology to identify these engines. Similarly, the prefabricated engines that Richard I 
made use of at Nottingham in 1194 might also have been counterweight trebuchets 
identified by traditional terminology.150 While this might suggest that the new technology 
was acquired in Palestine, the analysis in Chapter 5 will suggest that the artillery 
                                                 
144 Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:191, trans. Giles, 2:374-75. See also Matthew 
Paris, Chronica maiora, ed. Luard, 2:664. Ralph of Coggeshall, chronicon Anglicanum, ed. Stevenson, p. 
185. 
145 Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, ed. Coxe, 2:135, ed. Hewlett, 2:229, trans. Giles, 1:429, 2:406-
7, cf. ed. Hewlett, 2:252, 310, trans. Giles, 2:426, 478-79. 
146 Et inde progrediens, obsedit oppidum Wizense, quod similiter expugnavit usque ad arcem. Ibi tunc 
primum cepit haberi usus instrumenti bellici, quod vulgo tribok appelleri solet. Annales Marbacenses, ed. 
Wilmans, p. 172. Movens igitur castra contra miniciunculam in Salcza tribracho illo, cognomento tribock, 
muris inminet. Cronica Reinhardsbrunnensis, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 580. Tribracho is given in the Chronica 
S Petri Erfordensis, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 383. See also Schneider, Die Artillerie des Mittelalters, p. 28. 
147 One such engine was prepared during the winter of 1216-17 while another was used at the siege of 
Mesoten in 1220 and another at the siege of Waldia in 1226, Henry of Livonia, Chronicon Lyvoniae 4 (21.5, 
23.8, 30.5), ed. Arndt, pp. 138, 156-57, 220, trans. Brundage, pp. 164, 180-81, 243. The notable German 
engine at Fellin in 1211, apparently distinct from the machina minor, which is equated here with 
patherellus, may also have been a counterweight trebuchet, Henry of Livonia, Chronicon Lyvoniae 4 (15.1), 
ed. Arndt, pp. 79-80, trans. Brundage, p. 106. 
148 Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:123, trans. Giles, 2:135; Ralph of Diceto, 
Ymagines histriarum, ed. Stubbs, pp. 114-15. 
149 William the Breton, Philippide 7, ed. Delaborde, pp. 201-4; William the Breton, Gesta Philippi Augusti 
128-129, ed. Delaborde, pp. 218-19. 
150 Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:238-40, trans. Riley, 2:314-16; Pipe Roll 40 (1194), ed. 
Stenton, p. 43. 
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technology of all parties, both Christian and Muslim, was relatively similar. While even 
the largest counterweight trebuchets appear to have been quite small at this time, 
increasingly large and more powerful engines were built as time went on. 
 The term bricola and similar terms, including biblieta, biffa, blithe and blida, first 
appears in the early to mid-thirteenth century. The engine most associated with the term 
bricola appears to have been the pole-framed variety of counterweight trebuchet; a single 
vertical support carried the main axle and two counterweights were hung from the forked 
short arm.151 Terms like bricola are rarely mentioned in the context of the crusades and 
no vivid descriptions exist of the use of such an engine in the Levant.152 References to 
such engines are limited to little more than Frederick II’s dispatch of bricolae, along with 
prederiae and machinae, to the Holy Land in 1242 and mention of a biblieta in the 
Excidium at the siege of Acre in 1291.153 Unlike variants of trebuchetum, which appear 
relatively frequently in the thirteenth-century Frankish sources, these other terms, and 
perhaps the engines with which they were most commonly associated, were not widely 
embraced. 
 
Muslim Terminology 
In the early thirteenth century, Muslim sources also began to use a series of new Arabic 
terms to classify various types of trebuchets. These terms, including mangonels of the 
shaytani, qarabugha, maghribi and ifranji types, do not correspond with the earlier labels 
provided by al-Tarsusi in the late twelfth century. According to al-Tarsusi, the 'Frankish' 
mangonel was a light traction trebuchet; however, the same term was used by later sources 
to identify the heaviest type of contemporary artillery – some kind of counterweight 
trebuchet. While these later terms are helpful when determining what types of trebuchets 
were used at certain sieges, as will be examined below, they are of limited help when 
trying to identify when the first counterweight trebuchets came into use. 
Having examined the Arabic terminology used before the appearance of these new 
terms, Chevedden has argued that augmenting adjectives such as kabir (big), 'azim 
                                                 
151 See Fig. G9, and Figs. F18-F20, F24, F26 and F29. See also Appendix 1. 
152 Etymologically, Chevedden has interpreted bricola to come from the Latin bi-coleus ('double testicle') 
in reference to its design, Chevedden, "Invention," p. 109. David Nicolle has suggested that the term simply 
refers to the divided 'arms' of the short arm of the beam, while the variant biblieta might similarly refer to 
the division or opening of the short arm like a book, Nicolle, "The Vocabulary of Medieval Warfare," p. 
173. 
153 Caffaro, Annales, ed. Cesare Imperiale, 3:128. 
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(great), and ha'il (frightful or huge) were used to specify moments of technological 
change.154 Arguing in favour of three stages of development – the traction trebuchet, the 
hybrid trebuchet and the counterweight trebuchet – this allows him to categorise any 
engine described with such terms from the sixth century through the thirteenth as he sees 
fit. Accordingly, he views any instance where these adjectives were added from the 
twelfth century onwards as indicating the presence of counterweight trebuchets, such as 
at the sieges of Baghdad (1157), Alexandria (1174), Masyaf (1176), and Kerak (1184).155 
Although possible, this line of thinking appears to be overly convenient and lacks 
supporting evidence. As will be shown, it appears probable that counterweight trebuchets 
were coming into use by the late twelfth century; however, there is little solid evidence 
to support their use at any particular siege before the start of the thirteenth century.  
 
Considerable uncertainty remains when dealing with the development of medieval 
artillery. Issues such as how long torsion engines remained in use and how early swing-
beam engines were adopted in various regions remain open for debate. With such 
fundamental questions left unresolved, it is hard to discern the power of the artillery used 
between the sixth and eleventh centuries. From the end of the eleventh century, however, 
relatively detailed descriptions of artillery emerge from the theatre of the crusades, 
allowing for a comparatively good understanding of the artillery employed in the Levant 
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
Unfortunately, most of the studies mentioned in this chapter have concerned 
themselves with only the most sensationalised accounts of artillery and have neglected 
the wealth of less detailed references that can help to construct a fuller picture. Likewise, 
few have attempted to incorporate archaeological evidence or a sound appreciation of the 
practical physics and mechanics that governed the use of trebuchet technology. Such 
shortfalls have allowed scholars to accept all too uncritically certain reported values, often 
provided by those with limited experience with siege engines, and propose that 
contemporary artillery was far more powerful than appears to have been the reality.156 
Although Viollet-le-Duc seems to have held the incorrect belief that trebuchets, 
mangonels and pierriers were all counterweight engines, he is still among a minority of 
                                                 
154 Chevedden, "Invention," pp. 90-91. 
155 Chevedden, "Invention," p. 93. 
156 An extreme example of this is Saadé's belief that the artillery employed by Saladin at Saone could fire 
projectiles up to 1 km, Saadé, "Histoire du Château de Saladin," p. 998. 
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scholars who appear correct when suggesting that such engines were capable of little more 
than destroying battlements and creating a hostile environment for those defending the 
parapets in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.157 Before analysing the literary and 
archaeological evidence, a rudimental understanding of trebuchet mechanics is necessary.
                                                 
157 Viollet-le-Duc, Dictionnaire, 1:344. See also Dictionnaire, 5:218-42. 
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2. The Physics 
 
 
 
The term 'trebuchet' first appears in the late twelfth century. Because it has no classical 
roots, and seems only to have been used to describe swing-beam artillery, modern 
historians have embraced it as a broad technical term to describe the whole family of 
swing-beam stone-throwers. These engines are commonly divided into two groups based 
on the type of force that powered them: traction trebuchets relied on human strength, men 
pulling ropes attached to the end of the short arm; and counterweight trebuchets made use 
of a deadweight attached to the short arm. The difference in weight distribution led a 
traction model to rest with the tip of its heavier long arm on the ground and pulling ropes 
dangling from the end of short arm, while a counterweight model would rest with its beam 
vertical and the counterweight hanging directly below the main axle. 
 
 
 
Function 
 
Trebuchets make use of a beam fixed to a horizontal axis. By offsetting the pivot point 
along the length of the beam, the engine makes use of mechanical advantage: when 
sufficient downward force is applied to the end of the short arm of the beam, the end of 
the long arm rises a greater distance and at a quicker rate in proportion to its greater 
length. A sling is attached to the end of the long arm, allowing the projectile couched 
within to accelerate to an even greater velocity before release. The axle is elevated by 
mounting it on a framework, allowing the beam sufficient space to rotate. The ideal height 
of the main axle is determined by the power source. That of a traction trebuchet is 
determined by the distance a man can pull a rope, the axle being half this distance above 
the hands of the men providing the pulling power. For a counterweight trebuchet, the axle 
should be high enough to allow ample space for the weight attached to the short arm to 
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accelerate downwards, but low enough to minimise structural strain and allow the 
counterweight to fall as efficiently, or vertically, as possible. Both ends of the beam must 
remain unrestricted through the firing sequence to achieve a reasonable degree of 
efficiency, allowing as much energy to be transferred to the projectile as possible. The 
remaining energy is then dissipated as the beam and counterweight swing back and forth 
before coming to rest. 
 To maximise the strength of the frame, and minimise the materials required, a 
triangular trestle was generally employed: two vertical triangles, often with a central 
vertical support bisecting them, set parallel to each other. These were joined to a 
horizontal base structure that added further support while the tops were connected by the 
main axle.158 The long arm of a counterweight trebuchet would typically have been drawn 
back about 135 from its vertical position of rest. From a mathematical point of view, a 
greater angle would generate more energy, as the counterweight would fall a greater 
distance and reach a higher velocity. From a carpentry standpoint, the higher the axle is 
placed the more difficult it is to assemble the machine and the sturdier the accompanying 
structure must be to withstand the additional forces. Increasing the strength and stability 
of the structure would allow for a higher axle and the beam to be pulled back farther; 
however, the added strength would also permit the use of a longer beam and a heavier 
counterweight at the original loading angle. Because the latter would generally transfer 
the most energy, it would appear that the long arm of most counterweight trebuchets was 
50% longer than the axle was high. While there was an ideal ratio of 3:2 between the 
length of the long arm and the height of the axle, the optimal dimensions were dictated 
by the length of the short arm. 
 Historical sources of the Late Middle Ages suggest a variety of supposed ideal 
ratios between the long and short arms of the beam. Marino Sanudo advised a ratio of 6:1 
in the early fourteenth century, a proportion fairly close to ideal if maximum range is 
desired.159 The theoretical mathematics suggest that the ratio should be slightly less than 
this, especially when throwing larger weights; however, my own personal experience, 
field testing and historical illustrations suggest that a ratio of 5:1 is a safe and effective 
arrangement when the counterweight outweighs the projectile by at least 100:1. 
                                                 
158 For examples, see Figs. C2, C6-C8, C21, C22, F2-F6, F8-F11, F23, F25, F27, F34, G1-G7 and G10. 
159 Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 2.4.22, ed. Bongars, pp. 79-80, trans. Lock, pp. 135-36. 
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 The simplistic but essential addition that makes this pivoting beam a practical 
weapon, whether traction- or counterweight-powered, is the sling.160 The mechanical 
advantage is magnified as the projectile is forced to travel even farther, and thus faster, 
before it is released. One end of the sling was fixed near the end of the long arm while 
the other was fitted with a loop that slid over a hook or metal 'finger' extending from the 
end of the beam. The low friction of the metal finger allowed the loop to slide free and 
unleash the couched projectile at the point of release. For counterweight engines, by 
adjusting the length of the sling, and even the angle of the finger, the point at which the 
looped end slipped free could be finely altered to change the angle of release without 
altering the mass of the counterweight. The handheld staff-sling, Vegetius's fustibalus, 
was little more than a stick with a similar sling and finger arrangement at its end.161 The 
simplicity of the traction trebuchet allowed it to remain in use throughout the Middle 
Ages. 
 Whereas the mathematics show that a sling of equal or near-equal length to the 
long arm of the beam is ideal, a slightly shorter length is often more effective in the field, 
due to various mechanical inefficiencies. In the case of the counterweight model, a long 
sling allows for maximum mechanical advantage, while adding only negligible mass to 
the system. By extending the sling horizontally between the struts of the engine, the 
projectile is forced to travel as far as possible as efficiently as possible: by sliding 
horizontally, rather than hanging freely, the retarding resistance that the projectile exerts 
against the beam is limited before it is lifted off the ground. Furthermore, by positioning 
the projectile roughly horizontal to the tip of the long arm of the beam, the distance it 
must travel before release is maximised. Collectively, these factors all contribute to a 
higher release velocity. 
 For traction trebuchets, the distance that the short arm falls during a firing 
sequence is much shorter, fundamentally limited by the distance that an individual can 
efficiently pull a rope. Accordingly, the projectile is often held by an additional person 
during the early stages of pulling.162 This allows all slack to be taken up and the beam to 
flex before the projectile is pulled loose. This maximises the efficiency of the crew's 
pulling motion while drawing further energy from the structure of the beam, forcing the 
                                                 
160 The sling is such an intrinsic part that Jim Bradbury is willing to call any medieval engine that possessed 
a sling a 'trebuchet', Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, pp. 262-63. 
161 Vegetius, Epitoma Rei Militaris 3.14, ed. Lang, pp. 98-99. See also Figs. A3-A6. 
162 See Figs. B19 and B20.  
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projectile to accelerate more quickly and travel through a broader arcing path prior to 
release. Sling length would vary by machine but would typically be about half the length 
of the long arm. 
 
 
 
Traction 
 
The traction trebuchet had the benefit of being a fairly light engine. It was simple to 
assemble, and shift if necessary, and could be operated by crews with little experience. 
When worked by trained teams in relay, traction trebuchets were capable of maintaining 
high rates of fire over extended periods of time. Kelly DeVries suggests that trained crews 
could have sustained what seems to be a fairly reasonable rate of four shots per minute 
over the course of an hour, a rate that was achieved over shorter periods by Tarver in trials 
using relatively untrained volunteers.163 Although this method of propulsion sacrificed 
accuracy, as the force with which each crew member pulled invariably fluctuated, a 
traction trebuchet could be loaded with a variety of projectiles. Incapable of consistently 
reproducing the exact same firing sequence, it did not require the finely shaped stone balls 
necessary to achieve a precise trajectory shot after shot. This, along with its high rate of 
fire, meant that roughly tooled stones or fieldstones were suitable ammunition. 
 Whereas the power of a given counterweight trebuchet is limited by the amount 
of strain that its framework and primary components can withstand, traction models have 
much more finite limitations. The end of the short arm cannot travel a linear distance 
greater than the distance that each team member can pull (less than 1.5 m). This not only 
limits the scale of the engine but also the space in which crew members can stand under 
the short arm: with every additional puller, the direction of force spreads outwards. Power 
can thus be increased only to a limited extent by adding additional pullers. If the pullers 
are positioned behind the axle, rather than below the short arm, there is near limitless 
room; however, the distance that an individual can pull horizontally is less than they can 
pull vertically downwards. Furthermore, while something as simple as a block, ring or 
bar might be adequate to redirect the lateral pull of the crew into a downwards force 
                                                 
163 DeVries, Medieval Military Technology, p. 137; Tarver, "The Traction Trebuchet," pp. 58-59. DeVries' 
estimation is based largely on the figures provided from siege of Lisbon in 1147, see Chapter 4. 
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against the short arm, there is no evidence that this was ever done. The physics also 
prevents crews from pulling in stages or relays during a single firing sequence. Even with 
hugely exaggerated components, neither the rate of acceleration nor true velocity would 
have been sufficient to create a practical firing scenario. Although there are historical 
illustrations of crews standing behind the axle of an engine, these are relatively rare and 
do not appear to reflect a common practice.164 
 Thus unlike the counterweight trebuchet, the scale and structural strength of a 
traction trebuchet cannot simply be increased to reflect added force to the short arm. For 
this reason we do not find reliable accounts of 'super' traction trebuchets. In most 
historical references to exceptional traction trebuchets, the crew numbers are exaggerated 
rather than the proportions of the machine, indicating that the writer had an understanding 
of the engine's power source but not of its mechanics. Accounts of teams composed of 
hundreds of pullers, which some modern historians have taken literally, can be dispelled 
as pure hyperbole. DeVries's suggestion that early traction trebuchets were powered by 
teams of between 40 and 250, with one or two men to a rope,165 should therefore be treated 
with extreme caution, as should the description of 600 men powering a traction trebuchet 
at the siege of Damietta in 1218.166 
 Because of the fundamental limit imposed on the length of the short arm by the 
distance an individual can pull, and the knock-on consequences that this has for the 
proportional size of other components, the optimal size for any team is generally around 
ten. This number allows everyone to stand directly under the short arm and maximise the 
transfer of potential energy. This is a happy medium between standing farther back 
towards the axle, which would increase rotation but add greater resistance, and standing 
farther away, which has the opposite effect. Experimental trials using reconstructed 
engines have confirmed this as the ideal position of the pulling crew as well as the 
redundancy of any more than about ten to twelve pullers.167 
  
                                                 
164 See Figs. B16 and B25. Perhaps the closest mechanical solution might have been to dispense with the 
short arm and exaggerate the axle, as was been done with the counterweight engine in Fig. F32, drawn by 
Leonardo da Vinci. There is no evidence that such an engine was ever built. 
165 DeVries, Medieval Military Technology, p. 133-34. 
166 History of the Patriarchs, trans. Khs-Burmester et al., 3.2:218. Cf. Chevedden, "King James I," p. 324. 
167 For a documented case study, see Tarver, pp. 157-58. These findings have been confirmed by the crews 
operating the traction trebuchets both at Caerphilly castle and the Middelalder Centret. 
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Hybrid 
In an attempt to validate textual references to excessively large teams of pullers, 
Chevedden has developed his theory of a 'hybrid-trebuchet': a traction-type fitted with a 
counterpoise to offset the superior weight of the long arm.168 This is a practical innovation 
when dealing with small engines and may have been inadvertently added through the 
necessary structural supports if a fanning 'rake' was added to secure a broader 'foot' at the 
end of the short arm. This addition, to which the pulling ropes were attached, effectively 
increased the area in which the pullers could stand below the short arm.169 
 Chevedden argues that a counterpoise was added to heavier traction trebuchets 
with the aim of throwing larger projectiles. Adding mass to the short arm of a heavy beam 
would assist in raising the long arm; however, because the length of the short arm must 
remain the same, the force provided by the pulling crew must be increased in proportion 
to the overall weight of the beam, otherwise it will not accelerate sufficiently during the 
firing sequence. While this would theoretically render larger crews appropriate, the same 
issues of space that limit the number of pullers that can operate a lighter traction trebuchet 
remain. Because the short arm of a counterweight trebuchet can be lengthened, and all 
other components enlarged accordingly, the beam of a larger engine can accelerate at a 
lower rate due to the longer firing sequence, ultimately reaching a higher velocity at the 
point of release. It is through the unrealistic requirement of exceptionally large crews, 
occasionally mentioned in the sources, that Chevedden attempts to justify his theory, the 
impracticalities of which have already been addressed. Intrigued by the potential of such 
an engine, the Danish Middelaldercentret attempted to reconstruct such a machine but 
found it to be a complete failure. 
 For these reasons it is extremely unlikely that traction trebuchets ever threw 
anything of significant mass or were at any point considered a breaching weapon. 
Although the concept of a transition stage in the development of the counterweight 
trebuchet is appealing, it seems entirely impractical.170 The traction trebuchet was most 
                                                 
168 Chevedden argues the hybrid-trebuchet was developed under Islamic rule in the early eighth century and 
by the ninth had spread through the Byzantine Empire to northern Europe. He contends that such a machine 
was used by the Crusaders against Lisbon (1147) as well as Damietta (1218), Chevedden, "Invention," p. 
74; Chevedden, "King James I," pp. 324-25. 
169 For illustrative examples, see Figs. B16 and B19-B21. 
170 The assumed existence of hybrid-variants has so permeated scholarship that Kostick notes the use of 
such at the siege of Jerusalem in 1099 without any reference to Chevedden in his bibliography. He, 
however, also suggests that torsion engines were present at this siege, Kostick, The Siege of Jerusalem, pp. 
82-83. 
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effective as an antipersonnel weapon. It was reliable, affordable and required minimal 
skill and time to construct and operate. It was relatively mobile and could easily be 
grouped with others to concentrate fire. It was able to take advantage of ammunition that 
could be gathered locally and prepared with minimal time, cost and expertise yet could 
threaten the integrity of crenellated parapets over extended barrages. 
 
 
 
Counterweight 
 
Rather than replace the traction trebuchet, the counterweight trebuchet supplemented it. 
By using dead weight rather than pullers to propel the short arm downwards, the amount 
of force that could be applied was limited only by the strength of the beam, axle and 
framing. But this power came with drawbacks. The much larger size and weight of each 
component, as well as the stresses involved, necessitated a higher level of engineering 
competence and required more time and money for construction. The machine's rate of 
fire is also considerably lower than that of a traction trebuchet, as after each shot any 
energy that has not been transferred to the projectile is dissipated through a subsequent 
swinging process. This period of post-release swing is longer for those engines that make 
use of a fixed counterweight. A counterweight that is attached with a hinge will fall 
straighter, thus allowing for a more efficient transfer of energy, while one that is firmly 
fixed to the short arm will fall in a wider arc, remaining a constant distance from the main 
axle. Once still, the machine then had to be cocked. To pull the long arm back down from 
its vertical position of rest, thus lifting the short arm and its accompanying load, 
treadwheels or winches were required for the largest engines while the beams of smaller 
engines could be pulled into place manually with ropes. The amount of time it took to 
cock each engine and the number of men required to do so varied according to the size of 
the machine. It normally takes between 10 and 30 minutes for a modern reconstructed 
engine to complete a full firing and reloading sequence. Ammunition for counterweight 
trebuchets was typically specialised. Because of the uniform power behind each shot, the 
machine's accuracy was remarkably consistent provided projectiles of equal mass and 
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shape were used; however, this 
required additional investments of 
money and time as each stone had to be 
shaped by a mason or stonecutter.171  
 Despite its drawbacks, this was 
the most powerful form of artillery to 
be used in Europe and the Near East 
until the bombard was introduced. 
While there is little evidence that such 
engines breached curtains and 
pulverised towers through the twelfth 
century and most of the thirteenth, the 
fact that they could remove battlements 
and expose defenders along parapets to 
antipersonnel fire without the need to 
construct expensive, complicated and 
vulnerable siege towers was a notable 
achievement. Furthermore, the 
psychological effects of such engines 
should not be underestimated. 
 The basic mechanics of a 
counterweight trebuchet are very 
simple and had been understood for 
centuries. The ancient shaduf, which had been used for millennia in Egypt to bring up 
water from the Nile, was based on a similar design. In the West, the tollenno, described 
by Vegetius, made use of a 4:1 fulcrum and counterweight to elevate men to a besieged 
parapet.172 Although the engine described by Vegetius might have been more imaginative 
than practical, evidence from the mid-thirteenth century Morgan (Maciejowski) Bible 
suggests the concept was familiar at that time.173 Adding to this the known concept of the 
                                                 
171 On 30 June 1224 Henry III summoned an additional 30 quarrymen and stonecutters to shape projectiles 
to be used against Bedford, Amt, "Besieging Bedford," p. 111. There is evidence that standardised 
ammunition was stored in Northumberland during the Middle Ages, Hill, "Trebuchets," p. 104. 
172 Vegetius, Epitoma Rei Militaris 4.21, ed. Lang, pp. 142-43. 
173 Although these images postdate the earliest illustrations of counterweight trebuchets, only traction 
trebuchets are depicted in this particular source. 
Shaduf (from Descriptions de l'Égypte) 
Tollenno (from Roberto Valturio, BNF, MS lat. 
7236) 
Image protected by copyright 
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Roman onager and staff sling, 
and it is perplexing that the 
counterweight trebuchet, far 
simpler and more effective than 
the twisted columns of sinews 
and hair that powered Greek and 
Roman torsion machines, was not 
developed earlier.174 These 
engines make use of the same 
simple principle that allows 
children to lay a spoon across some kind of fulcrum and catapult peas at the dinner table. 
In his discussion of siege engines, Vitruvius dedicated significant space to dealing with 
torsion weapons, shelters and towers but deliberately omitted ladders, cranes and such 
machines that operated on much simpler principles, as he claims that these could be 
constructed by the ordinary soldier without guidance.175  
                                                 
174 Hill tries to argue the opposite, suggesting the initial failure to utilise a long sling may have been 
responsible for the delayed development of the counterweight trebuchet, Hill, "Trebuchets," pp. 108-9.  
175 Vitruvius, De architectura 10.16.1, ed. Krohn, p. 257, trans. Morgan, p. 315. 
Lifting engines (from Morgan Bible, Pierpont Morgan Library, M.638) 
Images protected by copyright 
Image protected by copyright 
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The Mathematics 
 
Abbreviations 
For clarity all angles with be represented in degrees but calculated in radians 
 
Arrangements A, B, C and D176 
  
                                                 
176 Arrangements A and B are based on values used by Donald Hill, Arrangement C is a roughly optimal 
set of values provided by Donald Siano and Arrangement D is an original data set. 
Mcw Mass of the counterweight (kg) 
Mp Mass of the projectile (kg) 
Mb Mass of the Beam (kg) 
Lb Length of the beam (m) 
Lla Length of the long arm (m) 
Lsa Length of the short arm (m) 
Ls Length of the sling (m) 
Lcw Length of the counterweight's centre of mass from the beam (m) 
Lax Height of the main axle (m) 
Hcw Displacement of the falling hinged counterweight (m) 
r Radius of the projectile (m) 
Ap Cross-sectional area of the projectile (m) 
Ek Kinetic energy (J) 
Ep Potential energy (J) 
Eff Efficiency (%) 
Rmax Maximum theoretical horizontal range (m) 
Rh Horizontal range (m) 
Rv Vertical range (m) 
V True velocity of the projectile at release (m/s) 
Vmax Maximum theoretical release velocity (m/s) 
Vh Horizontal velocity (m/s) 
Vv Vertical velocity (m/s) 
Ib Moment of inertia (kg·m2) 
Tf Flight time (s) 
g Acceleration due to gravity (9.8 m/s2) 
 Density of air (j/kg·K) 
C Coefficient of drag (shape dependent) 
Dc Drag constant 
 Angle of the short arm to the vertical below the beam 
 Angle of the short arm to the vertical hanging counterweight 
 Angle of the long arm to the loaded sling 
 Angle of release to the horizontal 
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Components of a counterweight trebuchet 
Firing sequence of a hinged counterweight trebuchet (from Siano) 
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It is relatively simple to express each mathematical component of a counterweight 
trebuchet: the system is little more than three masses and three axles, powered by the 
force of gravity. However, it is extremely complicated to represent a complete firing 
sequence as each component complicates the equation geometrically. For purposes here, 
the function of a counterweight trebuchet will be analysed; traction trebuchets operate on 
the same essential principles but the lack of a uniform and consistent downward force 
makes it very difficult to express a firing sequence mathematically. 
 Following Hill's first attempt to express the function of a counterweight trebuchet 
in mathematical terms, more detailed studies have been put forward by mathematicians 
and mechanical engineers. Although the essentials are of a high-school level, the full 
process is extremely difficult to express without computer software. Today the foremost 
mathematical representations of trebuchet dynamics are offered by Mark Denny and 
Donald B. Siano. Siano employs complex numerical models using Mathematica 
programming, plotted using Cartesian coordinates. Denny's range-based study is more 
approachable but still relies on a numeric rather than algebraic evaluation of a complete 
counterweight trebuchet.177 For clarity, the basic components will be outlined, loosely 
following Denny's model, to the limits that basic algebra will allow. 
 
Energy System 
At its core the firing process of a trebuchet is simple: potential energy stored in the 
suspended counterweight is transferred through the firing sequence to the projectile 
couched in the sling.178 Thus a simplified expression for maximum range can be 
expressed if the masses and measurements of the basic components are known: 
 
Rmax = 2 (
Mcw
Mp
) Hcw ∙ Eff 
  
                                                 
177 Denny, "Siege Engine Dynamics," 561-77; Siano, Trebuchet Mechanics. See also Denny, Ingenium, pp. 
61-91. Siano's work has served as the exclusive mathematical basis for studies such as Saimre, "Trebuchet," 
61-80. I am deeply indebted to Mark Denny for the innumerable scenarios and setups he has run through 
his algorithms to test the viability of various theories that I have come up with, which stretch far beyond 
the parameters of his article. For a more simplistic introduction to the physics of this mechanical process, 
see Chevedden, et al., "The Trebuchet: Recent Reconstructions and Computer Simulations," pp. 66-71. 
178 For working through the basic trigonometry and helping provide the essential platform from which I 
built my numerical representation of the firing system, I would like to thank Ross Underhill. 
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Or, if the velocity and angle of release are known: 
 
if Vh = V ∙ cos 
and Vv = V ∙ sin 
 Rh = 2 V2 (
sin ∙ cos
g
) 
and Tf = 2 (
Vv
g
) 
 
The maximum potential velocity of a perfectly efficient system (Eff = 1) can also be 
shown or, alternatively, the efficiency of a system with a known velocity: 
 
if Rmax = 2 (
Mcw
Mp
) Hcw 
where Hcw = Lsa (1 − cos ) 
 Vmax = √2 (
Ep
Mp
) Eff 
and Eff = V2 (
Mp
2 EP
) 
where EP = Mcw ∙ Hcw ∙ g 
 
The energy within the projectile can also be shown: 
 
EK = V2 (
Mp
2
) 
or EK =
1
2
Mp ∙ V2 
 
Although convenient, these representations are drastic simplifications and as 
representations of an actual engine they fail to take into account factors such as the mass 
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of the beam. For the sake of simplicity, certain modelling limitations will continue to be 
observed, notably that this remains a frictionless system (unless represented by Eff), the 
sling is considered to have no mass, the beam has a uniform cross-section, and every 
component is rigidly defined so that there is no flex or stretch at any point though the 
firing sequence. 
 
Mechanical System 
To model the mechanics of a trebuchet, it is helpful to start with the beam itself. Devoid 
of a sling or hinged counterweight, maximum release velocity is achieved at a release 
angle of 0 (horizontal): 
 
V = Lla √2 (
𝑣
I
) (sin  + cos) 
where 𝑣 = (Mcw ∙ g ∙ Lsa) − (Mp ∙ g ∙ Lla) − [Mb ∙ g (
Lla − Lsa
2
)] 
where I = (Mcw ∙ Lsa2) + (Mp ∙ Lla2) + Ib 
where Ib =
1
3
Mb (
Lla3 + Lsa3
Lla + Lsa
) 
 
The impracticality of this arrangement, the dinner table model, is obvious. If Arrangement 
A is used and the beam is loaded at 135, a projectile released at 45 will travel 26.57 m/s 
or 29.19 m/s at 0. Only 10% of the kinetic energy within the machine is transferred to 
the projectile and only about 4% of the potential energy stored within the counterweight 
is communicated to the projectile.179 Although this beam-only arrangement is entirely 
impractical, what should be highlighted is that when the mass of the projectile is reduced 
the launch speed intuitively increases but the efficiency of the system decreases, a trend 
that continues as additional components of complexity are added. 
 The next mathematical component to be added is a hinged counterweight. 
Although it seem very unlikely that a counterweight trebuchet was ever practically 
                                                 
179 EK =
Mp∙Lla2
I
. With so little energy conveyed to the projectile, most of the remainder would cause a long 
period of beam swing, further decreasing the potential rate of fire. 
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employed without a sling, such an arrangement is shown in Figs. D5-D7. In a scenario 
where it is desirable to throw an extremely large projectile, relative to the corresponding 
counterweight, only a short distance, the absence of a sling is actually beneficial. This 
scenario can be simplified to reflect an ideal scenario, when the centre of mass of the 
counterweight is in line with the long axis of the beam: 
 
V  √
𝑣[sin( − 90) + cos] − Mcw ∙ Lcw ∙ g(1 − cos)
1
2
(Mp ∙ Lla2 + Ib)
 ∙ Lla 
 
Arrangement A yields a release velocity of 31 m/s at a release angle of 45, or 37 m/s if 
release occurs, impossibly, at 0. 
 The addition of a sling, to the rotating beam and hinged counterweight, 
significantly complicates the mathematics. Furthermore, there arises the need to place a 
restriction on the initial path of the projectile, representing its horizontal slide before it is 
lifted into the air; without this, the projectile's natural arc would travel below its initial 
elevation. Rather than digging a trench to allow for this, using a low-friction trough 
increases the efficiency of the system. But as this represents a complete counterweight 
trebuchet, so too is it unfeasible to express this scenario algebraically and little can be 
expressed here aside from what has already been provided by Siano and Denny.180 The 
last component to add is the low-friction 'finger'.181 Although some analysts regard the 
angling of the finger as a significant design component,182 personal experience has 
revealed that this is more practically a point of fine tuning.183 Similarly, theories 
surrounding the 'propping' of the counterweight, as seen in Figs. F9 and F23, will not be 
discussed.184  
 Using Mathematica, Siano sums up the comparative results between the various 
scenarios discussed above using Arrangement C, each provided with an optimal release 
angle for maximum range:185  
                                                 
180 See Siano, Trebuchet Mechanics, pp. 15-20. Cf. Denny, "Siege Engine Dynamics," pp. 572-74. 
181 For a mathematical representation of the 'finger', see Siano, Trebuchet Mechanics, pp. 25-31. 
182 For example, Saimre, "Trebuchet," p. 71. 
183 These sentiments are also shared by Peter Vemming, see Vemming Hansen, "Experimental 
Reconstruction," p. 202. 
184 I have found nothing to suggest that this practice was employed during the period of the crusades. The 
impracticalities involved are sufficient to question whether this practice was ever effectively employed. 
185 Siano, Trebuchet Mechanics, p. 22. 
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The addition of a hinged counterweight and sling significantly increase both range and 
efficiency; however, these values decrease notably when the beam is given mass. This 
reinforces how each mechanical component contributes to the overall efficiency of a 
trebuchet, although certain retarding elements as friction are still omitted here. 
 At this point the decelerating force of drag can be factored in, determined by a 
numerically defined drag constant: 
 
Dc =
C ∙  ∙ Ap ∙ V2
2
 
where, for a sphere, C  between 0.45 and 0.50 
Horizontal deceleration = V ∙ Vh (
Dc
Mp
) 
Vertical deceleration = g − V ∙ Vh (
Dc
Mp
) 
 Both horizontal and vertical deceleration are expressed as positive values 
(rather than negative acceleration) 
 
Using a drag coefficient of 0.5, reflecting a near spherical projectile, the graph below 
demonstrates the rate of horizontal deceleration of projectiles with masses between 10 
and 100 kg (with a consistent density of 2,500 kg/m3). The initial release velocity here is 
67 m/s and at an angle of 45; the temperature is around 15C; the air pressure is about 
101.325 and generally dry: 
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This geometric distribution is important: although much lighter projectiles are often 
selected to maximise release velocity, they will decelerate more rapidly than heavier 
projectiles. Accordingly, many modern reconstructed counterweight trebuchets fire 
projectiles around 10 kg, which provide a balance between release velocity and in-flight 
performance. But returning to energy, a light projectile will sacrifice efficiency for range, 
while an efficient shot will never achieve maximum range. If air resistance is again 
negated, Arrangement A, with a 45 release angle, yields a theoretical range of 171.1 m, 
or 317.9 m if a 10 kg projectile is substituted.186 Even when the higher rate of in-flight 
deceleration is factored in the far lighter projectile, which enjoys a much higher release 
velocity, will travel considerably farther. 
  
   
                                                 
186 These figures have been generated using Siano's 'Trebuchet Simulator'. 
Arrangement A 
100 kg projectile at release 
Arrangement A 
10 kg projectile at release 
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Ideal Proportions 
Hill's earlier expression of the firing process of a trebuchet with a hinged counterweight 
is somewhat simpler in approach than those of Denny and Siano, but like those of his 
successors, is constructed around an attempt to maximise potential range. Assuming a 
135 loading angle and 45 release angle, Hill bases his calculations on a 50-grade timber 
beam weighing 35 lbs/ft3 (560 kg/m3) and working fibre stress of 3,000 lbs/in3 
(83,039,714 kg/m3). With this he constructed a compound pendulum to yield a theoretical 
range (using Rh =
V2
g
).187 When comparing his results with those achieved by the engine 
reconstructed by Louis-Napoleon and Favé, Hill determined that their efficiency was 
about 56%. If neglecting air resistance, he believed a maximum efficiency of around 70% 
is achievable. Hill then applied this framework to two postulated machines: 
 
 
 
By adjusting the length of the short arm, preserving a ratio of between 6:1 and 5:1, these 
are the maximum theoretical ranges that Hill was able to achieve after factoring in an 
efficiency of 70%.188 
 Siano concurs that the maximum mechanical efficiency of a counterweight 
trebuchet is just over 70%. Summing up his findings, Siano roughly defines the ideal set 
of proportions as stemming from the mass of the beam and length of the short arm:189 
 
 
 
                                                 
187 Hill, "Trebuchets," pp. 112-13. 
188 Marino Sanudo similarly recommended a ratio of 5:1 or 6:1 in the early fourteenth century, Marino 
Sanudo, Liber secretorum 2.4.22, ed. Bongars, pp. 79-80, trans. Lock, pp. 135-36. 
189 Siano, Trebuchet Mechanics, p. 41. 
 𝑀𝑝 = 0.2 ∙ Mb 
 𝑀𝑐𝑤 = 2 ∙ Mb 
 𝐿𝑠 = 3.75 ∙ Lsa 
 𝐿𝑙𝑎 = 3.75 ∙ Lsa 
 𝐻𝑐𝑤 = Lsa  
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This, however, can be further improved by lowering the counterweight as much as 
possible so long as Lax > Lsa + Lcw. 
 The simplicity of the mechanics that govern a trebuchet made the construction 
and operation of such engines relatively easy. As there are so few components, each is 
necessary to produce efficient firing system but so too can they be easily manipulated to 
generate a fairly optimal set of proportions. Today, computer models are helpful tools and 
are increasingly being used to improve our understanding of historical mechanical 
processes.190 However helpful, these are no substitute for real-world recreations, which 
not only express actual forces that are near impossible to compute, such as real-world 
friction and flux, but convey the functional issues associated with construction, operation 
and maintenance.191 Although an understanding of the mathematics is not necessary to 
operate a trebuchet, by appreciating the governing physics the historical context can be 
better understood and the sources better evaluated. 
                                                 
190 For example, Kooi, B. W. and C. A. Bergman, "An Approach to the Study of Ancient Archery," pp. 
124-134. 
191 For a selection of reconstructed trebuchets, see Appendix 4. 
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PART TWO:                                      
ARTILLERY IN THE SOURCES 
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3. Artillery and the First Crusade                         
A Baseline (1097-1099) 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, no archaeological evidence survives to indicate the scale or even the form 
of the early siege engines used by the Franks during their conquest of western Syria and 
Palestine. We are therefore dependent on the surviving literary sources, which fortunately 
include a number of eyewitness accounts, even if the most detailed of them are all written 
from a Frankish point of view. 
 
 
 
Nicaea: 1097 
 
Having crossed Europe and entered Asia, the first challenge that faced the Frankish forces 
in Anatolia was the city of Nicaea.192 A stronghold of the Eastern portion of the Roman 
Empire since the fourth century, considerable stretches of the city's classical defences can 
still be viewed today. Although the walls have not survived to their original height, when 
Raymond of Aguilers viewed them in 1097 he noted that Nicaea was surrounded "with 
such lofty walls that the city feared neither the attack of enemies nor the force of any 
machine."193 
 The first contingent of Franks arrived at Nicaea on 6 May 1097. The main force 
was followed by Raymond of St Gilles and the Provençal contingent a week later and 
                                                 
192 The regional units which composed the larger army were roughly represented by Bohemond of Taranto, 
leading the Italian Normans, Count Raymond and St Gilles of Toulouse and papal legate Adhémar of Le 
Puy, heading the Provençals, Godfrey of Bouillon leading the Alsatian forces, and Hugh of Vermandois, 
Stephen of Blois, Robert of Normandy and Robert of Flanders with their respective followings. 
193 Praeterea muris ita eminentibus cingitur, ut nullorum hominum assultus, nullis machinae impetus 
vereatur, Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 3, RHC Oc 3, p. 239, trans. Hill and Hill, p. 25. For a 
detailed description of Nicaea's defences, see France, Victory in the East, pp. 143-44. 
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Stephen of Blois arrived in early June, just 
in time to see the city surrender.194 The 
sources make it clear that ballistic 
machines were used throughout the siege. 
The anonymous author of the Gesta 
Francorum and Guibert of Nogent relate 
that after the main body of Franks arrived 
they began to construct machines to aid 
their early attacks.195 Raymond of Aguilers 
and Albert of Aachen note the construction 
of further artillery by the Provençal forces 
when they took up their position to the 
south of Nicaea.196 One of the first tasks of 
these Provençal engines was hurling the heads of fallen Turks, members of a defeated 
relief force sent by Kilij Arslan, over the walls and into the city.197 Raymond of Aguilers 
clearly states that the stone projectiles subsequently hurled by these engines had minimal 
effect. Albert of Aachen confirms this initial ineffectiveness but adds that when the 
number of engines was increased, from just two, some cracks were opened and a few 
stones fell free of the wall, a point reiterated and embellished by William of Tyre.198 
Fulcher of Chartres, traveling with Stephen of Blois' contingent, notes that petrariae and 
tormenta were built when their contingent arrived near the end of the siege.199 Later 
sources also tend to stress that ballistic siege machines were employed by the crusaders.200 
                                                 
194 Gesta Francorum 2.7-8, ed. and trans. Hill, pp. 13-17; Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 3, 
RHC Oc 3, p. 239, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 25-26; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.9.2-
10.1, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 177-81, trans. Ryan, pp. 79-81. The Gesta places Robert of Flanders at the siege 
before the arrival of the Provençals while Fulcher states he arrived with Stephen of Blois only days before 
the siege ended. 
195 Gesta Francorum 2.8, ed. and trans. Hill, p. 14; Guibert of Nogent, Die gesta per Francos 3.6-10, ed. 
Huygens, pp. 145-55, trans. Levine, pp. 62-66. 
196 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 3, RHC Oc 3, p. 239, trans. Hill and Hill, p. 26; Albert of 
Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 2.32, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 114-15, cf. 2.29, 32, pp. 110-11, 116-
17. 
197 Gesta Francorum 2.8, ed. and trans. Hill, p. 15; Guibert of Nogent, Die gesta per Francos 3.6, ed. 
Huygens, pp. 145-47, trans. Levine, pp. 62-63; Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Coxe, 2:83, 
trans. Giles, 1:394. Cf. Chanson d'Antioche 74, trans. Edgington and Sweetenham, p. 146. This force had 
been sent by Kilij Arslan, who was then busy besieging Melitene. Matthew of Edessa notes Kilij Arslan's 
use of artillery against Melitene, Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, pp. 163-64. 
198 William of Tyre, Chronicon 3.8-9 (9-10), ed. Huygens, 1:205-8, trans. Babcock and Krey 1:161-63. 
199 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.10.6, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 185-87, trans. Ryan, p. 82. 
200 For example, William of Tyre, Chronicon 3.6 (7), ed. Huygens, 1:203-4, trans. Babcock and Krey, 
1:158-59; Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Coxe, 2:84, trans. Giles, 1:394. 
Nicaea: town, plan (after Toy) 
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 Despite the clear presence of artillery, the contemporary sources all confirm its 
futility and failure to seriously damage the defensive masonry. A hexameter written by 
Robert the Monk, however, states that the Franks threw stones and other blunt munitions 
into the city rather than just against the walls, indicating that the Franks were at times not 
aiming at the mass of the walls but at the parapet or targets inside the city.201 
 The damage inflicted by the time that Stephen of Blois had arrived was caused by 
mining rather than artillery. The contingents that had been working against the walls used 
penthouses to shield their sappers while artillery fire provided additional cover.202 The 
extent of the damage to the walls is unclear as the Franks were denied the opportunity to 
assault them. After about seven weeks of siege, the garrison capitulated to a Byzantine 
force, which had made contact across the Ascanian Lake.203 
 What is perhaps most striking in this, the opening siege of the crusades, is the 
universal notice given to artillery by the contemporary sources. Most primary accounts 
note that the contingent of the army with which they were associated constructed such 
engines almost as soon as it arrived. This in itself strongly implies that each of the 
Frankish contingents had experience with machines of the types constructed at Nicaea 
before they had left for the East and that their use of them was nothing exceptional, 
suggesting knowledge of this technology was widespread in Europe by the end of the 
eleventh century. 
 If unable to threaten Nicaea's fortifications, the artillery that was used was 
powerful enough to throw a human head over the city's walls. If we assume that the walls 
had a height of 10 m, a release velocity of at least 20 m/s would be required to clear them 
at a release angle of 45. This, however, would place the machine only slightly more than 
20 m from the wall. Working from these figures, a rough scale of the trebuchets in 
question can be postulated. For example, a beam 3.5 m long with a ratio of 6:1, fitted with 
a 2 m sling, a counterweight of 600 kg (representing approximately the pulling force of 
eight to ten men) and a projectile of 3.5 kg (representing a human head), when loaded at 
                                                 
201 Robert the Monk, Historia Iherosolimitana 3.3, RHC Oc 3, p. 756, trans. Sweetenham, p. 104. 
202 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 3, RHC Oc 3, p. 239, trans. Hill and Hill, p. 26; Gesta 
Francorum 2.8, ed. and trans. Hill, p. 15; Guibert of Nogent, Die gesta per Francos 3.6, ed. Huygens, pp. 
145-47, trans. Levine, pp. 62-63; Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 17, RHC Oc 3, p. 615, trans. Bachrach 
and Bachrach, p. 40; Anna Comnena, Alexiad 11.1, trans. Sewter, pp. 333-35; Albert of Aachen, Historia 
Ierosolimitana 2.30, 34-36, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 112-13, 118-25. 
203 Anna Comnena, Alexiad 11.2, trans. Sewter, pp. 337-38; Gesta Francorum 2.8, ed. and trans. Hill, pp. 
16-17; Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 3, RHC Oc 3, pp. 239-40, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 26-
27. For an excellent analysis of the siege of Nicaea, see France, Victory in the East, pp. 143-69. 
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135 is capable of producing a release velocity of 37 m/s given the masses involved and 
initial load angle. If a reasonable mechanical efficiency of 70% is factored in, this 
decreases the release velocity to 26 m/s. A projectile travelling 26 m/s, released at 45 to 
the horizontal, can clear a 10 m wall from a range of 56 m.204 
 
 
Velocity (V) 20 m/s 26 m/s 
Release Angle (α) 45° 45° 
Max. Horizontal Range (Rh) 40.8 m 69.0 m 
Horizontal Range when at 10 m elevation (Rh when Rv 
= 10) 
23.2 m 56.7 m 
 
 
This very rough estimation of mechanical scale seems to fit both the capabilities 
and limitations suggested by the sources. Rather than breaching engines, the siege of 
Nicaea reveals that artillery was more likely used to support sapping efforts and other 
means of attacking a stronghold, targeting defenders rather than defences. 
 Despite every indication that the Franks had prior knowledge of the ballistic siege 
engines that they employed at Nicaea and that the power of these machines was not 
enough to classify them as breaching weapons, Paul Chevedden has argued that the 
Franks received counterweight trebuchets from the Byzantines in the lead up to the siege. 
The argument seems to be based entirely on the testimony of Anna Comnena, who was 
not an eyewitness of the siege and composed her account many decades after the events. 
In her description, Emperor Alexius, her father, judged that even with innumerable forces 
the Franks would not be able to take Nicaea. So, "he constructed helepoleis of several 
                                                 
204 In this scenario, the beam has been given a uniform cross-section and mass of 40 kg. No more than a 
rough simulation can be offered due to the use of traction power: unlike a mass falling under the force of 
gravity and accelerating downwards at a fairly uniform rate, the variance and irregular force applied by a 
single puller, let alone a collection of such, prevents an accurate mathematical model. The dimensions given 
here are relatively similar to those of many modern reconstructions. 
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types, but mostly to an unorthodox design of his own which surprised everyone" and sent 
these to the Franks.205 Prior to this, she claims the Franks made a brief attack on the walls 
of Constantinople during the uneasy period before they crossed the Hellespont but, at this 
point at least, they lacked any helepoleis.206 This contrasts the numerous occasions prior 
to this where she claims that artillery was employed by various Byzantine commanders.207 
 Using Anna's account, Chevedden has argued that Alexius personally built the 
Franks a number of trebuchet-type machines, associating such engines with Anna's use 
of the term helepoleis.208 In defending his position, Chevedden argues against the popular 
interpretation of these events, sensibly explained by Randal Rogers and John France. The 
latter suggest that Alexius might have helped the Franks in this regard by providing 
materials and possibly even some advice, but that knowledge of these machines was not 
foreign to the Franks and construction was almost certainly undertaken by Latin 
craftsmen. Chevedden's case is built in no small part on an absence of information and, 
while criticising the opposing perspective for its failure to acknowledge certain Greek 
sources, does precisely this with regard to Latin source material.209 To take matters a step 
further, Chevedden uses Anna's praise for her father and his commission of 'various' and 
'new' designs of his own imagination as evidence that this was the point at which the first 
counterweight trebuchet was conceived, designed by no less than Alexius himself.210 
Besides Anna's account, there is no evidence to justify such a claim. Thus although Greek 
aid should not be underemphasised in accounting for the early successes of the First 
Crusade, particularly with regard to provisioning, there is no reason to assume that the 
engines built by the Franks in Asia Minor were much different from contemporary 
engines built in southern Italy, greater France and western Germany, nor were they any 
more powerful. 
 As Rogers has pointed out, there are three essential ingredients necessary to build 
siege engines: timber, fasteners and manpower.211 Timber was available in the environs 
                                                 
205 Anna Comnena, Alexiad 11.2, trans. Sewter, p. 336. 
206 Anna Comnena, Alexiad 10.9, trans. Sewter, pp. 319-20. 
207 For example, Constantine Dalassenus's siege of Chios, Anna Comnena, Alexiad 7.8, trans. Sewter, p. 
234. 
208 Chevedden, "Invention," pp. 76-78. The term helepolis, 'city taker', appears to have been used as a fairly 
general term, used by various sources at various times to identify a variety of engines. For suggestions that 
this referred to a counterweight trebuchet at this point, see Chevedden, "King James I," p. 316; Dennis, 
"Byzantine Heavy Artillery," pp. 99-115. See also Chapter 1. 
209 See Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, p. 21-22; France, Victory in the East, p. 165. 
210 Chevedden, "Invention," p. 86. 
211 Rogers, Lain Siege Warfare, pp. 21-22. 
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of Nicaea while fasteners, nails and rope, would likely have been carried by any 
carpenters among the host, restocking from local merchants as opportunities presented 
themselves. With regard to personnel, Latin labour was in abundance. There is no 
evidence that a Byzantine engineering expert was present in the Frankish siege camp and 
the fact that the machines do not appear to have been disassembled and transported with 
the crusaders as they pushed east suggests that their form was quite simple. Construction 
of the Frankish artillery was most likely overseen by members of certain baronial 
households. Sometimes these individuals were retainers with demonstrated skill in this 
field while in many instances construction would be directed by a major lord himself.212 
Evidence of this at Nicaea is apparent with the construction of the early penthouses, while 
that built by the anonymous Lombard for the Lotharingians serves as a case of freelance 
profiteering by someone with certain transferable skills. Nicaea would prove to be a 
relatively easy success compared to the Franks' next challenge. 
 
 
 
Antioch: 1097-98 
 
Antioch had long been a strongly defended city. Geographically, the city is the first major 
urban centre south of the Nur Daglari which, with the Taurus Mountains, encircle Cilicia, 
and is midway between the Mediterranean and the Jabal al-Nusayriyya, the northernmost 
extension of the mountains marking the Great Rift in the Near East. Antioch had remained 
a largely Christian city during the periods that it was ruled by Muslim potentates and had 
been under continuous Turkish rule for little more than a decade when the Franks arrived 
in 1097. 
 Although the city was taken a number of times over the preceding centuries, in 
most instances it fell to a surprise attack or treachery – most damage sustained by the 
city's fortifications was the result of earthquakes.213 The walls were well provisioned with 
                                                 
212 For the case of Robert of Bellême and Robert of Normandy in the decade leading up to the First Crusade, 
see Orderic Vitalis, Historiae ecclesiasticae 8.16, 24, ed. and trans. Chibnall, 4:232-37, 288-95. 
213 The Sassanids took Antioch by storm, scaling its Roman walls, in the 540s. The city burnt and 
depopulated before the attackers withdrew but its defences were left intact. The city walls were 
subsequently developed in the reigns of Justinian, Zimisces and Basil II. The city fell under Muslim 
influence during the Arab expansion but was retaken by Nicephorus Phocas in 968. About 1085, forces of 
the Seljuk sultan, Suleiman, took the city by surprise, those who had fled to the citadel were granted 
favourable terms after a short blockade, A. W. Lawrence, "A Skeletal History of Byzantine Fortification," 
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large towers, spaced less than 50 m apart 
across exposed sections of the enceinte. The 
formidable strength of this city's now 
dilapidated defences still impresses, as it 
certainly did when the Franks viewed them 
in 1097. Raymond of Aguilers states that 
Antioch feared no besieging army regardless 
of its size.214 Fulcher of Chartres claims that 
as long as those within were provisioned, the 
city could never be taken from without, 
while Stephen of Blois simply described 
Antioch as "very strong and unassailable" in 
a letter to his wife.215 
 The siege was opened on 21 October 
1097.216 The Franks adopted a strategy of 
close blockade and soon turned to siege forts 
to enforce this more strictly.217 In the same way that it was taken by the Turks and 
Byzantines before them, the city was betrayed. After about eight months of siege, the 
Franks were able to enter the city one night in early June 1098 and by the next day the 
only remaining point of resistance was the citadel on top of Mt Silpius. This final bastion 
surrendered only days later, following the Frankish victory over Kerbogha of Mosul's 
relieving force.218 
                                                 
pp. 196-97; Oman, A History of the Art of War, pp. 527-28; Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. 
Dostourian, pp. 147-48. Oman discounts any notion that the defences of Antioch were altered or improved 
in any way while the city was under Muslim control. 
214 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 5, RHC Oc 3, p. 242, trans. Hill and Hill, p. 31. 
215 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.15.2, ed. Hagenmeyer, p. 217, trans. Ryan, p. 92. 
Antiochiam vero urbem maximam, ultra quam credi potest firmissimam atque inexpugnabilem, Stephen of 
Blois, Letters, RHC Oc 3, p. 888. Although Fulcher was not at the siege of Antioch, he visited the city only 
a couple years later. 
216 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.15.1, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 215-17, trans. Ryan, p. 92; 
Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 3.36-38, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 196-201. 
217 Gesta Francorum 5.12-13, 8.18-19, ed. and trans. Hill, pp. 29-30, 39-43; Raymond of Aguilers, Historia 
Francorum 7-8, RHC Oc 3, pp. 247-50, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 41-46; Stephen of Blois, Letters, RHC Oc 
3, pp. 889-90; Anselm of Ribemont, Letters, RHC Oc 3, pp. 890-93; letter of the people of Lucca on crusade 
to all faithful Christians, trans. Krey, in The First Crusade, pp. 161-62; Robert the Monk, Historia 
Iherosolimitana 5.4, RHC Oc 3, pp. 793-94, trans. Sweetenham, p. 138. Robert the Monk states that the 
third fort was an old castle, rather than a monastery, which Tancred repaired. The cloistered layout of a 
monastery, intended to shut out the world, was a naturally defensible type of structure and monasteries were 
used as counterforts before and after the time of the First Crusade. 
218 For the siege of Antioch and the battle that followed, see France, Victory in the East, pp. 197-296. 
Antioch: town, plan (after Asbridge) 
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 Unlike at Nicaea, siege machines figured 
very little into the crusaders' siege of Antioch. It 
is simplistic to conclude that the ineffectiveness of 
the ballistic siege engines employed at Nicaea was 
the reason for their corresponding absence before 
the even stronger fortifications of Antioch; 
however, there is a degree of truth in this. 
According to Guibert of Nogent, all sorts of siege 
engines were of no use and, had the city not been 
betrayed, the Franks would have endured famine 
and other difficulties in vain.219 Although 
descriptions of the siege of Antioch are far more 
substantial and detailed than those of Nicaea, references to artillery, or any siege 
machinery, are few. Eyewitness evidence suggests its possible employment at only two 
stages in the siege: during efforts to stem raids from the Bridge Gate and by the Franks 
defending the barrier built between Mt Silpius and the citadel after the city had fallen.220 
 A passage in the Gesta notes the latter incident. It states that machinae, 
presumably artillery, were employed to support the Frankish position in a defensive 
role.221 Raymond of Aguilers notes the construction of machinae in connection with 
efforts to build a siege fort to control the Bridge Gate, although he calls the engines 
useless.222 Anselm of Ribemont describes the construction of this fort in one of his letters 
and notes that balistariae were placed within; however, it is unclear what type of weapons 
these men were supposed to have been employing.223 It is left to the far more detailed 
account of Albert of Aachen, who was not a participant of the crusade, to gain greater 
insight into these weapons. 
 Albert of Aachen claims that before Raymond of St Gilles attempted to obstruct 
the Bridge Gate, he tried to destroy the bridge outside of the Dog Gate. In the third attempt 
                                                 
219 Huic obsidendae quarumcumque machinarum balistarumve tormenta nil poterant, Guibert of Nogent, 
Die gesta per Francos 6.16, ed. Huygens, p. 250, trans. Levine, p. 116. 
220 The limited references to artillery probably reflect its limited impact against the impressive defences of 
Antioch and their defenders. 
221 Gesta Francorum 9.26, ed. and trans. Hill, p. 62. 
222 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 7, RHC Oc 3, p. 248, trans. Hill and Hill, p. 41. 
223 Anselm of Ribemont, Letters, RHC Oc 3, pp. 890-93. It is possible that balistaria is meant to identify a 
machine rather than an operator; however, this is of no more help identifying the type of machine. The term 
was associated with engines as significant as a traction trebuchets or as light as a crossbows, depending on 
the source, in the eleventh century. 
Antioch: mural towers (from Rey) 
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to break up the bridge, Albert 
states that the crusaders tried to 
use three mangenae to damage 
the gate beyond the bridge, as 
well as sections of adjacent 
curtain and forewall. The 
engines, however, failed to 
make any impression upon the 
defences. Although Albert 
suggests that these engines 
were meant to destroy fortifications, this artillery might instead have been used against 
the defenders, who employed their own mangenae and fired down on the Franks with 
arrows from the parapet. In any case, the Franks resorted instead to obstructing the bridge 
with felled trees and large stones.224 It is noteworthy that in all three instances, artillery 
was apparently used to stem the egress of hostile defending forces. 
 For the defenders' use of artillery, it is again the writers who were absent who 
provide the most useful insights. In addition to engines that were used against Raymond's 
efforts to destroy the bridge outside of the Dog Gate, Albert of Aachen claims that 
mangenae were used to dispatch the heads of Adalbero of Metz and a female companion 
back to the Franks.225 Fulcher of Chartres also claims that the Muslims threw the heads 
of fallen Franks back over the walls, using petrariae and fundabula, while Robert the 
Monk ascribes this practice to the Franks and their balistae.226 Collectively, these 
accounts suggests that the artillery used at Antioch was comparable to that employed at 
Nicaea. 
                                                 
224 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 3.40-42, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 202-5. Cf. Chanson 
d'Antioche 147, trans. Edgington and Sweetenham, p. 182. Peter Tudebode describes the use of a penthouse, 
similar to that used in Raymond's second effort against the Dog Gate, to damage the Fortified Bridge outside 
of the Bridge Gate in spring 1098, although he mentions no artillery supporting it, Peter Tudebode, Historia 
de Hierosolymitano Itinere 8.1, RHC Oc 3, pp. 50-51. Neither of these episodes are found in the Gesta. 
225 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 3.41, 46, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 202-3, 208-11. 
226 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.15.10, ed. Hagenmeyer, p. 221, trans. Ryan, p. 94; 
Robert the Monk, Historia Iherosolimitana 4.3, RHC Oc 3, p. 777, trans. Sweetenham, p. 123. Similar to 
Fulcher's account, William of Malmesbury claims that the garrison used ballistae and petrariae to throw 
the heads of Christian Syrians and Armenians, slain within the city, into the Frankish camp, William of 
Malmesbury, De gestis rerum Anglorum 4.361, ed. Stubbs, 2:417, trans. Giles, pp. 379-80. Cf. Chanson 
d'Antioche 187, trans. Edgington and Sweetenham, p. 209; Michael Attaleiates, History 28.4.6, ed. and 
trans. Kaldellis and Krallis, pp. 414-15. 
Antioch: Bridge Gate, from the west (from Whitney)  
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 In contrast to the accounts of the siege of Nicaea, it is the rarity of the mention of 
artillery that is notable at Antioch. Neither the Gesta nor Ralph of Caen make any mention 
of artillery being used outside of the walls of Antioch and Fulcher of Chartres, who notes 
its use in defence, gives no indication that artillery was ever used by the Franks. Thomas 
Asbridge has suggested that the Franks lacked the materials or craftsmen to construct 
siege engines at Antioch;227 however, such an argument seems improbable. The Franks 
built notable engines at the preceding siege of Nicaea and subsequent siege of Jerusalem, 
but at neither would they have had the body of skilled labour that passed through the 
nearby ports of Latakia and St Symeon while they were besieging Antioch. Furthermore, 
the material and skill to build three siege forts was evidently present. The apparently 
modest scale and simplicity of contemporary artillery would have posed few building 
challenges to any who had seen, much less operated, such an engine previously. Rather 
than a shortage of skill or materials, it seems that their brief experience at Nicaea had in 
fact impressed upon the Frankish forces the limitations of these engines before such 
extensive classical defences. As at Nicaea, artillery would appear to have been used in a 
supportive role at Antioch; but as this was a more passive siege, its impact was far less 
significant. 
 
 
 
Marrat al-Nu'man and Arqa: 1098 
 
Marrat al-Nu'man 
The next significant siege of the First Crusade was that of Marrat al-Nu'man (Ma'arra).228 
On 27 November 1098, Raymond of St Gilles and Robert of Flanders encamped with a 
contingent of crusaders near the town's walls. An unsuccessful attempt was made to storm 
the town using ladders the following day and a second attempt failed a few days later, by 
which time Bohemond had arrived with a rival force.229 A third assault was carried out 
on 11 December 1098. This time, making use of a mobile siege tower in addition to 
                                                 
227 Asbridge, The Crusades, p. 66. 
228 The siege of Albara has been omitted on the basis that the sources offer little insight into the techniques 
that were employed and the general lack of details. 
229 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 14, RHC Oc 3, p. 268, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 75-76. 
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ladders, the Franks appear to have 
gained a foothold on the parapet by 
nightfall and the town was pillaged 
the next day.230  
 Ralph of Caen, who was not 
present, appears to be the only source 
who claims that the Franks employed 
artillery at this siege.231 The engines 
are portrayed as more powerful than 
in previous references but this 
appears to be a result of his poetic 
writing style. Although the Franks 
may not have employed artillery at 
Marrat al-Nu'man, its defenders did. 
Raymond of Aguilers, the Gesta, 
Guibert of Nogent, Ralph of Caen and Robert the Monk all note the defenders' use of at 
least one stone-thrower to target the Provençal siege tower.232 The potential effectiveness 
of stones and Greek fire thrown by defensive artillery would become apparent by the end 
of the crusade.  
                                                 
230 Gesta Francorum 10.33, ed. and trans. Hill, pp. 78-79; Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 14, 
RHC Oc 3, pp. 268-70, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 76-79; Guibert of Nogent, Die gesta per Francos 6.18, ed. 
Huygens, pp. 251-54, trans. Levine, pp. 116-17; Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 5.30, ed. and 
trans. Edgington, pp. 374-77; Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 104, RHC Oc 3, p. 679, trans. Bachrach and 
Bachrach, pp. 121-22; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.24.3, ed. Hagenmeyer, p. 261, trans. 
Ryan, p. 113; Robert the Monk, Historia Iherosolimitana 8.5-7, RHC Oc 3, pp. 846-49, trans. Sweetenham, 
pp. 183-86; Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 46. Robert the Monk adds a battering ram to the 
equipment used by the Franks and Albert of Aachen specifies that the wood for the engines came from the 
castle of Talamria, which he had already acquired, in the Syrian mountains. 
231 Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 96, 103-4, RHC Oc 3, pp. 674, 678-79, trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, 
pp. 115, 121-22. Cf. William of Tyre, Chronicon 7.9, ed. Huygens, 1:353-55, trans. Babcock and Krey, 
1:310-12. 
232 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 14, RHC Oc 3, p. 269, trans. Hill and Hill, p. 78; Gesta 
Francorum 10.33, ed. and trans. Hill, p. 78; Guibert of Nogent, Die gesta per Francos 6.18, ed. Huygens, 
pp. 251-54, trans. Levine, pp. 116-17; Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 104, RHC Oc 3, p. 679, trans. 
Bachrach and Bachrach, pp. 121-22; Robert the Monk, Historia Iherosolimitana 8.5, RHC Oc 3, p. 846, 
trans. Sweetenham, p. 183. 
Western Syria: topography 
Image protected by copyright 
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Arqa 
Arqa was an ancient city sited on a ridge extending northwards from Mt Lebanon, only a 
few kilometres from the coast and not much farther from Tripoli to the southwest.233 
Unlike the urban strongholds hitherto besieged by the Franks, Arqa's natural position 
offered no readily accessible line of approach. This denied any attacking force the option 
of using a siege tower. 
 When the siege opened on 14 February 1099, the only tactics available to the 
Franks were general assaults with ladders, made difficult by the sloping terrain, mining, 
which proved ineffective, and the use of ballistic engines. Accordingly, an artillery duel 
appears to have taken place and Anslem of Ribemont was among those who fell amid the 
exchange.234 Ralph of Caen provides an interesting indication of the use of such machines 
when he states that the leaders, Robert of Normandy, Raymond of St Gilles and Tancred, 
built tormenta to use against the walls, which he claims was common practice, but also 
that each leader had his own.235 The assertion that it was common practice to build such 
engines and the ability of each leader to build his own, appears to confirm that this 
technology was well known across Western Europe by the late eleventh century. Given 
Ralph's free style, however, it is possible that the practice to which he refers was a more 
general one of building siege engines. When compared with the accounts of his 
contemporaries, Ralph seems to exaggerate the power of the artillery and the degree of 
destruction inflicted at Arqa. The Frankish engines appear to have posed little threat, as, 
when mining proved difficult, the crusaders seem to have been quite content to accept a 
payoff when it was offered by the emir of Tripoli. The Franks resumed their march south 
in May 1099 and Arqa remained under Muslim rule for another ten years.  
                                                 
233 William of Tyre, Chronicon 7.14, ed. Huygens, 1:360-61, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:318. 
234 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 15-16, RHC Oc 3, pp. 275-78, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 87-
92; Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 105-10, RHC Oc 3, pp. 680-83, trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, pp. 123-
27; Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 5.31-36, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 376-87; Fulcher of 
Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.25.1-3, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 265-67, trans. Ryan, p. 113; Guibert of 
Nogent, Die gesta per Francos 6.23, ed. Huygens, pp. 264-65, trans. Levine, p. 122; Gesta Francorum 
10.34-35, ed. and trans. Hill, pp. 83-84. Cf. Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 106, RHC Oc 3, pp. 680-81, 
trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, p. 123. 
235 Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 105, RHC Oc 3, p. 680, trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, p. 123. 
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Jerusalem: 1099 
 
The conquest of Jerusalem appears to have been the accepted goal of the First Crusade 
by the time the various contingents set out across Europe; however, others also coveted 
the holy city. With the distraction caused by the Frankish presence in Syria, al-Afdal, 
vizier of Fatimid Egypt, besieged Jerusalem in July 1098, at that time under a Seljuk 
emir.236 Both Ibn al-Qalanisi and the later account of Ibn al-Athir emphasise the use of 
artillery and claim that the city's fall was a direct result of the damage that it inflicted.237 
Although it is tempting to see these Muslim engines as superior to their Frankish 
counterparts, subsequent Muslim sieges suggest that this was not necessarily so. 
 Situated in the Judean hills, between the coastal plain and the Jordan Valley, the 
trace of Jerusalem's walls had changed over the centuries. By the time that the Franks 
arrived, the walls stretched 4 km along a line which roughly corresponds with the present 
Ottoman trace. The northern front of the city extended for almost 1.5 km and was 
naturally approachable, standing at a slightly lower elevation than the remainder of the 
plateau which extends farther north. The Roman defences along this line had been 
strengthened under Muslim rule with the addition of a forewall and rock-cut fosse.238 The 
eastern side of the city, facing the Kidron Valley, was inaccessible to a sizeable force 
given the gradient of the topography. The western face was unapproachable along its 
southern half while the northern was anchored by two strong towers: the city's citadel, 
known as the Tower of David, in the centre of the western defences, and the Quadrangular 
Tower (Tancred's Tower or Tower of Goliath), which secured the northwest corner of the 
city.239 To the south, there was a constricted approach opposite the Tanners' Gate, just 
                                                 
236 It is presumptuous to tie this attack directly to the fall of Antioch. The amount of time required to 
assemble the Fatimid forces of Egypt meant that this process likely started before the city fell, although 
news of this blow to the Abbasids no doubt encouraged their preparations and strengthened their resolve. 
Fatimid forces appear to have required about two months to assemble and then march to Ascalon around 
the start of the twelfth century, Hamblin, The Fatimid Army, pp. 180-85. 
237 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 45; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:21. Even Albert of 
Aachen notes the use of artillery during the Fatimid siege of Jerusalem, though his source for this 
information is unknown, Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.31, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 442-
43. 
238 For descriptions of the medieval defences of Jerusalem and excavation findings, see Boas, Jerusalem, 
pp. 46-49; Pringle, "Town Defences," pp. 80-81; Weksler-Bdolah, "The Fortification System"; Mazor, "The 
Northern City Wall of Jerusalem"; Reich and Shukron, "Excavations in the Mamillah Area"; Broschi and 
Gibson, "Excavations along the Western and Southern Walls"; Broschi, "Mount Zion," p. 285. 
239 For a contemporary description of the citadel, see Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.26.4, 
ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 284-85, trans. Ryan, p. 117. Fulcher claims that the stones were fused with lead, a 
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west of the Temple Mount, or via the broader plateau, about 150 m square, that was the 
southern extension of Mt Zion. Both had been left exposed when the trace of the southern 
city walls had been redrawn under Muslim rule.240 From the Frankish sources it appears 
that a ditch had been added along this front by 1099. 
                                                 
practice described by Vitruvius, Vitruvius, De architectura, 2.8.4, ed. Krohn, trans. Morgan, pp. 51-52. Cf. 
Boas, Jerusalem, pp. 66-75. 
240 Prawer has suggested this may have occurred during the latter half of the tenth century or following an 
earthquake around 1033, Prawer, "The Jerusalem the Crusaders Captured," p. 2. Boas and Pringle believe 
that the redrawing of the southern line took place in the eleventh century, Boas, Jerusalem, pp. 43-44; 
Pringle, "Town Defences", p. 79. During the Ayyubid period, Mount Zion was completely enclosed in an 
effort to strengthen this section of the southern front. 
Jerusalem: town and initial deployment of crusaders in 1099, plan and topography 
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 As the Franks approached Jerusalem, the population of the surrounding region 
sought refuge within the city. The garrison gathered supplies, equipment and whatever 
timber they could from the surrounding area, burning the rest and poisoning the region's 
wells.241 The Christian population of Jerusalem was then expelled to eliminate the risk of 
a fifth column, as had been done at Antioch.  
 When the crusaders arrived on 7 June 1099, they immediately set about 
establishing a siege, dividing themselves into two groups. Robert of Normandy positioned 
himself near the church of St Stephen, opposing the St Stephen Gate (Damascus Gate) 
with Robert of Flanders to his right and Godfrey and Tancred stationed around the 
Quadrangular tower, thus covering the western half of the northern defences. Raymond 
of St Gilles initially opposed David's Gate (Jaffa Gate) but, given the restrictions of the 
terrain in this area, he soon repositioned his forces to the south, establishing them on Mt 
Zion near the church of St Mary of Mt Zion.242 Although a more suitable position from 
which to assail the city, the restrictions of the plateau forced this group to encamp fairly 
close to the city's walls and may have placed them within range of the defending archers 
at all times. 
 On 13 June 1099, the Franks made their first assault. Although the northern force 
was able to gain the forewall, their efforts to take the main wall failed.243 Following this 
test of the defenders' strength, it was agreed that machinery would be necessary to take 
the city, resulting in no less than two towers, artillery and a ram, in addition to a number 
of ladders. 
 The terminology used by the sources to describe the artillery used by and against 
the Franks is characteristically vague. The terms machinae and mangenae are used by 
Albert of Aachen to refer to the Franks' engines while Raymond of Aguilers adds 
                                                 
241 Benvenisti estimates the population of Jerusalem may have swelled to 40,000 at this point, Benvenisti, 
The Crusaders, pp. 35-36. 
242 Gesta Francorum 10.37, ed. and trans. Hill, p. 87; Peter Tudebode, Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere 
14.1, RHC Oc 3, p. 102; Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC Oc 3, pp. 292-93, trans. Hill 
and Hill, pp. 116-17; Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 5.46, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 402-5. 
243 Gesta Francorum 10.37, ed. and trans. Hill, p. 88; Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC 
Oc 3, p. 293, trans. Hill and Hill, p. 117; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.27.2, ed. 
Hagenmeyer, pp. 293-94, trans. Ryan, p. 119; Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.1, ed. and trans. 
Edgington, pp. 406-7; Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 118-119, RHC Oc 3, pp. 688-89, trans. Bachrach and 
Bachrach, pp. 134-36. Ralph of Caen gives a mystical account of Tancred receiving direction from a monk 
to attack the city on this day and his discovery of a cache of hidden lumber, which proved to be just enough 
for the single siege ladder. It is more likely that the Franks had multiple ladders, allowing them to take the 
forewall, but not enough of sufficient scale to take the main wall. The region's local timber is predominantly 
short and rarely straight – perhaps only one of the Frankish ladders was of sufficient height and strength to 
provide access to the parapet of the primary curtain. 
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tormenta and petrariae when identifying those used by the garrison.244 Writing decades 
later, William of Tyre uses the terms mangana or petrariae and Roger of Wendover calls 
these machines petrariae and trubuculi.245 None of the sources provide a detailed 
description. Nonetheless, the main challenge faced by the Franks when constructing their 
artillery, and much more so when erecting their siege towers, was the need for wood. 
Finding tall and straight trees in the Judean hills would have been challenging 
even if the area was more fertile in the Middle Ages than it is now.246 The Franks scoured 
the area as far as Nablus to find wood, possibly aided by the local Christians who had 
recently been evicted.247 To this end, the Franks benefited from the timely arrival of a 
Genoese fleet at Jaffa on 17 June. Trapped in the harbour by Fatimid vessels, the Genoese 
party, under the Embriaco brothers, was escorted to Jerusalem by a party of crusaders.248 
Timber, which had been stripped from the ships, was also carried back to the siege. The 
long beams, oars and even the ships' fasteners may have been regarded as divinely 
delivered as the Genoese sailors helped the Provençal carpenters construct their siege 
engines. 
 As at Marrat al-Nu'man, the Franks oriented their strategy around siege towers. 
Godfrey undertook the construction of one tower on the northern side of the city, placing 
this under Gaston of Bearn, while Raymond of St Gilles built another on Mount Zion, 
placing this under William Ricau.249 Constructed primarily from the wood taken from the 
Genoese vessels, Raymond's tower would have been as sturdy as the conditions 
                                                 
244 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.2, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 406-7; Raymond of 
Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC Oc 3, pp. 298-99, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 125-26. 
245 William of Tyre, Chronicon 8.6, ed. Huygens, 1:392-93, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:351; Roger of 
Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Coxe, 2:135, trans. Giles, 1:429. 
246 Adrian Boas has suggested that this may have been exacerbated by the series of sieges which had 
repeatedly consumed the surrounding timber over the preceding millennium, Boas, Jerusalem, pp. 5-7. 
247 Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 123, RHC Oc 3, p. 691, trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, p. 139; Peter 
Tudebode, Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere 15.1-3, RHC Oc 3, pp. 106-7; Albert of Aachen, Historia 
Ierosolimitana 6.2-4, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 406-9; Gesta Francorum 10.38, ed. and trans. Hill, p. 
90. 
248 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC Oc 3, pp. 294-95, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 119-20; 
Caffaro, De liberatione, ed. Belgrano, p. 111, trans. Hall and Phillips, p. 117; Peter Tudebode, Historia de 
Hierosolymitano Itinere 14.1-2, RHC Oc 3, pp. 103-4; Gesta Francorum 10.37, ed. and trans. Hill, pp. 88-
89; Caffaro, De liberation, ed. Belgrano, p. 110, trans. Hall and Philips, p. 116. Raymond adds that the 
tools which the Genoese brought proved invaluable in the construction of the southern siege tower, 
Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC Oc 3, p. 298, trans. Hill and Hill, p.125. 
249 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC Oc 3, p. 297, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 123-24; Gesta 
Francorum 10.37, ed. and trans. Hill, p. 88. Large parties of captured and coerced Muslim labourers may 
have taken part in handling the large beams, salvaged from the Genoese ships, which were used to construct 
the Provençal tower. 
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allowed.250 Albert of Aachen states that the defenders employed fourteen mangenae 
against the Frankish siege towers: five to the north to target Godfrey's tower and nine 
arrayed against that of the Provençals.251 These were used to throw both stones and Greek 
fire; the shortage of water that was afflicting the army also posed a serious threat to the 
crusaders' machines.252 When the Franks had completed their siege towers and supporting 
artillery, as well as mantlets and ladders, the Franks set about coordinating an attack. 
 The defenders of Jerusalem had strengthened their fortifications across from the 
northern siege towers as best they could. They added timber defences and heightened 
their towers with wooden turrets to mitigate the elevation advantage enjoyed by the siege 
towers. This compelled the northern assailants to attempt a daring manoeuvre: moving 
their tower from its original position, near the Quadrangular Tower, about a kilometre to 
the east during the night of 9-10 July.253 As it did not enjoy the structural strength of 
southern tower and its Genoese timber, the northerners were able to disassemble their 
tower and move it to its new location.254 Although not an eyewitness to these events, 
Albert of Aachen states that Franks moved their mangenae, and accompanying piles of 
ammunition, along with the tower. Three of these engines were then erected ahead of the 
tower's new position.255 
                                                 
250 Apparently using William of Tyre's account, some have added the construction of a second northern 
tower, bringing the total to three siege towers, Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, p. 116; Benvenisti, The 
Crusaders, pp. 37-38; William of Tyre, Chronicon 8.12, ed. Huygens, 1:401-2, trans. Babcock and Krey, 
1:560-61. 
251 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.15, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 422-23. Ralph of Caen 
and Fulcher of Chartres also make it clear that a number of defensive engines were used to target the 
northern tower, Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 123, RHC Oc 3, p. 691, trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, p. 
139; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.27.6, ed. Hagenmeyer, p. 296, trans. Ryan, p. 120. 
252 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC Oc 3, pp. 293-94, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 118-19; 
Gesta Francorum 10.37, ed. and trans. Hill, p. 89. 
253 Gesta Francorum 10.38, ed. and trans. Hill, p. 90; Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC 
Oc 3, p. 298, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 124-25; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.27.5, ed. 
Hagenmeyer, pp. 295-96, trans. Ryan, p. 120; Peter Tudebode, Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere 15.2, 
RHC Oc 3, pp. 107-8; Guibert of Nogent, Die gesta per Francos 7.6, ed. Huygens, pp. 275-78, trans. 
Levine, p. 128-29; Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 123, RHC Oc 3, p. 691, trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, 
p. 139; Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.9, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 414-15. 
254 It seems unlikely that the tower was designed so that it could be disassembled, as it took three days just 
to reassemble it once it was moved. Ralph of Caen claims that this manoeuvre was planned all along and 
the theory has since been supported by Thomas Asbridge, who suggests that the move took place on the 
night of July 13-14, rejecting the dating found in the Gesta and related sources, Asbridge, The Crusades, 
pp. 96-99. The ambiguous timing surrounding the construction of Robert of Normandy's tower at Courcy 
in January 1091, might suggest that such a tactic had been attempted before, Orderic Vitalis, Historiae 
ecclesiasticae 8.16, ed. Chibnall, 4:232-35. 
255 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.9, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 414-15. 
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 Supported by their artillery, 
the northern force of Franks used their 
ram to batter the forewall on 13-14 
July.256 The shaky siege tower was 
pushed up behind the ram and on 
Friday 15 July it was brought up 
against the main wall. In addition to 
denying the defenders along the 
rampart the protection of their 
battlements, the tower allowed the 
Franks to bridge the gap and gain 
access to the parapet. As the first 
Franks began stepping onto the walls, 
others were encouraged to bring up 
ladders and the northern defences were successfully stormed.257 To the south, the 
Provençal contingent launched a corresponding attack. 
 The southern force met stiff opposition from the defenders' artillery as they 
attempted to finish filling the fosse and advance their siege tower on 14 and 15 July. 
Unlike that built to the north, there was no room to manoeuvre the southern tower, leaving 
the defenders free to concentrate and then calibrate their artillery. The barrage had taken 
a toll on the sturdy tower by the time it was pushed forward on 15 July. Incendiaries were 
then thrown as it drew nearer. It seems these combustibles proved effective and the 
crippled tower was on the verge of being withdrawn when news arrived around noon that 
the northern contingents had broken into the city. Encouraged once more and with chaos 
consuming the town, they used ladders to force their way onto the parapet.258 From about 
midday on 15 July 1099, Jerusalem was subject to a thorough and brutal sack.  
                                                 
256 Rams create fractures in the masonry ahead of them, crushing rather than puncturing. The fractures form 
seems, so most of the mass that is removed is extracted by men with picks and prybars, rather than being 
smashed out of place by the machine itself. Because such engines are extremely cumbersome, France has 
argued, building on Albert of Aachen's account, that the ram used by the northern Franks was burnt in situ 
to clear its bulk from the path of the approaching tower, France, Victory in the East, pp. 349-50. 
257 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.9-12, 16-19, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 414-19, 422-29; 
Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.27.5-10, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 295-99, trans. Ryan, pp. 
120-21; Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 124-27, RHC Oc 3, pp. 691-94, trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, pp. 
139-43; Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC Oc 3, pp. 299-300, trans. Hill and Hill, p. 
127; Gesta Francorum 10.38, ed. and trans. Hill, pp. 90-92. 
258 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC Oc 3, pp. 298-99, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 125-27; 
Gesta Francorum 10.38, ed. and trans. Hill, pp. 90-91; Peter Tudebode, Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere 
Jerusalem: town and final deployment of 
crusaders in 1099, plan and topography 
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The Franks' Artillery 
Artillery was an important tactical tool employed by both the attackers and defenders. As 
with previous sieges of the First Crusade, the best indications of its power are somewhat 
morbid. The most illustrative descriptions of the capabilities of such engines are 
associated with an episode related by Peter Tudebode and Albert of Aachen concerning 
the treatment of a Muslim spy: 
 
They took him, with bound hands and feet, and put him in the sling of a machine 
called a petrera and intending with all their strength to hurl him into the city, they 
were unable to do so. For with such force it happened that his bonds broke before he 
arrived at the wall of the city and he was dismembered.259 
 
After this and other reports the messenger was handed back to the soldiers, and he 
was put into the [tormentum] of one of the mangonels with hands and feet bound, so 
that he would be thrown over the walls after the first and second charge. But the skin 
of the mangonel [sling] was too heavily weighed down by the weight of his body 
and did not throw the wretch far. He soon fell onto sharp stones near the walls, broke 
his neck, his nerves and bones, and is reported to have died instantly.260 
 
The machine described here is a traction trebuchet. The unfortunate spy was placed in the 
sling, which was attached to the end of the long arm of the beam, and the men pulling 
were hauling on the ropes attached to the end of the short arm. If the machine here was 
of the same dimensions as that which has been postulated may have been used against 
Nicaea, the prisoner, assigned a mass of 70 kg, would have been accelerated to such a 
limited velocity that he almost certainly would never have left the sling. However, if the 
axle is fitted to create a beam ratio of 2:1, decreasing mechanical advantage but increasing 
mechanical efficiency, and the downward pulling force is increased to represent close to 
1,000 kg, it might be possible to accelerate the unfortunate projectile to around 18 m/s, 
                                                 
15.3, RHC Oc 3, pp. 108-9; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.27.7, 11, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 
296-97, 299-300, trans. Ryan, pp. 120-21; Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.16-17, ed. and trans. 
Edgington, pp. 422-25. Raymond of Aguilers' account of the southern push is the most detailed but contains 
some conflicting information. For example he notes the existence of a forewall, which none of the other 
sources mention and for which there is no archaeological evidence. He also appears to suggest that the 
Provençal force built more than one siege tower; although possible, this is not corroborated by the other 
sources. 
259 This author's translation, atque eum acceptum, ligatis manibus ac pedibus, posuerent eum in funda 
cuzusdam ingenii, quod petrera vocatur, atque cum omnibus viribus suis cogitantes eum projicere infra 
civitatem, nequiverunt. Nam cum tanto impetu venit, quod, ruptis vinculis, antequam ad murum pervenisset 
civitatis, dilaceratus est. Peter Tudebode, Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere 15.2, RHC Oc 3, p. 107. 
260 Post hanc et ceteras relationes militibus restitutus, tormento cuiusdam mangene ligatis manibus et 
pedibus est inmissus ut sic post primam et secundam inundationem trans muros iataretur. Sed nimio 
corporis eius pondere pellis mangene grauata, non longe miserum proiecit. Qui mox iuxta muros corruens 
super asperos silices, fractis ceruicibus, neruis et ossibus, in momento extinctus fuisse refertur. Albert of 
Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.14, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 422-23. 
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subjecting him to a flight of about 30 m if he was thrown at an initial trajectory of 45. 
This range would be slightly extended if the projectile's flight ended below the horizontal 
plane of release, adding an additional 5 m of horizontal range if he landed at the base of 
a 6 m fosse for example.261 
 Given the limitations of traction power, throwing a mass this great, let alone of 
irregular size, is impractical. Testing carried out by modern reconstructions attempting to 
throw conglomerate masses of masonry have demonstrated the violence of the reciprocal 
centrifugal and centripetal forces that projectiles are subject to as they rapidly accelerate 
before release. These chunks of masonry are often torn apart through the firing sequence, 
ripping stone from mortar before the point of release. 
 There are no indications that the Franks employed counterweight trebuchets at 
Jerusalem and considering the limited supplies of suitable timber, and lack of any 
reference to wood brought from the Genoese ships being used to construct artillery, these 
engines do not appear to have been any stronger than those used at Nicaea or Antioch. 
Furthermore, their method of employment confirms that they were used as antipersonnel 
weapons. 
 Although Ralph of Caen and Albert of Aachen claim that sacks were hung from 
the walls to lessen the impact of the Frankish artillery, this tactic is more commonly used 
to protect siege towers from artillery and masonry fortifications from battering rams. In 
the account of Fulcher of Chartres, who like Ralph and Albert was not present at the siege, 
the Muslims tied two beams across the battlements as additional protection. The same 
beams then served as the bridge from Godfrey's tower to the wall in this version of 
events.262 While these beams can be interpreted as fulfilling a similar purpose to the sacks 
found in the accounts of Ralph and Albert, they were as likely used as a type of improvised 
hoarding: rather than shielding the walls, they provided additional temporary cover for 
those men on the parapet.263 By securing the beams over and in front of the merlons, the 
Muslims would have been able to protect themselves better from the Frankish artillery 
                                                 
261 Froissart provides an account of a trebuchet being used successfully to throw an emissary back into 
Auberoche during the Hundred Years War, Froissart, Chroniques 1.1.218, ed. Luce, 3:65. 
262 Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 124-25, RHC Oc 3, pp. 692-93, trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, pp, 140-
42; Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.17-19, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 424-29; Fulcher of 
Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.27.8, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 297-98, trans. Ryan, pp. 120-21. 
263 Unlike more developed hoarding or machicolations, these improvised measures would not likely have 
provided the means to assault those at the base of the walls, directly below the defenders. 
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and archers as well as those on top of the siege tower.264 Decreasing the size of the crenels 
in this way would have left enough space to fire through, but the added protection came 
at the expense of restricting the vertical field of view. While this may appear to have been 
a significant weakness, most arrows and slung stones fired against those who approached 
the base of a walls would have come from flanking towers rather than the battlements 
above, where the defenders were more likely to drop stones, requiring minimal visibility 
to do so. 
 
The Muslims' Artillery 
Despite the emphasis that has been placed on the Frankish engines, the sources seem to 
agree that the defenders enjoyed an advantage in artillery. Retrospectively, William of 
Tyre judged the Muslims' machines to have been superior to those of the Franks because 
they were constructed from materials brought into Jerusalem ahead of the siege, 
supplemented with structural beams harvested from buildings within the city.265 
Raymond of Aguilers says these tormenta and petrariae outnumbered those of the Franks 
by nine or ten to one while Albert of Aachen gives the definitive figure of fourteen 
mangenae, nine of which were directed against the Provençal tower.266 The incendiaries 
that were thrown by these engines at times were conglomerates of pitch, sulphur and other 
components, mixed to a consistency that would help them stick to the siege towers, or 
containers of combustibles that were provided with iron spikes to achieve the same end.267 
 Possibly reflecting the comparative strength of the southern siege tower, the 
defenders arrayed more artillery against it than against that to the north. From its prepared 
positions, the defending artillery was able to seriously cripple the stronger siege tower by 
the final stages of the siege. To the north, the defenders were forced to reposition their 
artillery when the Franks moved their siege tower and the focus of their assault eastward. 
The urban environment behind the walls may have posed challenges not only to moving 
                                                 
264 This is all postulated. Fulcher did not arrive in Jerusalem until the following year so was not an 
eyewitness of the siege, although neither was Albert of Aachen, who never visited the East. The latter's 
account states that this timber was a large tree trunk, covered in combustibles, which the defenders 
attempted to use to burn Godfrey's tower, Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.18-19, ed. and trans. 
Edgington, pp. 426-29. 
265 William of Tyre, Chronicon 8.8, 13, ed. Huygens, 1:395-96, 403-4, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:354, 
361-63. 
266 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC Oc 3, p. 298, trans. Hill and Hill, p. 125; Albert of 
Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.15, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 422-23. 
267 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.27.6, 9, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 296, 298-99, trans. Ryan, 
pp. 120-21; Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorum 20, RHC Oc 3, pp. 298-99, trans. Hill and Hill, pp. 
125-26. 
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the defensive engines but also effectively firing them from their new location.268 Albert 
of Aachen claims that the Muslims' artillery struggled to hit the siege tower as it advanced 
because there was not a sufficient open space between the buildings that would allow it 
to fire effectively. Each engine would have required an open area of space directly behind 
it equal to the length of the long arm of the beam plus that of the affixed sling, allowing 
the projectile to complete its arcing pre-release flight path uninterrupted. As the tower 
neared the wall and gained its protection, projectiles had to be released at increasingly 
high trajectories with decreasing accuracy.269 Despite these difficulties, enough fire was 
brought to bear against the northern tower to reveal its structural weakness. Devoid of the 
more sturdy beams brought by the Genoese from Jaffa, the tower was leaning to one side 
by the time it reached the northern wall. 
 
The stone-throwers employed throughout the First Crusade were almost certainly traction 
trebuchets.270 Although the conduct of the Franks at Jerusalem is commonly portrayed as 
the result of a two-year learning experience, this is a drastic over simplification.271 The 
individuals involved would have sharpened their martial skills over time, but this is true 
of any extended campaign. While some of its leaders gained more experience than they 
had previously gathered in Europe, the tactics employed by the Franks at each siege were 
the product of pre-existing European traditions and not new methods learned through the 
course of their travels. The artillery that they employed was of a known and familiar type. 
It continued to be used as a supporting weapon, in an antipersonnel capacity, while mining 
was the most effective breaching tactic. Although rarely acknowledged, the most 
effective and decisive siege weapon employed by the crusaders was the ladder. 
The Franks possessed neither a superior tradition in arms nor technology and the 
artillery used by the Franks appears to have been fairly similar in both capability and form 
to that of their Muslim adversaries. Rather than any tactical or technological advantage, 
the most significant advantage that the crusaders enjoyed through this episode was the 
determination of the rank and file and unity of their purpose. The goal of Jerusalem and 
                                                 
268 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.17, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 424-25. Ralph of Caen 
also notes this redeployment, Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 123, RHC Oc 3, p. 691, trans. Bachrach and 
Bachrach, p. 139. 
269 For an examination of this practice, see Chapter 5. See also Chapter 9. 
270 Most of those who suggest otherwise are not well acquainted with the broader study of artillery, as their 
focus lies elsewhere, for example, Asbridge, The First Crusade, pp. 55, 127; Kostick, The Siege of 
Jerusalem, pp. 82-83. 
271 For example, Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, p. 87. Cf. France, Victory in the East, p. 370. 
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the promised grace that its liberation offered was enough to inspire many who otherwise 
inexplicably endured the hardships associated with the march from Europe to Palestine 
and months of gruelling siege conditions. It was these individuals who were largely 
responsible for the labour which went into constructing the Frankish war machines and 
less glorious tasks associated with their function.  
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4. Artillery in the Twelfth Century               
Limitations (1099-1187) 
 
 
 
The Opening Decades 
 
Following the sieges of the First Crusade, artillery was used both offensively and 
defensively throughout the twelfth century. In the opening decades, there are fewer 
comprehensive Frankish sources for the campaigns launched in northern Syria than there 
are to the south in Palestine. This produces a skewed image of where and how artillery 
was employed. Although there is anecdotal evidence that artillery was used by the 
Frankish lords of Antioch and Tripoli, it is more frequently mentioned during sieges 
undertaken by the forces of Jerusalem. Even when analysing events in Palestine, there are 
certain issues when dealing with the written sources and little archaeological evidence 
against which to evaluate their testimony. 
The closest Frankish source to events in Palestine during the early twelfth century 
was Fulcher of Chartres, chaplain of Baldwin I of Jerusalem. He repeatedly states that his 
chronicle was written to give a true and accurate account of events surrounding the Franks 
in the Holy Land, but it is not as complete as might be desired, having undergone as many 
as three redactions, and, like the similar narratives composed by his contemporaries, is in 
part a work of propaganda. Although he lived in Jerusalem from late 1100, Fulcher 
maintained an interest in affairs to the north throughout the remainder of his life. While 
Fulcher appears to have made use of the Gesta and Raymond of Aguilers' account before 
composing his account of the First Crusade, he relies on his own knowledge and 
information obtained from others around him when composing the subsequent portion of 
his work.272 The account of Albert of Aachen is, according to Susan Edgington, "the most 
                                                 
272 For a discussion of Fulcher of Chartres, his sources and work, see Fulcher of Chartres, Historia 
Hierosolymitana, trans. Ryan, pp. 3-56, esp. pp. 42-46. 
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complete, most detailed, and most colourful of the contemporary narratives of the First 
Crusade and the careers of the first generation of Latin settlers in Outremer (1095-1119)." 
Albert's account was written independent of any knowledge of contemporary accounts. 
Although he never visited the East himself, he appears to have relied primarily on the oral 
testimony of those who had been on crusade, rendering his account detailed but suspect.273 
Although writing much later in the twelfth century and in a deliberately classical style, 
William of Tyre made use of the accounts of both Fulcher and Albert when composing 
his account of the events of the early twelfth century. Given his position in the Church 
and later role as Chancellor of the kingdom of Jerusalem, he probably had access to many 
other sources to supplement the works of his predecessors.274 While all three wrote with 
a slightly different audience in mind, each may have hoped that their work would inspire 
Europeans to take up the cross and help defend Latin control of the Holy Land. 
 From the Muslim perspective, the work of Ibn al-Qalanisi, a high-ranking 
Damascene civil servant, is of paramount importance up to the author's death in 1160. 
The nature of his position provided an ideal perspective from which to compose a 
chronicle of events from first-hand knowledge of pertinent documents and oral 
testimony.275 In the same year that Ibn al-Qalanisi died, another great Muslim historian, 
Ibn al-Athir, was born. Ibn al-Athir made extensive use of the histories written before his 
own time, including that of Ibn al-Qalanisi, to compile a more complete, if more distant, 
history of events, written mainly from Mosul. Ibn al-Athir does not appear to have held a 
high administrative or bureaucratic post, but was patronised by the Zangids, towards 
whom his work is slightly partial.276 
 The sources for this period and those that follow must each be considered 
independently. Few of these authors who were eyewitnesses to the sieges that they 
describe and would have had little direct knowledge of contemporary artillery. However, 
each would have been familiar with the concept of mechanical artillery, both from earlier 
writings to which they had access and from oral descriptions of contemporary engines 
provided by those more acquainted with siege warfare. Both would inevitably have 
                                                 
273 For a discussion of Albert of Aachen, his sources and work, see Albert of Aachen, Historia 
Ierosolimitana, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. xxi-xxxvii. 
274 For a discussion of William of Tyre, his sources and work, see Edbury and Rowe, William of Tyre, pp. 
13-58. 
275 For a discussion of Ibn al-Qalanisi, his sources and work, see Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 8-
14. 
276 For a discussion of Ibn al-Athir, his sources and work, see Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:1-
5. 
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influenced their portrayal of these engines. Given this imprecision, it will be highlighted 
when certain sources were eyewitnesses to described events. Inevitably, there are issues 
of reliability, exaggeration and bias with any documentary source, but until sources 
become more numerous later in the period, little can be done but to evaluate how each 
source treats artillery.277 
 
The Palestinian Coast 
The initial thrust of Frankish expansion in Palestine was across Galilee and along the 
Mediterranean coast. The sieges of these coastal towns received the most descriptive 
contemporary accounts and provide the clearest insight into Frankish artillery during this 
period of expansion. Albert of Aachen states that Godfrey of Bouillon spent six weeks 
constructing mangenae and other siege engines during the siege of Arsuf in 1099.278 
Despite the presence of two siege towers, the attack failed.279 The following year, Albert 
asserts that seven mangenae were used to support a siege tower built during the Veneto-
Frankish assault on Haifa led by Tancred.280 Godfrey's successor, Baldwin I of Jerusalem, 
renewed efforts against Arsuf in 1101, this time with Genoese assistance. The town 
surrendered very quickly, despite Fulcher of Chartres' account of a Frankish siege tower 
collapsing under the weight of its occupants. Artillery is not even summarily mentioned 
by the sources at this siege.281 After Arsuf had been garrisoned, the Franks turned on 
Caesarea, less than 40 km to the north. 
 At Caesarea, efforts once more focused on the construction of a siege tower. This 
was built from the masts and oars of ships and it is tempting to suggest that prepared 
timbers were also used to construct the petrariae that were used to protect the tower. After 
fifteen days of bombardment, and with their siege tower still incomplete, a general assault 
was launched with ladders. The zeal of the Franks and apparent effectiveness of their 
artillery, which Fulcher of Chartres claims was able to damage the parapet, allowed the 
                                                 
277 Visual sources have a similar set of issues. For a complimentary examination of illustrative sources, 
see Appendix 1. 
278 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 7.1-5, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 486-93. 
279 This failure is often attributed to the absence of Italian naval assistance, a point emphasised by William 
of Tyre the better part of a century later, William of Tyre, Chronicon 9.19, ed. Huygens, 1:446, trans. 
Babcock and Krey, 1:409-10. For an analysis of the Fatimid fleet at this time, see Hamblin, "The Fatimid 
Navy," pp. 77-83. 
280 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 7.22-25, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 516-21. 
281 See Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 7.54, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 562-63; Fulcher of 
Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 2.8, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 395-400, trans. Ryan, pp. 151-53; Caffaro, 
Annales, ed. Belgrano, p. 9, trans. Hall and Philips, p. 53; William of Tyre, Chronicon 10.13 (14), ed. 
Huygens, 1:468-69, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:433-35. 
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Franks to storm the town.282 The location of this 
damage suggests that the Frankish artillery was 
either targeting the battlements or the defenders 
behind them. Although these engines probably 
posed little threat to the city's defences, they 
appear to have been sufficiently powerful to have 
left an impression on the soft kurkar sandstone 
used in their construction.283 The amount of 
energy capable of producing such an effect would 
also have been sufficient to damage most 
improvised defences that might have been set up 
along the parapet, similar to those used at 
Jerusalem in 1099. It is likely to have been reports of this superficial damage that so 
impressed Fulcher, who was probably based in Jerusalem at this time. 
 Baldwin I's attentions next turned to Acre. The city had been besieged 
unsuccessfully by his brother Godfrey in 1100,284 and Baldwin himself failed before its 
walls in 1103.285 Fulcher of Chartres, followed by William of Tyre, notes that the latter 
attempt was a brief siege, confined mainly to burning the surrounding gardens. Albert of 
Aachen, however, gives a more sensational account, which includes the mention of a 
siege tower and mangenae during a five-week siege that brought the Franks to the verge 
of success before a Muslim relief force arrived by sea. 
 When Baldwin moved against Acre in May 1104, he did so with the aid of a 
Genoese fleet. After the city had been assaulted for around twenty days, again with the 
assistance of siege engines, the defenders were compelled to seek terms of surrender.286 
                                                 
282 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 2.9, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 400-4, trans. Ryan, pp. 153-55; 
Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 7.55-56, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 564-67; Caffaro, Annales, 
ed. Belgrano, pp. 9-12, trans. Hall and Phillips, pp. 53-56; William of Malmesbury, De gestis rerum 
Anglorum 4.380, ed. Stubbs, 2:444-45, trans. Giles, pp. 405-6; William of Tyre, Chronicon 10.14 (15), ed. 
Huygens, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:435-37. For less detailed Muslim perspectives, see Ibn al-Qalanisi, 
Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 51; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:47-48. 
283 Cf. the siege of Arsuf (1265) in Chapter 7. 
284 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 51; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:47. 
285 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 2.22, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 456-57, trans. Ryan, pp. 174-
75; William of Tyre, Chronicon 10.25 (26), ed. Huygens, 1:485, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:453; Albert of 
Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 9.19, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 660-61. William of Tyre asserts that 
the failure of the siege of Acre in 1103 was due to a lack of naval support. 
286 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 2.25.1, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 462-63, trans. Ryan, p. 176; 
Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 9.27, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 670-71; Caffaro, Annales, ed. 
Belgrano, p. 14, trans. Hall and Phillips, p. 57; Caffaro, De liberatione, ed. Belgrano, pp. 121-22, trans. 
Palestine 
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William of Tyre stresses the ingenuity of the Frankish artillery that was placed around the 
city and seems to imply that artillery was mounted on top of the Franks' siege towers, 
when he says that large stones were thrown from them. If stone-throwing engines were 
positioned on top of these siege towers, the size of these machines would have been 
restricted. There is evidence that swing-beam artillery was used in this way, possibly at 
Breval in 1092 and at Durazzo in 1081;287 however, accounts of large stones being thrown 
from the tops of siege towers are common and in most cases the apparent trajectory of 
these stones would suggest that they were tossed by hand. 
 Although the details found in William of Tyre's later account may add certain 
embellishments to the earlier accounts upon which this part of his chronicle is based, they 
are nevertheless important in confirming the tactical objectives and capability of these 
engines. Descriptions of damage done to the crenellations and buildings behind the 
defensive curtain reinforce the notion that the battlements of the city were targeted by the 
Franks' stone-throwers. Accordingly, literal readings of more colourful assertions, which 
have led some historians to conclude that these engines "destroyed the city walls and 
buildings within", are entirely unfounded.288 
 Artillery remained an important weapon as the Franks entered the second decade 
of their tenure in the East. Albert of Aachen notes the use of artillery by Bertrand of 
Toulouse against Tripoli in 1109, a piece of information corroborated by Ibn al-Qalanisi 
but absent from the account of Fulcher of Chartres.289 Albert states that the Franks also 
used artillery against both Beirut and Sidon in 1110 and at the drawn-out, and eventually 
unsuccessful, siege of Tyre in 1111-12. Writing later, William of Tyre includes stone-
throwing machines in his account of the siege of Beirut while the contemporary Muslim 
authority, Ibn al-Qalanisi, followed by Ibn al-Athir, notes their use against Tyre. Artillery 
                                                 
Hall and Phillips, p. 123; William of Tyre, Chronicon 10.27 (28), ed. Huygens, 1:486-87, trans. Babcock 
and Krey, 1:454-56; Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 61-62. Ibn al-Athir does not mention any siege 
equipment at this siege, Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:78-79. 
287 Orderic Vitalis, Historiae ecclesiasticae 8.24, ed. and trans. Chibnall, 4:288-89; Anna Comnena, Alexiad 
4.1, trans. Sewter, p. 135. 
288 This quote is from Benvenisti, The Crusaders, p. 81; however, the practice of taking such enthusiastic 
testimony literally is endemic. 
289 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 11.11, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 782-83; Ibn al-Qalanisi, 
Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 88-90; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 2.40-41, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 
526-33, trans. Ryan, pp. 193-96. See also Caffaro, De liberatione, ed. Belgrano, p. 123, trans. Hall and 
Phillips, pp. 123-24; Caffaro, Annales, ed. Belgrano, p. 14, trans. Hall and Phillips, p. 57. Tripoli had been 
blockaded to some degree since 1102, originally by Raymond of St Gilles and then his nephew William 
Jordan, before Bertrand arrived. 
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was also used defensively by the defenders of Beirut, according to Ibn al-Qalanisi, and 
the defenders of Sidon and Tyre, according to Albert of Aachen.290 
 Although artillery was frequently used by the Franks against the cities of coastal 
Palestine during the first decade of the twelfth century, the principal siege weapon used 
at many of these sieges was the siege tower. Artillery was used in a secondary role, 
supporting these towers, and this is why it is frequently mentioned but given little more 
than a nominal notice on most occasions. However, the repeated use of such engines is 
notable: indicating that the value of these machines justified the time, cost and manpower 
required to construct and operate them. 
 
The North 
Evidence for the use of artillery in northern Syria is more obscure; for instance, no such 
machines are mentioned in Ralph of Caen's otherwise detailed account of Tancred's siege 
of Latakia.291 As in Palestine, Albert of Aachen notes the presence of artillery at more 
sieges than any other contemporary source during the first quarter of the twelfth century. 
He mentions its use at Apamea in 1106 and al-Atharib in 1110 and specifies that twelve 
mangenae were used against Vetula (Qal'at Bani Qahtan) in 1111.292 Although it is 
possible that artillery was used at certain sieges, despite not being mentioned by most 
sources, the terrain of northern and western Syria also favoured a more mobile form of 
warfare. Siege tactics had to be more flexible when confronting the generally smaller and 
more topographically isolated strongholds of these regions. 
 Unlike the early set-piece sieges undertaken against the urban centres of coastal 
Palestine, most of the successful sieges in Syria at this time were concluded by a rapid 
escalade, or a quick surrender in the face of the imminent threat of such. By comparison, 
the gentle topography around the towns of the Palestinian littoral made them much more 
approachable and the greater circumference of their town walls meant that they were 
                                                 
290 For Beirut, Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 11.15-16, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 788-89; 
William of Tyre, Chronicon 11.13, ed. Huygens, 1:515, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:484-86; Ibn al-Qalanisi, 
Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 99-100. For Sidon, Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 11.31-34, ed. and 
trans. Edgington, pp. 804-9. For Tyre, Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 12.6, ed. and trans. 
Edgington, pp. 830-33; Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 122-23; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. 
Richards, 1:157. Only Albert of Aachen mentions artillery at the siege of Sidon in 1108, Albert of Aachen, 
Historia Ierosolimitana 10.46-51, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 760-67. 
291 Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 144, RHC Oc 3, pp. 706-9, trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, pp. 159-63. 
292 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 10.20-21, 11.44-47, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 738-39, 
820-25. For Apamea, cf. Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 69-70; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. 
Richards, 1:92-93. For al-Atharib, cf. Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, p. 206; Ibn al-
Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 105-6; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:153. 
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reliant on much larger bodies of fighting men to defend them. Whereas these conditions 
encouraged the use of siege towers and supporting artillery, the smaller more isolated 
strongholds of Syria were less susceptible to such tactics and instead encouraged massed 
frontal assaults or more passive blockades. The major urban centres of this region, with 
more extensive and approachable defences, including Aleppo, Hama and Homs, were not 
subject to an earnest siege by the Franks during this period. Thus the apparent absence of 
artillery from most sieges north of Palestine at this time probably reflects the rougher 
terrain and smaller population centres that were invested as much as the disparity of 
source material. But the Franks were not the only ones using artillery offensively. 
 
Jaffa: 1123 
The sieges of the First Crusade reveal that the Muslims of Syria-Palestine were as familiar 
with artillery as were their Frankish opponents. The only Latin reference to Muslims 
employing these engines during the first decade of the twelfth century is found in Albert 
of Aachen's account of an attack on Castellum Arnaldi, a small castle commanding the 
main western approach to Jerusalem through the Judean hills.293 From the Muslim 
perspective, artillery is noted by Ibn al-Qalanisi during the siege of rebellious Baalbek by 
Tughtakin of Damascus in March-April 1110.294 Few details are provided concerning the 
Damascenes' siege engines or how they were used before an amicable surrender was 
arranged, thirty-five days after the siege had begun. 
 In May 1123, Fatimid forces from Ascalon took advantage of Baldwin I's captivity 
to make an assault on Jaffa. What is particularly interesting about this episode is that 
Fulcher of Chartres claims that the attackers brought their artillery with them to Jaffa. 
The implication that these machines were prefabricated, along with Fulcher's claim that 
they threw sizable stones, appears to suggest that these were significant engines. 
However, both Fulcher's tendency to stress the power of artillery and the relatively small 
size of even 'large' projectiles at this time should be taken into consideration. Furthermore, 
a close reading of Fulcher's account reveals that these tormenta were used in a familiar 
manner: to target the battlements of Jaffa and more generally to apply pressure, both 
                                                 
293 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 10.14, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 730-33. This castle was 
rebuilt in 1132-33 by the patriarch of Jerusalem, William of Tyre, Chronicon 14.8, ed. Huygens, 2:639-40, 
trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:58. See also Pringle, Secular Buildings, no. 231, pp. 106-7; Pringle, "Templar 
Castles between Jaffa and Jerusalem," pp. 103-8. 
294 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 96-98. 
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physically and psychologically, to the besieged.295 Fulcher checks any notion that these 
were exceptionally large engines when he states that after five days of bombardment the 
walls had sustained minimal damage and that most was inflicted along the battlements. 
Finally, Fulcher's claim that these engines could fire from beyond the range of the 
garrison's archers seems to be an exaggeration, intended more to emphasise their 
impressive range than to give an accurate definition of it. Testimony from other sieges, 
such as the siege of Acre in 1189-91, directly contradicts this notion, as  so it appears  
does surviving illustrative evidence.296 The range of modern reconstructed traction 
trebuchets has also proved to be significantly less than the 200 m range of the most 
impressive medieval archers.297 
 It is only when Fulcher notes the approach of the Frankish relief force that the real 
thrust of the Egyptian assault on Jaffa becomes clear. Under partial cover of their artillery, 
Fatimid sappers were undermining the town walls. Unable to open a breach that would 
have allowed them to overwhelm the relatively small garrison before relief arrived, the 
Egyptians were compelled to dismantle their engines and evacuate them with the army to 
their ships. Despite Fulcher's apparent confirmation of the value of these engines, having 
been withdrawn rather than abandoned, it is the threat posed by the Fatimid miners that 
William of Tyre emphasises in his later account of this siege, omitting any mention of 
artillery.298 
 
 
 
Tyre: 1124 
 
In 1124 the Franks launched what was probably their largest siege operation since the 
First Crusade. Apart from Ascalon, Tyre was at this point the only remaining Muslim-
held outpost on the Palestinian coast. The ancient Phoenician stronghold was surrounded 
by the sea and joined to the mainland by a shallow tombolo, which was enlarged during 
                                                 
295 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 3.17, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 661-63, trans. Ryan, pp. 240-
41. See also Historia Nicaena 80, RHC Oc 5, p. 184. Cf. Ibn Muyassar, Akhbar Misr, RHC Or 3, p. 469. 
296 See Figs. B3, B4, B12 and B19. For the siege of Acre, see Chapter 5. 
297 See Appendix 4. 
298 William of Tyre, Chronicon 12.21, ed. Huygens, 1:572-73, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:545-47. The 
assault is also found in the account of Ibn Muyassar who states that the Fatimids had hoped for Abbasid 
support, they withdrew when it was not forthcoming, Ibn Muyassar, Akhbar Misr, RHC Or 3, p. 469. 
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Alexander the Great's famous siege in 332 BC.299 A millennium and a half later, the 
proverbial strength of the city was still emphasised by those who visited.300 The impetus 
for the siege in 1124 was the arrival of a Venetian fleet. The Venetians obviously intended 
to undertake a siege while in the Holy Land as Fulcher of Chartres states that they had 
brought long timbers with them, specifically those that were well suited for building siege 
engines.301 This is the only cargo that Fulcher notes and, apart from the number of ships 
                                                 
299 Marriner, Morhange and Meulé, "Holocene morphogenesis," pp. 9,218-23. 
300 For example, William of Tyre, Chronicon 22.30 (29), ed. Huygens, 2:1057, trans. Babcock and Krey, 
2:501; Ibn Jubayr, Rihla, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 319-20. See also Anna Comnena, Alexiad 14.2, trans. 
Sewter, p. 442; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:328. For the medieval defences of Tyre, see 
Chapter 5. 
301 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 3.14, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 655-57, trans. Ryan, p. 238-
39; William of Tyre, Chronicon 13.6, ed. Huygens, 1:593, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:10. See also Historia 
Nicaena 80, RHC Oc 5, p. 185. 
Tyre: town, plan (from Pringle) 
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that composed the fleet, the only real detail that he highlights about this force upon its 
arrival. 
 Under the leadership of the patriarch of Jerusalem and the doge of Venice, Tyre 
was invested from mid-February 1124. The Franks attempted to establish a blockade, 
digging two lines of trenches around the east end of the isthmus, cutting off the besieged 
and providing protection from hostile field forces, while all but one of the Venetian ships 
were pulled up on shore.302 Carpenters then used the materials brought by the Venetians, 
and probably harvested additional timber from one or more of the beached vessels, to 
build siege towers and other engines.303 
 Various terms are used by the sources to identify the Frankish artillery. Fulcher 
of Chartres ambiguously notes the construction of machinae at the start of the siege.304 A 
half-century after these events, William of Tyre specifies that some of these were 
machinae iaculatoriae, which could throw large stones against the town's walls and 
towers and terrorise the townspeople, while these are rendered as perrieres and 
mangoniaux in the subsequent Eracles translation.305 Although this may appear to 
represent the creative licence of later sources, many Syriac sources also specify that 
artillery was built by the Franks to support their siege towers.306 The garrison also 
employed artillery. 
 William of Tyre claims that the hail of defensive fire, from both artillery within 
the city and archers along the battlements, made it perilous for those guarding the 
Frankish siege towers and those moving to join or relieve the attackers within them.307 
Although there were still dangers faced by those inside, it would appear that the defenders' 
artillery was unable to threaten the immediate structural integrity of the siege towers. The 
strength of the Frankish engines would appear to have been comparable. 
                                                 
302 William of Tyre, Chronicon 13.4, 6, ed. Huygens, 1:590, 593-94, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:7, 10; 
Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, trans. Tritton, pp. 94-95. 
303 The rough February seas would have made beaching the fleet necessary; however, a significant part of 
it was launched later in the siege, restricting the amount of timber that the Franks could have harvested 
from these vessels. 
304 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 3.31.1, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 721-23, trans. Ryan, p. 262. 
305 Machinas nichilominus iaculatorias fabricari precipit, quibus magnis molaribus turres et menia 
concutiantur et civibus terror inferatur. William of Tyre, Chronicon 13.6, ed. Huygens, 1:593, trans. 
Babcock and Krey, 2:10; Eracles 13.6, ed. RHC Oc 1, p. 563. 
306 Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, pp. 233-34; Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, trans. 
Tritton, p. 95. Cf. Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 170-72; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 
1:252-53. 
307 William of Tyre, Chronicon 13.6, ed. Huygens, 1:593-94, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:10-11. 
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 Although William of Tyre claims that the Frankish artillery threw 'huge' 
projectiles and that the walls and towers of Tyre were nearly demolished by their barrage, 
his reference to numerous shots passing over the walls and damaging buildings within the 
city suggest that it was the parapet that was targeted. Similar allusions to impressive 
power but also the concentration of fire at the level of the parapet are found throughout 
both Fulcher of Chartres' and William of Tyre's accounts of various sieges. But had these 
engines posed a serious threat to fortified masonry, there would have been had little need 
to target the parapet. Instead, a more productive breach could be opened if lower sections 
of wall were targeted. Despite William of Tyre's colourful imagery of dust clouds created 
by the ferocity of the Frankish barrage, there is little evidence to suggest that engines as 
implicitly powerful as this were used even a half century later when William was writing 
his account of events. A certain episode during the siege further confuses matters. 
 At one point in the siege, Fulcher of Chartres notes that the defenders mounted a 
raid against the most formidable of the Franks' machines, successfully burning it. Fulcher 
describes this engine as having been used to "shatter the towers and the city walls by 
hurling rocks and riddling the defences with holes."308 Although no medieval swing-beam 
siege engine was ever capable of firing cleanly through defensive masonry, this suggests 
that the projectiles of the besieging artillery may have been thrown hard enough to leave 
an impression upon impact, as seems to have been the case at Caesarea in 1101. This 
particular episode becomes more confusing when set against William of Tyre's account 
of a very similar sally, which again led to the burning of a notable Frankish engine. 
William does not state what type of machine was targeted by the party of defenders but 
his implication that the siege towers were their main objective makes it more likely that 
he considered it to have been one of the towers that was set alight rather than a 
trebuchet.309 Unlike Fulcher, William states that the fire was extinguished and that the 
party responsible for setting the fire was apprehended and killed, leaving it entirely 
possible that the two sources are describing separate events. 
 
Havedic 
The climax of the siege in William of Tyre's account involves a certain character known 
as Havedic. William states that a particular stone-thrower of the defenders was wreaking 
                                                 
308 ...qua solebant turres antea iactis lapidibus conquassari et vehementissime perforari. Fulcher of 
Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 3.32.1-2, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 728-30, trans. Ryan, pp. 264-65. 
309 William of Tyre, Chronicon 13.10, ed. Huygens, 1:597, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:15. 
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havoc on the Frankish siege towers. Despite noting earlier that experts were manning the 
Frankish artillery, William claims that no one in the Frankish camp was sufficiently 
skilled to destroy this menacing engine with one of their own stone-throwers. 
Accordingly, an Armenian expert, Havedic, was summoned from Antioch and then paid 
from the public treasury upon his arrival. The Franks apparently succeeded in targeting 
the defensive engine with Havedic's help, though William provides no more details.310 
 Havedic and the events surrounding him at Tyre are found only in William of 
Tyre's account of the siege.311 Fulcher's silence is particularly notable as he was most 
likely living and writing in Jerusalem at this point in time.312 Many historians have lent 
their interpretations to the events surrounding Havedic's presence at Tyre, despite the 
absence of a corroborative account.313 Among them, Ronnie Ellenblum has argued that 
this may represent the first use of a counterweight trebuchet by Frankish forces.314 
Similarly, Paul Chevedden suggests that the Armenian introduced Byzantine gravity-
powered artillery technology to the siege.315 However, there is little evidence to suggest 
that any one of the machines employed at Tyre was more significant, powerful, or sizable 
than those used elsewhere by the Franks previously or that any Frankish engine was 
significantly more impressive than those of the defenders. Although it is entirely possible 
that there was experimentation with small counterweight trebuchets by 1124, it cannot be 
concluded with certainty that Havedic was brought to Tyre to construct such an engine. 
 Firstly, any suggestion that a small counterweight trebuchet is more difficult to 
construct than a traction trebuchet of similar size is baseless: additional skill is only 
required when the components become too large to be moved by hand. Secondly, there 
are few benefits to employing a small counterweight trebuchet. Although such an engine 
might produce slightly more power than a traction trebuchet of comparable size, it will 
suffer from a much lower rate of fire. It is this trade-off that ensured that the traction 
trebuchet remained in use long after large counterweight trebuchets were developed. But 
regardless of size, the counterweight trebuchet was an accurate engine provided the 
                                                 
310 William of Tyre, Chronicon 13.10, ed. Huygens, 1:597-98, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:15-16. 
311 Babcock and Krey suggested that William's specificity alone makes his account of this episode credible, 
William of Tyre, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:16 n. 23. 
312 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 3.34.5, ed. Hagenmeyer, p. 736, trans. Ryan, p. 267. 
313 For the figure of Havedic (Awétik) and the context, see Dédéyan, Les Arméniens, pp. 462-3, 513, 536, 
861-63. 
314 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, p. 210. 
315 Chevedden, "Invention," p. 92. This appears to clash with Chevedden's own theory that such engines 
had already been used by the Franks at Nicaea in 1097, Chevedden, "Invention," pp. 76-79. 
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components and masses involved were not altered. Numerous small adjustments could be 
made, such as changing the length of the sling or angle of the release finger, to adjust an 
engine's range without altering the primary components. This allowed subsequent shots 
to be walked in or out relatively easily. Finally, if increasing accuracy was the reason for 
summoning an expert, it is more likely that the machines being employed were traction 
trebuchets. Traction models require teams pulling in a single synchronised motion to 
replicate the same force with each shot. Range can be adjusted by altering the amount of 
pulling force that the team applies to each shot or by attempting to maintain a constant 
amount of pulling force and altering the length of the sling or angle of the release finger. 
In either case, honing in on and maintaining a specific range is much more difficult. As 
William of Tyre does not state that Havedic constructed any kind of engine upon his 
arrival, let alone one with a new type of power source, it remains just as likely that if an 
artillery expert was summoned it was done to manage the artillery crews or adjust their 
traction trebuchets. Regardless of these details, it was the blockade that compelled the 
garrison of Tyre to sue for peace. On 7 July, in an anti-climactic end, the garrison of Tyre 
marched out and Frankish forces took control of the city after a five-month siege.316 
 
 
 
Offensives of Zanki and John Comnenus 
 
To the north, most references to artillery during the 1120s are found in Matthew of 
Edessa's chronicle. Among them, Matthew includes the employment of stone-throwers at 
Balak's siege of Kharput in 1122, after its Frankish prisoners had taken control of the 
castle, as well as his siege of Muslim-held Manbij in 1124. Although the Syriac sources, 
notably Michael the Syrian, Bar Hebraeus and the Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, claim 
that it was artillery rather than mining that compelled the Franks to surrender Kharput, 
neither the Frankish sources nor their Muslim counterparts mention artillery at either 
siege.317 Matthew also notes artillery at Bursuqi's siege of 'Azaz in 1225; this is 
                                                 
316 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 3.34.1-3, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 733-35, trans. Ryan, p. 
266; William of Tyre, Chronicon 13.13-14, ed. Huygens, 1:600-2, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:18-21; Ibn 
al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 170-72; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:252-53. 
317 For Kharput, Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, pp. 229-30; Michael the Syrian, 
Chronicon 15.13, trans. Chabot, 3:211-12; Bar Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. Budge, 1:251; 
Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, trans. Tritton, p. 93. See also Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 
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corroborated by Fulcher of Chartres, William of Tyre and the Anonymous Syriac 
Chronicle but omitted by the Muslim sources.318 Matthew specifies that twelve engines 
were used against 'Azaz but that the breaches that were opened in the walls, also noticed 
by Ibn al-Qalanisi, were brought about by mining. Despite the number of sources that 
take notice of artillery at these sieges, none of them provides any clear indications of the 
strength or power source of any of these engines. But when considered in relation to 
instances of Fatimid-employed artillery, such as at the defence of Jerusalem (1099), 
Beirut (1110), Sidon (1110) and Tyre (1111-12) and assaults on Castellum Arnaldi 
(1106/7) and Jaffa (1123), as well as the apparent use of artillery by Tughtakin of 
Damascus against Baalbek (1110), the rulers of Mosul were far from the only Muslims 
                                                 
3.23-26.2, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 676-91, trans. Ryan, pp. 246-54; Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 169; 
Kamal al-Din, Bughyat, RHC Or 3, p. 637; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:244; William of Tyre, 
Chronicon 12.18, ed. Huygens, 1:568, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:541-44. Cf. Orderic Vitalis, Historiae 
ecclesiasticae 11.26, ed. and trans. Chibnall, 6:110-25. For Manbij, Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. 
Dostourian, pp. 231-32; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 3.31, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 721-29, 
trans. Ryan, pp. 262-64. See also Kamal al-Din, Bughyat, RHC Or 3, pp. 641-42; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, 
trans. Richards, 1:251. 
318 Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, pp. 234-36; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia 
Hierosolymitana 3.42.5-11, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 763-67, trans. Ryan, pp. 277-79; William of Tyre, 
Chronicon 13.16, ed. Huygens, 1:604-6, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:25; Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, 
trans. Tritton, p. 97. See also Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:258. Ibn al-Qalanisi appears 
mistaken when placing the assault on 'Azaz with the events of AH 517 (1123-24), an understandable error 
given the similarities in circumstance between Balak's assault on Manbij in 1124 and al-Bursuqi's assault 
on 'Azaz in 1125, Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 170. Chevedden has argued that counterweight 
trebuchets were used at 'Azaz, pointing to the mention of manganiqe rawrbe (great mangonels) by the later 
Anonymous Syriac Chronicle as evidence of such, Chevedden, "Invention," p. 92. 
Northern Syria 
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in greater Syria making use of stone-throwing engines in the first quarter of the twelfth 
century.319 
 
Al-Sawr: 1134 
One of the best insights into the potential power of Muslim artillery in the early twelfth 
century can be found in the eyewitness account of Zanki's siege of al-Sawr (Savur) by the 
warrior poet, Usama ibn Munqidh. 
 
Zanki then set up the mangonels against the citadel, which took down one side of it. 
But not enough of it was brought down for the men to use the breach to get up into 
the citadel. However, one of the atabeg's bodyguards, a man from Aleppo called Ibn 
al-'Ariq, climbed up through the breach and set to striking the enemy with his sword. 
But they injured him with a number of wounds and threw him down from the tower 
into the moat. By then, our men had overwhelmed them at that breach and we took 
possession of the citadel. The representatives of the atabeg climbed up to the citadel 
and took possession of its keys, sending them to Timurtash [ibn Ilghazi of Mardin], 
and granting Zanki the citadel.320 
 
It seems reasonable to assume that the breach mentioned was made in the parapet rather 
than the bulk of the wall; this would explain why it was still difficult to exploit, hardly 
assailable by more than one man at a time as a degree of climbing was still necessary, but 
sufficient to provide access to the rampart. Although the citadel fell to a broader general 
assault, using the breach to access the parapet, Usama's indication that some form of 
surrender took place, evident with the transference of keys, implies that the assault was 
perhaps less overwhelming than the description implies.321 An entirely different set of 
events a few years later provides another insight. 
 
Montferrand: 1137 
Zanki laid siege to Homs in May 1137. Failing to make progress, he cut his losses after a 
few weeks and moved on to invest the Frankish castle of Montferrand from early June.322 
                                                 
319 See Appendix 2. 
320 Usama ibn Munqidh, Kitab al-I'tibar, trans. Cobb, p. 168. Cf. Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 
1:306. Cobb locates Sur on the banks of the Khabur in the region of Diyar Bakr, n. 275. 
321 It is interesting that Zanki opted for an attack focussed on escalade, supported by artillery, as Usama 
mentions the presence of forces from Khursan, a virtual pseudonym for miners. For this convention see 
Usama's accounts of the sieges of Kafartab in 1115 and Masurra in 1132, and Ibn al-Qalanisi's accounts of 
the sieges of Banyas in 1132 and Edessa in 1144, Usama ibn Munqidh, Kitab al-I'tibar, trans. Cobb, pp. 
85-87, 171; Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 216-17, 267. See also Prouteau, "Beneath the Battle," 
pp. 105-17. 
322 Homs was then an ally of his opponents in Damascus, Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 237-38; 
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:325-25. 
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In the heights overlooking Raffaniya, 
Montferrand was a bastion of Frankish 
influence near Homs and Hama and 
was described by Ibn al-Athir as "one 
of the Franks' strongest and most 
impregnable castles."323 Zanki had 
previously besieged Pons of Tripoli in 
the castle unsuccessfully in 1133,324 
and in 1137 Fulk of Jerusalem and 
Raymond II of Tripoli found 
themselves commanding the castle's 
defence after an attempt to break the 
siege failed and the relief party was forced to take refuge with the besieged. 
 Because of the rugged strength of the castle's position, Zanki pitched his main 
siege camp in the plains bellow Montferrand, assigning the task of assaulting the castle 
to the emirs of his army in turn.325 Usama describes the siege as a fairly lax endeavour, 
pressed without vigour by the emirs who faced it.326 Kamal al-Din and the later accounts 
of Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir and Ibn al-Furat suggest that the siege was pushed quite hard, 
emphasising Zanki's use of mangonels, ten according to Kamal al-Din or fourteen 
according to the later sources.327 William of Tyre seems to support this latter 
interpretation: 
 
Zangi continued his vigorous attacks upon the besieged with unremitting zeal. The 
very walls shook under the impulse of his mighty engines. Millstones [or large 
stones] and huge rocks hurled from the machines fell into the midst of the citadel, 
shattered the houses within, and caused intense fear to the refugees there.328  
                                                 
323 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:336. 
324 William of Tyre, Chronicon 14.6, ed. Huygens, 2:637-38, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:56; Ibn al-
Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 221-22; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:303. 
325 Usama ibn Munqidh, Kitab al-I'tibar, trans. Cobb, p. 169. 
326 The rotating emirs possibly judged their individual prospects of taking the stronghold on the day that 
they opposed it, and the plunder which would accompany its fall, as too slight to risk the commitment of 
resources a real attempt would require. The castle was also well defended: when the relief force joined the 
garrison, the castle's provisions would have been consumed at a much more rapid rate but the combined 
defending force would have been capable of launching powerful sorties. 
327 Kamal al-Din, Bughyat, RHC Or 3, p. 673; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:652; Ibn 
al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:115. 
328 Sanguinus interea, obsessos continuis urgens molestiis, menia tormentis quatiens, machinis molares et 
saxa ingentia iaculatoriis in medium contorquens presidium, domos prosternit interius non sine multa 
Lebanon and surrounding region 
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The phrases that William uses to describe the destruction are part of an established trend: 
drawing attention to any damage done within the enceinte and the psychological impact 
of the barrage as much as the damage sustained by the defences. Although it might be 
suggested that non-military sources, such as William of Tyre, might overemphasise any 
damage inflicted on non-military structures, these, and even non-combatants, could have 
been targeted with the objective of weakening the defenders' moral. While Zanki besieged 
the isolated castle of Montferrat, Byzantine forces concurrently besieged Antioch. 
 
Antioch: 1137 
At the culmination of a rapid campaign, which saw John Comnenus take Tarsus and the 
other fortified towns and castles of Cilicia that had become part of the principality of 
Antioch, the Byzantine army pushed into Syria and besieged Antioch in 1137.329 William 
of Tyre claims that "Mighty machines and engines were placed in strategic positions 
around the city and ever-increasing pressure was exerted upon the place."330 Although 
William suggests that this was an aggressively prosecuted siege, unlike the comparatively 
passive efforts of the Franks forty years earlier, Ibn al-Qalanisi instead characterises this 
as a blockade.331 Alternatively, Niketas Choniates claims that John was travelling with 
artillery but was welcomed into Antioch while Vahram does not mention Byzantines ever 
moving out of Cilicia.332 
 Circumstances surrounding this siege bring into question William of Tyre's 
characterisation of it. Fulk's choice to continue to Montferrand rather than move to relieve 
Antioch and the decision, let alone ability, of Raymond of Poitiers, prince-regent of 
Antioch, to leave his besieged city to assist Fulk's relief effort, and then slip back into 
Antioch afterwards, are telling. But even if William overstates the tempo of the siege of 
                                                 
inclusorum formidine. William of Tyre, Chronicon 14.28, ed. Huygens, 2:667, trans. Babcock and Krey, 
2:89. 
329 This accumulation of territory in Cilicia was the primary objective of the Byzantine campaign, Vahram, 
Chronicle, trans. Neumann, pp. 31-32; Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, pp. 241-42; 
Niketas Choniates, Historia, trans. Magoulias, pp. 12-18. Antioch, which had not been returned to the 
Byzantines following its capture by the Franks in 1098, passed to Raymond of Poitiers, son of William IX 
of Aquitaine, in 1136 when he married Constance, daughter of the late Bohemond II and Alice of Jerusalem. 
330 Ordinatis itaque per girum machinis, et ingentibus tormentis congruis stationibus collocatis, urbem 
vehementius cepit artare. William of Tyre, Chronicon 14.24, ed. Huygens, 2:663, trans. Babcock and Krey, 
2:85. 
331 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 240-41. 
332 Niketas Choniates, Historia, trans. Magoulias, pp. 16, 18; Vahram, Chronicle, trans. Neumann, pp. 31-
32. 
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Antioch, his emphasis on the Byzantines' use of artillery should not be dismissed without 
consideration. 
 
The emperor, for his part, caused immensely heavy rocks to be hurled from the 
mighty machines and engines. In this way, he sought to weaken and break down the 
defences of the city and to shatter the walls and towers of the gate of the Bridge. 
Aided by a strong band of slingers, they sought at long range to prevent the 
townspeople from defending the walls and were ever on the watch for an opportunity 
to approach and undermine the fortifications.333  
 
Like many of William's descriptions of artillery, this passage is in itself inconsistent. If 
artillery was sufficient to break down the defences of Antioch, why did these remain 
effectively defended, let alone require sappers to undermine them? When considering the 
topography, William's account may have been influenced by those of the First Crusade: 
the Bridge Gate was one of only a few areas where artillery may have been used in 1097-
98.334 Any hopes of discerning an accurate sense of this siege are dashed if an attempt is 
made to reconcile this with the less detailed but drastically differing accounts of other 
sources.335 
 
Shayzar: 1138 
After peace was established between Raymond of Poitiers and John Comnenus, there 
seems little doubt that the Byzantines unleashed the full might of their artillery at the 
subsequent siege of Shayzar in 1138. The citadel of Shayzar sits on a river-cut spur that 
rises from the left bank of the Orontes, overlooking the town to the west. The Greeks 
positioned their camp on the west side of the river and surrounded the town.336 Ibn al-
Athir state that the Byzantines employed eighteen stone-throwers against Shayzar.337  Al-
                                                 
333 ...imperator quoque versa vice tormentis ingentibus et machinis iaculatoriis, cautes inmanissimos, et 
inmensi ponderis contorquendo, a Porta Pontis menia cedendo et turres, urbis claustra debilitare et 
effringere nitebatur. Dispositisque per gyrum legionibus, sagittis, et omni missilium genere, necnon et 
fundibulariorum manu proterva, cives a muri propugnatione arcebant eminus; et ad suffodienda moenia 
aditum et opportunitatem nitebantur vendicare. William of Tyre, Chronicon 14.30, ed. Huygens, 2:670, 
trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:92. 
334 See Chapter 3. 
335 Cf. Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 240-41; Michael the Syrian, Chronicon 16.8, trans. Charbot, 
3:245; Bar Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. Budge, 1:264; Niketas Choniates, Historia, trans. 
Magoulias, pp. 14-16. 
336 For the defences of Shayzar, see Tonghini and Montevecchi, "The Castle of Shayzar: Access System," 
pp. 201-24; Tonghini and Montevecchi, "The Castle of Shayzar: Recent Archaeological Investigations," 
pp. 137-50; Tonghini, "Die Burg Saizar," pp. 234-40; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 181; Müller-Wiener, 
Castles of the Crusaders, p. 55. See also Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:87-89. 
337 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:340. 
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Kamil gives the same number of mangonels and adds that four la'ab (lighter engines) 
were also erected.338 From the description provided by William of Tyre it must have 
seemed as though hell was unleashed upon the town: 
 
From the machines, set up in strategic positions, poured forth constant volleys of 
heavy stones which shook the towers and walls and even the houses of the people 
within. Under the repeated blows of these enormous missiles, the fortifications, on 
which the inhabitants had relied as their greatest defence, were utterly overthrown 
and in their fall wrought dreadful havoc among the townspeople.339 
 
This rhetoric suggests a greater degree of destruction than most of William's earlier 
descriptions of artillery damage. It is possible that the Byzantines employed more 
powerful engines than most of those employed by their Frankish and Muslim neighbours 
or even that William was inspired to characterise them as such given the prestige of their 
Roman heritage. The source that he made use of is unknown. From a Greek perspective, 
Niketas Choniates, who was also born after the events in question, states that although 
the Byzantine artillery was able to open breaches in the defences of Shayzar, its 
fortifications remained entirely defensible.340 
 William of Tyre states that John Comnenus walked among his troops, 
admonishing those who worked the engines to take better aim and increase their rate of 
fire.341 Although the evidence is far from conclusive, such encouragement would have 
been more useful to teams working traction trebuchets than larger counterweight engines. 
It is almost impossible for experienced operators to speed up any component of the 
loading processes of the latter, from waiting for the beam to come to a natural state of rest 
to the steady hauling or winching back of the arm into a cocked position, while the 
consistent firing motion of such engines makes them naturally accurate. On the other 
hand, the operation of a traction trebuchet is reliant entirely on close teamwork: 
synchronicity and consistency are both required to maintain a close measure of accuracy 
and rate of fire. Furthermore, if William of Tyre is implying that the artillery teams were 
                                                 
338 Kamal al-Din, Bughyat, RHC Or 3, pp. 677-78. This source states that the Byzantines bombarded 
Kafartab with mangonels, compelling its defenders to surrender, before they besieged Shayzar but provides 
no more helpful details. 
339 Hic demum machinis congrua provisione dispositis, turres ac moenia, et infra muros civium domicilia 
gravium immissione molarium, incessanter concutiunt, et crebris ictibus et vicaria immissorum cautium 
repetitione, non sine multa inhabitantium strage funditus dejiciunt, in quibus erat defensionis spes maxima, 
aedificiorum munimina. William of Tyre, Chronicon 15.1, ed. Huygens, 2:674, trans. Babcock and Krey, 
2:94-95. 
340 Niketas Choniates, Historia, trans. Magoulias, p. 18. 
341 William of Tyre, Chronicon 15.1, ed. Huygens, 2:674, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:95. 
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working in relays, as he states the fighting men were, there can be little doubt that these 
were traction- rather than counterweight-powered machines, the former being far more 
physically taxing and thus crews would more likely benefit from encouragement. So once 
more William of Tyre's assessment of the degree of damage appears to conflict with the 
manner in which it was inflicted. 
 Paul Chevedden has looked to other sources to argue that counterweight 
trebuchets were used against Shayzar. His theory is based largely on Ibn al-Adim's 
labelling of the Byzantine engines as majaniq 'izam (great mangonels) as well as Usama 
ibn Munqidh's designation of these engines as majaniq ha'ilah (huge/frightful 
mangonels).342 However, Ibn al-Adim's account was written in the mid-thirteenth century 
and is less detailed than those of Usama and William of Tyre. Although Usama ibn 
Munqidh was a native of Shayzar and was certainly the closest source to these events, he 
was absent during the siege in 1138 and appears to have relied on the testimony of others. 
 Usama claims that the Byzantine artillery threw stones weighing 20 to 25 ratls to 
a distance greater than that of a bowshot.343 If this loosely correlates to a weight of 50 kg 
(using the 2.14 kg ratl of Shayzar), and a range of close to 200 m, allowing for no 
exaggeration, this would be beyond the range of a traction trebuchet. However, it is 
unlikely that twelfth-century artillery was able to outrange a contemporary archer.344 
Similarly, the mass involved is also open to question. Although Usama was born in 
Shayzar, he held notable positions in both Damascus and Cairo during the mid-twelfth 
century. This opens up the possibility that he was using the 1.85 kg Syrian ratl, which 
would appear to cater to his intended audience, or even the 0.41 kg Egyptian ratl, closer 
to Hugh Kennedy's suggestion that the ratl was about half a kilogram.345 If a 10 kg 
projectile was employed (using the Egyptian ratl) this could easily have been cast to a 
more reasonable range of 100 m by a traction trebuchet. While a significant counterweight 
trebuchet would have been able to throw the heavier mass the greater distance, there is 
only limited evidence to suggest the presence of one apart from the descriptions of 
structural damage. Although Usama claims that one shot destroyed an entire house and 
William of Tyre similarly states that large stones soared over the walls and caused 
destruction among the buildings within the enceinte, there is little descriptive, 
                                                 
342 Chevedden, "Invention," pp. 92-93. 
343 Usama ibn Munqidh, Kitab al-I'tibar, trans. Cobb, p. 125. 
344 This has been discussed above in relation to the siege of Jaffa in 1123. 
345 Kennedy, "Shayzar," p. 12. 
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extrapolative or archaeological evidence to corroborate these colourful descriptions of 
destruction. 
 While Usama was not an eyewitness, in retelling stories told to him by one of his 
father's mamluks, he provides a grizzly personal perspective. As the defenders regrouped 
at one point during the siege, the man next to the storyteller turned to relieve himself and 
while doing so was struck on the head by a projectile cast by one of the Greek stone-
throwers. The force of the projectile was sufficient to stick the man's head to the wall 
upon which he was leaning at the time. On a different occasion, a man was struck in the 
leg by such a shot and while others rushed to find a 'bonesetter' to tend to the broken leg 
another stone struck the wounded man on the head, crushing his skull.346 These casualties 
do not convey a dramatic sense of power. Although sufficient to crush skulls and break 
other bones, there is nothing to suggest that the projectiles responsible for such injuries 
were any closer to 50 kg than to 10 kg or that they were thrown with a velocity closer to 
50 m/s than 30 m/s. By comparison, Ammianus describes almost identical injuries 
inflicted by classical torsion-powered scorpions around eight centuries earlier.347 
Furthermore, the gruesome, yet limited, impact of these personal injuries appears to 
overshadow any notion of colossal destruction and detailed anecdotal evidence of 
particularly large stones causing structural damage are absent. So again there is no direct 
evidence to rule out the use of small counterweight trebuchets at this siege, but neither is 
there particularly strong evidence to support their presence. 
 Contrary to William of Tyre's notion that this was a "vigorous but ineffective siege 
of the city",348 the assailants did eventually storm the town defences of Shayzar. Both 
Usama and Niketas Choniates claim that the Byzantine artillery was responsible for 
opening a breach in the town wall but only the former claims that this was stormed. This 
may reflect a similar situation to that which played out at al-Sawr in 1134, only in this 
instance John Comnenus was inclined to take a payoff from the Banu Munqidh rather 
than continue to besiege the citadel with the half-hearted aid of his Frankish allies.349 
After a siege of twenty-three days, according to Ibn al-Qalanisi, the Graeco-Frankish 
                                                 
346 Usama ibn Munqidh, Kitab al-I'tibar, trans. Cobb, p. 126. 
347 Ammianus, Rerum gestarum 19.2.7, ed. Eyssenhardt, p. 144, trans. Yonge, p. 188. 
348 William of Tyre, Chronicon 15.1, ed. Huygens, 2:675, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:96. 
349 William of Tyre, Chronicon 15.2, ed. Huygens, 2:675-76, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:96-97. William 
of Tyre is generally hostile to both Frankish characters; but in their defence, Raymond was essentially being 
compelled to fight for a new fief that would exclude Antioch if Shayzar were to fall. 
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army withdrew back to Antioch.350 Kamal al-Din claims that the Byzantines burnt their 
siege engines before departing but left some large mangonels, which Zanki moved into 
the citadel when he arrival not long after.351 
 
Banyas: 1140 
In 1140, forces of Jerusalem moved to support Damascus against the aggression of Zanki. 
In return for their assistance, Damascene forces accompanied the Franks in a move 
against Banyas, which had renounced its allegiance to Damascus in favour of Zanki. 
Mu'in al-Din Unar, regent of Damascus, arrayed his forces to the east of the city and the 
Franks took up positions to the west. 
 The artillery used by the forces besieging Banyas is described in similar terms to 
that used previously at Montferrand (1137) and Shayzar (1138). "From the hurling 
engines called petraries they threw huge stones of great weight, which shook the walls 
and demolished buildings within the city itself" wrote William of Tyre.352 He adds that 
due to the showers of arrows and other projectiles, which fell against the fortified town, 
there was no safety to be found within and even those manning the ramparts scarcely 
dared to look out from behind the crenellated parapet. Notwithstanding what was 
evidently an impressive artillery barrage, confirmed by Ibn al-Qalanisi,353 both 
chroniclers testify that it achieved little in advancing the siege. 
 Despite evocative descriptions of damage, the psychological impact would appear 
to have been at least as significant as the material damage. William may even have 
exaggerated his descriptions of physical damage in order to portray the psychological 
effects of such a barrage. Achieving few tangible results, the Franks turned to a staple in 
their siege arsenal: the siege tower. 
 Although the topography around Banyas was suitable for the use of a siege tower, 
there was apparently a shortage of suitable timber. This was one of the most lush and 
fertile areas of southern Syria but, revealingly, wood had to be brought from Damascus.354 
                                                 
350 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 252. 
351 Kamal al-Din, Bughyat, RHC Or 3, p. 678. For a brief discussion of the siege and the sources, see 
Kennedy, "Shayzar," pp. 11-16. 
352 ...et machinis iaculatoriis, quas petrarias vocat, immissis magnae quantitatis molaribus, moenia 
concutiunt... William of Tyre, Chronicon 15.9, ed. Huygens, 2:686, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:108. This 
is William of Tyre's first use of the term petraria since his account of the First Crusade. 
353 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 259-61. 
354 William of Tyre, Chronicon 15.9, ed. Huygens, 2:686-87, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:108-9. Although 
William states that these beams were kept for just such a purpose, when considering the rarity with which 
Muslim forces employed timber-framed siege towers during the twelfth century, this seems unlikely. These, 
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These timbers seem only to have been intended for the frame of the siege tower, which 
required long straight posts for the four vertical supports of the structure. Unfortunately, 
the medieval walls of Banyas do not stand to their original height and thus cannot provide 
an indication of how tall the tower would have been or how tall its corner posts were. The 
scale of these posts is important because none of them appears to have been used to 
construct artillery. This indicates that it was not a material restriction that dictated the size 
of mid-twelfth-century artillery but rather a perception of its value or technological 
limitation. Unlike counterweight trebuchets, which could be built as large as the building 
materials and construction methods permitted, traction trebuchets had mechanically 
determined maximum dimensions.355 It is also noteworthy that when William of Tyre 
subsequently speaks of the showers of stones and arrows cast down on the ramparts of 
Banyas from the siege tower, he uses very similar language to that which he employs 
when describing the effects of artillery. These hand-thrown/dropped stones would have 
been closer in size to those thrown by a traction trebuchet than by a counterweight engine. 
This again checks any tendencies to read the sources' descriptions of damage literally. 
Although the stones that were thrown from the siege tower would have been cast at a far 
lower velocity than those thrown by artillery, the change in trajectory facilitated by the 
siege tower denied the defenders the protection of their battlements, compelling the 
garrison to surrender.356 
 
Edessa: 1144 
Zanki more than compensated for the loss of Banyas with his acquisition of Frankish 
Edessa in 1144.357 Seizing an opportune moment, he implemented what can be seen as a 
relatively standard Muslim siege tactic used in northern Syria: when a frontal assault was 
                                                 
among other 'war materials', were probably part of a general a general stockpile of materials, used to patch 
up defences and raise counter-towers during a siege. 
355 See Chapter 2. 
356 William of Tyre, Chronicon 15.10-11, ed. Huygens, 2:687-91, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:109-12. Ibn 
al-Qalanisi does not mention the construction of a siege tower at any point in his account of the 
approximately twenty-three day siege. He instead attributes the town's eventual surrender to the effects of 
the blockade. 
357 Edessa had been besieged a number a number of figures in the century leading up to this: Alp Arslan 
(using a siege tower and mining) in 1070/71; Turkish forces (using artillery) in 1095/96, and then by 
Ridwan of Aleppo and Taghisiyan of Antioch after they broke the Turkish siege; Jokermish of Mosul in 
1105/6; Kilij Arslan in 1106; Mawdud of Mosul in 1110 and 1112; al-Bursuqi's in 1115; and briefly by 
Turkish forces in 1138, Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, pp. 131-32, 162-63, 197, 199, 
209-11, 215-16; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:106, 166; Bar Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, 
trans. Budge, 1:265; Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, trans. Tritton, pp. 82-86. 
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impractical, he turned to mining, supported by light artillery. Although such a 
generalisation risks oversimplifying the broad variety of available siege tactics and 
particular preferences of various personalities, mining was frequently employed by 
Muslim commanders when frontal assaults failed and the use of mechanised stone-
throwers is increasingly noted in support of it through the twelfth century, often placed 
alongside archers and slingers. 
 Gregory the Priest, followed by Bar Hebraeus, states that Zanki erected seven 
stone-throwers against the defenders manning the parapet of the city, but elaborates no 
more as he clearly implies that sapping was the focus of Zanki's siege plan.358 According 
to the Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, each of the leading figures in Zanki's force erected a 
trebuchet. These engines, as well as the sappers, were responsible for inflicting damage 
on the city's walls; however, it was the latter who opened the breach that led to the city's 
fall.359 The descriptions left by Ibn al-Qalanisi and William of Tyre, as well as the more 
extensive versed account of Nerses Shnorhali, reveal little additional information about 
the engines themselves or how they were used. All three confirm that mining contributed 
most to the city's fall.360 The breach that led to the storming of Edessa appears to have 
been made near the north gate. Seven towers in this stretch of the defences required 
repairs after the siege, though whether the damage that they incurred was as a result of 
the mining or the artillery supporting it is unclear.361 
 
 
 
The Second Crusade and the Ebb of Frankish Dominance 
 
Zanki's successful siege of Edessa precipitated the Second Crusade. Despite the 
involvement of the leading barons of Outremer and many of the most prestigious lords of 
France and Germany, there are no indications that artillery, or any other type of siege 
                                                 
358 Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, pp. 243-44; Bar Hebraeus, 
Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. Budge, 1:268. 
359 Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, trans. Tritton, pp. 282-83. 
360 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 266-68; William of Tyre, Chronicon 16.4-5, ed. Huygens, 2:717-
21, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:141-43; Nerses, Voghb Yedesyo ll. 835-1,146, RHC Ar 1, pp. 246-62. See 
also Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:372-73. 
361 Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, trans. Tritton, p. 289-90. 
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engine, was used during the climactic push against Damascus in 1148.362 However, the 
preceding siege of Lisbon by certain contingents on their way to the Holy Land is one of 
the most informative sieges to any study of twelfth-century artillery.363 
 
Lisbon: 1147 
Fifty years after the crusader siege of Nicaea, and a continent away, a fleet of Anglo-
Norman, German and Flemish contingents sailed into Lisbon in June 1147 on its way to 
the Levant. Despite the geographic separation, the ensuing episode clearly demonstrates 
the similarities between the siege tactics concurrently employed in Europe and the Near 
East. Importantly, the most detailed surviving eyewitness account of the ensuing siege, 
the anonymous De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, provides revealing descriptions of the 
crusaders' artillery. 
 Disembarking against Moorish Lisbon, the crusaders surrounded the city: the 
Anglo-Normans to the west and the Germans to the east with the Flemings on their left.364 
Fifteen days after the siege had begun, the Franks began to construct siege engines. The 
Anglo-Normans built a siege tower and the contingents from Cologne and Flanders built 
a penthouse, ram and siege tower, as well as five fundae Baleares to support them. These 
'Balearic slings' were mechanised stone throwers, directed against the walls and towers 
of Lisbon. The ensuing attack met with complete failure on all fronts and the Anglo-
Norman siege tower, which became stuck in the sand, was an easy target for three 
defending pieces of artillery, which played upon it for four days and nights until it was 
finally burnt in a sally.365 The inability of the defending artillery to destroy this immobile 
tower suggests that it was traction-powered and, in this regard, similarities can be drawn 
to the Frankish siege of Tyre in 1124. 
 Around September 1147, the Anglo-Normans employed two fundae Baleares of 
their own to cover mining efforts against an exposed section of the western wall: 
 
one on the river bank which was operated by seamen, the other in front of the Porta 
do Ferro, which was operated by the knights and their table companions. All these 
                                                 
362 See William of Tyre, Chronicon 17.1-2, 5-7, ed. Huygens, 2:760-61, 65-69, trans. Babcock and Krey, 
2:184-86, 190-95; Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 283-87; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 
2:21-22. 
363 For Eurocentric interpretations of the importance of this account, see Köhler, Die Entwickelung des 
Kriegswesens, 1:164; Gillmor, "Introduction of the Traction Trebuchet," p. 2. 
364 De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, ed. and trans. David, pp. 124-27. 
365 De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, ed. and trans. David, pp. 134-37. For a similar use of the term, see Ralph 
of Caen, Gesta Tancredi 125, RHC Oc 3, p. 692. 
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men having been divided into groups of one hundred, on a given signal the first 
hundred retired and another took their places, so that within the space of ten hours 
five thousand stones were hurled.366 
 
This passage has formed the basis of many interpretations of mid-twelfth century artillery; 
but, unfortunately, some scholars have accepted it at face value and failed to analyse it 
more thoroughly. 
 These two sentences reveal a number of interesting details. Firstly, that one engine 
was worked entirely by seamen supports the link between artillery and nautical 
traditions.367 This link is logical given the levered basis of trebuchet mechanics and the 
critical use of cordage. This was not a limiting factor though, as knights seems to have 
had no difficulty in operating the other engine. Secondly, the machines were again 
employed in an antipersonnel capacity: protecting mining efforts from sorties launched 
by the garrison and defenders along the parapet. Scholars who have dwelt on the number 
of men involved in the operation of these machines seem to have lost sight of this, 
preferring instead to see them as something larger and more threatening to the city's 
fortifications.368 This leads to the third and most misinterpreted aspect of this episode: 
that the teams operating the machines were each composed of one hundred men, does not 
mean that one hundred men provided traction power at the same time. These engines were 
probably traction trebuchets but there were other tasks associated with these machines, 
such as collecting ammunition and guarding them. But what definitively rules out the 
possibility that all one hundred men made up a single pulling team is the essential 
mechanics. The distance that each man is able to pull limits the length of the short arm of 
the beam, which in turn limits the remaining mechanical variables and the space available 
for the men to pull from. Thus although adding a second puller might double the potential 
power of a single man, adding ninety-nine men will not produce one hundred times as 
much power.369 Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that any more than 
approximately a dozen individuals provided the traction power for each of these engines 
at any one time. 
                                                 
366 Insuper due funde Balearice a nostris eriguntur, una supra ripam fluminis a nautis trahebatur, altera 
contra portam ferream a militibus et eorum convictualibus. Hii omnes per centenos divisi, audito signo 
exeuntibus primis centenis, alii centeni subintrassent, ut inter decem horarum spatia V milia lapidum 
iactarentur. De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, ed. and trans. David, pp. 142-43. 
367 For a broader introduction to this relationship, see Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, pp. 201-7. Cf. William 
of Tyre, Chronicon 8.9, ed. Huygens, 1:399, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:357. 
368 For example, Chevedden, "King James I," pp. 324-25. 
369 See Chapter 2. 
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 The fourth point of interest is the number of stones that were thrown: 5,000 shots 
over the course of 10 hours, or one shot every 7.2 seconds. If this rate of fire is anywhere 
near accurate the number of men gathering ammunition, let alone trying to shape any of 
it, would need to be many times that of the men working the two engines. It is unlikely, 
however, that the anonymous author counted the number of stones that were thrown. His 
estimation is thus either a reflection of the engine's rate of fire or an expression of the 
total number of stones thrown, two sides of the same coin. Accordingly, the author's 
figures should be interpreted as a reflection of his qualitative impressions rather than a 
quantitative reality. 
 The physical exertion required to achieve a rate of fire impressive enough to 
inspire such figures, would almost certainly have limited the relay periods to a matter of 
minutes rather than hours. If the author indeed meant that all one hundred men of each 
relay team took part in providing pulling power and that the total number of shots was 
divided between the two engines, it stands to reason that for each engine to support a rate 
of fire of around four shots per minute, a rate within the realm of possibility, each team 
was further subdivided. For instance, sub-crews of ten might have taken six-minute shifts, 
maintaining a maximum rate of fire and allowing the remaining ninety men to rest, gather 
ammunition and provide basic protection. The emphasis placed on crew size and rapid 
firing capability would appear to confirm that these were not counterweight trebuchets.370 
 The anonymous author makes it clear that the Frankish artillery was employed in 
a supporting role, and what it was supporting was not going well. With their mine more 
trouble than it was worth, the Anglo-Normans gave it up to build another siege tower, 
somewhat shorter than their earlier one. Steadfast in their approach, the men of Cologne 
and Flanders managed to undermine a section of the opposite wall of the city but the 
defenders held fast. The Anglo-Norman siege tower, supported by attacking artillery and 
capable of resisting the defenders' artillery, when pushed to within a few metres of the 
city, eventually compelled Lisbon's surrender.371 At the contemporary Iberian sieges of 
Almeria (1147) and Tortosa (1148), Caffaro witnessed the similar use of mangana to 
                                                 
370 That they were is suggested in Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, p. 260. Nicolle has grasped this and 
suggests that either these machines were quite light or that this whole episode may be little more than the 
author displaying his knowledge of the efficiency of Balearic slingers in the classical Roman army, Nicolle, 
Medieval Siege Weapons, p. 15. 
371 De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, ed. and trans. David, pp. 142-65. For secondary account of the siege, see 
Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, pp. 183-88. 
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support siege towers, which were targeted by similar defensive engines.372 Although he 
claims that stones weighing 200 pounds were thrown, Caffaro appears to contradict this 
when he suggests that rope netting was sufficient to protect one of the towers against 
them. 
 The siege of Lisbon reveals many similarities to the siege practices of the Franks 
in the Holy Land. The preference for siege towers shown by the Anglo-Normans seems 
to reflect that demonstrated by the Franks of Outremer during the first half of the twelfth 
century, while both made use of light artillery to support siege towers and sappers. It is 
the preference for mining shown by the contingents from Cologne that stands out. 
Although mining had been a tactic employed by Frankish forces at Nicaea in 1097 and 
numerous times since, it is generally viewed more as a Muslim tactic.373 Although 
artillery was not employed by Frankish forces at Damascus, it was used soon after the 
Second Crusade collapsed, at the siege of Ascalon. 
 
Ascalon: 1153 
Numerous sieges took place between 1148 and the Frankish siege of Ascalon in 1153; 
however, the sources reveal little about the nature of any artillery that was used.374 
William of Tyre references very generally the use of 'throwing-engines' by both Baldwin 
III and his mother's supporters during the former's siege of the Tower of David.375 During 
Nur al-Din's pushes against Damascus between 1150 and 1154, neither he nor the city's 
defenders appear to have made use of artillery,376 even though it would seem such engines 
were being stored inside the city by this point in history.377 
                                                 
372 Caffaro, Ystoria, ed. Belgrano, pp. 80-88, trans. Hall and Phillips, pp. 128-35. 
373 This interpretation is widely held and is accurate to a degree. The topography of coastal Palestine 
influenced the apparent Frankish preference for siege towers during the first two decades of the twelfth 
century; however, mining appears more frequently as a siege tactic than does the construction of siege 
towers thereafter. The rougher terrain away from the coast reduced the opportunities to employ siege 
towers, encouraging mining. 
374 These include a number of sieges conducted by Nur al-Din and Kilij Arslan as they mopped up what 
remained of the county of Edessa, largely under Byzantine control at this point, Ibn al-Azraq, Tarikh, trans. 
Hillenbrand, pp. 132-34; William of Tyre, Chronicon 17.16-17, ed. Huygens, 2:781-85, trans. Babcock and 
Krey, 2:208-12; Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, p. 260; Ibn al-
Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 309-12. For Nur al-Din's second push into this region a decade later, see 
Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, pp. 269-70, 276-77; Ibn al-
Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 356-57. 
375 William of Tyre, Chronicon 17.14, ed. Huygens, 2:778-80, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:206-7. 
376 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 297-300, 302-8, 318-20; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 
2:71. 
377 Fulton, "Development of Prefabricated Artillery," pp. 56-57. See also Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, 
pp. 310, 312-13. 
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 Ascalon was an ancient strongpoint on the southern coast of Palestine. Its 
medieval fortifications were founded on Bronze Age defences and contained elements of 
late Roman, Umayyad and Fatimid construction.378 Like most twelfth-century 
fortifications along the coast of Palestine, the defences of Ascalon were built using the 
local kurkar, soft sandstone composed of fossilised sand washed into the Mediterranean 
from the Nile. The mortar was a compound of lime, sand, potsherds and ash, which 
formed a bonding agent slightly harder than the stone itself and more resistant to the 
natural elements. These defences were manned by a sizable professional garrison during 
the first half of the twelfth century, regularly supplied and rotated out by the Egyptian 
fleet.379 
 Baldwin III led his army against Ascalon in January 1153 while Gerald of Sidon 
attempted to impose a naval blockade.380 Additional ships were procured and stripped for 
their timber with the arrival of a wave of pilgrims around Easter. The masts of these 
vessels were used to form the frame of a siege tower and the remaining wood was used 
to make penthouses and artillery. William of Tyre provides another of his conflicting 
descriptions when he states that the artillery was arrayed in ideal positions to batter down 
the walls but then clearly depicts it in a supporting role, providing covering fire for the 
siege tower and those preparing the ground ahead of it.381 The Anonymous Syriac 
Chronicle claims that the Franks employed a stone-throwing machine on top of the siege 
tower and emphasises the threat that this posed to those walking around inside the city.382 
 The Frankish attack wore on into the summer and the barrage seems to have been 
most intense around the east-facing Jerusalem Gate. Despite William of Tyre's assertion 
that "Volleys of mighty rocks hurled from the casting machines threatened to weaken the 
walls and towers and to overthrow from their very foundations the houses within the 
city",383 it seems that the integrity of the walls was never seriously imperilled by the 
Frankish artillery despite this prolonged period of exposure. Instead, the assailing artillery 
                                                 
378 Pringle, "Crusader Castles and Fortifications," pp. 357-72; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, pp. 123-28; 
Pringle, "Richard I," p. 135. 
379 Pringle, "Town Defences," pp. 84-85; William of Tyre, Chronicon 17.22, ed. Huygens, 2:790-92, trans. 
Babcock and Krey, 2:219-20. William of Tyre repeated mentions the city's reliance on a regular schedule 
of supply shipments from Egypt in books 13 and 17. 
380 William of Tyre, Chronicon 17.21, ed. Huygens, 2:789-90, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:217-18. 
381 William of Tyre, Chronicon 17.23-24, ed. Huygens, 2:792-94, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:220-23. 
382 Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, trans. Tritton, p. 301. 
383 ...tormentis nichilominus iaculatoriis turres ac menia debilitare et infra urbem non sine strage multa 
funditus dissolvere, immissis magnis molaribus, domicilia. William of Tyre, Chronicon 17.27, ed. Huygens, 
2:797, trans. 2:225-26. 
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should again be more accurately categorised as an antipersonnel weapon, fulfilling a 
similar function to the archers in the siege tower. Revealingly, it is the garrison, rather 
than Ascalon's defences, that is portrayed as suffering most from the Frankish artillery 
(mislabelled balistae) in the Auctarium Aquicinense.384 
 Keeping with the established tradition, the Franks' siege tower remained the focal 
point of their offensive. The tower was also viewed by the defenders as the greatest threat 
to their security and it was against it, rather than the attacking artillery, that the garrison 
directed most of its efforts. The defenders eventually breached their own walls during an 
attempt to burn the siege tower, leading them to surrender soon after and allowing the 
Franks to occupy the city on 12 August.385 
 
Banyas: 1157 
While the main army of Jerusalem was besieging Ascalon, Nur al-Din had briefly 
attempted to take Frankish Banyas before moving on to assume power in Damascus.386 
He returned to Banyas in 1157.387 Ahead of this, Nur al-Din travelled to Damascus where, 
according to Ibn al-Qalanisi, "He gave orders to dispatch what mangonels and weapons 
were required to the victorious 'askar", then rallied what remaining forces he could from 
the city and made for Banyas.388 In surprising similarity, William of Tyre states, "He 
summoned his cavalry, had his engines of war moved to the place, and suddenly appeared 
before the city."389 Thus, both Frankish and Muslim sources confirm that artillery was 
being stockpiled in Damascus by the start of the second half of the twelfth century. To 
warrant storage, these engines must have been viewed as sufficiently valuable to incur 
                                                 
384 Auctarium Aquicinense, MGH SS 6, p. 396. See also Auctarium Affligemense, MGH SS 6, pp. 401-2. 
385 William of Tyre, Chronicon 17.27, ed. Huygens, 2:797-99, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:225-27. 
386 William of Tyre, Chronicon 17.26, ed. Huygens, 2:796, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:225; Ibn al-Qalanisi, 
Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 314-16. 
387 The town itself was composed of a roughly rectangular enclosure, smaller than 300 m square, and sported 
defences prior to the Frankish presence the Holy Land. What were interpreted as Frankish building works 
in the nineteenth century, roughly resembling those encountered by Nur al-Din in 1157, have since been 
judged to be more likely of Ayyubid or Mamluk construction. If the quadrangular projecting towers and 
curtain postdate the siege, the footprint was the same. The north and western sides were swept by the river 
while the south enjoyed the protection of a valley. The eastern side was the most vulnerable and it can be 
assumed that this side was always the most heavily fortified. See Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western 
Palestine, 1:110-11; Pringle, Secular Buildings, no. 42, p. 30; Pringle, "Town Defences," p. 92. 
388 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 333-34. Abu Shama places his departure from Damascus on 12 
May 1157, Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 86. 
389 Nec mora, sumpta ex tempore oportunitate Noradunus et ex predicto successu factus elatior apposuit 
eandem urbem, casu predicto consternatam, obsidere convocataque militia et machinis comportatis ex 
inproviso ante urbem obsidione. William of Tyre, Chronicon 18.12, ed. Huygens, 2:827, trans. Babcock 
and Krey, 2:257. 
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the costs associated with their transportation and maintenance relative to those involved 
with building new engines in situ.390 
 Having surrounded the town and set up his artillery, Nur al-Din began the siege 
on 18 May 1157. The sources emphasise that a barrage of stones and arrows was 
unleashed on the defenders but again the artillery seems to have inflicted greater 
psychological damage than physical. The Muslim army gained entrance to the town either 
after a mine was successfully lit or a careless sally by the garrison allowed their assailants 
to overcome them before they were able to withdraw back into the town and secure the 
gate behind them.391 The garrison withdrew to the citadel but were soon relieved by a 
force led by Baldwin III in mid-June. Nur al-Din was able to defeat this relief force soon 
after its arrival, compelling the king to seek refuge in Safed and allowing Nur al-Din to 
return to Banyas.392 According to William of Tyre, Nur al-Din once more encircled the 
town "and set up his numerous engines in strategic positions. The mighty blows of the 
stone missiles shook the towers and weakened the walls."393 However, it is questionable 
whether Nur al-Din would have been able to bring any significant artillery to bear against 
Banyas in this second effort. It seems unlikely that these would have been the same 
machines that had been employed in May as both the surprise appearance of Baldwin's 
force and the mobility that Nur al-Din's forces demonstrated in defeating the army of 
Jerusalem suggest that he would not have been moving with a siege train. Had he not 
burnt his engines prior to leaving Banyas, they would almost certainly have been 
destroyed by the garrison on his second approach if they had not already been brought 
into the town or destroyed during the intermittent period when repairs were carried out. 
Despite his initial defeat, Baldwin was still able to break this second siege with the arrival 
of aid from Antioch and Tripoli; the weakened garrison having opted to defend only the 
citadel on this occasion.394 
 
                                                 
390 See Fulton, "Development of Prefabricated Artillery," 51-72. This appears to differ from the timber that 
was used to construct the siege towers when Banyas was besieged in 1140, see above. 
391 William of Tyre, Chronicon 18.12, ed. Huygens, 2:827-28, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:257-58; Ibn al-
Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 333-35; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 87-88. William 
of Tyre offers the latter scenario but claims that mines were used to slight the town's defences after it fell, 
leaving the possibility that work on these mines might have begun before the town was taken. 
392 William of Tyre, Chronicon 18.13-14, ed. Huygens, 2:828-32, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:258-62. 
393 ...machinis frequentibus et ordine congruo dispositis, turres concutit, moenia debilitat et crebra 
sagittariorum opera, et telorum, instar grandinis, immissione, eos qui intus se receperant, vices prohibet 
exercere resistentis. William of Tyre, Chronicon 18.15, ed. Huygens, 2:832, trans. Babcock and Krey, 
2:262-63. 
394 William of Tyre, Chronicon 18.15, ed. Huygens, 2:832-33, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:262-64. 
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Shayzar and Harim: 1157 
Nur al-Din's move on Banyas took place during a devastating series of earthquakes that 
were felt throughout Syria in 1156-57. In October 1157, the Franks took advantage of this 
destruction to move first against Shayzar and then Harim, emboldened not only by the 
extensive damage but also by the arrival of Thierry of Flanders on his third crusade and 
a bout of illness that afflicted Nur al-Din. 
 Artillery was used to support frontal assaults at the siege of Shayzar, which proved 
unsuccessful, and it helped to sustain a blockade and cover mining efforts that led to the 
capture of Harim.395 These engines may have been most effective as psychological 
weapons, as at neither siege are they portrayed as being particularly strong. Nur al-Din 
appears to have employed artillery with a similar psychological intent during his 
successful siege of Harim in 1164,396 while his use of stone-throwers at Banyas later the 
same year is another clear example of their successful use to support mining efforts.397 
 
 
 
Egypt: A New Frontier 
 
Alexandria: 1167 
During the 1160s, Amalric of Jerusalem's foreign policy was largely concerned with 
Egypt. During a campaign in Egypt in 1167, in what had become a fight with Nur al-Din's 
forces over the weakened spoils of the Fatimid state, Amalric besieged Alexandria. The 
city was defended initially by Shirkuh, Nur al-Din's commander in Egypt, until he left for 
Upper Egypt leaving command to his nephew, Saladin. 
The Franks initially imposed a blockade from a distance and pillaged the 
surrounding area. But with Shirkuh's escape through the blockade, a more active approach 
                                                 
395 For Shayzar, Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:89; William of Tyre, Chronicon 18.18, ed. 
Huygens, 2:836, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:267. For evidence of Nur al-Din's reconstruction efforts at 
Shayzar in the aftermath of these earthquakes, see Tonghini and Montevecchi, "Shayzar: Recent 
Archaeological Investigations," pp. 140-50. For Harim, William of Tyre, Chronicon 18.19, ed. Huygens, 
2:838-40, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:269-71; Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 344; Abu Shama, Kitab 
al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 96. 
396 William of Tyre, Chronicon 19.9, ed. Huygens, 2:874-75, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:306-8; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:146-48; Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, trans. Tritton, pp. 303-4. 
397 William of Tyre, Chronicon 19.10, ed. Huygens, 2:877, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:309-10; Ibn al-Athir, 
al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:148-49; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:47. 
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was adopted.398 It is only during this second stage of the siege that any kind of machinery 
is noted. William of Tyre describes the situation in fairly familiar terms: 
 
The besieging host assembled before the city now collected an immense number of 
masts, summoned craftsmen and carpenters, and caused them to erect a tower of 
great height from whose top the entire city could be surveyed. Machines called 
petraries which hurled forth enormous stones of great weight were also placed in 
strategic positions around the walls. From these, almost incessantly, were hurled 
immense stones of great weight which shattered the walls and terrified the people 
almost beyond endurance.399 
 
The statement is essentially a compilation of stock phrases, from the ability to survey the 
town from the tower to the throwing of large stones that terrorised those within and 
wrought damage on the town's defences. But with the possible exception of the Graeco-
Frankish siege of Shayzar in 1138, none of these supposed breaches or weakened walls 
was subsequently stormed by assailing Frankish forces, confirming that the impact of 
these projectiles was somewhat less dramatic than William's language would suggest. His 
reference to the constant firing of stones is a tenuous indication that these may have been 
traction trebuchets. In this light, William's repeated claims that projectiles 'smashed 
walls', may more accurately be read as 'smashed against walls' and the 'great' size of the 
stones should perhaps be seen in relation to the scale of a stone that a slinger would 
typically throw. 
 The materials that were used to build the Frankish artillery at Alexandria, wood 
from orchards and fruit trees,400 were entirely inappropriate for constructing 
counterweight engines of sufficient size to threaten the fortifications. Even if the beams 
and main struts had been fashioned from spars lashed together, the short and far from 
straight nature of these trees would have limited the size and strength of any engine. This 
would have made traction trebuchets by far the most practical artillery option. As at 
Caesarea (1101), Banyas (1140) and Ascalon (1153), the timber that would have been 
                                                 
398 William of Tyre, Chronicon 19.26, ed. Huygens, 2:901-2, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:334-35; Abu 
Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 132-33. For the wider campaign see Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, 
trans. Richards, 2:163-64. See also Omran, "King Amalric," pp. 191-96. 
399 Hic demum sumptis navium malis inmense quantitatis, vocati artifices, lignorum cesores, castellum 
erigunt mire altitudinis, unde totam despicere erat civitatem; machine quoque, quas vulgo petrarias vocant, 
unde missi molares graves et magni muros cedebant, congruis stationibus locate intolerabilem civibus, 
horis pene omnibus, inferebant terrorem. William of Tyre, Chronicon 19.18, ed. Huygens, 2:903-4, trans. 
Babcock and Krey, 2:337. 
400 William of Tyre, Chronicon 19.28, ed. Huygens, 2:903-4, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:337. 
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suitable for a larger counterweight trebuchet was instead earmarked for the construction 
of a siege tower. 
 The inability of the Franks to inflict more damage than would appear to have been 
the case is noteworthy when considering the security that they enjoyed during this siege. 
The local population of Alexandria was as hostile towards their Syrian 'defenders' as they 
were to the assailing Franks. This discouraged the garrison from launching sallies against 
their besiegers and left the Franks to conduct their siege in relative security.401 Under such 
conditions, the meagre power of the Frankish artillery is further revealed. 
 
Damietta: 1169 
In 1169 the Franks, with Byzantine aid, launched their first campaign against the port of 
Damietta. Near the mouth of one of the two main branches of the Nile delta,402 the city 
controlled access upstream by a tower, set in the middle of the river, that was connected 
to the town by a chain that extended across the main shipping lane. This would not be the 
last time a Frankish army would come up against this tower. 
 Upon their arrival in the region the Franks paused, allowing support and 
provisions to pour into Damietta.403 When siege efforts began, "It soon became apparent 
                                                 
401 William of Tyre, Chronicon 19.29-32, ed. Huygens, 2:905-9, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:339-43; Ibn 
al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:164-65. 
402 Then, as now, the other main branch entered the Mediterranean at Rosetta. 
403 Ibn al-Athir and Baha' al-Din credit this support to Nur al-Din and Saladin respectively, Ibn al-Athir, al-
Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:183-84; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 46. 
Alexandria: town, plan (from Description de l'Égypte) 
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that without the assistance of machines (machinae) and engines of war (tormenta bellica) 
Damietta could not be taken, although on the arrival of the Christians it had seemed 
scarcely able to sustain the first attack."404 Having opted not to make an initial general 
assault, the attacking forces had committed themselves to a set-piece siege. 
According to William of Tyre, the siege tactics relied heavily on siege engines.405 
The showpiece of the Frankish machines was a supposedly seven-storey siege tower. In 
addition to this, penthouses and artillery were also constructed. The latter is described in 
familiar terms, inflicting damage on the parapets and buildings beyond when they 
overshot the walls.406 William claims that the Byzantines used their fleet to transport 
engines to Egypt; this is apparently confirmed by Baha' al-Din, who indicates that the 
Christians brought their siege equipment with them.407 Niketas Choniates, who 
downplays the significance of the Frankish siege tower, emphasises instead the frontal 
assaults that the Greeks made using ladders. He does not say whether or not the Greeks 
brought any engines with them but clearly states that artillery was employed with some 
effect by at least some Byzantine elements.408 All three sources allude to the garrison's 
use of artillery without explicitly describing it, ambiguously referring to these engines 
with variants of 'machines of war'.409 
The siege was eventually abandoned as supplies wore thin and the Frankish siege 
tower failed in its assault against the most approachable, but equally heavily defended, 
front of Damietta. Forced to withdraw, the next Christian invasion of Egypt was 
orchestrated neither in Acre nor in Constantinople. 
 
Alexandria: 1174 
At the end of July 1174, Norman forces from Sicily attacked Alexandria. Possibly 
intending to coordinate with a Shi'ite coup against Saladin, which had miscarried earlier 
in the year, the force landed near the Ptolemaic lighthouse. A letter written by Saladin, 
which forms the basis of most Muslim accounts of this siege, claims that six ships of the 
Sicilian fleet, distinguished from the galleys and troop-carriers, bore siege engines and 
                                                 
404 William of Tyre, Chronicon 20.15, ed. Huygens, 2:929, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:364. 
405 William of Tyre was a notable figure in the kingdom of Jerusalem by this time; however, he was out of 
the realm on diplomatic missions during much of 1169, William of Tyre, Chronicon 20.17. 
406 William of Tyre, Chronicon 20.15, ed. Huygens, 2:929-30, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:364. 
407 William of Tyre, Chronicon 20.13, ed. Huygens, 2:927, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:361; Baha' al-Din, 
al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 46. 
408 Niketas Choniates, Historia, trans. Magoulias, pp. 92-95. 
409 Cf. Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 151-53; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 
2:183-84. 
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men who built artillery.410 Having made their landing, the Sicilians pushed the Muslims 
back to the walls of Alexandria while their fleet occupied the harbour. By the following 
day, they had finished setting up their engines and advanced them towards the city walls. 
No less than three siege towers, equipped with rams at their lowest levels and three stone-
throwers are said to have been employed by the attackers. On days four and five of the 
siege, 31 July and 1 August, the garrison launched successful sallies, at first burning the 
Sicilian siege towers and then defeating the besieging force itself. The Franks who 
survived withdrew, abandoning their remaining machinery.411 
 The way in which the Muslim sources treat the Frankish artillery is tantalising and 
enigmatic. That only three stone-throwers should be mentioned next to an equal 
complement of ram-equipped siege towers and be designated as 'big' by some of the 
Muslim sources may suggest that there was something exceptional about these engines. 
This idea becomes more alluring when they are noted to have thrown black, presumably 
volcanic, stones brought from Sicily. It is unlikely that stone projectiles would have been 
imported for traction trebuchets, given their limited power and high rate of fire. At a 
modest rate of four shots per minute, a sustained period of fire from a single engine would 
consume an astounding 240 shots per hour. Thus even if the Sicilians recognised that 
finding suitable stones for projectiles might be more difficult in the Delta than other 
regions, it is unlikely that a sufficient number of stones could have been transported to 
Alexandria to sustain even one traction trebuchet. Instead, the prominent notice given to 
these three machines, on equal footing with the siege towers, and the transportation of 
special ammunition, suggests the presence of counterweight trebuchets. The slow rate of 
fire and high impact velocity of such engines would certainly warrant special projectiles 
and may even have overshadowed the presence of lighter traction engines that escaped 
notice.412 
 The projectiles thrown by these three trebuchets are described as being large and 
apparently hit the walls of Alexandria with impressive violence, a portrayal with 
                                                 
410 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 165-66. See also al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, 
p. 49. 
411 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 164-67; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:229-
30; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 48-50. See also Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, 
p. 50; William of Tyre, Chronicon 21.3, ed. Huygens, 2:963, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:399-400. 
412 The only explanation that I can think of for why Sicilian stones would be thrown by traction trebuchets 
is that these were ballast stones. To do this, however, would imply that the Sicilians were extremely 
confident in their ability to take the city, believing that they could substitute the weight of the stones with 
booty on their return home. This appears to be an unlikely possibility when considering that the Sicilian 
force was so small that it was defeated by the garrison before Saladin arrived to relieve them. 
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longstanding precedent. However, the black, presumably volcanic, rock would have been 
harder than the available local stone and that with which Alexandria's defences were 
built.413 This gave the Sicilians the same advantage that Richard I of England would enjoy 
seventeen years later when he too brought stone projectiles from Sicily to the siege of 
Acre.414 
 Although there is reasonable circumstantial evidence to propose the possibility 
that counterweight trebuchets were used by the Sicilians in 1174, the logistics of the siege 
expose this to question. According to the time scheme repeated by the various Muslim 
sources and confirmed by William of Tyre,415 the Sicilians landed, assembled and 
deployed their siege engines in less than thirty-six hours. This limited period of time 
would have necessarily restricted the potential size of the assailing machinery. 
Furthermore, having landed on 28 July and initiated the siege the following day, 30 July 
was the only full day that the Sicilians were able to bombard the city uninhibited: a 
number of engines were burnt during a sortie by the garrison on 31 July and the Sicilians 
were routed the following day ahead of Saladin's arrival on 2 August. This timetable 
would have prevented any medieval artillery from threatening contemporary 
fortifications, let alone allowing a multi-storey siege tower to do so.416 
The Sicilians' use of what may have been relatively unique engines in 1174 is 
significant when considering their siege of Thessalonica in 1185. Eustathius of 
Thessalonica claims that the Sicilians employed an array of artillery that included large 
and small engines of a supposedly traditional type, used in addition to mining on one side 
of the city, as well as some of a supposedly new variety.417 Although the latter proved 
cumbersome and ineffective on account of their size, it is likely that these, and possibly 
even some of the large traditional engines, were counterweight trebuchets. 
 Despite certain embellishments, the accounts of the siege of Alexandria provide 
plausible evidence that counterweight trebuchets were employed by a Latin force in the 
                                                 
413 Randal Rogers has proposed that these black stones were supposed to fragment upon impact; however, 
this seems unlikely given the geology involved, Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, p. 121. 
414 See Chapter 5. Cf. the supposedly impregnable castle built near Damietta during the Fifth Crusade, 
Vitry, Lettres, no. 7, ed. Huygens, pp. 139-40. See also Pringle, "A Castle in the Sand," pp. 189-90. 
415 William of Tyre claims that the Sicilians' siege lasted five or six days, William of Tyre, Chronicon 21.3, 
ed. Huygens, 2:963, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:399-400. 
416 It took the Franks assailing the cities of Palestine, fifty to seventy-five years earlier, the better part of a 
month to construct their siege towers. At Jerusalem, it took Godfrey of Bouillon all of three days to 
reassemble his siege tower from components just light enough to be moved in the field, rather than any so 
small that they could be stowed on board a ship. 
417 Eustathius of Thessalonica, Capture of Thessalonica, ed. and trans. Melville Jones, pp. 72-105. 
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theatre of the crusades before the Third Crusade. This is not to say that this was the first 
time that such engines were used in or around the Latin East, only that this appears to be 
the first recorded instance that is supported by a reasonable degree of circumstantial 
evidence. Likewise, this does not imply that these were monstrous machines comparable 
to those constructed in the fourteenth century, only that they were strong enough that the 
value of their greater power, when coupled with imported ammunition, outweighed their 
reduced rate of fire. In any case, this is a rare example of prefabricated artillery being 
employed by Latin armies in the Levant during the twelfth century. A more typical 
example of Frankish artillery tactics in the closing decades of the twelfth century is found 
at the siege of Harim. 
 
Harim: 1177 
Philip of Flanders arrived in the Holy Land in August 1177 and marched north alongside 
Raymond III of Tripoli and Bohemond III of Antioch that autumn. After a brief move 
against Hama, the Frankish force invested Harim, then in revolt against al-Salih of 
Aleppo. Upon arrival, the Franks built huts to show their determination and artillery to 
support frontal ladder-assisted assaults, the topography rendering a siege tower 
Harim: castle, plan (from Gelichi) 
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impractical.418 The siege was not pressed particularly hard and after a lengthy stay, as 
long four months, Bohemond was satisfied with a payoff while Philip of Flanders was 
content just to leave. With their departure, al-Salih moved in to finish off the beleaguered 
garrison, which quickly came to terms.419  
 Despite the stronghold's inaccessibility, William of Tyre notes that the Frankish 
artillery that was arranged around the castle could still harass it from all sides, as appears 
to have been the case during Nur al-Din's siege of the castle in 1164.420 The castle sits on 
top of a tell, roughly 40 m high, and it would appear that access was unobstructed to the 
base of its sides, which rise at an angle of about 45. If William's account is accurate and 
some shots cleared the castle's battlements, these projectiles must have been released at a 
minimum velocity of 34 m/s (assuming the curtain wall was approximately 10 m tall). If 
the Frankish engines were capable of releasing projectiles at 40 m/s, they could achieve 
the same result at a distance of 40 m from the base of the tell (80 m from the vertical plane 
of the wall) using a release angle of 55 If it was the walls rather than the battlements 
that were assailed, the release angle could be lowered to 45, increasing the horizontal 
velocity of any projectiles by over 5 m/s. 
 
                                                 
418 William of Tyre, Chronicon 21.18 (19), ed. Huygens, 2:986-87, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:425-26; Ibn 
al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:255-56. For the defences of Harim, see Gelichi, "The Citadel of 
Harim," pp. 184-200; Gelichi, "Die Burg Harim," pp. 211-20. 
419 William of Tyre, Chronicon 21.18 (19), 24 (25), ed. Huygens, 2:986-87, 994-96, trans. Babcock and 
Krey, 2:425-26, 434-35; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:254-56; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, 
RHC Or 4, pp. 191-93. 
420 William of Tyre, Chronicon 21.24 (25), ed. Huygens, 2:995, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:434-35. For 
Nur al-Din's siege of Harim in 1164, see William of Tyre, Chronicon 19.9, ed. Huygens, 2:874-75, trans. 
Babcock and Krey, 2:306-8; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:146-48; Anonymous Syriac 
Chronicle, trans. Tritton, pp. 303-4. 
Harim: castle, section (from Gelichi) 
ARTILLERY IN AND AROUND THE LATIN EAST MICHAEL S. FULTON 
  
 
125 
 
Release Angle (α) 45° 55° 69° 
Velocity (V) 40 m/s 40 m/s 34 m/s 
Horizontal Velocity (Vh) 28.28 m/s 22.94 m/s 12.18 m/s 
Max. Horizontal Range (Rh) 163.27 m 153.42 m 78.93 m 
Max. Vertical Range (Rv) 40.82 m 54.78 m 51.40 m 
 
Although an apparently small difference, when one considers that a projectile's 
horizontal velocity accounts for its total velocity at the apex of its flight path, the 
projectile released at 45 would be travelling 23% faster than the projectile released at 
55 at this point in flight. When considering that kinetic energy is half the product of mass 
and velocity squared [Ek =
1
2
(m ∙ V2)], the former would carry 52% more energy than 
the latter if they both had a mass of 10 kg. 
 
 
 
Although a projectile's real velocity would be at its lowest when it reached the apex of its 
flight path, if it struck the vertical exterior face of a wall at this point, the perpendicular 
angle of impact would allow for the most efficient transfer of energy. In theory, an oblique 
angle of impact would be ideal when targeting the corner of a polygonal structure, such 
as a tower or even a merlon. In practice, however, if the strength of the targeted structure 
was so great and the mass of the projectile so small as to make this approach appear 
attractive, the engine in question could almost certainly be employed more productively 
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firing at a different target, given the amount of time it would take to inflict any significant 
damage. 
As the mass of the projectiles thrown at Harim is unknown, the force with which 
they were tossed is unclear. However, considerations of range can be used to assess the 
possible presence of counterweight-powered engines. An engine capable of a releasing a 
projectile at 34 m/s has a theoretical horizontal range of 118 m (if fired at 45) and a 
comfortable range of 102 m (+/-15) – comparable with the range of some modern 
reconstructed traction trebuchets.421 If a release velocity of 40 m/s were possible, 
projectiles could in theory be thrown up to 163 m (141 m +/-15). This appears to have 
been on the very edge of possibility for a traction trebuchet. These engines had to throw 
quite small projectiles (generally less than 10 kg) in order to achieve release velocities 
exceeding 30 m/s, whereas counterweight trebuchets could release significantly heavier 
stones at this speed. 
 Although there appears to be little evidence to suggest that counterweight 
trebuchets were used at Harim in 1164 or 1177, suggesting it was the defenders on the 
parapet rather than the walls below them that were targeted, neither is there enough 
evidence to rule out their presence conclusively. It is through many of Saladin's sieges in 
the late-1180s that more conclusive evidence for the use of these heavier engines becomes 
apparent. But before investigating these sieges, it is pertinent to look at Saladin's earlier 
use of artillery. 
 
 
 
The Rise of Saladin 
 
Jacob's Ford: 1179 
In 1175 and 1176, Saladin used artillery against a number of Muslim strongholds in Syria 
and, in 1179, 'Imad al-Din implies that Saladin intended to use it against the newly built 
Frankish castle at Jacob's Ford.422 Although this siege has become the focus of some 
discussion, little attention has been given to this reference to artillery.423 'Imad al-Din 
                                                 
421 See Appendix 4. 
422 For an overview of Saladin's use of artillery, see Appendix 2. 
423 For discussions of Jacob's Ford, see Ellenblum, et al., "Crusader Castle," pp. 258-74; Barber, "Frontier 
Warfare," pp. 9-22. For descriptions of the castle, see Boas, Crusader Archaeology, pp. 118-20; Pringle, 
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states that wood and vine poles were gathered from 
around Safed to build protective screens for the 
Muslim artillery,424 apparently a routine procedure as 
Saladin had similar defences built for his artillery 
when he besieged Jerusalem in 1187.425 However, 
artillery is not mentioned following the start of the 
siege and not a single identifiable projectile has been 
uncovered during recent excavations at the castle.426 
The apparent absence of artillery speaks to the speed 
of this siege: despite an initial mining setback, the 
castle fell to a frontal assault less than a week after 
the siege began.427 While there have certainly been 
previous examples of artillery being erected in 
shorter periods of time than this, the rapid progress 
that Saladin's forces were making against the castle 
probably discouraged him from setting up his 
artillery after it arrived. 
 When Saladin initially crossed the Jordan, he 
left his baggage at Banyas and it stands to reason that 
any prefabricated artillery that he might have been moving with the army would have 
been left here as well. Accordingly, the early efforts to gather materials to establish a 
fortified artillery position probably began before the engines arrived. Prefabricated 
                                                 
Secular Buildings, no. 174, p. 85; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, pp. 304-5; Conder and Kitchener, Survey of 
Western Palestine, 1:250-51; Guérin, Description: Galilée, 2:341. Unfortunately, no comprehensive record 
of the archaeological activities, which commenced in 1992, has yet been published. For contemporary 
descriptions see Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 197, 203-6; William of Tyre, Chronicon 
21.25 (26), ed. Huygens, 2:997, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:436-37; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 
2:264-65. Contrary to the assertions of William of Tyre (21.27, 30), the castle was never completed, as 
confirmed by archaeological evidence, Ellenblum, et al., "Crusader Castle," p. 305; Boas, Crusader 
Archaeology, p. 118-20. 
424 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 203. Cf. Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:265. 
425 De expugatione terrae sanctae, ed. Stevenson, pp. 243-44, trans. Brundage, p. 160. 
426 Pers. cor. with excavators Adrian Boas and Kate Raphael, May 2013. For a survey of the numerous 
arrowheads that have been found see, Raphael, "A Thousand Arrowheads," pp. 252-61. For general 
excavations, see Ellenblum, et al., "Crusader Castle," pp. 303-6. 
427 For Saladin's campaign against Jacob's Ford and the siege of the castle, see Abu Shama, Kitab al-
Raudatain, RHC Or , pp. 195-205; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:264-66; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, 
trans. Broadhurst, pp. 59-61; William of Tyre, Chronicon 21.26.28 (27-29), ed. Huygens, 2:998-1,002, 
trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:440-43. See also Benvenisti, The Crusaders, pp. 304-5; Boas, Crusader 
Archaeology, pp. 118-19; Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 270-73. 
Jacob's Ford: distribution of 
arrowheads, plan (after Raphael 
and Ellenblum) 
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artillery was being stockpiled in Damascus before Nur al-Din established himself there 
and it is possible that the engines that 'Imad al-Din implies Saladin intended to use at 
Jacob's Ford were drawn from this arsenal.428 The only other materials that are mentioned 
in relation to artillery are those that were gathered from around Safed, suggesting that the 
Muslim army had no intention of building any new stone-throwers on site. 
 The ways in which artillery was employed by the end of the 1170s are thus varied. 
While there is evidence that the Sicilian force that attacked Alexandria in 1174 did so 
with the aid of imported counterweight trebuchets, the Frankish forces that besieged 
Harim in 1177 did so with locally constructed artillery that may have been little more 
advanced than that used during the First Crusade. At Jacob's Ford, it would appear that 
Saladin had initially intended to use prefabricated artillery, but with siege efforts 
proceeding at a good pace, he opted neither to make use of these nor to build lighter 
engines from locally sourced materials. Despite what appears to be the growing 
importance of artillery, Saladin made no use of any when he attacked Beirut a few years 
later. 
 
Beirut: 1182 
William of Tyre, explicitly states that Saladin's forces did not bring artillery with them 
ahead of the assault launched against Beirut in 1182, nor does he mention its subsequent 
construction. Instead, archers were relied upon to cover ongoing sapping efforts. Frontal 
assaults were undertaken in relays for three days until a Frankish fleet arrived to break 
the siege.429 Unlike the scenario at Jacob's Ford in 1179, the topography between a 
Muslim staging point, such as Banyas, and Beirut would have posed quite a challenge. 
Accordingly, Saladin may have opted to travel light and maximise the mobility of his 
forces. This may also reflect the policy that Saladin had employed in 1179, when he 
appears to have kept his baggage safely on the far side of the Jordan until he had 
successfully defeated the army of Jerusalem. As a third possibility, Saladin may have 
been sufficiently impressed by his miners and assault forces at Jacob's Ford to forgo the 
troubles of moving artillery with the army. 
                                                 
428 Fulton, "Development of Prefabricated Artillery," pp. 58-59. 
429 William of Tyre, Chronicon 22.18-19 (17-18), ed. Huygens, 2:1032-36, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:475-
79. Cf. Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 57; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 
223; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:283. 
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 Whatever Saladin's motives were for not bringing artillery to Beirut, his decision 
not to construct even light engines upon his arrival is significant. William of Tyre's 
remark that the Franks built siege engines and ladders with wood harvested from the pine 
groves around Beirut when they besieged the city in 1110, a detail not found in Fulcher 
of Chartres' earlier account, suggests that there were appropriate sources of timber 
surrounding the city at the time of Saladin's siege.430 In 1184, a confirmation of the 
bishop's right to take beams from a nearby pine forest leaves no doubt that suitable timber 
for the construction of traction, if not counterweight, engines was at hand.431 
 The fortifications of Beirut would have posed a much more significant obstacle 
than those of the incomplete castle at Jacob's Ford. Although William of Tyre claims that 
sappers attempted to undermine the town walls, Saladin likely realised that his chances 
of taking the city before the forces of Jerusalem could arrive would be slim so focused 
his efforts on waves of consecutive frontal assaults. Revealingly, the Muslim sources treat 
this attack as a far less significant episode than does William of Tyre. Despite the absence 
of stone-throwers at Beirut, Saladin's competence with artillery is confirmed by his 
campaigns beyond the Euphrates soon after. 
 
Mosul and Amida: 1182-83 
Mosul was the most significant city on the upper Tigris and its defences reflected this. 
With Saladin's approach, Izz al-Din of Mosul had artillery prepared for the city's defence 
before the siege was opened in November 1182. According to Ibn al-Athir, Saladin's 
nephew, Taqi al-Din, lobbied that they should erect a large stone-thrower against the city, 
to which Saladin responded, "No trebuchet can be set up against a city like this. If we 
erect it, they will seize it." Rejecting this, Taqi al-Din set one up anyway, only to have it 
targeted by nine alleged defensive stone-throwers before it was seized in a sally.432 The 
account reveals little of the power of Saladin's artillery, apart from the possibility that 
Taqi al-Din's engine may have been slightly more significant than the norm, though this 
is not stated. 
                                                 
430 William of Tyre, Chronicon 11.13, ed. Huygens, 1:515-16, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:484-86; Fulcher 
of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 2.42.1-2, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 534-36, trans. Ryan, pp. 196-97. 
431 Pringle, Churches, no. 42, 1:115. 
432 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:285-87. Cf. Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 57-
58. The Mosuli forces were kept within the city during most of this siege, rather than engaging the enemy 
in the field as typically occurred at the sieges of Aleppo and Damascus in the twelfth century. 
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Although absent at the time, Ibn al-Athir was a resident of Mosul and would have 
been familiar with the provisions for its defence. His account confirms the widespread 
use of defensive artillery throughout the Near and Middle East but also touches on the 
difficulties of disabling offensive artillery with such engines. Unfortunately, Baha' al-
Din, who left the city to gather support from Baghdad only days before Saladin's arrival, 
leaves very few details of this siege in his chronicle of events. After moving on from 
Mosul, Saladin erected artillery against Amida (Diyar Bakr) in early 1183, where it was 
once more used to support sapping efforts.433 
 Up to this point, one geographic region has been deliberately neglected in this 
investigation of twelfth-century artillery and its usage. Because Saladin devoted so much 
attention to Transjordan during the 1170s and especially the 1180s, it will be explored 
outside the general chronology. 
 
 
 
Transjordan 
 
At the start of the twelfth century, Baldwin I had extended Frankish interests into 
Transjordan ahead of his coronation.434 Under the aggressive leadership of Reynald of 
Châtillon from 1176/77, the region became a critical battleground between Egypt and 
Syria. The Franks had erected fortifications along the eastern ridge of the Wadi Araba 
from at least the second decade of the twelfth century and by the 1170s, the mighty castles 
of Montreal and Kerak anchored Frankish interests in this region.435 But what had once 
                                                 
433 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 58; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:287; al-
Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 71. Baha' al-Din claims that the siege lasted eight days while Ibn 
al-Athir places its length at around fourteen days. The impressive remains of the basalt walls are some of 
the best preserved medieval defences in the region. See also Chevedden, "Invention," pp. 93-94. 
434 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 2.4, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 370-75, trans. Ryan, pp. 143-
47; Historia Nicaena 64, RHC Oc 5, pp. 177-78. Cf. Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 7.41-43, 
ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 546-51. Baldwin I followed up this initial reconnaissance in force with another 
in 1107, intercepting a Damascene force around Wadi Musa (Petra). In 1112/13, he returned to the region 
to prey on the caravan traffic between Cairo and Damascus, Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 81-82, 
130-31; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:146, 164; Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 
10.29-31, 12.8, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 744-47, 834-35. For the lordship and its lords, see Richard, 
The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, pp. 88, 95; Tibble, Monarchy and Lordships, pp. 29-36, 83-84. Cf. Riley-
Smith, The Crusades, pp. 96-99. 
435 In the extreme south, a castle was built as an outpost on the so called Ile de Graye (Pharaoh's Island, 
Jazirat Fara'un) at the north end of the Gulf of Aqaba, probably in the 1160s. In the Petra valley, al-Habis 
and Li Vaux Moise (Wadi Musa) were built by the Franks, overlooking the Nabataean-Roman basin and a 
few kilometres beyond the siq respectively. Montreal, situated between Petra and the Dead Sea, was the 
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been a frontier area between the independent powers of Jerusalem, Cairo and Damascus 
was transformed into a vital corridor between the two geographic power-centres of 
Saladin's empire following his unification of Egypt and Syria. The increased importance 
of this region led Kerak to become the most besieged castle of the kingdom of Jerusalem 
in the twelfth century, having enjoyed relative peace until 1170. 
 
Defences of Kerak 
The fortifications of Kerak are not very sophisticated. Its towers do not protrude far from 
the line of the adjoining curtain walls and its Frankish masonry, composed of hard 
volcanic stone, appears poor compared to the fine limestone masonry of later Muslim 
additions and rebuilding. Kerak's strength is its position and solidity. High on a ridge, the 
castle is secured along its east and west flanks by a steep gradient. To the north, the castle 
is separated from the town by a fosse 20-30 m wide and perhaps once as deep as sixty 
cubits (32.4 m).436 Behind the fosse is a 135 m long wall, up to 5 m thick, rising from the 
rock-cut scarp of the fosse and secured at each end by a slight projection akin to a tower, 
each with a postern on its recessed inner flank. To the south, the castle is separated from 
the remainder of the ridge by a dip in the topography, augmented with a rock-cut by the 
Franks. The original Frankish work at this end of the castle has been mostly obscured by 
the addition of the large Mamluk donjon. Beyond the southern masonry defences is an 
external open cistern, both a source of water and a defensive obstacle. Along the western 
                                                 
first major castle built in the area. From about 1142, Montreal as overshadowed by the equally impressive 
castle of Kerak, just east of the southern end of the salt lake and much closer to Jerusalem. For the Ile de 
Graye and Aqaba, see De Meulemeester and Pringle, "Al-'Aqaba Castle," pp. 97-102; Pringle, "The Castle 
of Ayla," pp. 333-53; Pringle, Secular Buildings, no. P5, p. 113; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 30; 
Deschamps, Les Châteaux des Croisés, 2:44; Rey, Architecture militaire, p. 276. For al-Habis see Pringle, 
Secular Buildings, no. 97, p. 49; Marino, "The Crusader Settlement in Petra," pp. 4-5; Kennedy, Crusader 
Castles, pp. 25, 29-30. For Li Vaux Moise see Pringle, Secular Buildings, no. 230, pp. 105-6; Kennedy, 
Crusader Castles, pp. 25-27; Vannini and Tonghini, "Medieval Petra," pp. 371-84. For Montreal, see 
Faucherre, " La fortresse de Shawbak," pp. 43-66; Pringle, Churches, 2:304-14; Pringle, Secular Buildings, 
no. 157, pp. 75-76; Brown, "Summary Report"; Deschamps, Les Châteaux des Croisés, 2:43-45. Cf. 
Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 2.55, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 592-93, trans. Ryan, p. 215; 
Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 12.22, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 858-59; Historia Nicaena 
76, RHC Oc 5, pp. 181-82; William of Tyre, Chronicon 11.29, ed. Huygens, 1:542, trans. Babcock and 
Krey, 1:513; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:65. For Kerak, see Deschamps, Les Châteaux 
des Croisés, 2:35-98; Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, pp. 47-48; Pringle, Churches, 1:286-94; 
Pringle, Secular Buildings, no. 124, pp. 59-60; Brown, "Excavations"; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 45-
50. Cf. William of Tyre, Chronicon 15.21, 22.28, ed. Huygens, 2:703-4, 1056, trans. Babcock and Krey, 
2:127, 499; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:50-51. 
436 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:300; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:51. Abu'l-
Fida' claims that it was fifty cubits deep, Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, pp. 47-48. 
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side of the castle there appears to have 
been a lower bailey, though this too has 
been obscured by subsequent Muslim 
rebuilding. 
 Although simple in design, Kerak 
was keenly planned. The only practical 
position from which to assail the castle 
was from the town, across the castle's 
northern fosse. The present wall facing 
this front, presumably dating to the mid-
twelfth century, is thick and bristling with 
three levels of embrasures below the 
battlements. The castle was thus almost 
impossible to assail directly provided the 
northern ditch remained unobstructed. 
Although any town defences constructed 
by the Franks appear to have vanished in the wake of the Mamluk rebuilding, the sources, 
and simple defensive necessity, suggest that the town was fortified to at least some extent 
during the twelfth century. 
 
Early Sieges: 1170-73 
Kerak was besieged no less than five times between 1170 and 1188.437 Only months after 
the Frankish-Byzantine attack on Damietta in 1169, Nur al-Din led a screening 
manoeuvre into Transjordan in early 1170, shielding the movement of a large contingent 
of supplies, merchants and members of Saladin's family heading to join him in newly 
Abbasid Egypt. Kerak appears to have been besieged at this point and 'Imad al-Din claims 
that two stone-throwers bombarded the castle for four days before the siege was lifted 
with the approach of Frankish forces.438 In 1171, Nur al-Din attempted to coordinate a 
                                                 
437 These took place in 1170, 1173, 1183, 1184 and 1187-88. 
438 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 153-54. See also Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 
2:184. Cf. Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 46; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:51. 
Kerak: castle, plan (from Müller-Wiener) 
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joint assault on Montreal with Saladin but mutual mistrust led to its failure,439 while in 
1173 Saladin led the first assault on Kerak from the direction of Egypt.440 
 In spring 1182, Saladin moved a force into Transjordan to cover the movement of 
troops out of Egypt that he intended to use later that year in Mesopotamia. Although no 
siege appears to have taken place, al-Maqrizi notes that mangonels were sent to the army 
just before it left Egypt.441 The following year, Kerak endured its first widely documented 
and truly concerted siege attempt during the wedding of Humphrey III of Toron and 
Isabella of Jerusalem,442 the first of three sieges in five years. 
 
Kerak: 1183 
Saladin left Damascus on 22 October 1183, ordering his brother, al-'Adil, to meet him at 
Kerak. The latter was to bring Egyptian forces to aid siege efforts while simultaneously 
ferrying his family and treasury out of Egypt to his new post in Aleppo.443 The Egyptian 
forces arrived on 22 November, after the siege had already begun. 
 Upon its arrival, Saladin's main force established a blockade and began to set up 
artillery. These engines may have been erected initially against the town, which Reynald 
of Châtillon attempted to defend, but after forcing an entry they were set up to assail the 
north face of the castle from inside the town. In their panic to reach the castle, the fleeing 
refugees from the town tore down the bridge over the northern fosse. Although this firmly 
halted the besiegers, it also prevented the Franks from launching any sorties and provided 
Saladin with the security to erect his artillery as close to the fosse as he liked, having only 
to contend with the missiles and projectiles thrown from the castle. 
                                                 
439 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:198-200; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 38, 41-
43. 
440 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 48; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:213-14; Abu 
Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 156-57; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:51; al-
Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 43; William of Tyre, Chronicon 20.26-28, ed. Huygens, 2:948-52, 
trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:386-90. William of Tyre's descriptions of events in Transjordan are rarely clear 
and his mistakes when discussing imply that he never visited the castle, rendering his descriptions of 
particulars suspect. He claims that invasions took place in the eighth, ninth and tenth years of Amalric's 
reign (from 1170 to 1174), but they appear to be skewed within the chronology. This appears to explain 
why Richard dated William's account of the 1170 siege of Kerak to 1173, the latter would require Saladin 
to be both besieging Kerak and relieving Alexandria from Cairo in July 1174, Richard, The Latin Kingdom 
of Jerusalem, p. 51. 
441 al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 67. See also Hamilton, The Leper King, p. 172. 
442 Hamilton has suggested that Saladin deliberately planned the siege to take place while the castle was 
filled with wedding guests, Hamilton, "The Elephant of Christ," p. 105. 
443 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 62; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 248; 
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:297; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 71-72. 
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 William of Tyre states that Saladin brought siege equipment with him from 
Damascus,444 which probably consisted of prefabricated artillery. Ibn al-Athir claims that 
Saladin erected seven stone-throwers and William of Tyre gives the figure of eight: six 
within the town and two without at a place known as 'Obelet'.445 Deschamps has suggested 
that this secondary position was on the spur to the south and that the engines placed here 
targeted the castle's southern defences, now dominated by the Mamluk donjon.446 
Although this appears to be the only sensible secondary position, at a distance of about 
115 m, it is questionable whether contemporary artillery could have had any kind of effect 
from here.447 
 The bombardment from the town was clearly intense, allowing the besiegers to 
slaughter the Frankish livestock that had been gathered in the northern fosse. However, 
the physical effects of this artillery barrage seem to have been minimal. Undoubtedly 
psychologically exhausting and threatening to any who exposed themselves along the 
parapet, at no point do these engines seem to have endangered the integrity of the 
stronghold's fortifications. Either critically or apologetically, Ibn al-Athir claims that 
Saladin did not expect the main Frankish army to allow him to besiege Kerak for very 
long so had intentionally not brought a sufficient number of engines for a long siege. This 
observation is peculiar when considering that this is the largest number of trebuchets 
given by Ibn al-Athir at a single siege since the Fatimid siege of Jerusalem in 1099. 
Saladin's lack of progress after a month of uninterrupted bombardment is revealing. 
Although he may have been employing prefabricated artillery, even these were evidently 
fairly light. Whether these were traction trebuchet or small counterweight engines, they 
were certainly not breaching engines. 
 The defenders attempted to build their own stone-thrower inside the castle, but 
this was soon put out of action by the skilled crews working the Muslim artillery. Thus it 
was left to little more than the static strength of Kerak's fortifications to endure the 
Muslim artillery barrage, while those within hoped that the masonry over their heads was 
                                                 
444 William of Tyre, Chronicon 22.29 (28), ed. Huygens, 2:1,055-57, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:498-501. 
445 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:297-98; William of Tyre, Chronicon 22.31 (30), ed. Huygens, 
2:1,059, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:503. 
446 Deschamps, Les Châteaux des Croisés, 2:64. 
447 The Ernoul account states that Saladin spared the tower in which the married couple were staying from 
the barrage of his perrieres and mangonniaus, Ernoul 9, ed. Mas Latrie, pp. 103-4. The context would 
suggest that this tower was in range of the attacking artillery; however, the author provides no details of 
where Saladin's engines were placed or which towers were in range, drawing into question the reliability 
of this anecdote. 
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strong enough to withstand the impact of any projectiles that sailed over the walls and 
struck the unfortified buildings within the enceinte. 
 The siege was lifted in early December 1183 when relief arrived under Baldwin 
IV of Jerusalem. With Egypt stripped of its defenders, brought out by al-'Adil, Saladin 
sent his nephew Taqi al-Din 'Umar there while he turned his forces towards Damascus, 
giving Kerak a short period of respite.448 
 
Kerak: 1184 
Saladin returned to Kerak around the start of August 1184 and the Islamic sources clearly 
convey the impression that he once more made extensive use of artillery.449 William of 
Tyre omits any mention of this episode but Baldwin IV notes the use of petrariae in a 
letter written soon after the siege.450 Having failed the year before, there is little reason to 
doubt that Saladin brought his best and most powerful machines on this occasion. 
 'Imad al-Din appears to suggest that the defenders again made an effort to defend 
the town, against which Saladin initially directed nine trebuchets. He claims that the 
engines destroyed part of a wall, leaving only the fosse of the castle to overcome.451 Due 
to the source's poetic writing style, it cannot be said with certainty that he intended this 
wall to be part of the town curtain rather than the north wall of the castle; however, Ibn 
al-Athir and Ibn Shaddad preferred the former interpretation in their accounts.452 'Imad 
al-Din places this artillery damage early in the siege, before efforts were underway to fill 
the castle's northern fosse by 17 August. However, Baha' al-Din appears to imply that 
Saladin did not erect his artillery until 23 August, when he was joined by the 
Mesopotamian contingents of his army, and al-Maqrizi claims artillery was not used until 
                                                 
448 William of Tyre, Chronicon 22.29 (28), 31 (30), ed. Huygens, 2:1,055-57, 1,059-60, trans. Babcock and 
Krey, 2:498-501, 503-4; Ernoul 8, 9, ed. Mas Latrie, pp. 80-82, 102-6; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. 
Richards, p. 62; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:297-98; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC 
Or 4, p. 248; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:52; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, 
pp. 71-72. 
449 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 249-56; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 
64-65; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:299-300; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:52; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 74. Cf. Ibn Jubayr, Rihla, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 300-1, 313-
14. 
450 Letter of Baldwin IV to a Frankish delegation in Europe, in Ralph of Diceto, Ymagines historiarum, ed. 
Stubbs, pp. 27-28. 
451 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 254. 
452 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:300; Ibn Shaddad, in Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:52. 
ARTILLERY IN AND AROUND THE LATIN EAST MICHAEL S. FULTON 
  
 
136 
3 September.453 It is thus unclear how long these engines were in use before Frankish 
relief arrived and the siege was lifted around 4 September. 
There are presently no signs of damage to indicate that the northern wall of the 
castle was significantly damaged during this siege, or that of the previous year, while the 
Frankish town walls and gates have since disappeared, preventing an assessment of any 
repair work. Although the weakness of these outer defences might have encouraged their 
rebuilding, it still seems unlikely that late-twelfth-century artillery could have inflicted 
sufficient damage to be credited with allowing assailing forces to take the town, especially 
given the implicitly short period of time that they were assailed. 
 When the sources are read collectively, it seems that Saladin directed most of his 
efforts towards filling the northern fosse and constructing covered ways to assist in this 
operation. Most accounts present the Muslim artillery as assisting these efforts. It is in the 
freer language of the letters preserved by Abu Shama, that the destructive effect of the 
attacking artillery is most embellished. Despite the prevalent imagery of general 
destruction, at times these letters definitively refer to artillery targeting the castle's parapet 
and its Frankish defenders.454 While the mass of the northern wall displays no evidence 
of obvious impact signatures or significant repairs, this cannot be said of the parapet, or 
what remains of it. This is not conclusive evidence that the castle's northern battlements 
were damaged during the siege in 1184, as damage and repairs carried out here could date 
to a number of subsequent episodes, but the lack of discernible destruction below this 
level suggest that this was where artillery fire was concentrated.455 
 In contrast to the siege of 1183, most of the sources draw attention to the active 
defence mounted by the defenders. The garrison, which had apparently constructed 
defensive artillery since the last siege, showered the Muslims attempting to fill the fosse 
with stones as well as arrows. The limited power of these engines is indicated by their 
inability break through the improvised mud-brick coverings built by the besiegers to 
protect their path to the fosse.  
                                                 
453 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 64-65; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 
254; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 74. See also Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:300; 
Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:52. Cf. Deschamps, Les Châteaux des Croisés, 2:66-68. 
454 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4 pp. 251-55.  
455 Brown, "Excavations," p. 290. 
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Kerak and Counterweight Artillery 
Given the frequency with which Kerak was besieged through the 1170s and 1180s, a 
number of historians have discussed some of these sieges in their assessments of the 
power of late-twelfth-century artillery. Ronnie Ellenblum has suggested that the brevity 
of the siege in 1170, and 'Imad al-Din's claim that only two engines were used, is 
reflective of a wider policy whereby Muslim forces were beginning to integrate 
prefabricated heavy artillery.456 But it is unclear how the brevity of an unsuccessful siege 
supports the presence of particularly powerful siege engines, especially when most 
sources do not mention the use of artillery. Such a theory also fails to address the sieges 
of 1183 and 1184, where many more engines were used with equally little physical effect. 
Furthermore, if Saladin abandoned his artillery when he lifted the siege in 1183, as is 
suggested by William of Tyre,457 this suggests that it was less valuable to him than the 
mobility that he gained without it, allowing him to raid the southern parts of the kingdom 
of Jerusalem and burn Nablus before returning east of the Jordan. 
 What has hitherto been neglected by historians is a simple investigation of the 
architectural remains. The outer face of Kerak's northern wall reveals neither notable 
                                                 
456 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, p. 258. 
457 William of Tyre, Chronicon 22.31 (30), ed. Huygens, pp. 1059-60, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:504. 
Kerak: north wall of the castle, from the northwest (author) 
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blemishes nor subsequent repairs below the level of the ramparts. No trace of the 
bombardments in the 1180s is discernible, even though the attacking artillery may have 
been as close as 30 m in 1183.458 While the rough masonry could easily disguise impact 
signatures inflicted by traction trebuchets, if heavier counterweight engines were 
employed with the intention of damaging the structure of the wall, there should be 
evidence of this. Rather than this wall, it is the fosse in front of it that was considered to 
be the more formidable obstacle – so long as the castle's foundations remained beyond 
the reach of the Muslim miners on the far side of the fosse, the castle and its defenders 
were secure. Whether traction- or counterweight-powered, prefabricated or locally built, 
the inability of Saladin's artillery to make an impression on Kerak's defences following 
so many sieges clearly reveals the limited power of the artillery brought against them. 
 
Kerak: 1187 
The last siege of Frankish Kerak began in 1187. As part of the multi-directional offensive 
that ultimately culminated in the battle of Hattin, Saladin took a force to Bosra that spring 
to protect the returning pilgrim caravans. This force then moved into Transjordan where 
it was joined by contingents from Egypt. A part of this force settled down to invest Kerak 
while the remainder raided throughout the Frankish lordship.459 Having travelled to Bosra 
without baggage, it seems unlikely that Saladin made use of artillery or even intended to 
press the siege to an aggressive conclusion. Although it is possible that the Egyptian 
contingent might have brought siege equipment, there is no evidence of this. Saladin 
appears to have appreciated the relative resilience of Kerak to acute siege tactics and 
changed his strategy, content to allow the garrison to starve itself to the point of 
capitulation if events to the north failed to bring about a greater advantage there.460 
 
                                                 
458 The castle was subsequently besieged at least twice in the thirteenth century, in 1246 by Egyptian forces 
and 1286 by a Mamluk detachment, though there appear to be no indications that artillery was used on 
either occasion, Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, p. 80; Maqrizi, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 
281-82, trans. Quatrèmer, 2.1:87-88; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, p. 13. 
459 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 71-72; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 
261-62; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:318-19; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 82; 
Eracles 23.54, RHC Oc 2, p. 81. 
460 Since his devastating defeat at Montgisard in 1177, Saladin had been seeking a decisive battle with the 
kingdom of Jerusalem, but failed to lure the numerically inferior Frankish army into an ideal position 
despite repeated incursions into Galilee and Transjordan. These campaigns had, however, reinforced the 
advantages of pressure along multiple fronts at the same time. 
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Most contemporary references to twelfth-century artillery are far from detailed. From the 
Frankish perspective, this mirrors similar trends in Europe: using ambiguous terms such 
as machinae or only vaguely identifying the presence of artillery, with terms like 
petrariae, without describing how it was employed. However, the mundane manner in 
which such engines are noted throughout the century clearly indicates that these were 
familiar machines, a point plainly made by the number of occasions in which certain 
sources, such as Albert of Aachen, Matthew of Edessa and William of Tyre, claim that 
artillery was used. From the Muslim perspective, references to artillery in Ibn al-
Qalanisi's history increase from about 1138. This probably reflects, to some degree, the 
author's increased exposure to such engines, perhaps associated with the increasing 
pressure that Zanki was applying towards Damascus. A similar pattern can be found in 
Ibn al-Athir's record of events, in which artillery is referenced at only nine sieges in the 
Near and Middle East between 1100 and 1159 but is then found on no less than ten 
occasions between 1160 and 1177. This dramatic increase, which corresponds with the 
height of Nur al-Din's power and Saladin's early career, may be due in part to the source's 
use of the lost portions of 'Imad al-Din's al-Barq al-Shami. Ibn al-Athir then mentions 
artillery in sixteen places during the 1180s, accompanying Saladin's rise to pre-eminence 
and the attention this received in the various histories that he used. The increasing number 
of references to artillery suggests that these engines were gaining greater importance. By 
examining the events surrounding the Third Crusade, it is possible to gain an appreciation 
of how much these engines had developed since the First Crusade and a better sense of 
how they were being employed by the end of the twelfth century.
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5. Artillery and the Third Crusade                   
Power and Value (1187-1192) 
 
 
 
The Consequences of Hattin 
 
When Saladin crossed the Jordan in 1187, his campaign objectives may have been far 
more like those that he had had when he invaded Galilee in 1179 and 1183 than is often 
considered.461 Saladin most likely left his siege engines east of the Jordan while he 
provoked the Frankish army into action by besieging Tiberias in early July. The only 
Muslim source that indicates that artillery might have been used at Tiberias is 'Imad al-
Din; however, his choice of words seems to be influenced by the rhyming style of his 
writing.462 The term he uses, hajjarun, can be understood as 'stoneworkers', which applied 
to sappers as well as those who shaped artillery ammunition.463 Mining and a frontal 
assault, rather than artillery, appear to have been the decisive factors that allowed the 
Muslims to take the town in a single day.464 
                                                 
461 For the 1179 campaign, William of Tyre, Chronicon 21.27-29 (28-30), ed. Huygens, 2:1,000-4, trans. 
Babcock and Krey, 2:440-45; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 198-206; Ibn al-Athir, al-
Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:264-65; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 59-60. For the 1183 
campaign, see William of Tyre, Chronicon 22.26-28 (25-27), ed. Huygens, 2:1,048-54, trans. Babcock and 
Krey, 2:492-98; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 242-48; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. 
Richards, pp. 60-61; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:297; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, 
p. 72. 
462 See Fulton, "Development of Prefabricated Artillery," pp. 58-59. 
463 See Khamisy, "Some Notes on Ayyubid and Mamluk Military Terms," pp. 73-92. See also Amitai, "Foot 
Soldiers," p. 236. For the siege of Tiberias, see 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 24. For the Arabic, 
see Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 264. Cf. Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 
73; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:320-21; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 58; Eracles 
23.31, RHC Oc 2, pp. 47-48. 
464 For the defences of Tiberias, see Pringle, "Town Defences," pp. 94-95; Stepansky, "Das 
kreuzfahrerzeitliche Tiberias," pp. 384-95; Stepansky, "Tiberias, the Courtyard of the Jews"; Stepansky, 
"Tiberias, Map Survey." 
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 It is unclear whether Saladin 
was moving with his artillery when he 
arrived at Acre on 8 July and received 
the town's surrender on the following 
day.465 Baha' al-Din and 'Imad al-Din 
note its use soon after at Toron but it is 
unclear where these engines came 
from.466 It is possible that they were 
brought by Taqi al-Din or Saladin via 
Acre, or that an otherwise unknown 
party brought them from elsewhere, or 
even that they were built on site before 
the garrison surrendered on 26 July.467 Saladin does not appear to have employed any 
engines during his subsequent push up the coast, during which he took Sidon, Beirut and 
Jubayl (Byblos), nor during the foray into Palestine that gained him Ramla, Hebron and 
Bethlehem. Likewise, the Muslim sources do not mention artillery during al-'Adil's 
acquisition of Mirabel and Jaffa. The contemporary Frankish author of the De 
expugnatione terrae sanctae, however, notes the use of machinae at the former.468 The 
two Muslim armies united on 23 August before investing Ascalon. 
 
Ascalon: 1187 
Saladin was likely impressed by the defences of Tyre, having passed them twice in less 
than a month, and probably regarded Ascalon as an easier target; possessing the latter 
would also facilitate the movement of troops and supplies from Egypt to Palestine. The 
Muslims encamped outside Ascalon in late August and, once Saladin's offer to free Guy 
                                                 
465 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 31-33; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 75; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:324-26. See also Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 58. 
466 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 37-38; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 76. 
467 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 37-39; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 76; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:326-27. Baha' al-Din's account is the exception to the popular narrative, 
stating the castle fell to assault and its steadfast defenders were led into captivity. For a nineteenth-century 
description of the castle see Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 1:133-35, for a more recent 
report, see Piana, "The Crusader Castle of Toron," pp. 177-91. 
468 De expugnatione terrae sanctae, ed. Stevenson, p. 229; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 33; Ibn 
al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:326; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 83. For an examination 
of the section of the Libellus de expugnatione de terrae sanctae per Saladinum dealing with the events of 
1187, a brief discussion of its author and its relation to the Ernoul and Eracles continuations of William of 
Tyre’s account, see Kane, "Wolf's Hair." 
Toron: castle, plan and topography (after Piana) 
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of Lusignan in exchange for the city's surrender was rejected, he erected artillery.469 The 
sudden appearance of these engines and their widespread notice is peculiar. It is possible 
that the appearance of artillery at this point reflects the greater significance of this siege, 
during which the defenders put up a stiff resistance initially, that the engines employed 
here were more impressive than others used earlier, or simply that such engines were not 
often used by Saladin and his army in July 1187. 
 Despite the number of sources that mention their use, only a few portray them as 
exceptional. A letter sent by Saladin that is preserved in the History of the Patriarchs, 
presumably one of many sent out declaring his latest victory, presents the besieging 
engines as particularly destructive. It states that he ordered his artillery set up on 23 
August, that they were ready on 25 August and only one day later they opened a breach 
in a certain large bastion.470 When considering that the letters sent out after the siege of 
Kerak in 1184 also appear to exaggerate the power of Saladin's artillery, caution should 
be taken before concluding that these engines were particularly powerful. The widespread 
notice of artillery in the Muslim sources is perhaps related to the spread of letters such as 
this. Whatever the case, after a siege of two weeks, Ascalon's defenders surrendered on 5 
September. No mention of artillery is made during the subsequent acquisition of many 
smaller towns and strongholds as contingents of the Muslim army spread out across 
Palestine before Jerusalem was besieged. 
 
Jerusalem: 1187 
The defences of Jerusalem that Saladin encountered were similar to those faced by the 
Franks in 1099.471 On 20 September 1187, Saladin encamped his army to the west of the 
city, where Raymond of St Gilles had first positioned his forces eighty-eight years earlier. 
From this point, Saladin's archers began to discharge a shower of suppressing fire that 
would continue throughout the siege. After surveying the city's defences, Saladin moved 
                                                 
469 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 76-77; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 97, 100; 
Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 312-13; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:32930; 
al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 84; De expugnatione terrae sanctae, ed. Stevenson, pp. 236-37; 
Itinerarium 1.8, ed. Stubbs, pp. 19-20, trans. Nicholson, p. 37; History of the Patriarchs, trans. Khater and 
Khs-Burmester, 3.2:128-31. This is the first time that Ibn al-Athir clearly states that artillery was used by a 
component of Saladin's army since it crossed the Jordan months earlier. 
470 History of the Patriarchs, trans. Khater and Khs-Burmester, 3.2:131. 
471 Most Frankish fortification efforts at Jerusalem undertaken between 1099 and 1187 appear to have been 
repairs rather than more extensive rebuilding projects. For example, William of Tyre, Chronicon 21.24 
(25), ed. Huygens, 2:996, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:436. See also Boas, Jerusalem, p. 44; Pringle, "Town 
Defences," pp. 79-80. 
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the bulk of his army to the north on 25 September, having decided to focus his assault 
east of St Stephen's (Damascus) Gate, as the crusaders had in 1099. The space and 
elevation of the ridges running northwards from the city would have provided Saladin 
with plenty of options when positioning his artillery. 
 Saladin began to set up his artillery on the night of 25 September and by the 
following morning it was operational.472 Although artillery is included in all of the 
principal sources,473 'Imad al-Din's account is perhaps the most evocative: 
 
[Saladin] installa les machines de guerre, fit tomber les calamités comme l'eau tombe 
des nuages...Les assises des murailles et les dentelures de leurs créneaux furent 
détruites et écrêtées par les pierres qui sortaient des machines de guerre. On eût dit 
que les mangonneaux devenaient fous tandis qu'on les manœuvrait, ils étaient comme 
des braves qu'on ne peut égaler; ils semblaient des monts entraînés par des cordes; 
on eût dit des vols de sauterelles actionnés par les hommes, des mères d'infortune et 
de mort, des femmes grosses qui enfantaient les calmités; nulle protection contre 
leurs pierres; nulle sécurité près d'elles, mème pour qui prenait garde; leurs 
projectiles ne progressaient qu'accompagnés du danger; leur passage ne créait 
qu'amertumes pour les humains. Que d'étoiles s'abattaient du haut de leur ciel! Que 
de rochers jaillissaient de leur emplacement! Que de tisons se répandaient de leurs 
étincelles! Rien de comparable aux ravages causés par leurs proches à la précision 
de leurs coups subits, aux tractions de leurs cordes. Sans cesse, elles arrachaient tout 
au moyen de leur frondes, battaient de toute leur charpente, tiraient avec entrain sur 
leur cordes, frappaient, démolissaient, renversaient, fendaient, puisaient à leur 
réserve de pierres, préparaient le mal qu'elles allaient faire, dérangeaient 
l'assemblage des pierres du rempart au moyen des roches lancées l'une après l'autre, 
détruisaient la cohésion des édifices dont elles disloquaient, déchaussaient et 
disjoignaient les assises en atteignant leurs fondements, déliaient les clefs de voûte 
en les prenants sous l'effet de leurs cordes, épuisaient les citernes en buvant à leur 
creux. 
 
Bref, laissant les remparts à l'état de résidus dont les défenseurs étaient repoussés, 
l'ennemi se trouva déconfit, son organisation, détruite; le fossé fut franchi; les troupes 
furent lancées en avant...474  
                                                 
472 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 77; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 326-
27; De expugnatione terrae sanctae, ed. Stevenson, pp. 241-43, trans. Brundage, pp. 159-60; Ernoul, 
Chronique 18, ed. de Mas Latrie, pp. 211-14; Eracles 23.55, RHC Oc 2, pp. 82-83. 
473 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 44-46; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 77-78; 
Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 326-30; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:330-33; 
De expugnatione terrae sanctae, ed. Stevenson, pp. 241-46, trans. Brundage, pp. 259-62; Itinerarium 1.9, 
ed. Stubbs, pp. 20-21, trans. Nicholson, pp. 38-39; Ernoul, Chronique 18, ed. de Mas Latrie, pp. 211-14; 
Eracles 23.55-57, RHC Oc 2, pp. 8385; Bar Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. Budge, 2:325. 
474 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 45-46. Costello's translation of Gabrieli's translation is slightly 
different: "He [Saladin] mounted catapults, and by this means milked the udders of slaughter...The bases 
of the walls and the teeth of their battlements were battered and broken down by stones from the catapults' 
slings; they seem like madmen throwing stones at random, impregnable gallant knights, mountains crossed 
with ropes, living beings aided by others, mothers of disaster and death, pregnant with calamity. Their 
missiles were invincible, all precautions against them were useless. Their darts vibrated with menace, their 
flight nourished on the bile of perceptive men. How many boulders came down out of heaven upon them, 
how many blocks of sandstone plunged into the earth, how many blazing firebrands bespattered them! The 
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It is unclear whether counterweight- or traction-powered trebuchets are described: both 
types of engines require the hauling of ropes. The degree of destruction suggests the use 
counterweight trebuchets while the apparent rate of fire is indicative of traction 
trebuchets. There is illustrative evidence that counterweight technology was known by 
this time;475 however, there is nothing exceptional in any of the Muslim or Frankish 
accounts to confirm their use in 1187. 
 Regardless of its power, Saladin employed his artillery as a supporting weapon. 
According to accounts from both sides, he used it to restrict the garrison's ability to 
maintain an active defence, allowing his miners to approach the city walls.476 Although 
more distant than some of his contemporaries, Ibn al-Athir clearly explains how archers 
advanced with the sappers as they crossed the fosse while the artillery constantly 
bombarded the parapet, keeping it clear of defenders. This is very similar to the 
sentiments expressed in the De expugnatione terrae sanctae. It is unclear how far the 
sappers had progressed by the time that the city's defenders, fearing a breach, capitulated 
on 2 October.477 With Jerusalem in hand, Saladin departed on 30 October for Acre and 
then onwards to Tyre on 8 November, the Franks' last foothold on the Palestinian coast 
and a vital link with Europe. 
 
Tyre: 1187 
The proverbial strength of Tyre's defences impressed onlookers around the end of the 
twelfth century as it had in antiquity.478 Saladin arrived on 12 November 1187 but was 
                                                 
damage caused by the catapults, the extraordinary extent of their devastation, the effects of their 
concentration, the whistling wind of their flight, the extent of their range were beyond compare. The attack 
from their catapults never ceased, the battery of their mangonels, the drawing of water with their ropes, the 
parading in their halters, the attacking and defending, prostrating and slashing open, shaking their buckets, 
becoming downcast at their misfortunes, dissolving the composure of strong men with the boulders that 
they shot one after another, smashing the huddles of buildings, breaking them down into ruins, demolishing 
their foundations, breaking their joints by hauling them within their ropes, exhausting the wells by drinking 
from them with their own cups, until they reduced the walls to a single line of bricks and drove their 
defenders away. The enemy's ordnance was smashed and broken, the moat crossed and the attack 
sustained..." 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. in Gabrieli, Arab Historians, pp. 154-56. 
475 See Fig. C1. 
476 De expugnatione terrae sanctae, ed. Stevenson, pp. 244-46, trans. Brundage, pp. 160-62; Eracles 23.55-
57, RHC Oc 2, pp. 83-85. Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 77; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. 
Richards, 2:331. 
477 Benvenisti takes a literal interpretation and suggests that the sappers covered an incredible 30 m within 
two days, Benvenisti, The Crusaders, p. 44. Prawer places the mine at precisely the same point where the 
Franks broke into Jerusalem in 1099 and the Persians entered in 614, Prawer, "The Jerusalem the Crusaders 
Captured," p. 14. 
478 William of Tyre, Chronicon 22.30 (29), ed. Huygens, 2:1,057, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:501; Ibn 
Jubayr, Rihla, trans. Broadhurst, p. 319-20; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:328; Wilbrand of 
Oldenburg 1.2, ed. Pringle, p. 117, trans. Pringle, p. 63. See also Ibn Battuta, Tuhfat, trans. Gibb, p. 58. For 
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forced to wait until 25 November for his son, al-Zahir Ghazi, and his artillery to arrive. 
Once his forces assembled, Saladin established his camp on a hill near the famous 
causeway and began to attack the city.479 The Ernoul account states that Saladin employed 
seventeen perrieres and mangonniaus, while the Eracles counts fourteen perrieres and 
mangoneaus and a letter from Brother Terricus of the Templars to Henry II of England 
notes thirteen perrariae.480 The Muslim accounts give no numbers; 'Imad al-Din states 
simply that there were both large and small stone-throwers and gives the impression that 
they were worked by teams in relay.481 
Although the Frankish sources use two terms to describe Saladin's artillery, this 
on its own is not sufficient evidence to conclude that more than one type of engine was 
employed; however, such a suggestion appears more plausible when taking into 
consideration 'Imad al-Din's reference to large and small engines. It is still a jump to assert 
that these represent counterweight and traction engines; but whatever engines were used 
at Tyre were likely to have been the same that had been used at Jerusalem only weeks 
earlier. Little more about these engines can be discerned as the sources instead focus on 
Saladin's use of siege towers at Tyre and the naval engagement in late December that 
ultimately compelled the sultan to end the siege. 
 Saladin's treatment of his artillery is unclear following his decision to lift the siege. 
According to many Frankish sources, Saladin burnt his engines before departing;482 
however, Baha' al-Din states that Saladin disassembled his artillery and withdrew it with 
the army, only burning what could not be taken away.483 If Saladin was making use of 
prefabricated engines, moving them from Ascalon to Jerusalem to Tyre, and especially if 
some of these were counterweight trebuchets, it would seem inexplicable why he would 
burn these as he was not threatened by another field army. If Saladin destroyed some of 
                                                 
the medieval defences of Tyre, see Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 1:72; Pringle, 
"Town Defences," 85-88; Pringle, Churches, 4:178-80. 
479 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 78-79; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 63-65; 
Eracles 24.2, RHC Oc 2, pp. 104-5; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 342-44; Ibn al-Athir, 
al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:335-38. 
480 Ernoul, Chronique 20, ed. de Mas Latrie, p. 237; Eracles 24.2, RHC Oc 2, p. 105; letter from Terricus 
of the Temple to Henry II of England, in Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 2:346-47, trans. Riley, 
2:90-91. 
481 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 64-65. 
482 Eracles 24.4, RHC Oc 2, p. 110; Itinerarium 1.10, ed. Stubbs, p. 25, trans. Nicholson, p. 41; William of 
Newburgh, Historia rerum Anglicarum 3.20, ed. Howlett, 1:264-65; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 
3.9.8, ed. Bongars, pp. 193-94, trans. Lock, pp. 307-8. Cf. Ernoul, Chronique 21, ed. de Mas Latrie, p. 224. 
483 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 79. Cf. 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 79-80. 
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his artillery, it would most likely have been his smaller engines, perhaps those which had 
been built on site or those not worth the trouble of storing over the winter. 
 Saladin spent a considerable portion of the winter of 1188, as well that of 1189, 
in Acre, while most of his army was sent home for the season. Baha' al-Din Qaraqush al-
Asadi, who had constructed Saladin's citadel in Cairo, was summoned from Egypt to 
strengthen Acre. References to him bringing labourers and supplies with him from Egypt 
support the possibility that Saladin may have similarly brought artillery out of Egypt, to 
use in greater Syria, at some point over the preceding decade.484 Saladin had acquired 
most of Palestine by the end of 1187 but the strongholds of eastern Galilee, Transjordan, 
and most of Lebanon and the lands farther north remained in Frankish hands.485 
 
Eastern Galilee: 1188 
In the second half of 1187, while Saladin was campaigning primarily against major urban 
centres, smaller contingents of his army were sent to oppose the castles of Belvoir, Safed, 
and Chateau Neuf (Hunin), which overlook the upper Jordan valley. Chateau Neuf 
surrendered in December 1187,486 but the relatively new Hospitaller stronghold of Belvoir 
and the hilltop castle of Safed, a Templar possession since 1167, which had been 
blockaded by August, defiantly held out. In December 1187 or January 1188, the garrison 
of Belvoir launched a successful sally, capturing provisions and arms.487 This led Saladin 
to move what forces he had retained over the winter against the castle in March 1188.488 
Despite the suitable topography around the castle, neither Saladin nor the earlier 
                                                 
484 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 108-9; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 393; 
Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 90; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 87. 'Imad al-
Din and Baha' al-Din, as well as al-Maqrizi, note that this figure was left to complete the defences of Acre, 
and possibly the wider area, when Saladin left Acre following his time there over the winter of 1189. When 
considering 'Imad al-Din's account, it is possible that he may have held this position since the winter of 
1188. 
485 For the contemporary significance of these strongholds, see letter from the East to the Master of the 
Hospitallers of Italy, 1187, in Ansbert, Historia, FRA (1 Abt.) 5, p. 3, MGH SRG 5, pp. 3-4, trans. Loud, 
p. 35; letter of the Master of the Temple to Henry II of England, in Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 
2:346-47, trans. Riley, 2:90-91. 
486 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 75-76; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 79; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:338; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 345. For discussions 
of Chateau Neuf, see Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 1:123-24; Deschamps, Les 
Chateaux des Croisés, 2:130-31, pl. XXXIV A-C; Pringle, Secular Buildings, no. 164, pp. 79-80; Boas, 
Crusader Archaeology, p. 103. See also Ibn Jubayr, Rihla, trans. Broadhurst, p. 315. 
487 Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 2:346-47, trans. Riley, 2:90; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. 
Richards, pp. 79-80; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 81-82; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC 
Or 4, pp. 344-45; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:339. 
488 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 79-80; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 103-4; 
Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 346-47; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:344. 
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blockading force appear to have employed artillery. Instead, Saladin sent his small force 
in waves against the castle, much as he had at Beirut in 1182. This proved ineffective. A 
force was left to continue the blockade while Saladin departed for Damascus, where he 
arrived on 5 May 1188. For the time being, Belvoir and Safed remained Frankish outposts 
in Eastern Galilee. 
 
 
 
Indications of Range in Western Syria and Transjordan 
 
Saladin left Damascus soon after 
arriving and mustered his army to the 
east of Crac des Chevaliers (Hisn al-
Akrad). He sent al-Zahir Ghazi and 
Taqi al-Din to oppose Antioch while 
contingents of the army raided as far 
as Tripoli before the main body set out 
towards Tortosa on 1 July 1188. 
 Saladin does not appear to 
have employed artillery during the 
early part of his campaign as he 
travelled up the Syrian coast from 
Tortosa to Latakia.489 Frontal assaults 
were sufficient to take the town 
defences of Tortosa and one of its two 
tower-keeps, but neither offensive nor 
defensive artillery appear to have 
factored into the failed attempt to take 
the Templars' tower, although neither 
did mining.490 Maraclea was occupied 
                                                 
489 For the inclusion of various smaller components that broke off and rejoined the main force, see 
Deschamps, Les Chateaux des Croisés, 3:127-31. 
490 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 82-83; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 124-25; 
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:345; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 59; letter of 
Saladin’s movement through Syria, 1188 
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unopposed and the town of Jabala (Gibellum) was surrendered before Saladin had 
finished arranging his forces against it. The castle followed suit the following day after a 
single attack.491 'Imad al-Din appears to be the only source to mention stones being 
thrown, but does not specify if this was done with machines. At Latakia, the miners who 
were responsible for the capture of the city seem not to have been supported by 
artillery.492 From a Frankish perspective, the Itinerarium also portrays Saladin's push up 
the coast as a series of attacks rather than sieges.493 Although artillery is not mentioned 
as part of the more complex operations at Tortosa or Latakia, it suddenly becomes a 
critical element as the army turned inland. 
 
Saone: 1188 
Saone was the first stronghold that Saladin's army encountered after turning away from 
the coast. The castle was one of a number of Byzantine outposts in the Syrian hills that 
had been developed by the Franks.494 That castle sits on a spur with wadis over 200 m 
wide to the north and south. The original Byzantine citadel was surrounded by a central 
enceinte and an additional bailey was built on either side of this. Dividing the castle from 
the remainder of the spur was one of the most impressive medieval fosses, almost 40 m 
                                                 
Hermenger to Leopold V of Austria, in Ansbert, Historia, FRA (1 Abt.) 5, p. 4, MGH SRG 5, pp. 4-5, trans. 
Loud, pp. 35-36. 
491 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 82; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 125-28; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:345; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 59; Abu'l-Fida', al-
Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 59. 
492 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 82-83; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 128-31; 
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:346-47; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 59. 
493 Itinerarium 1.13, ed. Stubbs, pp. 26-27, trans. Nicholson, p. 43. 
494 Matthew of Edessa, Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, p. 32; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-
Khowayter, 2: 708-9; A. W. Lawrence, "A Skeletal History," p. 218. See also Michaudel,"Étude 
historique," p. 6; Saadé, "Histoire du Château de Saladin," pp. 985-87; Deschamps, Les Chateaux des 
Croisés, 3:219-20. For the Frankish lordship of Saone, see Michaudel,"Étude historique," pp. 6-9; Saadé, 
"Histoire du Château de Saladin," pp. 987-91; Deschamps, Les Chateaux des Croisés, 3:227-28. Bourzey 
and Balatunus were among the other Byzantine strongpoints developed by the Franks in this region. 
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deep and approaching 20 m wide.495 The outer eastern wall is pierced by thirty-two 
embrasures along the ground floor level alone, indicating that its designers regarded a 
massed assault to be more threatening than any artillery, as these apertures would have 
detracted from the wall's strength. 
 The Muslim army arrived at Saone on 26 July. Baha' al-Din states that Saladin 
erected six stone-throwers early the following day, and although he does not give 
Saladin's position, 'Imad al-Din indicates that he was positioned on the spur facing the 
castle's eastern fosse. This would have been an ideal position in which to erect artillery. 
The sources unanimously place al-Zahir Ghazi elsewhere in a secondary position with 
another one or two trebuchets, ambiguously claiming that he was along the side of one of 
the wadis facing a certain promontory of the castle. The sources claim that al-Zahir Ghazi 
and his Aleppan forces were able to damage a section of wall with their artillery and some 
appear to suggest that it was here that Muslim forces broke in during the successful attack 
that was launched on 29 July.496 
                                                 
495 Baha' al-Din states that the fosse is 60 cubits deep (32.4 m according to the standard Egyptian measure). 
For studies and descriptions of Saone, see Mesqui, "Saône"; Michaudel, "Le château de Saône"; Saadé, 
"Histoire du Château de Saladin," pp. 980-1,016; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 84-95; Boase, "Military 
Architecture," pp. 145-49; Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, pp. 44-45; Deschamps, Les Chateaux 
des Croisés, 3:217-47; T. E. Lawrence, Crusader Castles, ed. Pringle, pp. 42-49; Rey, Étude sur les 
monuments, pp. 105-13. 
496 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 84-85; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 131-32; 
Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 365-67; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:347-48. 
Saone: castle, plan and topography (from Mesqui) 
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 Interpreting the events of this siege, Gabriel Saadé argued that that al-Zahir 
Ghazi's artillery was able to breach the north wall of the western bailey from across the 
northern wadi.497 An alternative theory has been put forward by Benjamin Michaudel and 
Jean Mesqui, who suggest that the breach mentioned in the sources was created by 
Saladin's artillery at the north end of the eastern wall.498 Both theories, however, rely on 
misinterpretations of the power of contemporary artillery. 
 Saadé's theory holds that contemporary artillery not only had a range of over 200 
m but that it could throw stones large enough to inflict significant damage from this 
distance. While there is some circumstantial evidence that small stones might have been 
thrown this far, it would appear impossible that one or two engines operating at such a 
distance could have opened a breach in less than forty-eight hours. Although 
counterweight trebuchets were extremely accurate, the prolonged flight time would 
magnify the variables which compromise precision.499 Furthermore, the high angle of 
release necessary to throw a projectile this distance would compromise the amount of 
energy transferred on impact, because of the reciprocally steep angle of impact. It is 
doubtful whether swing-beam engines could ever have achieved such a task. 
If the supposed artillery damage was instead inflicted at the north end of the 
eastern wall, the issue is one of power alone. When placed in the broader context, there 
is no evidence that artillery powerful enough to breach defensive masonry over 2 m thick 
in only two days was ever employed during the twelfth century. Consider the prolonged 
periods of bombardment that the northern defences of Kerak were subjected to during 
1183 and 1184. If engines powerful enough to inflict the degree of damage that has been 
suggested existed, it is inexplicable why they were not employed with equal devastation 
at most other sieges. On this occasion, it seems the generally reliable Baha' al-Din 
borrowed heavily from the more exuberant 'Imad al-Din. He may have been inclined to 
incorporate the exaggeration of al-Zahir Ghazi's engines as he was under the patronage 
of al-Zahir when composing his account.500 Artillery probably played a much less 
significant role at this siege than has previously been thought, used to support the assault 
                                                 
497 Saadé, "Histoire du Château de Saladin," pp. 997-1,002. 
498 Michaudel, "Étude historique," pp. 15-16; Mesqui, "Saône," p. 14. See also Michaudel, "Le château de 
Saône," p. 3. 
499 These variables include pre-release factors that influence a projectile's release trajectory as well as 
environmental elements that affect the projectile while in flight. 
500 For these authors and the relation between their texts, see Richards, "A Consideration of Two 
Sources," pp. 46-65. 
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troops that ultimately stormed the castle rather than creating a breach through which they 
could enter.501 
 
Shughr-Bakas: 1188 
Saladin took the main contingent of his army away from Saone on 30 July 1188 and on 2 
August he encamped it on the banks of the Orontes near the stronghold of Shughr-Bakas. 
This castle, in the heights above the important Jisr ash-Shughr, had two distinct wards, 
divided by a fosse that cut across the spur.502 According to Baha' al-Din and 'Imad al-Din, 
Saladin took a detachment and assaulted Bakas until it was taken on 5 August. According 
to the former, it was acquired by force, whereas the latter claims that that the garrison 
surrendered.503 Ibn al-Athir states that the Franks abandoned this portion of the castle 
when the Muslims arrived.504 Only Baha' al-Din mentions the use of artillery against the 
Bakas portion of the castle, but all three agree that it was used against ash-Shughr. 
 Baha' al-Din claims that ash-
Shughr was bombarded from all sides, 
leaving the defenders no choice but to 
surrender. Although he does not 
explicitly state that Saladin's artillery 
was able to reach the castle, this would 
appear to be implied. 'Imad al-Din 
states that neither artillery nor archers 
could reach the castle; but despairing 
of taking it in a frontal assault, Saladin 
nevertheless resorted to setting up 
these engines. Ibn al-Athir appears to give the clearest description of events, stating that 
some shots were able to reach the castle but that they had no effect. When read together, 
the three accounts appear to agree that although a few shots were able to reach ash-
Shughr, these were likely very light projectiles that made little impact. According to the 
                                                 
501 For a more thorough investigation of this siege and how artillery may have been employed, see Fulton, 
"A Ridge too Far." 
502 For Shughr-Bakas, see Deschamps, Les Chateaux des Croisés, 3:349-50; Boase, "Military Architecture," 
p. 162. 
503 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 85; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 133. 
504 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:348. 
Shughr-Bakas: castle, plan and elevation (from 
Van Berchem and Fatio) 
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latter two accounts, the situation was so hopeless that the Muslim forces were shocked 
when the garrison asked for terms on 9 August.505  
 If Van Berchem and Deschamps are correct in identifying the southern component 
of the castle as Bakas and the northern part as ash-Shughr, which seems sensible, the 
former sits at a greater elevation than the latter.506 This means that Saladin either besieged 
ash-Shughr from a direction other than Bakas, or that his engines were incapable of a 
range greater than the width of the fosse between them. If Saladin positioned his artillery 
in the valleys below the castle, this would clearly support Baha' al-Din's statement that 
the castle was assailed from all sides as well as 'Imad al-Din and Ibn al-Athir's claims that 
the artillery struggled to reach the castle's lofty walls. However, it is hard to imagine why 
Saladin would not have taken advantage of the higher elevation once he had taken Bakas. 
Had he been able to move his trebuchets to the plateau east of Saone, it would appear 
sensible for him to now move them up to Bakas, from which he could assail ash-Shughr. 
Regardless, having occupied both parts of the castle, Saladin moved his army south to 
Bourzey. 
 
Bourzey: 1188 
Sitting on a conical peak, 320 m above the floor of the Orontes valley to the east, Bourzey 
had been a notable Byzantine outpost.507 When Saladin arrived on 20 August, he again 
encamped the bulk of his army on the banks of the Orontes. The next day, after surveying 
the site, he moved a secondary assault force and his artillery up to the col between the 
castle and hills rising to the west.508 
 The plateau below the castle is about 425 m above sea level, beginning about 30 
m horizontally from the plane of the castle's western wall and extending about 60 m to 
the west and 100 m to the southwest. Above this position, the foundations of the south 
end of the castle's western face are about 460 m above sea level and the Byzantine citadel, 
                                                 
505 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 85; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 134-35; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:348-49. See also Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 59. 
506 Deschamps, Les Chateaux des Croisés, 3:349-50; Van Berchem and Fatio, Voyages en Syrie, 1:251-53. 
507 For the early history of Bourzey, see Mesqui and Michaudel, "Bourzey," pp. 4-6; Mesqui, "Bourzey," p. 
97; Michaudel, "Étude historique," pp. 4-5; Deschamps, Les Chateaux des Croisés, 3:345-46. See also Anna 
Comnena, Alexiad 13.12, trans. Dawes, p. 354. For the castle, see Mesqui and Michaudel, "Bourzey"; 
Mesqui, "Bourzey"; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 81-83; Boase, "Military Architecture," p. 162; 
Deschamps, Les Chateaux des Croisés, 3:346-48. 
508 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 86; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 136; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:349-50; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 59. 
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in the northwest corner of the castle, caps the highest point of the hill, about 500 m above 
sea level.509  
 Baha' al-Din states that men surrounded the castle and that artillery was fired at it 
day and night. As at ash-Shughr, he again implies that the besieging artillery had no 
trouble reaching the castle; but suspiciously, there is no description of any damage. This 
conflicts with 'Imad al-Din's account, which states that the besieging artillery was 
insufficiently powerful to assail the castle, as at ash-Shughr, forcing Saladin to resort to 
frontal assaults two days later. Ibn al-Athir states that there was a position from which 
artillery could reach the castle but that a defensive engine within was able to put the 
Muslim trebuchets out of action on 22 August, events which he claims to have witnessed 
from a hill overlooking the castle.510 
                                                 
509 The Franco-Syrian expedition concluded that the elevation disparity between the point at which they 
suspected that Saladin planted his engines and the foundations of the walls which they assailed was about 
60 m, Mesqui and Michaudel, "Bourzey," p. 11. 
510 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 86; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 136; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:350. See also Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 59. 
Bourzey: castle, plan and topography (from Mesqui) 
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 Given the distances and elevations involved, it would appear possible for artillery 
to reach the southern sections of Bourzey's western face; however, the citadel would have 
been harder to assail. A minimum release velocity of 32 m/s is necessary to reach the 
lowest battlements of the western face (at an estimated elevation of 45 m). With a release 
velocity of 35 m/s, for which a precedent appears to have been established earlier at 
Harim,511 an engine could be placed in the centre of the plateau and assail this lowest 
parapet with a release angle of 60, increasing horizontal velocity by 77%. To reach the 
battlements of the Byzantine citadel, a release velocity of 42 m/s is necessary from the 
edge of the plateau or 44 m/s from 30 m farther back. Had Saladin's engines been capable 
of this, so too could they have fired projectiles of the same mass against the base of the 
lowest portion of wall with a horizontal velocity of 33 m/s. 
 
 
Release Angle 72° 60° 41° 80° 70° 
Velocity 32 m/s 35 m/s 44 m/s 42 m/s 44 m/s 
Horizontal Velocity 9.9 m/s 17.5 m/s 33.2 m/s 7.3 m/s 15.0 m/s 
Max. Horizontal Range 61.42 m 108.25 m 195.63 m 61.56 m 126.98 m 
Max. Vertical Range 47.26 m 46.87 m 42.51 m 87.29 m 87.22 m 
Vertical Range at 60 m 47.23 m 46.32 m 36.16 m 59.82 m 86.96 m 
  
                                                 
511 See Chapter 4. 
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The absence of archaeological evidence of the mass of the projectiles prevents an 
accurate calculation of the energy, and thus destruction, that Saladin's engines might have 
been able to produce. If Saladin's artillery struggled to reach the walls of Bourzey, it is 
almost certain that these were traction trebuchets throwing quite small projectiles; 
however, if the engines were not only able to reach the castle but inflict damage, which 
is not mentioned by any of the sources, these would necessarily have been counterweight 
trebuchets. 
The lack of agreement between Baha' al-Din, 'Imad al-Din and Ibn al-Athir makes 
it impossible to say with certainty whether Saladin was using traction- or small 
counterweight-powered engines. But given the absence of any suggestions of damage, 
these would appear to have been relatively light engines throwing small projectiles 
against the garrison, rather than the bulk of the walls. This would appear to support Ibn 
al-Athir's observations at ash-Shughr: although the castle was theoretically within range, 
its elevation placed it beyond effective range. What Baha' al-Din, 'Imad al-Din and Ibn 
al-Athir do agree on is that it was acknowledged that Bourzey would not fall due to 
artillery damage. This contrasts the apparent artillery damage inflicted at Saone but 
reflects the same tactical approach of setting up artillery followed by a general assault a 
few days later.512 
 On 23 August, Saladin divided his army into three divisions to attack the castle of 
Bourzey in rotation.513 Around mid-day, after the Franks had repulsed the first wave with 
arrows and stones, the second wave, supported by elements of the third and first, scaled 
the western wall. While the Franks were forced back to the citadel, contingents from the 
main army had made their way up the steep eastern slope and managed to scale the outer 
eastern walls, devoid of defenders.514 From the citadel, the garrison surrendered 
themselves into captivity, allowing Saladin to move north to the Iron Bridge and the 
environs of Antioch.515 
 
                                                 
512 See Fulton, "A Ridge Too Far." 
513 For the use of such attacks in rotation, see the sieges of Montferrand (1137) and Beirut (1182) in Chapter 
4 and Belvoir (1188) above. 
514 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 86; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 136-39; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:350-51. Cf. the account of Ibn Wasil, trans. in Mesqui and Michaudel, 
"Bourzey," p. 8. Ibn al-Athir describes the gradient beyond the outer eastern bailey as climbable but too 
steep to fight from. 
515 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 86; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 139; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:351-52. 
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The Syrian Gates: 1188 
Saladin appears to have used artillery against both Trapessac (Darbasak) and Baghras 
(Gaston), the Templar castles that secured the Syrian Gates north of Antioch, in 
September 1188.516 In a reversal, 'Imad al-Din, rather than Baha' al-Din, is the most 
generous with his praise of the artillery at these sieges. During the former, Ibn al-Athir 
claims that the engines were able to inflict no damage while at the latter they were 
rendered ineffective by the relative elevation of Baghras. These observations are 
somewhat puzzling because Trapessac occupies a rise similar to the tell at Harim and 
Baghras is relatively approachable on two fronts. Although the elevation of Trapessac 
may have provided the castle with protection, Baghras, tucked up further into the 
mountains, could have been assailed from the south, avoiding the sheer cliffs to the west 
and north and steeper grade to the east.517 Baha' al-Din's account is exceptionally brief as 
he was not present during these events.518 While mining efforts forced the garrison of 
Trapessac to seek terms, it would appear the Templar garrison of Baghras sought 
favourable terms relatively quickly. Saladin then arranged a brief truce with Bohemond 
III and set off for Damascus via Aleppo.519 
 The Syrian campaign of 1188 is an important window into Saladin's siege 
practices. None of the sieges were particularly grand and the accounts are far from the 
most detailed; however, having two, and possibly even three, eyewitness accounts of 
these events makes them extremely important.520 The regularity with which Saladin 
employed his artillery confirms its apparent importance, despite the conflicting reports of 
its power. The speed with which the army appears to have moved confirms the likelihood 
that these were prefabricated trebuchets, light enough to be set up overnight in most 
instances and easy enough to be moved through the hills of western Syria without too 
much difficulty.521 
 
                                                 
516 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 87; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 141-43; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:352-53. 
517 For the castle of Baghras, see A. W. Lawrence, "The Castle of Baghras," pp. 35-83. 
518 He accompanied one of the contingents that was dispatched to screen the main army from any attacks 
by the Franks by taking up a position in the plane north of Antioch. 
519 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards. p. 87; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 144-45; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:353-54. 
520 Saadé has expressed this contentious belief, but Ibn al-Athir's contribution of information not found in 
either Baha' al-Din or 'Imad al-Din, such as the lady operating the defensive engine at Bourzey, and his use 
of the first person on occasion, make this a possibility. See Saadé, "Histoire du Château de Saladin," p. 996. 
521 For the broader development and use of prefabricated artillery, see Fulton, "Development of 
Prefabricated Artillery," pp. 51-72. 
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The Absence of Artillery in Transjordan 
When the garrisons of Kerak and Montreal refused to surrender to free their lord, 
Humphrey IV of Toron,522 the task of reducing the strongholds was given to al-'Adil. Both 
castles were under strict blockades, led by Sa'ad al-Din Kamshaba, by the autumn of 
1187.523 Neither direct assaults nor artillery appear to have been used against Kerak in 
1188, despite Saladin's use of such engines here in 1183 and 1184. Although a portion of 
the garrison had left to fight at Hattin, the defenders were still in a strong enough position 
to secure their liberty, and that of their lord, when supplies ran out and they were forced 
to surrender sometime between 24 October and 23 November 1188.524 To the south, the 
older, further isolated and less celebrated castle of Montreal continued to hold out. It was 
not until April or May 1189 that the castle's garrison surrendered the stronghold, having 
endured more than a year of uninterrupted but passive blockade.525 So far from Frankish 
support, the determined resistance offered by the garrison is bewildering. 
 In his assessment of the extended blockade of Montreal, Hugh Kennedy has 
proposed that the castle's ability to endure was due to its topographic isolation, which 
prevented the Muslims from bringing siege engines up to its walls.526 Although the 
castle's topographic position was the key to its strength, Muslim forces rarely used rams 
and siege towers in the Near East; mining, often supported by artillery, and frontal attacks 
were much more common tactics. The position from which artillery could assail Montreal 
is a plateau to the northwest of the castle, now occupied by the visitors' centre. Similar to 
the ridge south of Kerak, the castle is less than 150 m away but at a slightly higher 
elevation, requiring projectiles be thrown with a release velocity of about 40 m/s. This 
would necessitate a counterweight trebuchet to batter the battlements or inflict any degree 
of damage. Notably, William of Tyre describes Montreal as being beyond the range of 
machines and bows,527 although it must be admitted that he probably never visited the 
castle. It is perhaps indicative that it was not until the end of the thirteenth century that 
                                                 
522 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 104-7; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:333. 
523 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 107. Kerak may have been continuously opposed by a small force 
since Saladin left the castle in June 1187. 
524 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 88; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 381-
82; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 87-88; Eracles 26.9, RHC Oc 2, p. 188. The smaller 
strongholds of the region also appear to have fallen around this point, Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, 
RHC Or 4, p. 382; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:354-55. See also Vannini and Tonghini, 
"Medieval Petra," 371-84. 
525 Itinerarium 1.15, ed. Stubbs, pp. 29-30, trans. Nicholson, pp. 45-46. See also, Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, 
trans. Richards, p. 91; Eracles 24.2, 26.9, RHC Oc 2, pp. 104-5 (lower text), 188. 
526 Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 111. 
527 William of Tyre, Chronicon 20.27, ed. Huygens, 2:951, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:389. 
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the northwest front of Montreal and southern defences of Kerak were significantly 
refortified, by which point artillery had become significantly more powerful.528 
 
The Significance of Range 
As was touched upon when dealing with the siege of Harim in 1177, trebuchets capable 
of releasing projectiles at a velocity around 40 m/s or a range greater than about 150 m, 
were likely counterweight engines. Even with a sense of range, the power of a 
counterweight trebuchet cannot be determined unless the mass of its projectiles is known. 
 
 
V α Vh Rh max Rv max Rv at 
50 m 
Rv at 
100 m 
Rv at 
150 m 
Rv at 200m 
35 m/s 40° 26.8 m/s 123.1 m 25.8 m 24.9 m 15.8 m -27.5 m -104.8 m 
45° 24.8 m/s 125.0 m 31.2 m 30.0 m 19.2 m -30.0 m -120.0 m 
50° 22.5 m/s 123.1 m 36.7 m 35.4 m 22.4 m -39.1 m -148.9 m 
55° 20.1 m/s 117.5 m 41.9 m 41.0 m 21.2 m -59.3 m -200.7 m 
60° 17.5 m/s 180.2 m 46.9 m 46.9 m 13.2 m -100.2 m -293.6 m 
40 m/s 40° 30.6 m/s 160.8 m 33.7 m 28.9 m 31.7 m -8.4 m -40.9 m 
45° 28.3 m/s 163.3 m 40.8 m 34.7 m 38.8 m 12.2 m -45.0 m 
50° 25.7 m/s 160.8 m 47.9 m 41.1 m 45.0 m 11.0 m -58.1 m 
55° 22.9 m/s 153.4 m 54.8 m 48.1 m 49.7 m -4.8 m -86.7 m 
60° 20.0 m/s 141.4 m 61.2 m 55.0 m 50.7 m -15.8 m -143.6 m 
                                                 
528 For the development of the northwestern defences of Montreal, see Faucherre, et al., "La forteresse de 
Shawbak," pp. 62-64. For the development of the southern defence of Kerak, see Deschamps, Les Chateaux 
des Croisés, 2:88-89. For the relation of these building efforts to artillery, see Chapter 8. 
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45 m/s 40° 34.5 m/s 203.5 m 42.7 m 31.6 m 42.7 m 33.1 m 2.9 m 
45° 31.8 m/s 206.6 m 51.7 m 37.9 m 51.6 m 41.1 m 6.4 m 
50° 28.9 m/s 203.5 m 60.6 m 45.0 m 60.6 m 47.0 m 4.1 m 
55° 25.8 m/s 194.2 m 69.3 m 53.0 m 69.3 m 48.7 m -8.6 m 
60° 22.5 m/s 179.0 m 77.5 m 62.4 m 76.4 m 42.0 m -40.8 m 
50 m/s 40° 38.3 m/s 251.2 m 52.7 m 33.6 m 50.5 m 50.7 m 34.2 m 
45° 35.4 m/s 255.1 m 63.8 m 40.2 m 60.8 m 61.8 m 43.2 m 
50° 32.1 m/s 251.2 m 74.8 m 47.7 m 71.7 m 72.0 m 48.6 m 
55° 28.7 m/s 239.7 m 85.6 m 56.5 m 83.2 m 80.2 m 47.3 m 
60° 25.0 m/s 220.9 m 95.7 m 67.0 m 94.8 m 83.4 m 32.8 m 
 
 
In order to provide a general appreciation of scale, the power of certain engines can 
be modelled and used as a comparative. Applying a simplified formula, based on the 
initial and release angles of a beam, the dimensions of the beam and the sling, and an 
arbitrary factor of efficiency to represent the retarding forces of friction, a very rough 
estimate of release velocity can be rendered: 
 
V = (
Lla + Ls
Lsa
) √2 ∙ g (2 [Lsa ∙ sin (
1
2
[
( − )
180
])]) Eff 
 
As this does not take into account most dynamics of the mechanical system or even the 
masses involved, this is not a particularly accurate mathematical representation of a 
trebuchet's firing sequence but it is suitable to provide a general idea of the capabilities 
of engines of varying sizes. If Arrangements A, B and D are used and each is loaded so 
that the short arm is 135 to the vertical below (), the following values are produced: 
 
 
 
 
  
Arrangement A (12 m beam, 5:1) 
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Although imperfect, these rough figures reveal the mechanical scale required to produce 
certain release velocities.529 Although maximising range would appear to have been 
important to the Muslims in 1188, this should not be taken as a given in every scenario. 
Whereas reducing the mass of an engine's projectiles will generally increase release 
velocity and maximise range, heavier projectiles will maximise efficiency, ensuring as 
much potential energy as possible is transferred to the projectile. This will become an 
important consideration as artillery develops increasingly into a breaching weapon. 
 
 
 
Saladin's Conquest of Northern Palestine 
 
Safed: 1188 
Around the start of November 1188 Saladin erected artillery against Safed.530 Amidst 
heavy rains, Baha' al-Din states that Saladin was determined to have five engines erected 
overnight. The work on each engine was entrusted to a different component of his army 
                                                 
529 Although the beam of Arrangement D is only 2 m less than that of Arrangement A, the shorter sling of 
the former is a mathematical handicap. In reality, sling length is one of the most easily altered mechanical 
variables, optimally determined by the proportions and masses of the other components but easily altered 
to adjust for range. 
530 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 31-32, 88-89; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 
149-50; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 384; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:355. 
For descriptions and discussions of the castle, see Chapter 7. 
Arrangement B (6 m beam, 4:1) 
Arrangement D (10 m beam, 4:1) 
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and by morning only the khanazirs were left to be fitted.531 This description suggests that 
the engines were sizable enough to require significant teams to assemble them but small 
enough so as to be erected in less than 18 hours, roughly the same amount of time that it 
took Saladin's forces to erect artillery during the Syrian campaign a few months earlier. 
The Templar garrison sought terms on 30 November, their provisions exhausted from the 
extended blockade. From Safed, Saladin made for the Hospitaller castle of Belvoir. 
 
Belvoir: Dec 1188 
Belvoir, postdating 1168, was the most sophistically planned castle built by the Franks in 
Outremer during the twelfth century, planned in two concentric squares. It was 
constructed with basalt blocks hewn from the surrounding fosse and the outer wall is 3 m 
thick, provisioned with numerous posterns for rapid egress and a strong barbican to 
control ingress.532 These defences were necessary as the castle could be approached easily 
from the south, west and north.  
  Saladin arranged his forces around the three approachable fronts of Belvoir and 
in the harsh November weather he erected his artillery. The sultan encamped so close to 
the castle that his tent was apparently within 
bow-shot of the garrison.533 If accurate, this 
would suggest that Saladin positioned his 
artillery quite close to the castle, as these 
engines were almost certainly placed ahead of 
his tents. But although artillery was clearly 
used, it does not appear to have played a 
significant part in this siege; instead, it was 
frontal assaults and the mining of the eastern 
barbican that led the garrison to sue for terms 
on 5 January 1189. Saladin probably used his 
                                                 
531 The exact component that this term corresponds with is unknown, it might designate the sling or even a 
winch. 
532 For the layout of the castle see Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 2:117-19; Benvenisti, 
The Crusaders, pp. 298-99. For the castle's construction, see Benvenisti, The Crusaders, pp. 299-300; 
Pringle, Churches, 1:123; France, Western Warfare, p. 92. 
533 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 89; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 152-53; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:356; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 387-88. 
Belvoir: castle, plan (after Benvenisti) 
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artillery to support his frontline forces, which might explain the apparent absence of 
artillery damage in the various accounts. 
Like the north wall of Kerak, the surviving courses of masonry display few traces 
of the bombardment that took place in 1188-89. This would appear to be partly due to the 
limited force of the attacking engines but may also reflect the way in which the hard basalt 
fractures. Any impact signatures that might have been visible higher up the walls were 
obscured when the castle was slighted.534 When the castle was cleared in the twentieth 
century, no note appears to have been taken of any spent projectiles, denying the 
opportunity to calculate the potential force with which they may have been thrown. 
 Frankish Palestine fell with Belvoir. When the campaign season of 1189 opened, 
Saladin moved his forces against Reynald of Sidon's mighty stronghold of Beaufort, 
perched high above the Litany River at the southern extent of Lebanon. Although the 
castle was approachable from all sides but the east, with an ideal plateau for artillery to 
the south, the Eracles account appears to be the only contemporary source that suggests 
                                                 
534 This destruction took place either in 1192, or decades later under al-Mu'azzam 'Isa. For the former date, 
see Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 81. For the more likely latter, see Pringle, Churches, 
1:120-22; Boas, Crusader Archaeology, pp. 106-8. 
Belvoir: castle, topography 
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that artillery was used at this time. Most sources are far more interested in the episode of 
intrigue orchestrated by Reynald of Sidon to defer Saladin's assaults.535 The siege was 
evidently more of a blockade and the garrison, even after its lord had been taken prisoner, 
was able to hold out until 22 April 1190, at which point it secured favourable terms of 
surrender. But by then Saladin's attention had been drawn elsewhere: the Frankish siege 
of Acre had begun. 
 
 
 
The First Great Siege of Acre 
 
Saladin had initially delayed releasing Guy of Lusignan, a prisoner since the battle of 
Hattin and whose liberty had been a term of Ascalon's surrender. Once freed and finding 
himself shut out of Tyre by Conrad of Montferrat, Guy and his supporters invested Acre 
from August 1189. With Acre's walls ahead of him, recently strengthened by Baha' al-
Din Qaraqush al-Asadi, and Saladin to his rear, Guy had begun what would become the 
most protracted siege undertaken by Frankish forces in the Holy Land during the twelfth 
century.536 
 
First Phase: 1189-90 
Artillery does not appear to have been an immediate consideration of the Franks: the first 
notable assault was a frontal attack using ladders.537 Although the motives for a rapid 
attack need no explanation, Saladin's arrival the day after this attack would have cut the 
Frankish force off from the larger trees beyond the plane of Acre, leaving them with the 
orchards around the city as their only source of timber. Only one source appears to date 
the construction of artillery to the autumn of 1189,538 most others emphasise the Franks' 
                                                 
535 Eracles 26.9, RHC Oc 2, pp. 187-88; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 90-91, 95-96, 97, 
108; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 159-62, 210; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 
397-400, 441; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:360. 
536 Eracles 24.13-16, RHC Oc 2, pp. 123-27; Itinerarium 1.26-27, ed. Stubbs, pp. 61-63, trans. Nicholson, 
pp. 70-73; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 91, 96-98; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, 
pp. 168-71; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:364-65. 
537 Itinerarium 1.27, ed. Stubbs, p. 62, trans. Nicholson, p. 71. For a complete breakdown of the Latin 
force's deployment, see Ralph of Diceto, Ymagines historiarum, ed. Stevenson, pp. 79-80; Roger of 
Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:20-22, trans. Riley, 2:126-28. 
538 Aymar the Monk, Expeditione Ierosolimitana ll. 81-104, ed. Falk and Placanica, pp. 8-10. 
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efforts to entrench their siege 
camp. Defensively, the first 
mention of artillery appears to be 
in December 1189,539 although 
their use is not mentioned until 
the spring of 1190. 
 During the first winter, 
the Franks filled a section of 
Acre's ditch and built three siege 
towers, commanded by Conrad 
of Montferrat and the Genoese, Guy of Lusignan, and Landgrave Ludwig II of Thuringia. 
These, according to the Itinerarium, were designed to resist defensive artillery. 
Furthermore, each contingent had a number of petrariae to support its tower as it 
advanced and to batter the walls near it.540 Ambroise calls these engines, pierieres and 
mangoniels, and claims that the Muslim defenders made use of the same.541 While it may 
appear conflicting that the same engines should be intended to provide cover for the 
advancing towers and target the walls, they could be seen to do both if they were used to 
target the parapet. Any damage done to the battlements would further expose any 
defenders. 
 Discerning the position and strength of these engines is further complicated when 
considering that Baha' al-Din claims that each siege tower was capped with a 
mangonel.542 The Itinerarium states that this level was occupied, more sensibly, with 
archers and crossbowmen but fails to identify where the petrariae were placed. Roger of 
Howden locates them behind the Franks' earthworks, implicitly quite far from the siege 
towers.543 These trebuchets were almost certainly less powerful than those used by 
Saladin in 1188: the best local wood and that scavenged from European ships would have 
                                                 
539 Itinerarium 1.33, ed. Stubbs, pp. 77-79, trans. Nicholson, pp. 85-86; Ambroise, Estoire ll. 3,143-74, ed. 
Paris, pp. 84-85, trans. Ailes, p. 77; Aymar the Monk, Expeditione Ierosolimitana ll. 113-20, ed. Falk and 
Placanica, p. 12; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 430-31, 441-42; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, 
trans. Massé, pp. 196-202; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:370; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. 
Richards, p. 109. See especially 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 201-2; Ambroise, Estoire ll. 3,205-
22, ed. Paris, p. 86, trans. Ailes, p. 78. 
540 Itinerarium 1.36, ed. Stubbs, pp. 84-85, trans. Nicholson, pp. 90-91. 
541 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 3,191-222, ed. Paris, p. 86, trans. Ailes, pp. 77-78. 
542 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 110. 
543 Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:22, trans. Riley, 2:128. 
Acre region: deployment of forces, 1189 (after Oman) 
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been required to construct the three siege towers, leaving little choice lumber left for 
artillery.544 
 On 5 May 1190, the Frankish siege towers were advanced to the walls of Acre. 
The towers initially fared well against the stones and containers of Greek fire that were 
thrown against them, but this success was short-lived and by nightfall they were 
destroyed. According to the Muslim accounts, with the garrison's artillery failing to halt 
the advancing siege towers, Saladin permitted the son of a Damascene caldron-maker to 
approach Baha' al-Din Qaraqush, commanding the garrison, and concoct a mixture with 
which he intended to burn the towers. The incendiaries that he produced were then fired 
at the Frankish towers and consumed them in flames.545 The Frankish sources give a far 
less dramatic account of this day's events, suggesting that the towers were burnt in a sally 
late in the day. Even if fanciful in their specifics, the Muslim accounts provide critical 
insight into how the defensive engines were employed. 
 'Imad al-Din and Ibn al-Athir give the impression that the first series of shots were 
made to gauge the range and accuracy of the responsible engine.546 Once satisfied, the 
incendiary pots were cast against each tower in turn. Accuracy was critical to this exercise 
and adjustments would have been necessary whether the engine was traction- or 
counterweight-powered. Although it is tempting to judge the latter as the more likely 
given its accuracy once properly ranged, because the sources unanimously state that the 
towers had been pushed up to the edge of the fosse when they were burnt, they would 
have probably been within the range of a single traction trebuchet placed midway between 
them. A light traction trebuchet could also have been moved behind the curtain or from 
tower to tower to occupy an ideal position to target each siege tower in turn, mitigating 
the inherent inaccuracy of such an engine. The ability to move or elevate a traction 
trebuchet would also remove the complications that a small counterweight engine would 
face when trying to fire at a target so close to the curtain wall. 
                                                 
544 The use of imported wood is emphasised by the Muslim sources, see Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, 
RHC Or 4, pp. 447-48; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:372. See also 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. 
Massé, p. 214. 
545 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 217-19; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 110-11; 
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:373-74. See also Itinerarium 1.36, ed. Stubbs, p. 85, trans. 
Nicholson, p. 91; Ambroise, Estoire ll. 3,395-432, ed. Paris, p. 91-92, trans. Ailes, p. 80; Ralph of Diceto, 
Ymagines historiarum, ed. Stevenson, p. 83; Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 3:23, 
trans. Giles, 2:92; Aymar the Monk, Expeditione Ierosolimitana ll. 201-12, ed. Falk and Placanica, p. 20. 
546 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 218; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:373. 
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 Short shots over an obstacle are harder for a counterweight trebuchet than they 
might first appear. They can be achieved either by increasing the release angle to produce 
a high trajectory shot or decreasing release velocity to maintain a more regular parabolic 
flight. The former requires less labour but shortens the firing sequence, making 
mechanical adjustments more sensitive, and extends a projectile's exposure to 
environmental influences. The latter requires that mechanical power be reduced by using 
a lighter counterweight. This is an inaccurate means of adjusting range that significantly 
increased the likelihood that the engine will misfire, as the projectile is accelerated more 
slowly and thus held in place by lower centrifugal and centripetal forces. Accordingly, 
there would have been a certain window of security for any siege tower once it was close 
enough to interfere with a more 'natural' flight trajectory but not quite close enough so 
that its top levels became exposed, no longer obscured by the curtain wall. 
 
Second Phase: 1190 
The arrival of Henry of Champagne, Theobald of Blois and a large party of French and 
English nobles, encouraged a second wave of siege engine construction, as well as 
Saladin's withdrawal to al-Kharuba on 1 August.547 For the first time during the twelve 
months of the siege, the Franks initiated a significant artillery barrage.548 From Baha' al-
Din's account, it would appear that the barrage, maintained by teams working in relays, 
took a larger toll on Acre's defenders and moral than its fortifications. This seems sensible 
when considering that the ammunition at hand would have been almost exclusively the 
same soft kurkar sandstone that made up Acre's defences. 
According to the Muslim sources, the garrison launched an initial sortie in late-
August that successfully burnt two of the assailing stone-throwers. Henry's largest 
trebuchet appears to have escaped unscathed: still unfinished, it had not yet been brought 
forward. But it too fell victim to the garrison's pyrotechnics during another successful 
sally on the evening of 3 September, the flames then spread to an adjacent smaller 
trebuchet.549 In what appears to be a different version of the latter incident, Baha' al-Din 
                                                 
547 Itinerarium 1.42-43, ed. Stubbs, pp. 92-94, trans. Nicholson, pp. 97-99; Ambroise, Estoire ll. 3,505-20, 
ed. Paris, p. 94, trans. Ailes, pp. 81-82; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 120; 'Imad al-Din, al-
Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 243-44; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:377. 
548 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 122; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 245; Abu 
Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 469-70; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:378; 
Ambroise, Estoire ll. 3,529-34, ed. Paris, p. 95, trans. Ailes, p. 82. 
549 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 122-23; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 245-46; 
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:378. Cf. Ambroise, Estoire ll. 3,661-700, ed. Paris, pp. 98-99, 
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adds that arrows with burning tips were used to light one of the Franks' trebuchets on fire 
and that flames spread to another nearby engine.550 Ibn al-Athir describes how Henry of 
Champagne, when attempting to build additional engines after the first sally, used a 
mound of earth to shield the two new trebuchets from Acre's archers. The mound was 
then advanced towards the walls until the engines, presumably those burnt in the second 
sally, were in a position to effectively fire against the city.551 
 If Chevedden's theory is correct, the use of the adjective 'great' found in certain 
Muslim accounts to refer to one or more of the Frankish trebuchets suggests that at least 
some of the assailing engines were counterweight trebuchets. Although there is no clear 
evidence to support or refute this, Baha' al-Din and Ibn al-Athir clearly state that the range 
of Henry of Champagne's trebuchets was less than that of Acre's archers. The latter's 
emphasis on the difficulties of constructing screens to shelter the crews working the 
Frankish artillery, rather than the engines themselves, speaks to the vulnerability of these 
individuals relative to the larger wooden engines next to them. 
Baha' al-Din's claim that some trebuchets were completely set alight by incendiary 
arrows must be viewed critically as this would not have been an easy feat. The penetrating 
power of an arrow diminishes through the course of its flight, limiting the effectiveness 
of a heated arrowhead, or that of any incendiaries attached behind, against a relatively 
distant target.552 Furthermore, the essential mobility of a trebuchet's beam allows for any 
incendiaries that might became lodged near the end of the long arm to be dealt with fairly 
quickly. It is in part due to this resilience to arrows that encouraged the use of defensive 
artillery, which could throw much larger incendiaries, and led to artillery battles. 
 The defensive artillery that appears during the events of May 1190 is described 
by Ambroise in one of his frequently quoted passages: 
 
There were within the city, as the historian tells us in truth, many catapults that hurled 
[missiles] so well that you never saw the like. There was one which was so powerful 
that it did us much harm, continually breaking into pieces our catapults and cerceleia, 
for it hurled the stones so that they flew as if they had wings; it took two men to load 
the sling, according to the written word, and then the sling let fly, when the stone fell, 
it had to be looked for a full foot into the ground. This very catapult struck a man in 
                                                 
trans. Ailes, p. 83; Itinerarium 1.54, ed. Stubbs, p. 105, trans. Nicholson, p. 109; Aymar the Monk, 
Expeditione Ierosolimitana ll. 405-20, ed. Falk and Placanica, p. 40. 
550 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 124-25. 
551 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:378. 
552 The hardwood ideal for trebuchet components would have further resisted the penetration of any 
arrowheads, although it is questionable whether such wood would have been available to the Franks 
besieging Acre in 1190. 
ARTILLERY IN AND AROUND THE LATIN EAST MICHAEL S. FULTON 
  
 
168 
the back and if the man had been a tree, or a column of marble, he would have been 
cut in half, but the good man did not feel it, for God did not permit it. One should 
have faith in such a Lord, for such a miracle inspires faith.553 
 
Ambroise appears to suggest that the defenders of Acre possessed at least one trebuchet 
of comparable scale to the largest employed by the Franks. Instead of praising the size of 
this machine, likely concealed behind the town walls, he emphasises its accuracy and the 
size of its projectiles. The reference to the man who was struck but spared, resembling 
the incident at Wark in 1174,554 should not be taken as a literal record of events but rather 
a piece of fiction to stress the engine's power but the even greater power of God, in whose 
name the crusaders were fighting. In its similar rendition of these events, the Itinerarium 
also draws attention to the power of this engine but highlights its size and range when 
adding that the individual who was struck believed that he was out of range.555 Both 
accounts state that the Muslim artillery, and this exceptionally large engine in particular, 
was targeting the Frankish artillery as well as the shelters protecting those working to fill 
the town's fosse and the men defending them. While counterweight engines would have 
been well suited to targeting the immobile artillery and shelters, traction engines would 
have been much more effective at harassing the personnel around them. 
 Smaller defensive engines appear to have been used against the rams built by the 
archbishop of Besançon and Henry of Champagne. Frankish and Muslim sources state 
that artillery was used against these engines from the walls of the city on 14 October 
1190.556 Heavy artillery may have been used against the principal ram while it 
approached, but once close, the only engines capable of assailing it would have been those 
positioned on Acre's mural towers. From these towers, light artillery would enjoy 
                                                 
553 Il aveit dedenz la citié, / Co dit l'estorie en verité, / Mult perieres si bien jetantes / Que ainc ne vit l'en 
de tels tantes. / Une en i ot si jeteresse / Que trop esteit damajeresse, / Qui nus depecoit totes veies / Noz 
perieres e noz cercleies, / Car el getoit les pieres teles, / Volanz come s'eussent eles, / Que dous genz 
conveneit a metre / En la funde, sulonc la letre, / E quant la piere descendeit / E la funde aval la rendeit / 
Que bien plein pié parfont en terre / Al chaeir la coveneit querre. / Iceste meismes periere / Feri un home 
el dos deriere, / E si li hom devenist arbre / O une columpue de marbre, / Si l'eust el par me colpee, / Tant 
i fud el dreit acopee; / E li prodom ne la senti, / Car Dampnedeus nel consenti; / En itel seignor doit l'om 
creire, / Que tel miracle fait a creire. Ambroise, Estoire ll. 3,535-60, ed. Paris, p. 95, trans. Ailes, p. 82. 
554 Jordan Fantosme, Chronique ll. 1,240-55, ed. Howlett, pp. 307-8. 
555 Itinerarium 1.47, ed. Stubbs, p. 98, trans. Nicholson, p. 103. 
556 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 3,819-96, ed. Paris, pp. 102-4, trans. Ailes, pp. 85-86; Itinerarium 1.59, ed. Stubbs, 
pp. 111-13, trans. Nicholson, pp. 115-16; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 255-57; Baha' al-Din, al-
Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 130-31; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 485-86. Baha' al-
Din misdates the assault to 4 October (3 Ramadan), rather than 14 October (13 Ramadan), so the ram and 
bore that he describes as being built by Frederick of Swabia, who arrived at Acre on the evening of 7 
October, are likely equitable with the engines built by the archbishop and the count of Champagne. 
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sufficient room to operate and a good field of view to target anything assailing the base 
of the adjoining stretch of curtain.557 While structural limitations would have prevented 
any attempts to mount heavy trebuchets on top of towers, the limited power of these 
engines is confirmed by their inability to significantly damage the ram. The heaviest 
stones thrown against the ram once it had reached the wall were likely dropped from the 
parapet above. This also offered the best angle to target the neck of the ram behind its 
iron head. The lighter tower-mounted traction trebuchets provided antipersonnel fire 
against any assailants bold enough to venture out of the ram while wood and incendiaries 
were dropped on and in front of it from the wall above. Disabled and burning, the 
archbishop's lumbering siege engine was eventually abandoned. 
 On the night of 4 Jan 1191 the first signs of damage appeared in Acre's walls when 
a section of the main curtain fell on the forewall ahead of it following a winter storm.558 
The Franks made an assault but were turned back and the defenders were able to patch 
the breach during the following days.559 Artillery, in addition to archers, was used to 
protect the breach while it was being repaired, indicating that these were traction 
trebuchets. The inability of the Franks to exploit this gap in the walls, as well as its rapid 
repair, suggest that the damage did not extend far below the level of the parapet. Had the 
damage which led to this breach been caused by a large counterweight trebuchet in the 
lead up to the storm, it is inconceivable that the same engine would not have been able to 
repeatedly strike the same position, enlarging the breach or at least preventing its repair, 
let alone open a new one. Although the winter weather and wild temperature swings 
would have amplified any damage inflicted over the previous year, the breach may have 
been the result of a much older weakness in the structure, hidden within the masonry of 
the wall, which grew with each winter storm. While the siege of Acre continued into 
1191, the principal leaders associated with the Third Crusade made their way to Palestine. 
 
  
                                                 
557 See Fig. B23. 
558 If accurate, this would appear to contradict Jacoby's theory that Acre was surrounded by only a single 
line of walls until the early thirteenth century, Jacoby, "Montmusard," pp. 207-17. Cf. Fulcher of Chartres, 
Historia Hierosolymitana 2.22.1, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 456-57, trans. Ryan, p. 174; Pringle, Churches, 4:5-
6. 
559 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 142; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 277-78; 
Aymar the Monk, Expeditione Ierosolimitana ll. 557-68, ed. Falk and Placanica, pp. 54-56. 
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Third Phase: 1191 
Before reaching the Holy Land, Richard I of England prepared his artillery, perariae and 
other engines according to Roger of Howden,560 on Sicily during the early months of 
1191. Experience in France had taught Richard the benefits of speed and preparedness on 
campaign while the landward blockade of the Christian force at Acre necessitated the 
importation of any materials that would be required during the siege. Richard also appears 
to have collected ammunition before departing Sicily: with the harder limestone beyond 
the coastal plain cut off by Saladin's forces, hard volcanic projectiles would have been far 
more effective against Acre's soft kurkar defences than projectiles hewn from the same 
type of stone.561 Baha' al-Din appears to confirm Richard's importation of artillery when 
he notes the presence of engines of war, among other supplies, on a ship sent ahead to 
Acre that was intercepted off Beirut.562 Richard was able to avenge this loss only weeks 
later when he intercepted a Muslim ship in the same area. Among the thirty-five men that 
Richard spared were experts at constructing siege machinery.563 The only indication that 
Richard used his artillery before reaching Acre appears to be in Richard of Devizes's 
account of the siege of Buffavento on Cyprus; however, the sources more closely linked 
to these events do not corroborate this.564 
 Philip II of France arrived at Acre in mid-April 1191 as the siege was entering its 
third campaign season. Philip's siege strategy involved artillery from the outset. 
According to the Itinerarium, Philip erected petrariae and other engines opposite the 
Accursed Tower, which anchored the city's north east salient.565 Roger of Howden also 
                                                 
560 Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:72, 105, trans. Riley, 2:174, 200. 
561 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 4,791-4,800, ed. Paris, p. 128, trans. Ailes, pp. 98-99. 
562 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 147. Cf. 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 292; Abu 
Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 8; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:386-87. 
563 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 2,268-76, ed. Paris, p. 61, trans. Ailes, p. 64; Itinerarium 2.42, ed. Stubbs, p. 209, 
trans. Nicholson, p. 199. Cf. Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:112, trans. Riley, 2:206; Ralph of 
Diceto, Ymagines historiarum, ed. Stubbs, pp. 93-94; Aymar the Monk, Expeditione Ierosolimitana ll. 757-
80, ed. Falk and Placanica, pp, 74-76. Ibn al-Athir's timing of events agrees with that in the Frankish 
sources; however, Baha' al-Din and 'Imad al-Din place the ship's capture on 11 June, after Richard's arrival 
at Acre, Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:387; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 299; Baha' 
al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 151. 
564 Richard of Devizes, Chronicon 61, ed. Howlett, p. 425, trans. in Chronicles of the Crusades, p. 39. See 
also Peter of Langtoft, Chronicle, ed. and trans. Wright, pp. 66-67. Cf. Ambroise, Estoire ll. 2.009-13, ed. 
Paris, p. 54, trans. Ailes, p. 60; Itinerarium 2.39, ed. Stubbs, p. 202, trans. Nicholson, p. 194; Roger of 
Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:111, trans. Riley, 2:205; Ralph of Diceto, Ymagines historiarum, ed. 
Stevenson, p. 92. 
565 Itinerarium 2.28, ed. Stubbs, p. 181, trans. Nicholson, pp. 177-78. See also Ambroise, Estoire ll. 1,341-
45, ed. Paris, p. 36, trans. Ailes, p. 50; Aymar the Monk, Expeditione Ierosolimitana ll. 729-40, ed. Falk 
and Placanica, pp. 70-72. 
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notes Philip's initial use of artillery but specifies that these engines made no impact on 
the town's defences while he waited for Richard to arrive.566 
 The Muslim sources claim that the Franks pressed Acre from 30 May with seven 
trebuchets. Saladin was able to interrupt the barrage when he advanced his forces from 
their wintering position and attacked the Frankish siege camp but the relentless 
bombardment resumed when his forces retired to rest.567 While the Franks continued their 
attempts to fill the ditch around Acre, the defenders divided themselves into four teams: 
one cut up the debris in the fosse, another threw it into the sea, a third stood guard and a 
fourth provided cover with artillery (traction trebuchets). 
 Richard landed at Acre on 8 June 1191, by which point, twenty-one months after 
the siege had begun, damage was becoming visible on one of the city's towers. Despite 
being struck down with a bout of illness, he saw to the deployment of petrariae, 
mangunelli and a castellum, which was erected in front of one of the city's gates.568 
Frankish artillery played against the walls of Acre throughout June 1191. 'Imad al-Din 
states that most damage was sustained at the level of the parapet, though in some sections 
Acre's walls were reduced to the height of a man.569 Similarly, Baha' al-Din notes that the 
Franks placed increasing focus on their artillery and increased the mass of their projectiles 
as much as they could, adding to the mental strain sustained by the garrison.570 Although 
'Imad al-Din is a particularly difficult source to deal with, both he and Baha' al-Din appear 
to suggest that while lighter engines continued to suppress any defenders along Acre's 
ramparts, the heaviest engines targeted the integrity of the walls. The ability of the 
defenders to continually repair their damaged battlements was critical to their ability to 
maintain an effective defence; however, enough damage had apparently been inflicted by 
the start of July that the French forces felt confident enough to make a frontal assault. 
                                                 
566 Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:113, trans. Riley, 2:207. 
567 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 147,148-50; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 293-
94, 295-97; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 10; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 
2:387. 
568 Itinerarium 3.4, ed. Stubbs, p. 214, trans. Nicholson, p. 204. Richard of Devizes states that the castellum 
was the same that Richard had disassembled before leaving Sicily, and it is likely the same armoured siege 
tower that the Muslim sources claim was burnt later in June and that which Ambroise and the Itinerarium 
mention among the events of late June and early July, Richard of Devizes, Chronicon 28, 64, ed. Howlett, 
pp. 403, 426-27, trans. in Chronicles of the Crusades, pp. 21, 41; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, 
pp. 151-52; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 299-300; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:387; 
Ambroise, Estoire ll. 4,773-84, ed. Paris, p. 128, trans. Ailes, p. 98; Itinerarium 3.7, ed. Stubbs, p. 219, 
trans. Nicholson, p. 209. 
569 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 306-8, 310-11, 314-15. 
570 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 156. 
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 Acre was hosting a veritable convention for some of Europe's most powerful 
figures to demonstrate their prowess through the construction of siege engines. Philip of 
France had one trebuchet, named Male Veisine/Mala Vieina, which drew the fire of one 
of the garrison's best engines, dubbed Male Cosine/Mala Cognata, possibly the same 
defensive engine noted elsewhere during the autumn of 1190. The latter was able to knock 
the former out of commission on a number of occasions but it was repeatedly rebuilt and 
continued to fire against the Accursed Tower and adjoining stretches of curtain. Although 
this is the only one of Philip's trebuchets that is mentioned, he likely had other lighter 
ones. Hugh of Burgundy, the Templars, and the Hospitallers each had a notable trebuchet 
and another was funded communally. Philip of Flanders, veteran of the siege of Harim in 
1177, had a choice trebuchet along with a smaller one, both of which were appropriated 
by Richard following the count's death. Richard directed these two against a gate, 
presumably that which his castellum faced, and erected another two perieres/petrariae, 
likely those prepared on Sicily, and two mangonels/mangunelli.571 This breakdown 
supports the Muslim sources' claims that seven engines were used by the Franks from the 
end of May 1191, making Bar Hebraeus's remark that the Franks used seven engines after 
Richard's arrival only slightly misdated.572 From mid-June, nine notable petrariae and at 
least two mangunelli were in use. 
 For practical reasons, most of the trebuchets erected by the Franks through 1189-
91 were probably traction-powered; however, this does not mean that the engines 
enumerated in the summer of 1191 were such. The wealth and resources of the European 
potentates and the natural competition between them for prestige make it likely that the 
trebuchets constructed in 1191 were particularly impressive for their time. But although 
this is suggestive it is far from definitive. 
 According to Ambroise, Richard was able to damage the top of the gate tower that 
he targeted with Philip of Flanders' engines. The same author states that Philip II's 
principal engine was able to inflict significant damage on the Accursed Tower and 
adjoining curtain, while the communal engine did further damage to a section of wall next 
to this tower, presumably on the other side of it.573 Similarly, Roger of Howden states 
                                                 
571 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 4,737-800, ed. Paris, pp. 127-28, trans. Ailes, pp. 98-99; Itinerarium 3.7, ed. 
Stubbs, pp. 218-19, trans. Nicholson, pp. 208-9. See also Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:111, 
trans. Riley, 2:205; Aymar the Monk, Expeditione Ierosolimitana ll. 785-88, ed. Falk and Placanica, p. 76. 
572 Bar Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. Budge, 2:334. 
573 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 4,749-51, 4,759-76, ed. Paris, pp. 127-28, trans. Ailes, p. 98. Cf. Itinerarium 3.7, 
ed. Stubbs, pp. 218-19, trans. Nicholson, p. 209. 
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that the perrariae of the French king, the Templars and the Pisans opened a breach near 
the Accursed Tower and it was here that the French rushed the walls but were turned back 
in early July.574 Ralph of Diceto is less specific, noting that walls were worn down by the 
assailing machines and petrariae but not where this damage was concentrated.575 Despite 
the universal reports of destruction, which support the likelihood that counterweight 
trebuchets were used, the emphasis placed on the danger faced by members of the garrison 
when attempting to man their defences, suggest a range of artillery was used. Repeated 
references to cerclieas (shelters for attacking archers) are a reminder that the parapet, 
although damaged in sections, remained largely defensible in July 1191. 
 The descriptions of Richard's engines provided by Ambroise and the Itinerarium 
are important to any discussion of terminology.576 One of the projectiles loosed by one of 
Richard's perieres/petrariae, a river stone brought from Messina, is supposed to have 
killed twelve of Acre's defenders. The stone was then taken to Saladin for inspection.577 
The notion that either source could have seen the impact of this stone is as unlikely as the 
possibility that a swimmer would have smuggled the stone out of the city during the peak 
of the siege. The responsible engine was probably relatively heavy: although the projectile 
supposedly killed a group of people, rather than destroying a notable section of 
fortification, their number suggests that it is the size of the stone that the authors are trying 
to emphasise. Furthermore, the use of imported ammunition bears clear similarities to the 
Sicilians' use of such at Alexandria in 1174, as reported by 'Imad al-Din and subsequent 
Muslim sources.578 These special stones were likely used by the most powerful engines 
to transfer as much energy as possible to their targets and fired at a correspondingly slow 
rate. Fieldstones would suffice for antipersonnel fire. This, along with the apparent 
damage caused by Philip of Flanders's larger engine and that inflicted by the communal 
engine and that of Philip II, suggest that the terms perieres/petrariae were used by these 
authors to describe the heaviest artillery, but not necessarily exclusively. 
 If the two perieres/petrariae that Richard erected at Acre were counterweight 
trebuchets, it is tempting to try and distinguish them from the two mangonels/mangunelli. 
                                                 
574 Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:116-17, trans. Riley, 2:210-11. 
575 Ralph of Diceto, Ymagines historiarum, ed. Stevenson, p. 94. 
576 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 4,767-800, ed. Paris, pp. 127-28, trans. Ailes, pp. 98-99; Itinerarium 3.7, ed. 
Stubbs, pp. 219-20, trans. Nicholson, p. 209. 
577 Cf. the description of a stone killing three of Tortosa's defenders in 1155, Otto of Freising and Rahewin, 
Gesta Friderici I 2.21, ed. Waitz, p. 124, trans. Mierow, p. 135. 
578 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, pp. 165-66. 
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Unfortunately the only description of the latter is that one was particularly swift, and 
possibly capable of firing its projectiles across an impressive distance.579 Swiftness is a 
characteristic attributable to a traction trebuchet but a remarkable range is not. It is 
possible that Ambroise used mangonels as a synonym for perieres in order to rhyme with 
ignels; however, later events suggest that these engines are distinct from the four perieres. 
Fitting with the machines' reported swiftness, Ambroise's remark that Quant sa piere 
voleit en Acre, Qu'ele aloit jusqu'en la maçacre may refer to an area of more general 
slaughter, such as the parapet, rather than to a specific area within the city associated with 
a butcher (macel), such as that identified near the harbour by Philip of Novara decades 
later.580 
 The comparable damage inflicted by the other enumerated perieres/petrariae 
suggests that these were counterweight trebuchets similar to those of Richard. With 
Frankish numbers at their highest since the siege began, the Franks might have felt 
comfortable advancing their engines relatively close to the curtain in order to fire 
particularly heavy projectiles. By using a lower trajectory and sacrificing release velocity 
for additional force and mechanical efficiency, a greater amount of energy would be 
transferred upon impact. The masonry would have been forced to absorb this added 
energy, manifesting in shockwaves that would break apart the bonds of the stone and 
mortar as they reverberated out from the point of impact. But despite the probable power 
of these engines, the term perriere/petraria does not appear to have been exclusively used 
to denote counterweight trebuchets, as it was also applied to the lighter engine used 
against Philip's 'cat',581 similar to, if not the same as, those that had fired on the Frankish 
ram in the autumn of 1190.582 
 The primary breaching weapon of the Franks was their sappers, who worked to 
undermine Acre's defences from late June 1191, if not earlier.583 It is an unexplored 
possibility that Philip and Richard may have used their heavy artillery to assist the 
                                                 
579 Si fist fiare dous mangonels, / Dont li uns esteit si ignels, /quant sa piere voleit en Acre, / Qu'ele aloit 
jusqu'en la maçacre. Ambroise, Estoire l. 4,787-90, ed. Paris, p. 128, trans. Ailes, p. 98, trans. Hubert, pp. 
202-3. 
580 Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 138, ed. Raynaud, p. 50, trans. La Monte, p. 91. See also 
Ambroise, Estoire, trans. Ailes, p. 98 n. 332, trans. Hubert, p. 203 n. 22. 
581 Cf. the πιβαθρα, Vitruvius, De architectura 10.13.8, ed. Krohn, p. 253. 
582 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 4809-40, ed. Paris, pp. 127-28, trans. Ailes, p. 99; Itinerarium 3.8, ed. Stubbs, pp. 
220-21, trans. Nicholson, p. 210. 
583 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 4,841-5,040, ed. Paris, pp. 129-35, trans. Ailes, pp. 99-102; Itinerarium 3.9-14, ed. 
Stubbs, pp. 221-28, trans. Nicholson, pp. 211-16; Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:115, 116, 118-
20, trans. Riley, 2:209-10, 212-14. Cf. Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 156-58, 160; 'Imad 
al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 306-13, 314-18. 
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sappers, working against the notoriously strong mortar of this region. Both kings 
attempted to undermine the same towers that their artillery was targeting, perhaps using 
the percussive force of their artillery to spread small fractures through the mass of the 
wall being undermined, facilitating the collapse of these sections when the mines were 
set alight. Philip of France appears to have done this in reverse during the final stages of 
his siege of Chateau Gaillard in 1204. Using a petraria called Cabulus/Chadabula, he 
knocked down a weakened section of the inner bailey that had been undermined but had 
not fallen completely.584 By 12 July 1191, the garrison was no longer confident that it 
could withstand the Frankish assaults and surrendered before the town could be taken by 
force. 
 
Legacy 
"For if the ten-year war made Troy famous, and the Christian triumph made Antioch more 
illustrious, then Acre will certainly win eternal fame for the whole globe assembled to 
fight for her."585 Perhaps more than any other aspect of this extraordinary siege, it is the 
use of artillery during its final phase that has attracted the attention of historians. Although 
it is popularly held that counterweight trebuchets were employed, the evidence supporting 
this remains at best circumstantial. No new terminology is used by any of the eyewitness 
sources and similar descriptions of artillery damage can be found at a number of earlier 
sieges; however, the wealth of the figures involved, the importation of prefabricated 
engines and ammunition and what appears to be the use of both heavy and light artillery, 
make it very likely that both traction and counterweight trebuchets were used. 
 A commendable evaluation of the artillery used at Acre in 1191 has been put 
forward by Randal Rogers.586 Considering the various descriptions of destruction in the 
sources, Rogers suggests that there is little firm evidence upon which to support any 
conclusions regarding the power source of these machines and instead emphasises the 
impact that they seem to have had on the city's fortifications. But this approach can be 
misleading as descriptions of artillery smashing fortified masonry can be found 
throughout the classical and medieval periods and even light engines would have left an 
impression in the soft kurkar after two years of bombardment. Apart from 'Imad al-Din, 
the sources agree that mining was the greatest threat to Acre's fortifications. 
                                                 
584 William the Breton, Gesta Philippi Augusti, ed. Delaborde, p. 219. 
585 Itinerarium 1.32, trans. Nicholson, p. 83. 
586 Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, pp. 227, 234-35. 
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 Instead of relying on colourful and easily exaggerated adjectives and adverbs, the 
manner in which the engines at Acre were deployed should be stressed. But even when 
considering relative ranges, targets and the presence of imported ammunition, Rogers' 
conclusion holds firm: there is a lack of material evidence to quantify the power of the 
artillery that was used. Dispelling this caution, numerous historians have seized the 
chance to state unhesitatingly that counterweight trebuchets were employed at Acre, 
relying on no more evidence than a literal reading of the sources discussed above.587 
 Modern historians can be forgiven to some degree for their uncritical reading of 
the sources as some subsequent medieval authors added further embellishment or injected 
descriptions suited to their own context into their accounts. James of Vitry, writing only 
a few decades later, left a powerful, if brief, account of the siege which emphasises the 
kings' use of artillery and does not mention mining.588 A similar description of what 
appear to be more powerful engines and larger projectiles than are described by the 
eyewitness sources, can also be found in Peter of Langtoft's later account, although this 
author makes it clear that mining was the impetus for the city's surrender.589 
 Despite the apparent power of certain engines at the siege of Acre, it is important 
to observe the consistent manner in which artillery was used throughout the twelfth 
century. As at Nicaea and Jerusalem in the last years of the eleventh century, the besieging 
artillery used at Acre appears to have targeted the city's parapets. This in itself should 
check any tendency to see these weapons as breaching engines, even if the heavier ones 
were now deliberately targeting the battlements and tops of walls rather than those 
defending them. Evidence to suggest that reciprocally heavy engines were commonly 
employed in defence is scarce; however, it would appear that garrisons were increasingly 
employing artillery as part of a more comprehensive defence. Although the tower-
mounted engines employed at Acre did not disable the ram used in 1190 or Philip's 'cat' 
                                                 
587 Benvenisti and Nicolle do this without apparently considering any other alternative, while Chevedden, 
operating on the premise that such engines were employed much earlier in the twelfth century, sees the 
descriptions of destruction as ample evidence of the use of counterweight trebuchets, Benvenisti, The 
Crusaders, pp. 284-85; Nicolle, "The Early Trebuchet," p. 272; Chevedden, Citadel of Damascus, p. 279. 
588 "King Philip of France battered the city walls, towers, and battlements incessantly, both by day and by 
night, with huge stones, breaking the enemy's machines, houses, and buildings within the city, and giving 
the besieged no rest. On the other side, the King of England frequently made perilous assaults on the 
besieged; wherefore, as the wall was giving way under the continual strokes of the great stones flung against 
it, the citizens, perceiving that they could not much longer resist, surrendered the city..." James of Vitry, 
Historia orientalis 99, ed. Donnadieu, p. 454, trans. Stewart, p. 112. 
589 Peter of Langtoft, Chronicle, ed. and trans. Wright, pp. 80-81. 
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in 1191, their use reflects more systematic defensive planning than appears to have been 
in place at the start of the century. 
 
 
 
Late Sieges of the Crusade 
 
Darum: 1192 
After Acre had fallen, Richard I of England disassembled his artillery and prepared it for 
transport.590 The king does not appear to have had the opportunity to use these engines 
until the following year as most of the coastal defences and those of southern Palestine, 
with the notable exception of Jerusalem, were slighted by the time the crusader army 
arrived.591 With the 1192 campaign season opening, Richard led a reconnaissance force 
from Ascalon to Gaza on Easter Tuesday and onward to Darum the following day.592 The 
original small quadrangular castrum described by William of Tyre had grown since its 
initial foundation and the apparently weak outer defences that Saladin had faced in 1170 
had been rebuilt. By 1192 the stronghold boasted seventeen towers and a fosse.593 
 Richard grew impatient waiting for the French and Eastern Frankish forces to 
prepare themselves, appreciating that Saladin had been mustering his army since early 
April. He decided to march what forces he had at Ascalon to Darum, which was still 
occupied by a Muslim garrison, and besieged the outer defences from Tuesday 18 May 
1192. Although Richard's force was unable to surround the stronghold, it was able to 
deploy its artillery, which had been moved by sea and alighted about 2 km up the coast. 
The prefabricated components of three machines were then reassembled in position. 
These may have been the two petrariae that Richard had assembled at Acre and the 
notable trebuchet that the count of Flanders had built before his death. Richard maintained 
command of one of these engines while contingents from Normandy and Poitou each 
                                                 
590 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 5,379-82, ed. Paris, p. 144, trans. Ailes, p. 106; Itinerarium 4.2, ed. Stubbs, p. 240, 
trans. Nicholson, p. 227. Cf. Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:122, trans. Riley, 2:215. 
591 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 5,980-84, 6,835-69, ed. Paris, pp. 160, 183, trans. Ailes, pp. 114, 124-25; 
Itinerarium 4.14, 23, 32, 35, ed. Stubbs, pp. 256, 297-98, 280, 303, trans. Nicholson, pp. 242, 261, 274-75, 
278; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 177-80, 181, 183; 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, 
pp. 231, 345-48; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 462, RHC Or 5, pp. 40, 43-44, 50-51; Ibn 
al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:391, 392. 
592 Itinerarium 5.7, ed. Stubbs, pp. 318-19, trans. Nicholson, pp. 289-90. 
593 William of Tyre, Chronicon 20.19, ed. Huygens, 2:937, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:372-73; Ambroise, 
Estoire ll. 9,223-29, trans. Ailes, p. 156; Itinerarium 5.39, ed. Stubbs, p. 353, trans. Nicholson, p. 317. 
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commanded another. As at Acre, Ambroise's version of events emphasises the fear that 
these engines impressed on the garrison while the Itinerarium stressed their destructive 
force. 
The trebuchets are portrayed as being quite powerful yet at least Richard's engine 
was used to provide cover for the sappers who worked to undermine the largest of the 
mural towers. It can be assumed that Richard's artillery was once more targeting the 
battlements and the defenders' artillery – an engine which had been set up on top of the 
large tower that was being undermined was knocked out of action by the engine 
commanded by the king. One of the other attacking engines targeted a gate, which it 
reportedly damaged. Like the gate that Richard targeted with Philip of Flanders' engines 
at Acre, this might have been to prevent the garrison from making a sally, as was done at 
the Bridge Gate during the siege of Antioch in 1097-98. The position of the third engine 
is unclear.594 
 The garrison sought terms on the morning of the fourth day of the siege. Refusing 
to accept anything less than an unconditional surrender, Richard renewed the barrage. 
The tower that that was being undermined was so weakened by this point that a sizable 
portion collapsed when the engine commanded by the king renewed its barrage. As the 
resulting breach was stormed, the garrison withdrew to a tower and surrendered from 
there before the day ended.595 
 Although this episode reinforces many of the principles that can be discerned from 
the siege of Acre, there is no clear description of these engines and thus no definitive 
evidence of what form these engines took. Although the use of one engine to bring down 
a tower implies that it is quite powerful, the Frankish sources clearly state that it was only 
able to do so because the tower was already undermined. Revealingly, 'Imad al-Din and 
Baha' al-Din emphasise Richard's use of miners and omit any mention of artillery, though 
they confirm the brevity of the siege.596 
 
  
                                                 
594 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 9,151-262, ed. Paris, pp. 245-48, trans. Ailes, pp. 155-56; Itinerarium 5.39, ed. 
Stubbs, pp. 352-54, trans. Nicholson, pp. 316-17. 
595 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 9,288-373, ed. Paris, pp. 248-51, trans. Ailes, pp. 157-58; Itinerarium 5.39, ed. 
Stubbs, pp. 354-56, trans. Nicholson, pp. 318-19. Cf. Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:180, trans. 
Riley, 2:266. 
596 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 378-79; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 201; Abu 
Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 54. 
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Jaffa: 1192 
While Richard moved on Beirut the following year, another coastal city to which artillery 
could be moved via his fleet, Saladin moved on Jaffa. The Muslims arrived on 27 or 28 
July 1192 and the siege began the following day.597 The Frankish sources claim that the 
first three days of the siege were consumed with fighting in the suburbs around Jaffa until, 
on the fourth day, Saladin brought artillery into play. This, according to Ambroise, 
consisted of four strong and light perieres and two mangunels, or, according to the 
Itinerarium, four notable and effective petrariae and two fast-firing mangunelli. The 
adjectives used to describe these engines suggest technical difference between the two 
types. While the mangunelli would appear to have been traction trebuchets, references by 
these sources to tower-mounted petrariae and the supposed difficulties encountered by 
Jaffa's defenders when attempting to operate additional petrariae should discourage any 
inclination to impose terminological guidelines too strictly.598 References to powerful 
'fast-firing trebuchets' at Toulouse in the second decade of the thirteenth century 
complicate matters further.599 But it is perhaps the number of engines noted by the sources 
that most exposes them to question: the same compliment of engines was assigned to 
Richard at Acre. Furthermore, the measure of the breach reportedly created near the 
eastern gate, two perches (about 10 m), is the same as the extent of the damage inflicted 
by the communal engine at Acre a year earlier.600  
 Baha' al-Din, 
a participant of this 
siege, provides the 
best account from the 
Muslim perspective. 
According to him, 
Saladin intended to 
employ artillery from 
the start, having his 
                                                 
597 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 217. The Frankish sources place these events one day 
earlier than the Muslim accounts, Ambroise, Estoire ll. 10,807-10, ed. Paris, p. 289, trans. Ailes, p. 175; 
Itinerarium 6.13, ed. Stubbs, pp. 400-1, trans. Nicholson, p. 349. 
598 Although counterweight trebuchets were mechanically more complex than the traction variety, they were 
much easier to operate accurately. 
599 Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise 192, ed. Meyer, 1:285, trans. Shirley, p. 141. 
600 Ambroise, Estoire ll. 10,811-49, ed. Paris, pp. 289-90, trans. Ailes, pp. 175-76; Itinerarium 6.13, ed. 
Stubbs, p. 401, trans. Nicholson, pp. 349-50. 
Jaffa: town, from the north (de Bruyn, 1681, from Schiller) 
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forces erect his trebuchets near Jaffa's eastern gate. He claims that this section of 
fortifications had been damaged during an earlier siege, more probably when the town 
was slighted in 1190, but had since been partly repaired.601 Sappers were able to excavate 
an area under the weakened fortifications on the first day but the defenders successfully 
collapsed this mine before it could bring down a section of wall. Two trebuchets came 
into action on the morning of the second day of the siege and a third was ready later in 
the day. Although the sappers had begun to undermine a longer section of the town's 
defences, Saladin's forces became disheartened as they were well aware that their artillery 
could have little effect before Richard arrived with relief. Even Saladin became worried 
after the extended mines brought down a part of the curtain but the improvised defences 
of the garrison proved sufficient to repel the attacks of his forces. That night, he resolved 
to have five trebuchets erected, either two more to bring his total to five or five more to 
bring his total to eight. The engines were ready by the morning of the fifth day of the 
siege (31 July), by which point stones had been scavenged from riverbeds and distant 
places for them to throw. Although Baha' al-Din claims that the engines were to be used 
to target the weakened curtain wall, the trebuchets are portrayed as supporting the attacks 
that were made that day, while it is the miners that were clearly responsible for bringing 
down the section of wall that allowed the Muslims to storm the town.602 Having taken the 
town, Saladin does not appear to have used his artillery against the citadel, still without 
battlements since it was slighted in 1190. 
 The Muslim and Frankish accounts loosely align, from the fighting beyond the 
walls and the eventual breach, to the notable number of Muslim trebuchets. Although 
artillery is portrayed as a showpiece, it was the work of the miners that compromised the 
besieged defences, as at Acre and Darum. It is hard to assess Saladin's artillery. The 
gathering of distant stones for ammunition can be interpreted in two ways: either that 
Saladin needed harder stones, such as limestone from the Judean-Samarian hills to the 
east, for counterweight trebuchets, which targeted the walls of Jaffa; or, that he was 
running out of field stones to feed his rapidly firing traction trebuchets. A literal reading 
of the sources would suggest the former; however, Baha' al-Din's explicit statement that 
no stones were found around the town, and the use of these engines in conjunction with 
the frontal assaults might support the latter.  
                                                 
601 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 217. Cf. 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 231. 
602 Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 217-20. See also 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, pp. 
384-85; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 67-68. 
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The period from 1187 to 1192 is an interesting and tumultuous one, documented by 
sources that were close to the figures and events. Their treatment of artillery over the five 
years between the battle of Hattin and the siege of Jaffa is enlightening. Although few 
mechanical descriptions are provided, the detailed week-to-week and day-to-day accounts 
reveal how these engines were used, if not the specifics of their design. The apparent use 
of prefabricated artillery by Saladin and Richard I conveys a sense of value while 
Saladin's campaign through Syria appears to reveal certain limitations of these engines. 
The increasing use of what appear to be heavier engines in conjunction with mining, 
supplementing rather than replacing lighter antipersonnel engines, is revealed to be a 
popular tactic when the topography allowed. 
 At the end of the twelfth century, the heaviest artillery was still incapable of 
breaching fortifications; however, there is evidence that it was being used to target 
defensive masonry, even if this was the thinner masonry of battlements. Defensively, light 
traction trebuchets were still popularly employed. Although most appear to have been no 
more powerful than those used a century earlier, there are indications that heavier engines 
may also have been given a defensive function. The continued development of the 
heaviest engines would soon provide them with a definitively new role, entirely distinct 
from the antipersonnel function of lighter traction engines.
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6. Artillery in the Ayyubid Period                       
New Terminology (1192-1260) 
 
 
 
On average, the Franks were engaged in fewer sieges each year during the first half of the 
thirteenth century than they had been during the twelfth. The Third Crusade had allowed 
them to recover a small coastal strip of Palestine but little territory beyond this. Less than 
six months after Richard I had left the Holy Land, Saladin died and a sixty-year power 
struggle between the potentates of Cairo, Damascus and Aleppo ensued, with the Franks 
of Acre an occasional fourth party. But throughout this period of intra-Ayyubid conflict, 
there are only a few points at which the use of artillery can be analysed.  
 
 
 
The Fifth Crusade 
 
The first period of Frankish expansion in the aftermath of the Third Crusade coincided 
with a German crusade in 1197-98. There seem to be no indications that these forces used 
artillery when Sidon, Jubayl and Beirut were acquired nor at the unsuccessful siege of 
Toron.603 Similarly, there is little to suggest that artillery was employed by al-'Adil when 
he took Jaffa in 1197, besieged Mardin in 1198 and 1203, attacked Crac des Chevaliers 
                                                 
603 James of Vitry, Historia orientalis, ed. Donnadieu, pp. 452-54, 464, trans. Stewart, pp. 111, 117-18; 
Arnold of Lubek, Chronica Slavorum, ed. Pertz, pp. 200-1, 205-7, 209-10; Wilbrand of Oldenburg, 
Itinerarium terrae sanctae 1.5, ed. Pringle, p. 118, trans. Pringle, p. 65; letter of the Duke of Lorraine to 
the Archbishop of Cologne (1197), ed. Pertz, Annales Colonienses Maximi, p. 805, trans. Munro, in 
Translations and Reprints 5.1, vol. 1.4, , pp. 22-23; Eracles 27.6-7, 9, RHC Oc 2, pp. 224-26, 227; Roger 
of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 4:28-29, trans. Riley, 2:406-7; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC 
Or 4, p. 462, RHC Or 5, pp. 117-18; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 102, 123; Philip of Novara, 
Gestes des Chiprois 127, ed. Raynaud, pp. 41-42, pp. 678-79, trans. La Monte, pp. 78-79; Deschamps, Les 
Châteaux, 2:225 n. 1; Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p. 70. 
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and Tripoli in 1207, or at the five Ayyubid sieges of Damascus between 1194 and 1201.604 
Despite the lack of references to artillery in these instances, it was certainly employed 
during the Fifth Crusade. 
 
Mount Tabor: 1217 
Crusading armies under Andrew II of Hungary and Leopold VI of Austria arrived in the 
Levant in 1217. These forces, with Hugh of Cyprus, John of Brienne, king-regent of 
Jerusalem, and sizable contingents of the military orders, launched three raids from Acre 
into Galilee that year. The second of these was directed towards Mount Tabor, fortified 
by al-'Adil to oppose Frankish incursions stemming from Acre.605 The exact details of 
this episode are not clear but it appears to have been more of an attack than a concerted 
siege: the garrison made a pre-emptive assault against their assailants and then held off a 
subsequent Frankish frontal attack. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi claims that the defenders threw 
Greek fire to hold off the Franks, but this was probably thrown by hand.606 Ibn al-Athir 
is the only source who mentions artillery, claiming it was used by the Franks.607 Although 
the Franks may not have used artillery at Mount Tabor, its use against Damietta soon after 
reveals the full potential of artillery at this point in history. 
 
Damietta: 1218-19 
Tactically, Damietta offered many of the same options to a besieging force as did most 
cities along the Palestinian littoral: although its western front was protected by a branch 
of the Nile and Lake Manzala secured it to the east, it was easily approached from the 
                                                 
604 Eracles 27.3, RHC Oc 2, pp. 219-20; James of Vitry, Historia orientalis, ed. Donnadieu, pp. 464-66, 
trans. Stewart, p. 118; Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 4:25-26, trans. Riley, 2:404-5; Arnold of 
Lubek, Chronica Slavorum, ed. Pertz, p. 204; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 118-19, 152; 
Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 3:67; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 118-19, 123-24, 
144. 
605 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 3:79, 158; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 156-
57; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 153, 155-56; James of Vitry, Historia orientalis, ed. 
Donnadieu, p. 466, trans. Stewart p. 119 . Cf. Raphael, Muslim Fortresses, p. 17. For discussions of the 
castle, see Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 1:390; Creswell, "Fortification in Islam," p. 
123; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, pp. 358-62; Raphael, Muslim Fortresses, pp. 20-24. 
606 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 2-4, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 163-68, trans. Gavigan, pp. 53-56; 
James of Vitry, Lettres no. 3, ed. Huygens, pp. 98-99; Eracles 31.10-12, RHC Oc 2, pp. 321-25; Ernoul, 
Chronique 35, ed. De Mas Latrie, pp. 411-12; Cronica S Petri Erfordensis moderna, ed. Holder-Egger, pp. 
385-86; Cronica Reinhardsbrunnensis, ed. Holder-Egger, pp. 590-91; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. 
Richards, 3:174-75; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 160-63; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, 
RHC Or 1, p. 88; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 164-65; History of the Patriarchs, trans. 
Khater and Khs-Burmester, 3.2:212-13. See also Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, pp. 226, 228; 
Raphael, Muslim Fortresses, p. 18. Cf. Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, p. 18. 
607 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 3:175. 
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south. These similarities, and the significance of the 1218-19 siege, have allowed 
Christopher Marshall to judge this siege as one of two that best reveal the dynamics of 
major thirteenth-century Frankish-Muslim sieges.608  
In March 1218, the group of crusaders who had attacked Mount Tabor was joined 
by additional crusaders from Frisia, Cologne and other parts of Germany. With support 
from the local baronage and the military orders, this force set out by sea from Acre for 
Egypt. Advance units captured the port area of Damietta on 29 May and established a 
camp on the west side of the Nile before King John of Brienne and other notables arrived 
a few days later.609 Since Amalric's campaigns in Egypt a half-century earlier, Damietta's 
defences had been strengthened. In 1181 Saladin had overseen repairs to the two towers 
that commanded the chain across the river and had strengthened the town's walls. Despite 
this, al-Maqrizi claims that al-'Adil considered tearing down the pyramids to use their cut 
                                                 
608 Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, pp. 250-53. 
609 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 10, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 175-78, trans. Gavigan, pp. 61-62. 
James of Vitry, Lettres nos. 3, 4, ed. Huygens, pp. 100, pp. 103-4. Cf. Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. 
Richards, 3:176; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 30-31; Abu Shama, Kitab al-
Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 153; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 166; History of the Patriarchs, 
trans. Khater and Khs-Burmester, 3.2:216. 
Damietta region: deployment of forces, 1218 (after Powell) 
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stone to develop the city's fortifications in 1196.610 By 1218, the city was secured by two 
lines of walls and the famous Tower of the Chain.611 
 The Franks had landed on the west side of the mouth of the Damietta branch of 
the Nile and made camp upstream across from the city. The crusaders erected artillery on 
their bank of the river to provide cover for marine assaults against the tower, which was 
finally taken on 25 August 1218. A pause then ensued as the Franks expected the arrival 
of additional forces and al-Kamil, who had positioned himself opposite the Franks on the 
east bank, awaited the arrival of his father, al-'Adil, who died travelling to support his 
son.612 
 To prevent the Franks from crossing the river, the Muslims had fortified the right 
bank south of Damietta. An earthen rampart was raised and ships and stakes were sunk 
in the river to further impede any attempt to cross it. The Frankish sources claim that 
these defences were also supported by artillery.613 The Franks avoided these obstacles by 
developing the narrow al-Azraq channel, but they found the right bank undefended when 
they crossed on 5 February 1219; al-Kamil had fled in fear of a plot against him, leading 
his forces to abandon their camp the night before the crossing.614 Despite this, al-Kamil 
retained control of his army and, joined by his brother al-Mu'azzam of Damascus, 
established a new base upstream at Mansura from which he repeatedly sent forces against 
the Franks.615 
                                                 
610 al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 122, 144-46. These fears were not entirely unfounded as the 
Nile delta had been raided by Frankish forces earlier in the thirteenth century, Abu Shama, Kitab al-
Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 153; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 146; History of the Patriarchs, 
trans. Khater and Khs-Burmester, 3.2:193-95. 
611 For contemporary accounts of this tower, see William of Tyre, Chronicon 20.15, ed. Huygens, 2:929, 
trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:363; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 3:176; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
Broadhurst, p. 166. See also Powell, Anatomy of a Crusade, p. 141. 
612 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 11-14, 16, 18, 21, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 179-91, 194-96 trans. 
Gavigan, pp. 63-72; James of Vitry, Lettres nos. 3, 4, 5, ed. Huygens, pp. 100, 105-8, 109, 114-16; Roger 
of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett 2:229-34, trans. Giles 2:406-10; Cronica S Petri Erfordensis 
moderna, ed. Holder-Egger, pp. 386-87; Cronica Reinhardsbrunnensis, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 592; Ibn al-
Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 3:176-77; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 167-68; al-
Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 166-67; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, p. 26; 
History of the Patriarchs, trans. Khater and Khs-Burmester, 3.2:215-19. 
613 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 22, ed. Hoogeweg, p. 196, trans. Gavigan, pp. 73-74; James of 
Vitry, Lettres no. 5, ed. Huygens, p. 114; Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:238-39, 
trans. Giles, 2:415. For these defences, see also Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 3:176-77; al-
Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 172. 
614 James of Vitry, Lettres no. 5, ed. Huygens, p. 118; Ernoul, Chronique 36, ed. De Mas Latrie, pp. 418-
20; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 3:177; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 173-74; Ibn 
al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, p. 33. 
615 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 23, 25, 27, 29-31, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 201-2, 205-7, 211-13, 
213-24, trans. Gavigan, pp. 76, 78, 179-80, 81-84-86; James of Vitry, Lettres no. 5, ed. Huygens, pp. 118-
19; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 174-75. 
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 On the right bank, the Franks built artillery: petrariae and trabucula, according to 
James of Vitry, and perrieres, mangoniaus and trebuces, according to the Ernoul 
account,616 while efforts were also made to blockade and mine the city. Despite the 
diminishing provisions within Damietta, the defenders were able to launch a successful 
sally and burn many of the Franks' engines at one point.617 Even without their machines, 
the Franks pressed the attack with fire and ladders, gaining the outer defences of the city 
at the start of November. On 5 November 1219 the city surrendered.618 
 
Artillery at Damietta 
Artillery is noted at a number of points and is described as fulfilling different roles during 
this siege. It was used by Damietta's defenders in the summer of 1218 to protect the Tower 
of the Chain, damaging Frankish ships and ladders as they attacked it.619 Oliver of 
Paderborn specifies that at least six machine [sic], mounted on towers, were used in this 
way but that the most powerful one broke after just a few shots.620 These do not appear 
to have been particularly strong engines as netting hung in front of the ship-borne siege 
towers, which carried their own lapidum iactatores, was enough to resist the defenders' 
projectiles. These light engines were almost certainly traction trebuchets and probably 
distinct from certain heavier engines among those found by the Franks when they entered 
the city in November 1219: "four trabucculi with petrariae and many mangonelli."621 
Oliver of Paderborn states that eight mangonelli were directed against the crusaders' camp 
in 1219 but he does not quantify the petrariae. 
                                                 
616 James of Vitry, Lettres no. 5, ed. Huygens, p. 119; Ernoul, Chronique 36, ed. De Mas Latrie, p. 424. 
Petrariarum and trebuculorum) according to Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:243, 
trans. Giles 2:418. 
617 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 28, ed. Hoogeweg, p. 211 trans. Gavigan, p. 80; Cronica 
Reinhardsbrunnensis, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 593. 
618 James of Vitry, Lettres no. 6, ed. Huygens, pp. 125-26; Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 32, ed. 
Hoogeweg, pp. 224-25, trans. Gavigan, pp. 86-87; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 176-
77; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, p. 31. Cf. Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, 
ed. Hewlett, 2:248, trans. Giles 2:423; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.11.8, ed. Bongars, p. 208, trans. 
Lock, p. 331; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 91; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 179. 
For complete accounts of this siege, see Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 10-32, ed. Hoogeweg, 
pp. 175-226; James of Vitry, Lettres nos. 3-6, ed. Huygens, pp. 100, 103-10, 114-32; Ernoul, Chronique 
36, ed. De Mas Latrie, pp. 415-26; Eracles 31.14-32.14, RHC Oc 2, pp. 326-46. 
619 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 11, ed. Hoogeweg, p. 181, trans. Gavigan, p. 64; James of 
Vitry, Lettres no. 4, ed. Huygens, pp. 105-6. 
620 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 13, ed. Hoogeweg, p. 183, trans. Gavigan, p. 66. See also Roger 
of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:231-32, trans. Giles, 2:408-9. 
621 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 39, ed. Hoogeweg, p. 239, trans. Gavigan, p. 96. 
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Oliver of Paderborn's selective use of terminology suggests that he categorised 
the defenders' artillery. The new term, trabucculi,622 most likely refers to counterweight 
trebuchets, used to target the Frankish engines and stationary targets, while the petrariae 
and mangonelli, probably traction trebuchets, were used against ships and personnel. It is 
hard to gauge the strength of the defenders' strongest engines as their artillery is rarely 
emphasised. Although stones are noted inflicting casualties and minor damage, it is 
unclear whether, or when, these were thrown mechanically or by hand. This lack of 
emphasis seems to indicate that these defensive engines were either fairly ineffective or 
not particularly powerful. 
 Oliver of Paderborn and James of Vitry claim that the Franks also made use of 
trabuculi, against the Tower of the Chain for example. This term was then widely adopted 
by subsequent chroniclers, although the traditional mangoneaus is found in the Eracles 
account in this instance: 
 
Oliver of Paderborn Non vero considerantes, turrim capi non posse petrariarum vel 
trabuculorum ictibus (hoc enim multis diebus fuit attemptatem), 
nec applicatione castri propter fluminis profunditatem, neque 
fame propter civitatis vicinitatem, neque suffossione propter 
circumfluentis aque importunitatem,623 
James of Vitry Mansimus autem in insula predicta IIII mensibus detenti in 
expugnatione cuiusdam turris mire fortitudinis, que nec 
petrariis nec instrumentis que trabucula dicuntur poterat 
superari nec a parte inferiori suffodi eo, quod in medio Nili 
fluminis inter insulam et civitatem sita erat,624 
Roger of Wendover Principes interea militiae Crucifixi de captione turris nimis 
solliciti viderunt eam capi non posse fame, propter civitatis 
vicinitatem; neque suffossione, propter aquae circumfluentis 
importunitatem; neque insultu petrariarum aut trebuculorum 
ictibus, quia, cum id multis esset diebus attentatum, parum vel 
nihil profecerunt.625 
Cronica Reinhardsbrunnensis Cristiani vero considerantes turrim non posse capi petrariorum 
et tribuculorum ictibus neque fame propter vicinitatem 
civitatis,626 
Eracles Quant li Crestien si furent herbergé et atiré, si entendirent a 
faire assaillir la tor de la Cosbarie, si drecerent perrieres et 
mangoneaus et les firet geter a cele tor,627  
                                                 
622 For the appearance of this term, see Chapter 1. 
623 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 12, ed. Hoogeweg, p. 181. 
624 James of Vitry, Lettres no. 4, ed. Huygens, p. 105. 
625 Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:229. 
626 Cronica Reinhardsbrunnensis, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 592. 
627 Eracles 31.14, RHC Oc 2, p. 327. Cf. Ernoul, Chronique 36, ed. De Mas Latrie, p. 416. 
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While these descriptions present the Frankish artillery as insufficiently powerful to 
threaten the defensibility of the Tower of the Chain, these same engines would appear to 
be the 'machines' responsible for damaging the bridge that connected the tower to the 
city.628 Like Oliver of Paderborn's classification of the defending artillery, James of Vitry 
also seems to present the trabuculi as the heaviest, likely counterweight engines, while 
the petrariae appear to have been lighter, noted as inflicting casualties when fired across 
the river.629 
 The heavier Frankish engines were apparently able to damage at least one of 
Damietta's twenty-eight outer towers in 1219. Oliver of Paderborn ascribes this to the 
trabuccus of the duke of Austria while Roger of Wendover credits the trebuculus of the 
Templars.630 The Eracles account states that John of Bienne erected one trabuchet, the 
Hospitallers another and a third was held communally, while many perrieres and 
mangoneaus were placed around the city; but among these, it was the Hospitallers' 
trabuchet that inflicted notable damage.631 These accounts again suggest that the heavier 
trabuculi, distinct from the lighter petrariae and mangonelli, were newer counterweight 
engines while the latter were probably traditional traction trebuchets or at most quite small 
counterweight engines. Despite the specificity shown by some sources, this was not 
embraced by all: the Ernoul account very generally groups the use of perrieres, 
mangoniaus and trebucés by the Franks during the 1219 phase of the siege.632 
The significance but also the limitations of artillery are identified by the Frankish 
sources: although the heaviest trebuchets featured here appear to have been at least as 
powerful as any used in the region beforehand, none of the sources suggests that the 
damage inflicted by these engines led to the fall of the city.633 Thus, while the heaviest 
machines were probably used to target the battlements first and then the bulk of the 
defences below the parapet, they were not yet powerful enough to compromise the 
                                                 
628 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 12, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 182, trans. Gavigan, pp. 65. 
629 …bellicis machinis, que petrarie dicuntur, lapides iaculando quosdam ex nostris interficientibus, James 
of Vitry, Lettres no. 6, ed. Huygens, p. 130. 
630 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 38, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 237-38, trans. Gavigan, p. 94; Roger of 
Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:250, trans. Giles, 2:424-25. 
631 Eracles 32.8, 14, RHC Oc 2, pp. 337-38, 345. Cf. Chronica de Mailros, ed. Stevenson, p. 136; Marino 
Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.11.8, ed. Bongars, p. 208, trans. Lock, p. 331. 
632 Ernoul, Chronique 36, ed. De Mas Latrie, p. 421. Unlike his contemporaries, this figure appears to have 
had little interest in artillery, mentioning none during the attacks against the Tower of the Chain. For an 
examination of the Ernoul account and its relation with other accounts, see Edbury, "Ernoul, Eracles and 
the Fifth Crusade." 
633 Roger of Wendover states this outright, Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:243, 
trans. Giles, 2:418. See also Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, pp. 226-29. 
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integrity of Damietta's defences, even after as long as seven months of bombardment in 
1219. Meanwhile, traction trebuchets continued to provide an antipersonnel function. A 
Coptic source, however, has provided a different account. 
 According to the continuation of Sawirus ibn al-Muqaffa's chronicle, the Franks 
erected a large mangonel in their fortified camp on the west side of the river in 1218. This 
was destroyed by another engine erected by the defenders, leading the Franks to build an 
even larger mangonel as well as four others. The largest of these targeted the city while 
the smaller ones fired at the Tower of the Chain. The author gives a sense of the scale of 
the smaller engines when stating that these proved incapable of reaching the tower. 
Despite their apparent weakness, the author states that the Franks built two more 
mangonels and another 'stone-thrower'. It is unclear how the author differentiated a 
mangonel and a 'stone-thrower'; however, the latter would not appear to have been very 
large as a stone-thrower is said to have been mounted on the Tower of the Chain by the 
defenders. Although this account provides more mechanical details than others at times, 
its descriptions are often contradictory. 
In a later anecdote, the smaller mangonels, which could not reach the Tower of 
the Chain, were used to throw the heads of dead Muslims into Damietta from across the 
river. Despite the apparent inconsistency, the author appears to portray these engines as 
fairly light compared to the larger mangonel built by the Franks. This engine is described 
as having a lead box, weighing 2 Syrian qintars (370 kg), at its 'head' and throwing 
projectiles weighing 1 Syrian qintar (185 kg).634 The counterpoise suggests that this was 
a counterweight trebuchet but the disparity between the mass of the counterpoise and the 
mass of the projectiles is impractical.635 The author seems to suggest that this was a 
particularly large engine, requiring six hundred men to operate. Even if the impractically 
large crew is set aside, and the unlikely size of the projectiles, for which there is no 
substantiating evidence, is accepted, it is hard to justify the use of such a small 
counterweight. The mechanics of a counterweight trebuchet generally require a 
counterweight that is at least ten times the mass of any intended projectile in order to fire 
with any kind of success, while a disparity of around 100 times will generally allow for a 
fairly efficient firing sequence and one of 1,000 times will produce a long-range shot. 
                                                 
634 History of the Patriarchs, trans. Khater and Khs-Burmester, 3.2:215-21. 
635 Paul Chevedden has used this as part of a theory that this was a 'hybrid' engine, supported by a reference 
to 600 men who 'hauled' below the engine; however this does not take into account the impracticality of 
600 men providing traction power simultaneously, Chevedden, "The Hybrid Trebuchet," pp. 186-87. 
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Taken as a whole, it is hard to determine which elements of this description can be trusted 
as each seems to contradict the practicality of another, apparently reflecting the author's 
ignorance of these engines and their mechanics. 
 
The Push to Mansura: 1221 
After fortifying Damietta, the Franks marched south towards Mansura, on the right bank 
of the Damietta branch just south of where the Ushmum canal (al-Bahr as-Saghir) diverts 
to the northeast towards Tanis.636 The Franks arrived at the fork in the river before the 
end of July 1221 and established a camp enclosed by earthworks. According to Oliver of 
Paderborn and al-Maqrizi, they also erected artillery.637 Together with the Muslim army's 
use of artillery to defend the right bank of the river south of Damietta, these appear to be 
the first examples of artillery being used against field forces during the crusades. 
Although plausible, such references should be regarded with caution, as unlike some 
classical engines, the more parabolic trajectory of swing-beam artillery and difficulties 
associated with yawing make this type of engine much better suited to siege warfare.638 
However, Oliver of Paderborn's use of differing terms, Muslim mangonelli south of 
Damietta and Frankish petrariae at Mansura, and al-Maqrizi's notice of artillery in both 
instances appear to lend credence to this episode.639 If present, these engines do not appear 
to have influenced the situation. Syrian reinforcements continued to join al-Kamil as the 
Franks held their position, eventually compelling the Franks to burn their camp on the 
night of 26 August and flee towards Damietta, leading to their surrender and the return of 
Damietta in exchange for their lives.640  
                                                 
636 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 39, 40, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 240-41, trans. Gavigan, pp. 96-97; 
James of Vitry, Lettres nos. 6, 7, ed. Huygens, pp. 128, 134-35, 139-40; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
Broadhurst, p. 179; Pringle, "A Castle in the Sand," p. 190. 
637 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 72, ed. Hoogeweg, p. 269, trans. Gavigan, p. 125; al-Maqrizi, 
al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 185. For the movement of the Franks, see Oliver of Paderborn, Historia 
Damiatina 57-59, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 259-61, trans. Gavigan, pp. 114-16; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. 
Eddé and Micheau, pp. 31-32; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 179-80. 
638 Cf. Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 2.4.22, ed. Bongars, p. 79, trans. Lock, pp. 134-35. 
639 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 30, 72, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 219, 269, trans. Gavigan, pp. 84, 
125; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 185. 
640 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 71, 74-78, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 267-69, 270-75, trans. Gavigan, 
pp. 123-24, 126-31; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 33-34; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, 
trans. Richards, 3:181; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 184; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
Broadhurst, p. 181, 184-87. 
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'Atlit and Caesarea: 1218-20 
While considerable numbers of crusaders and eastern Franks were occupied with the siege 
of Damietta, forces from Damascus took the opportunity to strike at the newly constructed 
Templar castle at 'Atlit (Castellum 
Peregrinorum) and Caesarea.641 
According to James of Vitry and 
the Eracles account, Mu'azzam 
'Isa besieged Caesarea and 'Atlit 
in 1218 before making for Egypt 
to support his brother.642 While 
James of Vitry characterises the 
attack on Caesarea as more of a 
sack, the Eracles account states 
that three perrieres were used, 
implying an additional facet of 
complexity. Oliver of Paderborn, 
however, states that Mu'azzam 
'Isa took Caesarea following his 
return from Egypt in 1219, 
destroying it before going on to 
besiege 'Atlit.643 The similarities 
suggest that the sources are 
                                                 
641 For the fortification of these sites, see Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 5-6, 26, ed. Hoogeweg, 
pp. 168-72, 207-11, trans. Gavigan, pp. 56-58, 78-79; James of Vitry, Lettres no. 3, ed. Huygens, p. 99; 
Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:261, trans. Giles, 2:434; Cronica S Petri 
Erfordensis moderna, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 386. For descriptions and discussions of 'Atlit castle, see Oliver 
of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 6, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 169-72, 290-91, trans. Gavigan, pp. 57-58, and 
letter no. 3 (1218), ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 290-91; Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 1:293-
96; Rey, Étude sur les monuments, pp. 97-99; Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 2:24-34; Johns, Guide to 'Atlit, 
ed. Pringle; Johns, "Excavations, (1932)," pp. 145-64; Johns, "Excavations: Faubourg," pp. 111-29; Boase, 
"Military Architecture," pp. 157-58; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, p. 176-78; Pringle, "Town Defences," pp. 
91-92; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 125-26; Boas, Crusader Archaeology, pp. 110-12. For the limited 
fortification of Caesarea see, Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 5, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 168-69, trans. 
Gavigan, p. 56. See also Wilbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium terrae sanctae 2.2, ed. Pringle, pp. 131-32, 
trans. Pringle, p. 86. 
642 James of Vitry, Lettres nos. 3, 4, ed. Huygens, pp. 101-2, 108; Eracles 32.5-6, RHC Oc 2, pp. 334-36 
(lower text). Cf. Johns, Guide to 'Atlit, ed. Pringle, pp. 18, 20, and notes on pp. 1-2. Abu Shama notes a 
victory by Mu'azzam over the Templars at al-Kaimon at the end of August 1218 which may relate, Abu 
Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 168, cf. p. 170. 
643 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 41, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 244-45, trans. Gavigan, p. 99. See also 
Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 1:299. 
'Atlit: town and castle, plan (from Rey) 
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describing the same set of events, although the correct year is unclear as Mu'azzam 'Isa 
briefly returned to Egypt in 1219.644 
 Mu'azzam 'Isa returned to 'Atlit in October/November 1220. On this occasion, 
according to Oliver of Paderborn, he fortified his position and erected artillery: 
 
He set up one trebuchet, three petraries and four mangonels, and harassed the 
fortification night and day by blows of the machines. However, he could not move 
one stone from its place in the new towers and the middle wall. But the trebuchet of 
the [castle], with a petrary and a mangonel placed next to it, battered and broke the 
trebuchet and the petrary of the enemy.645 
 
The mention of only one trabuculum on each side suggest that these were the most 
exceptional engines, probably counterweight trebuchets, but the differentiation between 
the petrariae and the mangonelli is once again more difficult to explain. The attacking 
engines appear to have had little impact on 'Atlit's thick but soft walls. Hugh Kennedy 
has concluded that the Ayyubid artillery was used against the castle's outer wall, unable 
to reach the inner line,646 but the above account more accurately describes the inner 
defensive line with its two towers and connecting wall (turribus novis ac muro medio). 
This suggests that the castle's outer curtain may not have been built at this point or that 
Oliver of Paderborn, then in Egypt, was unaware of its completion. Nonetheless, the 
power of even the heaviest engines appears to be no more than those used at Damietta but 
the accuracy of those within, successfully destroying some of those opposing them, is 
noteworthy. Mu'azzam 'Isa made little headway against 'Atlit, its 300 crossbowmen and 
passive strength were sufficient to hold back the assailants until reinforcements began to 
arrive.647 Unable to overwhelm the castle with a frontal assault, the Muslims cut their 
losses and withdrew before the end of November.648  
                                                 
644 For a secondary account of Mu'azzam 'Isa's movements, see Humphries, From Saladin to the Mongols, 
pp. 162. 
645 Coradinus obsidione fimata metuens excursum castensium fossatum fieri iussit inter castrum et sua 
tentoria, erigens trabuculum unum, petrarias tres, mangonellos quatuor, diebus ac noctibus ictibus 
machinarum munitionem infestans, sed de turribus novis ac muro medio nec unum lapidem de suo loco 
movere valuit. Trabuculus autem castri cum petraria iuxta se posita ac mangonello trabuculum hostium et 
petrariam concutiens fregit. Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 52-53, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 254-55, 
trans. Gavigan, pp. 108-9. The vagueness in Oliver of Paderborn's account is excusable given that he was 
in Egypt during these events. Cf. Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 94; Richard of Morins, Annales 
Prioratus de Dunstaplia, ed. Luard, p. 63. 
646 Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 127. 
647 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 53, ed. Hoogeweg, p. 256, trans. Gavigan, p. 110. 
648 Abu'l-Fida' claims that Mu'azzam 'Isa went on to besiege Caesarea after departing 'Atlit in 1220, adding 
to the confusion surrounding these campaigns in 1218-20, Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 94. Cf. 
Abu'l-Musaffar Sibt al-Djauzi, in Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 178. 
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The Sixth Crusade and War on Cyprus 
 
With the concentration of Frankish forces in Egypt, Mu'azzam 'Isa had opted to slight 
many of the fortifications of interior Palestine, fearing this area and its strongholds would 
revert to Frankish control. This campaign of destruction extended to the walls of 
Jerusalem, though not the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) and Tower of David, as well 
as Toron, Safed, Chastel Blanc (Safita), Mount Tabor, built by al-'Adil only a decade 
earlier,649 and Belvoir.650 While this would have consequences in the future, the Muslims 
turned their attentions away from the Franks as the threat posed by the armies of the Fifth 
Crusade dissipated. 
Most sieges carried out during the 1220s and 1230s were conducted by Muslim 
armies against large urban centres throughout Syria. Unfortunately, detailed descriptions 
of artillery in sources that have been translated into European languages are scarce during 
this period: twenty non-descript engines appear to have been used by Jalal al-Din 
Khwarizim Shah at Khilat in 1229 and artillery seems to have been a notable weapon at 
al-Kamil's siege of Amida in 1232,651 but little more is discernible. The continued 
Ayyubid conflict and arrival of Frederick II allowed the Franks to negotiate the return of 
Toron and Jerusalem, the latter still without walls, as well as the fortification of Jaffa and 
Sidon.652 Frederick, however, was a divisive figure and the most informative Frankish 
sieges around 1230 were fought between his opponents and supporters.  
                                                 
649 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 156-57; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 
153, 156; James of Vitry, Historia orientalis, ed. Donnadieu, p. 466, trans. Stewart p. 119. 
650 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina 24, 42, 52, ed. Hoogeweg, pp. 203, 245, 254, trans. Gavigan, 
pp. 76-77, 100-1, 108; Eracles 32.10, RHC Oc 2, pp. 339-40; Ernoul, Chronique 36, ed. De Mas Latrie, p. 
417; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 141, 165-66, 173-74; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC 
Or 1, p. 91; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 181. Belvoir appears have been slighted by Saladin 
in either 1191 or 1192 and remained abandoned until it was destroyed further at this point, Ambroise, 
Estoire ll. 6,835-69, ed. Paris, p. 183, trans. Ailes, pp. 124-25; Itinerarium 4.23, ed. Stubbs, p. 280, trans. 
Nicholson, p. 261; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 87-88. 
651 Bar Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. Budge, 2:394-95; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé 
and Micheau, pp. 44-47; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 211, 213-14, 216-18. 
652 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 186; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, 
pp. 38-41; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 198-207. See also Bartlett, Islam's War, pp. 215-17. 
For the broader preoccupation of the Muslims, see also Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 
190-91; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 42-43; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
Broadhurst, pp. 210-11. For the fortification of Jaffa, see Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 157, ed. 
Raynaud, p. 77; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, A and B p. 14 (438), ed. Edbury, pp. 
152-53; Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. 2:365-69, trans. Giles, 2:522-24. See also Pringle, 
"Town Defences," p. 94. For the fortification of Sidon, see Eracles 32.25, RHC Oc 2, p. 365; Marino 
Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.11.10, ed. Bongars, p. 211, trans. Lock, p. 335; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
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Kantara, Beirut and Kyrenia: 1229-33 
During the siege of Kantara Castle in Cyprus in 1229-30, a grant trabuc, built by Anceau 
of Brie, was used by the Ibelins.653 The topography of the site suggests that this engine 
would most likely have been erected on the plateau below the heavily fortified northeast 
front of the castle. This position is relatively close to the castle but significantly lower, 
limiting the amount of energy that a projectile could have communicated at the point of 
impact. Despite these difficulties, the engine itself was apparently so impressive that John 
of Beirut left the siege of Deidamour (St Hilarion) to view it.654 More numerous engines 
were used soon afterwards at Beirut in 1231-32. 
 The town walls and citadel of Beirut had been rebuilt and refortified respectively 
by the time that Wilbrand of Oldenburg visited in 1211.655 Wilbrand claims that the 
recently built towers had been reinforced with iron to resist the impact of heavy stones 
thrown by artillery, a measure that appears to have been tested two decades later. During 
this siege, which saw the use of many different siege engines, the Eracles account claims 
that the besieging artillery included a large trabuchet, capable of throwing stones 
weighing a quintat, three small trabuches and six tunbereaus.656 Philip of Novara also 
uses three terms to identify the royal-Ibelin artillery at the siege of Kyrenia in 1232-33 
(perieres, mangueneaus and grans trabucs), while the defenders, under Philip Chenart, 
are said to have employed trabus, perieres, and mangueneaus.657 
 At each of these sieges, Kantara, Beirut and Kyrenia, Philip of Novara asserts that 
the attacking artillery inflicted significant damage. He claims that a section of wall was 
brought down at Kantara, but the rocky approaches were steep enough to repel a frontal 
assault and hard enough to resist the Ibelin sappers. Although Philip gives no description 
of a trabuc, or trabucher,658 these terms again appear to denote the most powerful type of 
                                                 
Broadhurst, pp. 204-5. See also Kalayan, "The Sea Castle of Sidon," pp. 81-82; Mesqui, "La fortification 
des Croisés," p. 11; Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 2:229-32. 
653 Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 148, ed. Raynaud, p. 63, trans. La Monte, p. 105. 
654 Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 148-51, ed. Raynaud, pp. 62-67, trans. La Monte, pp. 105-7. See 
also Eracles 33.11, RHC Oc 2, p. 377. 
655 Wilbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium terrae sanctae 1.5, ed. Pringle, pp. 118-19, trans. Pringle, p. 65. 
656 Eracles 33.22, RHC Oc 2, p. 388. See also Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 159, 162, 164, ed. 
Raynaud, pp. 78-79, 83, 86, trans. La Monte, pp. 120-21, 129, 133; For the broader siege, see Philip of 
Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 158-70, ed. Raynaud, pp. 76-89, trans. La Monte, pp. 118-37; Eracles 33.19-
29, RHC Oc 2, pp. 385-96; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, A and B p. 15 (439). 
657 Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 198, 199, ed. Raynaud, pp. 108, 109, trans. La Monte, pp. 157, 
158. 
658 As it is alternatively labelled, Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 151, ed. Raynaud, p. 66, trans. La 
Monte, p. 108. 
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artillery. Like the trabuculi/trabuches at Damietta in 1219 and the perieres/petrariae at 
Acre in 1191, the use of only one such engine by an army, or contingent, in most cases 
suggests both the relative power and prowess of these engines relative to others. While 
these larger engines were almost certainly counterweight trebuchets, the greater numbers 
of smaller machines were probably traction trebuchets, employed in a similar capacity 
and numbers as they had been in the twelfth century. References to small trabuches by 
some sources may suggest the use of smaller counterweight trebuchets, which others may 
have continued to identify by using traditional terms. The perieres noted by Philip of 
Novara, distinct from the trabucs and mangueneaus, may have been counterweight 
trebuchets in the same way that the notable perieres/petrariae found at Acre in 1191 
probably were. 
Although counterweight trebuchets of differing sizes may have been built, the 
power of even the largest was still limited: Philip of Novara praises John of Caesarea's 
party of crossbowmen just as highly as his grant trabuc at Kantara.659 Although the 
artillery used at Beirut is credited with inflicting notable damage, John of Ibelin's decision 
to abandon the siege when the defenders successfully countermined contextualises this: 
unlike mining, it was not yet a practical breaching weapon. Similarly, when the defenders 
thwarted the use of siege towers at Kyrenia, a year-long passive blockade ensued.660 In 
this light it is clear that although heavy artillery was growing stronger it was still not 
powerful enough to be the focus of a siege strategy. Had it been more powerful at this 
point, it would be difficult to explain why it was not used after mining efforts failed at 
Beirut and the use of siege towers proved unsuccessful at Kyrenia.  
                                                 
659 Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 152, ed. Raynaud, pp. 68-69, trans. La Monte, pp. 109-10. 
660 Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 198-201, ed. Raynaud, pp. 108-11, 116-17, trans. La Monte, pp. 
157-61, 167-78. 
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Continued Infighting and the Earliest Physical Evidence 
 
Jerusalem: 1239 
In 1239, tensions between al-Salih Najm al-Din of Damascus and his brother al-'Adil II 
of Egypt came to a head and the Franks sustained a crushing defeat near Gaza.661 Amid 
this confusion, al-Nasir Da'ud of Kerak took the opportunity to besiege Jerusalem towards 
the end of the year. Al-'Ayni states that al-Nasir directed artillery against the Tower of 
David and Ibn al-Furat, using Ibn Shaddad, appears to imply the same; however, al-
Maqrizi gives the impression that a much more comprehensive attack took place, 
involving a three-week siege of the city.662 If the Tower of David was targeted by the 
Muslims' artillery, no impact signatures can be identified along the contemporary sections 
of rusticated masonry, indicating the limited power of these engines.663 
 
Beaufort: 1240 
When al-Salih Najm overthrew his brother al-'Adil II in Egypt,664 their uncle, al-Salih 
Isma'il, then of Damascus, appealed to the Franks. Among the territorial rights exchanged 
                                                 
661 Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 60-62, 65-68; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
Broadhurst, pp. 242-44, 245-49, 252-53. For the Frankish defeat, see Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC 
Or 5, p. 193; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 251; Rothelin 27-29, 35, RHC Oc 2, pp. 541-48, 
555, trans. Shirley, pp. 47-51, 57-58; Eracles 33.44-45, RHC Oc 2, pp. 413-15, trans. Shirley, pp. 123-24; 
Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, ed. Luard, p. 25, trans. Giles, 1:272-73; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 
3.11.15, ed. Bongars, p. 215, trans. Lock, p. 241. 
662 Al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 196; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:62; Al-
Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 251. See also Rothelin 21, RHC Oc 2, pp. 529-30, trans. Shirley, p. 
40. The Rothelin account states that the Franks had made improvements to the St Stephen (Damascus) gate 
before the siege, indicating that the town walls were not entirely indefensible since their destruction, but 
mentions only the citadel in the context of the siege proper, Rothelin 1, RHC Oc 2, p. 489, trans. Shirley, 
p. 13. For the Frankish fortification efforts during the 1230s, see also Pringle, "Town Defences," p. 80; 
Benvenisti, The Crusaders, p. 51. 
663 For descriptions of the Tower of David, see Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.26.4, ed. 
Hagenmeyer, pp. 284-85, trans. Ryan, p. 117; Wilbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium terrae sanctae 2.6, ed. 
Pringle, p. 133, trans. Pringle, p. 88; Guidebook to Palestine, trans. Bernard, p. 23. See also Boas, 
Jerusalem, pp. 66-75; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, p. 53. For archaeological investigations, see Johns, "The 
Citadel, Jerusalem," pp. 121-90; Solar, "Jerusalem, citadel moat," pp. 47-48. For a radical, if unlikely, 
theory of the citadel's development, see Ellenblum, "Frankish Castles," pp. 93-109. For Jerusalem's 
Ayyubid defences more broadly, see Hawari, Ayyubid Jerusalem, pp. 22-26; Boas, Jerusalem, pp. 44-49; 
Pringle, "Town Defences," pp. 79-80; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, pp. 50-51. For archaeological evidence 
of these early thirteenth-century defences, see Weksler-Bdolah, "The Fortification System," pp. 105-30; 
Reich and Shukron, "Excavation in the Mamillah Area," pp. 128-30, 145-50. See also Wilbrand of 
Oldenburg, Itinerarium terrae sanctae 2.6, ed. Pringle, p. 133, trans. Pringle, pp. 87-88; Abu Shama, Kitab 
al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 82-83; Rothelin 9, RHC Oc 2, p. 505, trans. Shirley, p. 22. 
664 Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 61-63; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, 
pp. 245, 254, 256-57. 
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for an alliance, al-Salih Isma'il agreed to return Safed and Beaufort;665 the former had lain 
in ruins since the time of the Fifth Crusade while the latter had been developed by the 
Ayyubids.666 Beaufort's defenders were less than willing to surrender their impressive 
castle, compelling al-Salih Isma'il to besiege the stronghold on behalf of the Franks. 
According to the Rothelin account, al-Salih Isma'il brought artillery from Damascus, 
which threw large and small stones against the castle.667 Although there is no indication 
of how powerful these engines were, the account suggests not only that engines of two 
distinct scales were employed, but that both were stockpiled in Damascus. While the 
Ayyubids used artillery to assail each other into the 1240s, so too did the Franks. 
 
Tyre: 1242 
Balian of Beirut took advantage of the departure of Richard Filanghieri (the Emperor's 
marshal in the East) to attack Tyre in 1242. Philip of Novara's account states that after 
gaining the city, by a combination of surprise and collusion, the Ibelin party laid siege to 
the citadel with engines and perieres.668 If Philip of Novara used a consistent set of terms 
to refer to specific types of artillery, these would appear to have been lighter than the 
heavier trabucs found elsewhere; however, the obscure medieval landscape of Tyre 
prevents any further analysis of how large these engines might have been.669 
 
'Ajlun: 1243/44 
Artillery appears to have been used when 'Ajlun was besieged on behalf of al-Salih Isma'il 
of Damascus. Ibn al-Furat gives no indication of how these mangonels were employed 
                                                 
665 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 193; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:6; 
Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 68-69, 71, 73; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
Broadhurst, pp. 261-63; Eracles 33.42-43, RHC Oc 2, pp. 417-18, trans. Shirley, pp. 125-26; Rothelin 32, 
RHC Oc 2, p. 552, trans. Shirley, pp. 55-56; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, A and B 
p. 16 (440); Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, ed. Luard, 4:64-65, 288-91, trans. Giles, 1:303, 482-84; 
Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.11.15, ed. Bongars, pp. 215-16, trans. Lock, pp. 341-42. 
666 For the Ayyubid contributions to the fortification of Beaufort, see Corvisier, "Les campagnes de 
construction," pp. 243-66; Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 2:197-208. See also Chapter 7. 
667 Rothelin 32, RHC Oc 2, pp. 552-53, trans. Shirley, pp. 55-56. Cf. Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:8. 
668 Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 227, ed. Raynaud, pp. 130-32, trans. La Monte, pp. 178-80. 
Engines are mentioned in the account of Marsiglio Georgio but are absent from most others, Marsiglio 
Georgio, part. trans. La Monte, in Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, p. 207. Cf. Eracles 33.52, 
55, RHC Oc 2, pp. 422, 426-27, trans. Shirley, pp. 129, 131-32; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.11.16, 
ed. Bongars, p. 216, trans. Lock, p. 343; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 242, ed. Minervini, p. 52, 
trans. Crawford, p. 17. 
669 No difficulties, such as those faced by the operators of the Jerusalem's northern defensive engines in 
1099, are noted. 
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but, as at Jerusalem, no impact signatures are discernible on the surviving section of 
Ayyubid masonry. Once more this may suggest that the bossed masonry is obscuring the 
impact signatures of fairly light engines or that the targeted areas were among those 
subsequently damaged and rebuilt after one of the later earthquakes.670 
 
The Consequences of La Forbie 
The Khwarizmians do not appear to have used artillery when they sacked Jerusalem in 
1244, following their alliance with al-Salih Najm Ayyub of Egypt against the Franks, al-
Salih Isma'il of Damascus and al-Nasir Da'ud of Kerak.671 Al-Salih Ismail's coalition was 
soundly defeated at the battle of La Forbie, outside Gaza on 17 October 1244,672 allowing 
al-Salih Najm Ayyub to move first on Damascus and then on Homs. Al-Salih Najm's 
forces appear to have used artillery against the former,673 but the disgruntled 
Khwarizmians do not appear to have used such engines when they besieged the city not 
long after.674 
 
Ascalon: 1247 
Work was underway to refortify Ascalon with a castle by 1240, coinciding with peaceful 
relations with Damascus and the crusade of Theobald IV of Champagne (king of 
                                                 
670 Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:1. Cf. al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 278. 
For studies of 'Ajlun see Johns, "Medieval 'Ajlun," pp. 21-33; Yovitchitch, "The Tower of Aybak," pp. 225-
42; Yovitchitch, "Die Aiyubidische Burg 'Aglun," 118-25. 
671 For this agreement, see Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:1-2; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
Broadhurst, pp. 271-72. For the sack of Jerusalem, see Rothelin 41, RHC Oc 2, pp. 562-66, trans. Shirley, 
pp. 63-66; Eracles 33.56, RHC Oc 2, pp. 427-28, trans. Shirley, p. 132; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons 
and Lyons, 2:2-3; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 75-76; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
Broadhurst, p. 273; Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, ed. Luard, 4:288-91, 300-11, 337-44, trans. Giles, 
1:482-84, 491-500, 522-28; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, A and B p. 17 (441). The 
city remained defenceless at the time of Ibn Battuta's visit, Ibn Battuta, Tuhfat 1.1, trans. Gibb, p. 56. 
672 Eracles 33.57, RHC Oc 2, pp. 429-31, trans. Shirley, pp. 133-34; Rothelin 41, RHC Oc 2, pp. 564-66, 
trans. Shirley, pp. 64-66; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 252, ed. Raynaud, pp. 145-46, trans. 
Crawford, pp. 19-20; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 193-94; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. 
Lyons and Lyons, 2:4-7; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 76-77; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, 
trans. Broadhurst, p. 274. See also John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 528-38, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 
260-67. 
673 Al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 275-77; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, 
pp. 77-78; Eracles 33.59, RHC Oc 2, p. 432, trans. Shirley, pp. 134-35; Chevedden, The Citadel of 
Damascus, pp. 73-74. 
674 Al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 278-81; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, 
pp. 79-80; Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, pp. 74-75. 
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Navarre).675 The castle was completed 
by Richard of Cornwall, who saw to its 
initial security by concluding a truce 
with the Egyptians before returning to 
Europe.676 
 After the battle of La Forbie, 
the castle, which provided refuge for 
some Franks who escaped the battle, 
appears to have been besieged, 
although a more concerted effort to 
take the castle did not materialise until 
1247.677 That year, an Egyptian force 
crossed into Palestine, targeting 
Tiberias and Ascalon.678 Tiberias, 
which had been recently refortified by 
Odo of Montbeliard, fell to a frontal 
assault but Ascalon posed a greater 
challenge and a fleet was summoned to 
complete a blockade. The defenders 
appealed to Henry of Cyprus and a 
naval standoff took place until a storm drove many of the Egyptian vessels onto some 
rocks. The Eracles account claims that this change in the weather came as a mixed 
                                                 
675 Rothelin 22, 25, 33, RHC Oc 2, pp. 531-32, 537-38, 552, trans. Shirley, pp. 41-42, 45, 56. Cf. Ibn al-
'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 71-72; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 263-64. 
See also Eracles 33.49, RHC Oc 2, pp. 419-20, trans. Shirley, pp. 126-27; Rothelin 34, RHC Oc 2, p. 554, 
trans. Shirley, p. 57; Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, ed. Luard 4:79-80, trans. Giles, 1:315; Templar of 
Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 254, Minervini, p. 58, trans. Crawford, p. 20; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 
3.11.15, ed. Bongars, p. 216, trans. Lock, p. 342; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 263-64, 267. 
676 Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, ed. Luard, 4:43-47, 71, 89, 138-45, trans. Giles, 1:287-90, 308-9, 323, 
362-68; Rothelin 36, RHC Oc 2, pp. 555-56, trans. Shirley, p. 59. For the development of Ascalon's 
fortifications, see Pringle, "Richard I," pp. 133-47. 
677 For the early siege efforts, see Rothelin 41, RHC Oc 2, p. 565, trans. Shirley, p. 65; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, 
trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:8; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 274-75. See also Matthew Paris, 
Chronica maiora, ed. Luard, 4:559-60, trans. Giles, 2:174-75; Pringle, "The Walls of Ascalon." 
678 Eracles 33.59, RHC Oc 2, pp. 432-33, trans. Shirley, p. 135; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 258, 
ed. Minervini, p. 58, trans. Crawford, p. 21; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, A and B 
p. 18 (442); Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 194; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2: 10-11; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, p. 82; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
Broadhurst, p. 283-84. 
Ascalon: town and castle, plan (from Pringle) 
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blessing: the Muslims used the 
wreckage of their ships to construct 
penthouses and trebuchets.679 
 Artillery is not emphasised 
in the surviving accounts of this 
siege and the castle appears to have 
fallen after miners dug a tunnel into 
the castle.680 However, this appears 
to be the first time that masts are 
recorded as being used to construct 
trebuchets in the East.681 Whereas 
masts had been used at the sieges of Caesarea (1101),682 Tyre (1111-12),683 Ascalon 
(1153),684 and Alexandria (1167)685 to construct siege towers, the leftovers being 
allocated for the construction of artillery, their use to build artillery indicates both the 
increasing scale and significance of these engines. Although Muslim armies rarely built 
siege towers in this region, their part in the erection of one at Banyas in 1140 and Baybars' 
later construction of one at Caesarea in 1265686 suggest that the use of siege towers 
remained a consideration throughout this period. It is revealing that artillery was 
considered to be the wisest use of this timber. 
If masts were used to construct artillery, or even if this reference is more figurative 
than literal, it provides a rough sense of the scale of these engines. They would appear to 
have been larger than those used at the end of the twelfth century, a suggestion supported 
by the presence of spherical granite projectiles made from antique column-drums, albeit 
of unknown exact provenance. Two of these stones, found in the fosse near the Jaffa Gate, 
have a diameter greater than 30 cm. A number of smaller stones, which may have been 
                                                 
679 Eracles 33.60-61, RHC Oc 2, pp. 433-35, trans. Shirley, pp. 135-36. See also Annales de Terre Sainte, 
ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, B p. 18 (442), ed. Edbury, p. 154. 
680 Cf. the Roman siege of Maogamalcha, Ammianus, Res gestae 24.4.2-23, ed. Eyssenhardt, pp. 303-7, 
trans. Yonge, pp. 357-61. 
681 Eracles 33.61, RHC Oc 2, p. 434, trans. Shirley, p. 136. James of Aragon states that sailors from 
Marseilles built a trebuchet from the masts and wood of a ship in 1229 during the conquest of Majorca, 
James of Aragon, Llibre dels fets 69, trans. Smith and Buffery, p. 93. 
682 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 2.9.2, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 401-2, trans. Ryan, p. 153. 
683 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 125-26. 
684 William of Tyre, Chronicon 17.24, ed. Huygens, 2:794, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:222 
685 William of Tyre, Chronicon 19.28, ed. Huygens, 2:903-4, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:337. 
686 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. Sadeque, 2:557; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:70-
71; Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp. 160-61. 
Ascalon: granite projectile (Denys Pringle) 
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projectiles, have also been identified in the fosse that surrounded the thirteenth-century 
castle, strongly indicating that they date to the siege of 1247. 687 
It is hard to determine the effect that these projectiles had as the castle was 
destroyed following its capture and razed further by Baybars in 1270.688 While there are 
suggestions that certain engines used at Ascalon were of an increasingly large scale, those 
used the following year at Homs were praised directly by the sources. 
 
Homs: 1248-49 
In 1248, al-Nasir Yusuf of Aleppo and al-Salih Isma'il moved against Homs. The city was 
surrendered before an Egyptian relief force arrived, compelling al-Salih Najm Ayyub to 
dispatch a larger force to retake it. According to Abu'l-Fida' and al-Maqrizi, fourteen 
mangonels were arrayed against Homs during this second siege. Like the engines brought 
against Beaufort four years earlier, these had been transported from Damascus, some in 
as many as fifty disassembled components. One of these engines, a manjaniq maghribi, 
was supposed to have been able to throw projectiles weighing 140 ratls of the Syrian 
measure (259 kg or 289 kg according to those of Damascus or Hama respectively),689 
around ten times the size of the stones found at Ascalon. This figure, drawn from Ibn 
Wasil, who was himself informed of these events by participants, is almost certainly an 
exaggeration; however, it can be seen to clearly distinguish this large engine from most 
of the other lighter ones. Hill and Chevedden are thus justified in believing that this was 
a counterweight trebuchet.690 Although there is increasing evidence, both descriptive and 
physical, for the growing scale of artillery, these engines were still incapable of 
effectively breaching fortifications: the garrison of Homs held out through the winter until 
                                                 
687 My thanks to Denys Pringle and Hannah Buckingham for bringing these stones to my attention. 
Although the granite stones have not been weighed, rough measurements of their circumference and an 
estimated density of 2,500 kg/m3 suggest that the mass of the smaller stone is approximately 43 kg and the 
larger stone 60 kg. 
688 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:737, 741; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:140, 142; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:526; Ibn Battuta, Tuhfat 1.1, trans. Gibb, p. 
57; Stager and Esse, "Ashkelon," p. 72. For archaeological examinations of this castle, see Pringle, "Town 
Defences," pp. 84-85; Pringle, "Richard I," esp. Appendix 1, pp. 144-46. Cf. Benvenisti, The Crusaders, 
pp. 120-28. 
689 Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 125; Al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 285-86. See 
also Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:11; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, 
p. 85. 
690 Hill, "Trebuchets," pp. 104, 106; Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, p. 280. My Thanks to Rabei 
Khamisy for translating the appropriate section of Ibn Wasil for me. 
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a peace was eventually brokered. The conclusion of this agreement was partly encouraged 
by news that Louis IX had arrived in the East.691 
 
 
 
Louis IX and the Seventh Crusade 
 
Louis IX of France left Cyprus and landed with a force of crusaders at the mouth of the 
Damietta branch of the Nile in the spring of 1249. Unlike the landings of the Fifth Crusade 
in 1218, the Sicilian force in 1184 and Frankish-Byzantine force in 1169, Louis' army 
encountered little opposition. After defeating an initial force that opposed their landing, 
the crusaders found Damietta and its provisions abandoned to them.692 Al-Salih Najm 
Ayyub had returned to Egypt from Syria in expectation of the French king's arrival. Now 
sick, he established himself at Mansura, where his father, al-Kamil, had halted the 
southward advance of the Fifth Crusade.693 Louis, like his predecessors twenty-eight 
years earlier, marched south to Mansura and dug in on the north bank of the Ushmum 
canal, opposite to his adversary, in December.694 
The Franks erected two siege towers (chas chastiaus), used as elevated firing 
platforms, to provide cover for others constructing a causeway across the river.695 
                                                 
691 Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, p. 83; Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum historiale 
32.95, ed. Johann Mentelin, trans. in Jackson, Seventh Crusade, no. 72, pp. 121-22; John of Joinville, Vie 
de Saint Louis 144, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 70-71. 
692 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 146-64, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 72-81; Rothelin 59-60, RHC Oc 
2, pp. 589-93, trans. Shirley, pp. 85-88; Eracles 34.1, RHC Oc 2, pp. 436-37, trans. Shirley, p. 137; Templar 
of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 263, ed. Minervini, p. 60, trans. Crawford, pp. 21-22; Annales de Terre Sainte, 
ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, A and B pp. 18-19 (442-43); Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum historiale 32.97-
98, ed. Mentelin, trans. in Jackson, Seventh Crusade, no. 72, pp. 122-24; letter of Jean de Beaumont (1249), 
trans. in Jackson, Seventh Crusade, no. 58, pp. 85-86; letters of the Count of Artois, Guy (in service of the 
count of Melun), and William of Sonnac, in Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, ed. Luard, 6:152-62, trans. 
Giles, 3:409-18; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 195; Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij, trans. Jackson, 
no. 73, pp. 130-31; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:15-16; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
Broadhurst, pp. 288-90. 
693 Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij, trans. Jackson, no. 73, pp. 130-31; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:12, 17; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 83-84; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. 
Broadhurst, pp. 287-88, 290-92. 
694 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 179-86, 191, 197, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 88-91, 94-95, 96-97; 
Rothelin 62, RHC Oc 2, pp. 594-99, trans. Shirley, p. 89-92; Eracles 34.1, RHC Oc 2, p. 437, trans. Shirley, 
p. 137; Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij, trans. Jackson, no. 73, pp. 141-42; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:20; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 301. 
695 Cf. Amalric's attempt to bridge the Nile farther upstream, intending this bridge to be fortified with 
wooden towers provisioned with artillery, William of Tyre, Chronicon 19.22, 23, 29, ed. Huygens, 2:892-
93, 895, 905, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:325-26, 328, 339. 
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According to John of Joinville, sixteen Muslim engins targeted those working on the 
causeway. In response, the Franks constructed eighteen engins under Joscelin of 
Cornaut.696 It is unclear how the Frankish and Muslim engines differed, but while 
Joinville claims that the Frankish artillery was incapable of inflicting any notable damage, 
that of the Muslims was not only capable of harrying work on the causeway but also 
supported Muslim forces who crossed the river and attacked the Frankish camp.697 
 Despite their effect against Frankish personnel, the Muslims' engins were not 
strong enough to threaten the siege towers. Against these, the Muslims erected, in 
Joinville's terms, a perriere.698 This was probably a counterweight trebuchet, while the 
engins used by both the Franks and Muslims were traction trebuchets, elsewhere 
differentiated from large tension weapons (arbalestre a tour).699 Despite the evidence that 
sizeable stones were thrown by Egyptian artillery at Ascalon and Homs, Joinville clearly 
communicates that the perriere threw incendiaries (containers of Greek fire) rather than 
stones at the Frankish towers.700 Only the lighter engins appear to have thrown stones.701 
 The first shot discharged by the perriere passed between the two towers. The 
Franks who attempted to extinguish the subsequent fire were initially sheltered by wings 
extending from the bases of the towers; however, the Muslims adjusted their engins, firing 
high into the air to subject the Franks to plunging fire.702 The apparently rapid rate of fire 
of these engines, targeting soldiers and workers, is another indicator that these were 
traction trebuchets, whereas the perriere discharged only three shots during the first night 
that it came into service. The Muslims appear to have slowly adjusted the range of the 
perriere, the first shot falling behind the Frankish towers before another fell short.703 
Intriguingly, Joinville claims that the Muslims' perriere was used only at night; it 
was thus exceptional when it was brought forward one day.704 Supported by a hail of 
stones thrown by the lighter engins, the perriere was advanced close to the river, the 
implicit suggestion being that this move contributed to the machine's ability to set both 
                                                 
696 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 192-95, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 94-97. 
697 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 200-1, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 98-99. 
698 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 203-4, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 100-1. 
699 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 206, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 100-1. 
700 This is similar to the use of such by the defenders of Acre in May 1190, 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. 
Massé, pp. 217-19; Baha' al-Din, al-Nawadir, trans. Richards, pp. 110-11; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. 
Richards, 2:373-74. 
701 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 210, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 102-3. 
702 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 205, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 100-1. 
703 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 208, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 102-3. 
704 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 209, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 102-3. 
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towers on fire that day.705 With the towers destroyed, Louis used timber from his barons' 
ships to build a new penthouse to extend the causeway. But after the men around the 
penthouse had been driven away by the sixteen engins, this too was set alight by the 
perriere.706 
 Joinville's clear distinction between the Muslim's antipersonnel stone-throwing 
engins and the single machine-targeting Greek fire-throwing perriere must be evaluated 
alongside other accounts. The Rothelin account states, rather non-specifically, that Louis 
employed perrierez, mangongiax, trebuchez and other enginz while the Muslims made 
use of anginz, which fired large and small stones as well as Greek fire and javelins.707 In 
a letter composed by a Templar (or possibly a Hospitaller), the Muslims are noted as using 
many machinae and fundibula against the Franks and their efforts to cross the river.708 
Similarly, in a letter sent back to France in 1250, Louis IX mentions the use of machinae 
by both the Franks and Muslims. Although he does not provide detailed descriptions of 
these engines, Louis claims that the Muslims' artillery threw stones that damaged the 
Frankish towers, but confirms Joinville's assertions that it was Greek fire that ultimately 
destroyed them.709 Florence of Worcester simply refers to Louis' use of machinae to 
facilitate his efforts to cross the river.710 From the Muslim perspective, Ibn Wasil, Ibn al-
Furat, al-'Ayni and al-Maqrizi confirm that the Franks fortified their position and used 
artillery (mangonels), but omit any mention of siege towers, penthouses or Muslim 
artillery.711 Thus, while some sources appear to support certain aspects of Joinville's 
account, none fully corroborates it. 
 The crusaders abandoned their causeway following the destruction of the 
penthouse and eventually found a ford across the river in early February 1250. Louis then 
encamped part of his army on the south side of the river where the Muslims had been 
encamped in 1249, close enough to the river to be supported by the duke of Burgundy 
                                                 
705 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 210, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 102-3. 
706 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 211-13, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 102-5. 
707 Rothelin 63, RHC Oc 2, p. 600, trans. Shirley, p. 93. Cf. Florence of Worcester, Chronicon ex chronicis, 
ed. Thorpe, 2:181. 
708 Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, ed. Luard, 6:191-97. 
709 Letter of Louis IX to his subjects in France (1250), ed. Duchesne, in Historiae Francorum Scriptores, 
vol. 5, pp. 428-32, trans. in Jackson, Seventh Crusade, no. 70, pp. 108-14. See also Vincent of Beauvais, 
Speculum historiale 32.99, ed. Mentelin. 
710 Florence of Worcester, Chronicon ex chronicis, ed. Thorpe, 2:181-82, trans. Forester, p. 325. 
711 Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij, trans. Jackson, no. 73, pp. 141-42; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:20; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 208; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 301. 
ARTILLERY IN AND AROUND THE LATIN EAST MICHAEL S. FULTON 
  
 
205 
from the crusaders' original camp.712 The Muslims had apparently abandoned their 
artillery, fourteen engins according to the Rothelin account. These were evidently of little 
value to the crusaders as they were broken up to build a palisade around the new camp 
while a bridge was built across the river to connect the two Frankish camps.713 Louis was 
initially able to defend this double-ended bridgehead but momentum was lost with the 
arrival of al-Mu'azzam Turanshah.714 The Franks attempted to withdraw back across the 
Ushmum canal in early April and then made a disastrous effort to retreat back to Damietta, 
in which most of the army appears to have been captured or killed. 
 In his account of the negotiations between the Franks and Muslims that followed 
Louis' initial withdrawal across the river, Joinville gives the impression that the king was 
attempting to move with his artillery. During one of these dialogues, he claims that as a 
condition of Damietta being exchanged for Jerusalem, al-Mu'azzam Turanshah would 
mind the king's siege engines until he was able to collect them.715 These talks broke down 
when Louis would not personally serve as a guarantor and the Franks' disastrous flight 
towards Damietta ensued.716 Al-Mu'azzam Turanshah was murdered before Damietta was 
surrendered in early May 1250; having spent most of his adult life in Hisn Kayfa, he was 
never given the opportunity to employ artillery in the Levant.717 Following Damietta's 
                                                 
712 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 215-48, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 104-23; Rothelin 64, RHC Oc 
2, pp. 602-9, trans. Shirley, pp. 94-98; Eracles 34.1, RHC Oc 2, pp. 437-38, trans. Shirley, p. 138; Ibn al-
'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, p. 86; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 302-3. 
713 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 244, 254-61, 263-66 269-70, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 120-21, 
126-29, 130-33, 132-35; Rothelin 64, RHC Oc 2, pp. 607-8; trans. Shirley, p. 98; letter of Louis IX to his 
subjects in France (1250), ed. Duchesne, in Historiae Francorum Scriptores, vol. 5, pp. 428-32, trans. in 
Jackson, Seventh Crusade, no. 70, pp. 108-14; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.2, ed. Bongars, p. 
219, trans. Lock, p. 347. Cf. al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 303. 
714 For the death of al-Salih Najm Ayyub and arrival of Mu'azzam Turanshah in Egypt, see Ibn Wasil, 
Mufarrij, trans. Jackson, no. 73, pp. 133-43, 145-46; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 195-
96; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 84, 86-87; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:23-26; Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi, trans. in Jackson, Seventh Crusade, no. 74a, p. 155; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, 
trans. Broadhurst, pp. 292-94, 306; John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 196-97, 287-88, ed. and trans. 
Monfrin, pp. 96-97, 142-43. See also Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp. 32-36; Bartlett, Islam's War, pp. 227-
30. 
715 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 301-3, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 148-51. Cf. Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, 
trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:28; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 307. 
716 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 304-25, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 150-61; Rothelin 66, RHC Oc 
2, pp. 612-16, trans. Shirley, pp. 100-3; Eracles 34.1, RHC Oc 2, p. 438, trans. Shirley, p. 138; Ibn al-
'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 87-88; Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij, trans. Jackson, no. 73, p. 147-
8; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:28; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 307-8. 
717 For the murder of al-Mu'azzam Turanshah, see John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 344-53, ed. and 
trans. Monfrin, pp. 168-75; Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij, trans. Jackson, no. 73, pp. 150-52; Abu Shama, Kitab al-
Raudatain, RHC Or 5, pp. 198-200; Rashid al-Din, Ta'rikh-i Ghazani, trans. Boyle, p. 234; Ibn al-Furat, 
Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:33-34; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, p. 88; al-
Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 311-13. See also Bartlett, Islam's War, pp. 230-31. For the 
surrender of Damietta, see Rothelin 69, RHC Oc 2, p. 623, trans. Shirley, p. 108; Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij, trans. 
Jackson, no. 73, p. 154; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:35-36. For the subsequent role of 
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return to the Muslims, it was deemed too vulnerable to defend and its fortifications were 
torn down. It was replaced as a port by al-Munshiya farther up river.718 
 
The Aftermath 
Following the collapse of the Seventh Crusade, the Ayyubid princes quickly turned their 
attention back to each other. In an effort to leave a positive legacy, Louis IX financed a 
major wave of fortification efforts along the Palestinian coast. The town walls of 
Caesarea,719 Jaffa,720 Acre721 and Sidon722 were all developed as well as certain citadels 
and urban castles. There can be little doubt that artillery was taken into consideration 
when these fortifications were constructed. Louis and his deputies would have been 
familiar with the capabilities of European artillery and had just experienced Ayyubid 
artillery at first-hand. An anecdote recounted by Joinville about the Count of Eu and his 
small model of a stone-thrower (bible), which fired pebbles into Joinville's tent and broke 
his glasses and pots, is an example of the close familiarity that the knightly class had with 
this kind of technology.723 These were the men who commissioned, if not designed on 
                                                 
the party of murderous mamluks in Palestine during the 1250s, see Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. 
Sadeque, pp. 80-93; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 89-97. 
718 Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, ed. Luard 5:258, trans. Giles, 2:458; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons 
and Lyons, 2:38. The city was still indefensible when Ibn Battuta visited in 1326, Ibn Battuta, Tuhfat 1.1, 
trans. Gibb, pp. 46, 49. 
719 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 470, 493,ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 232-33, 252-45; letter of the 
patriarch of Jerusalem to Blanche of Castile, queen of France (1251), in Annales de Burton, ed. Luard, p. 
296, trans. in Jackson, Seventh Crusade, no. 115, p. 209; Eracles 34.2, RHC Oc 2, p. 440, trans. Shirley, p. 
139; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, A and B p. 21 (445), ed. Edbury, p. 155. For 
modern studies of Caesarea's defences, see Faucher. Merlin and Mesqui, "Césarée (Israël)," pp. 1-4; 
Mesqui, "L'enceinte médiévale de Césarée," pp. 83-94; Pringle, "Town Defences," pp. 89-91; Benvenisti, 
The Crusaders, pp. 138, 131-44; Frova, "Caesarea," pp. 150-51; Negev, "Caesarea," (1961), pp. 81-83; 
Negev, "Caesarea," (1960), pp. 264-65; Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 2:13-28; Rey, 
Étude sur les monuments, pp. 221-25. 
720 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 515-17, 561-62, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 254-57, 278-79; Eracles 
34.2, RHC Oc 2, p. 440, trans. Shirley, p. 139; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, A and 
B p. 21 (445), ed. Edbury, p. 155; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:641; Mufaddal, Kitab, 
ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:504-5; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 227. For a more comprehensive 
history of Jaffa's defences, see Pringle, "Town Defences," p. 94. 
721 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 615-16, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 304-5; Eracles 34.1, RHC Oc 
2, p. 438, trans. Shirley, p. 138. 
722 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 582, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 288-89. For modern studies of the 
fortifications of Sidon, see Mesqui, "La fortification des Croisés," pp. 11, 24-26; Pringle, "Town Defences," 
pp. 81-90; Boase, "Military Architecture," p. 161; Kalayan, "The Sea Castle of Sidon," pp. 81-83; 
Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 2:227-33; Pringle, "A Castle in the Sand," p. 188. For the Muslim attack during 
construction, see John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 551-53, ed. and trans. Monfrin pp. 272-75; Eracles 
34.2, RHC Oc 2, pp. 440-41, trans. Shirley, p. 139; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.4, ed. Bongars, 
p. 220, trans. Lock, pp. 348-49. Cf. the siege in 1249, Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:18; 
al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 292. 
723 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 583, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 288-91. For variants of this term, 
see Chapter 1. 
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occasions, both the engines and the fortifications that they would play against. Similarly, 
when such engines were not built at certain sieges, such as those of Mount Tabor in 1217 
and Subayba in 1253, the reason cannot have been ignorance.724  
 
 
 
The Mongols and the War of St Sabas 
 
Mongols 
When Louis IX left the Holy Land in late April 1254,725 the East that he was leaving was 
in transition. The Mongols' westward migration continued and on 17 January 1258 
Mongol forces under Hulagu crushed the army of Baghdad and entered the city less than 
a month later.726 The Mongols would have learned about swing-beam artillery during the 
course of their campaigns in China, had they not known about it beforehand. According 
to Bar Hebraeus, a large body of Chinese men, "skilled in the working of engines of war 
and throwing naphtha", was sent west with Hulagu in 1252727 and al-Makin Ibn al-'Amid's 
first reference to the use of artillery, in proximity to the Latin East, is at the Mongol siege 
of Irbil in 1258-59.728 It has been suggested that the Mongols learned about heavier 
(counterweight) artillery from the Muslims. During the protracted siege of Fancheng 
(Xiangyang) from 1268 to 1273, Rashid al-Din notes that no 'Frankish mangonels' had 
formerly been employed in this region along the Chinese frontier, but that an artillery-
                                                 
724 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 563-81, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 278-89. For the castle of 
Subayba, see Rey, Étude sur les monuments, p. 4; Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 
1:126; Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 2:145-74; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, pp. 147-57; Ellenblum, "Who 
Built Qa'at Subayba?" pp. 103-12; Amitai, "Notes on the Ayyubid Inscriptions at Subayba," pp. 113-119. 
Cf. Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:47; Ibn Jubayr, Rihla, trans. Broadhurst, p. 315. For the 
most recent archaeological work, see Hartal, The al-Subayba (Nimrod) Fortress. 
725 John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 584-87, 603, 615-17, ed. and trans. Monfrin, pp. 290-93, 298-301, 
304-7; Eracles 34.2, RHC Oc 2, p. 441, trans. Shirley, p. 441; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Edbury, pp. 
155-56. 
726 For the Mongol migration in relation to Ayyubid matters, see Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp. 59-62; 
Bartlett, Islam's War, pp. 233-35. 
727 Bar Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. Budge, 2:419. 
728 Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and Micheau, pp. 103-4. Cf. Rashid al-Din, Ta'rikh-i Ghazani, 
trans. Boyle, p. 190. See also the account of a Mongol siege by papal emissary Plano Carpini, in Raphael, 
Muslim Fortresses, p. 54. 
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maker, who had come from Baalbek and Damascus with his three sons, constructed seven 
large mangonels that were used against the strongly fortified town.729 
 Whether the Mongols had prior knowledge of the heaviest artillery used in 
western Syria or not, their allies Hethum of Armenia, Bohemond VI of Antioch and al-
Ashraf Musa of Homs, all present when Hulagu entered Aleppo on 25 January 1260,730 
certainly would have.731 But there are few indications that the Mongols employed artillery 
during their conquest of western Syria: few strongholds resisted them and those that did, 
such as Subayba, typically fell to a frontal assault. The leading citizens of Damascus fled 
the city and it was occupied without opposition,732 but a revolt by the garrison 
commander, following Hulagu's departure to the East, may have provided the opportunity 
for both sides to deploy their artillery. 
 Paul Chevedden has suggested that artillery was responsible for compelling the 
garrison of Damascus to surrender. Having spent the night of 25 April 1260 cutting wood 
for their artillery, the Mongols gathered ammunition the following day and moved more 
than twenty trebuchets into position to the west of Damascus on the night of 26 April. 
The bombardment that followed, according to Chevedden, led the garrison to seek terms 
after about twenty-four hours.733 Although the technology would have been known and 
suitable materials could have been harvested along the banks of the Barada River, there 
would not appear to have been enough time to inflict the supposed damage. Besides the 
lack of any evidence to support the existence of artillery powerful enough to compel this 
type of reaction, the amount of time required to erect the Mongol engines was similar to 
that required by Saladin's forces seventy years earlier, suggesting they may not have been 
much larger.734 The rebuilding work along the western side of the citadel is probably 
                                                 
729 Rashid al-Din, Ta'rikh-i Ghazani, trans. Boyle, p. 290-91. See also Hill, "Trebuchets," p. 104; 
Chevedden, "Black Camels," p. 236 n. 17; Chevedden, "King James I," p. 318; Needham and Yates, Science 
and Civilization in China, p. 221. 
730 The citadel held out until 25 February. Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp. 66-67. See also Bar Hebraeus, 
Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. Budge, 2:435-36. 
731 Hethum of Armenia had solicited the support of the Mongols in the 1250s and recognised their 
hegemony, his son-in-law-Bohemond initially rebuked the Mongols in 1244 but subsequently submitted to 
their rule, Eracles 34.2, RHC Oc 2, pp. 440, 442, trans. Shirley, pp. 139, 140; Vahram, Chronicle, trans. 
Neumann, pp. 48-49; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 302, trans. Crawford, p. 34; Matthew Paris, 
Chronica maiora, ed. Luard, 4:389-90, trans. Giles, 2:31; Chronicle of Melrose, ed. Stevenson, p. 158, 
trans. Stevenson, p. 188. 
732 Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:41-42; Menkonis Chronicon, ed. Weiland, pp. 547-49, 
trans. Barber and Bates, in Letters from the East, pp. 153-56; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and 
Micheau, pp. 114-16. 
733 Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, pp. 78-79. 
734 See, for example, the sieges of Saone (1188), Safed (1188) and Jaffa (1192) discussed in Chapter 5. 
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associated with a later destruction phase. This face of the citadel, along with the northern 
face, are part of the city's external walls and were most heavily slighted by the Mongols 
in 1260. They were then besieged repeatedly through the late medieval and modern 
periods.735 Contrary to Chevedden's theory that the citadel's large towers, built by al-'Adil, 
were meant to be platforms for counterweight trebuchets, defensive artillery does not 
appear to have played a significant role in this siege.736 
The Franks managed to evade the Mongols' gaze during the latter's campaign 
through Syria in 1259-60. Unlike Bohemond, the Franks of Palestine rejected any notion 
of Mongol suzerainty.737 Sidon was the only Frankish possession to be attacked, in 
response to a raid into the Biqa' valley by Julian of Sidon from Beaufort. The Mongols 
do not appear to have employed artillery on this occasion, breaking into Sidon following 
a frontal assault but being unable to take either of the castles.738 Although Sidon remained 
in Frankish hands, the attack was damaging enough to compel Julian to sell Sidon and 
Beaufort to the Templars. 
                                                 
735 For Chevedden's discussion of this slighting, derived largely from Ibn Shaddad, see Chevedden, The 
Citadel of Damascus, pp. 87-89. 
736 For more on this, see Chapter 10. 
737 Rothelin 80, RHC Oc 2, pp. 635-36, trans. Shirley, pp. 118-19; Ibn al-'Amid, al-Majmu, trans. Eddé and 
Micheau, p. 116. For interpretations of the Mongol invasion of Syria-Palestine in 1260, see Jackson, "Crisis 
in the Holy Land in 1260," pp. 481-513. For the brief Mongol administration of Syria see Amitai, "Mongol 
Provincial Administration," pp. 117-43. 
738 Eracles 34.3, RHC Oc 2, pp. 444-45, trans. Shirley, pp. 141-42; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Rohricht 
and Raynaud, B p. 25 (449); Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.6, ed. Bongars, p. 221, trans. Lock, p. 
350; Menkonis Chronicon, ed. Weiland, p. 549; Hayton, La flor des estoires 3.24, RHC Ar 2, p. 174; Abu 
Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 203. 
Sidon: sea castle, plan (after Mesqui and Kalayan) 
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In Acre, preparations were 
made for a similar encounter: trees 
around the city were cut, towers 
beyond the city walls and the 
Church of St Nicholas were 
disassembled, and tomb stones 
were even removed.739 These 
measures to deny materials for a 
siege camp or artillery, however, 
proved unnecessary. But it was not 
only Ayyubid and Mongol 
artillery that various Frankish 
factions in Acre had to contend with around this time. The wave of disruption that 
accompanied the Mongol invasion of Syria effectively ended the period of Ayyubid 
rivalry but the Franks remained relatively divided. 
 
The War of St Sabas 
Around thirty days of open fighting took place between Pisan and Genoese forces in Acre 
in 1249. According to the Eracles account, "they shot at each other with twenty-two 
different engines, stone-throwers, trebuchets and mangonels" while the Annales de Terre 
Sainte similarly states that twenty-two engines were used, including both large and small 
stone-throwers.740 The Templar of Tyre, who also notes the use of large and small 
engines, states that "there was one such engine which hurled a stone so large that it 
weighed 100 rotas, and each engine had its own name."741 While the former accounts 
emphasise the number of engines, the latter appears to give some indication of the size of 
the large trebuchets. Crawford suggests that the rota might be associated with the Cypriot 
oka, implying the mass of these projectiles was around 130 kg.742 The ratl might also be 
                                                 
739 Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, p. 449, ed. Edbury, p. 157; Marino Sanudo, Liber 
secretorum 3.12.6, ed. Bongars, p. 221, trans. Lock, p. 350. 
740 ...geterent les uns as autres de xxii manieres d'engins, perrieres, trebuches et mangouniaus. Eracles 
34.1, RHC Oc 2, p. 437, trans. Shirley, p. 137Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, B p. 19 
(443). Cf. Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.2, ed. Bongars, p. 218, trans. Lock, p. 346. 
741 ...geterent les uns as autres de plusors manieres d'engins et grans et petis, et tel engein avet quy getet 
une piere si grant quy pexet c rotes, et avoient les engins chascun son nom. Templar of Tyre, Gestes des 
Chiprois 270, ed. Minervini, p. 64, trans. Crawford, p. 23. The largest Genoese engines were named Boverel 
and Vincheguerre, and another was named Peretin. One of the Venetian engines was called Marquemose. 
742 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois, trans. Crawford, p. 24 n. 4. 
Sidon: land castle, plan (after Piana and Deschamps) 
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considered; however, the heavier Syrian measures would more likely have been used than 
the lighter, more reasonable, Egyptian measure. Although there is mounting evidence for 
the use of increasingly large counterweight trebuchets, there is no physical evidence to 
support the existence of projectiles much more than about 50 kg and the clean figure was 
probably intended to communicate an impression of scale rather than an accurate measure 
of weight. 
 The conflict between the Genoese and Venetians entered a new phase from 1256, 
triggered by a dispute over possession of a building in Acre that belonged to the Orthodox 
monastery of St Sabas. According to the Rothelin account, 
 
[A]t least sixty engines, every one of them throwing down onto the city of Acre, onto 
houses, towards towers and turrets, and they smashed and laid level with the ground 
every building they touched, for ten of these engines could deliver rocks weighing 
as much as 1,500 pounds weight of Champagne.743 This meant that nearly all the 
towers and strong houses of Acre were destroyed...744 
 
At the climax of this struggle in 1258, the Templar of Tyre notes that the Genoese 
gathered a fleet of forty-eight galleys and four nefs, each of the latter supported an engin, 
adding a naval element to the artillery battle taking place in Acre.745 Although the 
Venetians were eventually able to push the Genoese out of Acre, the rivalry and factional 
fighting would drag on and continue to divide the Franks while another major power was 
rising in Egypt.746 
 
There appears to be evidence that heavy artillery was used with increasing regularity from 
the time of the Third Crusade. New terminology was used by Frankish sources to identify 
engines at the siege of Damietta in 1218 and at the intra-Frankish sieges around 1230, 
                                                 
743 This mass is equivalent to 660 kg if the modern Troy pound is used. 
744 Et tout cel an ot bien LX angins, qui tuit gitoient a val la cite d'Acre seur les messons et sor les torz et 
seur les tornelles, et abatoient et fondoient jusques en terre quan qu'il les consivoient, car il i avoit tiex X 
engyns, qui ruoient si grosses pierres et si pesanz que eles pesoient bien XV C livres aus poiz de 
Champainge. Dont il avint que prez que toutes les torz et les forz maissonz d'Acre furent... Rothelin 79, 
RHC Oc 2, p. 635, trans. Shirley, p. 117. 
745 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 281, ed. Minervini, p. 68, trans. Crawford, p. 27. See also Eracles 
34.3, RHC Oc 2, p. 443, trans. Shirley, p. 141; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.5, ed. Bongars, pp. 
220-21, trans. Lock, pp. 349-50. This was not the first occasion that war had broken out in Acre: Frederick 
II had besieged the Templar complex in 1229 and the Ibelins had besieged the Hospitaller complex for 
around six months in the early 1240s, Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 138, 222-23, ed. Raynaud, pp. 
50, 126-27, trans. La Monte, pp. 91, 172-74. See also Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Rohricht and Raynaud, 
A and B p. 17 (441). 
746 For an extremely hostile opinion of this rivalry and its ultimate cost, see Ludolph of Suchem, De itinere 
Terrae sanctae liber 26, ed. Deycks, p. 42, trans. Stewart, pp. 54-55. 
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while the manjaniq maghribi also appears with increasing frequency in Muslim 
accounts.747 Although the heaviest engines were still incapable of breaching fortifications, 
even after months of bombardment on some occasions, there appears to have been a 
continual process of technical development and experimentation. This is suggested by the 
use of only one, or very few, of these larger engines and their perceived impressiveness, 
evident at sieges such as those of Acre (1190-91), Damietta (1218-19), Kantara (1229-
30), Beirut (1231-32), Homs (1248-49) and Mansura (1250). 
 The familiarity that the Franks and Muslims had with their rivals' technology, 
apparent during the Third Crusade, seems to have continued. The frequency with which 
al-'Adil and his descendants moved between the power-centres of Egypt and Syria would 
have contributed to this diffusion of knowledge: even if certain engines and experts 
remained tied to specific regions, high-level military figures would have been able to 
examine closely the engines in each arsenal. Even certain Franks were privy to these 
opportunities to examine a neighbour's artillery: officials were able to buy arms, siege 
engines and war materials from the inhabitants of Damascus as part of their agreement 
with al-Salih Isma'il and less than a decade later Louis IX's artilleryman, John the 
Armenian (qui estoit artillier le roy), went there to buy horn and glue for crossbows.748 
Such peacetime interactions would have added to the information exchanged during 
hostilities as various powers arrayed their artillery technology against each other. 
It is still hard to discern the scale of the largest mid-thirteenth-century engines: 
while masts of ships may have been used to build some, others were apparently erected 
in just twenty-four hours. Although the physical evidence (projectiles) from Ascalon is 
rather vague and unique at this point, the significance of such finds dating to the Mamluk 
period are the best indicators of the scale of late-thirteenth-century artillery.
                                                 
747 See Appendix 3. 
748 Al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, pp. 262-63; John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 446, ed. and 
trans. Monfrin, pp. 218-19. 
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7. Artillery in the Mamluk Period                   
Physical Evidence (1260-1291) 
 
 
 
Following the death of al-Salih Ayyub and the murder of his son al-Mu'azzam Turanshah 
in 1250, Izz al-Din Aybak became the first Mamluk sultan of Egypt. The ongoing intra-
Muslim struggle for regional power continued, however, until Hulagu's campaign through 
Syria and Palestine in 1259-60.749 Qutuz, who had been the effective leader of the 
Mamluks since Aybak's murder in 1257, defeated the Mongols at 'Ayn Jalut on 3 
September 1260 and remained in power just long enough to extend Mamluk authority 
across most of western Syria. It was left to his successor, Baybars, to reveal the potential 
of Mamluk artillery.750 
 In the spring of 1263, Baybars moved his army into Palestine, having resolved to 
acquire Kerak from al-Mughith, his last remaining rival between Cairo and Aleppo. As a 
sideshow to this, he briefly tested the strength of Acre's defences from the morning of 14 
April until he withdrew from the area on 16 April.751 Peter Thorau has suggested that 
Baybars brought siege engines with him on this campaign but Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Baybars' 
secretary and biographer, makes no mention of any during the assaults on Acre or at any 
other point during the ninety-five-day campaign. The source states that craftsmen 
travelled with the army but that when the army reached Transjordan Baybars only ordered 
the provision of ladders.752 It would appear, therefore, that Baybars had little intention of 
                                                 
749 For the last portion of these conflicts, see Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. Sadeque, pp. 80-93. See 
also Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp. 54-69. 
750 Qutuz, then sultan, and Baybars, who would soon succeed him, were entertained in Acre ahead of the 
battle, inadvertently giving Baybars the opportunity to view some of Acre's defences from within, Rothelin 
81, RHC Oc 2, pp. 637-38, trans. Shirley, pp. 118-19; Eracles 34.3, RHC Oc 2, p. 444; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, 
al-Rawd, trans. Sadeque, pp. 193-95; Bar Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. Budge, 2:437-38. 
Baybars' visit to Acre is emphasised in Boase, Kingdoms and Strongholds, p. 204 and Bartlett, Islam's War, 
p. 239. For the murder of Baybars, see Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. Sadeque, pp. 96-98, 111, 123-34. 
751 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. Sadeque, pp. 139-40, 164-71, 173-75; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. 
Lyons and Lyons, 2:43-44, 56-59; Eracles 34.4, RHC Oc 2, pp. 446-47. 
752 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. Sadeque, pp. 178-82; Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, p. 138. 
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using artillery against either Acre or Kerak, instead opting to use assault troops and 
miners. 
 Baybars faced a growing threat from the Mongols in 1263-64, as Hulagu received 
support from both the Byzantines and Kublai. The emboldened Franks were confident 
enough to launch raids through Palestine in 1264. Baybars responded by ordering limited 
raids around Caesarea and 'Atlit, weary of committing his forces with the far greater 
Mongol threat looming beyond the Euphrates.753 
 
 
 
Baybars' Early Artillery 
 
Baybars was in Egypt when he received word that Mongol forces had laid siege to al-Bira 
(Birecik) in early 1265. He dispatched an advance force and followed with the bulk of the 
army, reaching Gaza on 9 February. There, Baybars learned that the Mongols had erected 
seventeen trebuchets against al-Bira, fifteen of which focused on a certain tower. A letter 
arrived six days later informing the sultan that the Mongols had withdrawn with the 
arrival of the troops that he had sent ahead.754 
Among the instructions that Baybars issued for the refortification of al-Bira, was 
that wood and stones be collected for the defensive artillery within the town, suggesting 
that such engines had been present, and presumably used, during the siege.755 Baybars 
had additional engines sent to al-Bira from Shayzar, which were in turn replaced by 
engines from Damascus.756 Although artillery appears to have been stockpiled in certain 
strongholds since at least the second half of the twelfth century, Baybars would repeatedly 
exploit this network of arsenals with far greater effect than any of his predecessors. 
Having ordered that some engines be sent to al-Bira, Baybars summoned others as his 
attention turned to Caesarea.  
                                                 
753 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. Sadeque, pp. 186-91, 208-9, 216; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 
3.12.7, ed. Bongars, p. 222, trans. Lock, p. 351; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:67. 
754 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. Sadeque, pp. 237-39, cf. trans. al-Khowayter, 2:547-49; Abu'l-Fida', 
al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, pp. 473-74; Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 205; Mufaddal, Kitab, 
ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:473-74, 503-4. See also Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp. 158-59. 
755 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:248-50, 252. 
756 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:253. 
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Caesarea: 1265 
Free from the obligation of relieving al-Bira, Baybars reconnoitred the area around 
Caesarea on 25 February, under the pretence of hunting in the forests around Arsuf. While 
he was away, wood to construct artillery and ammunition were brought to the Mamluk 
camp at al-'Auja. Upon his return, Baybars had 'Izz al-Din al-Afram erect several 
trebuchets of the 'Maghribi' and 'Frankish' types from the timber that had arrived. Four 
large engines, as well as some smaller ones, were ready by the end of the following day. 
The army then moved to an advanced position and at midnight it prepared for the short 
march to Caesarea, arriving before dawn on 27 February.757 
Caesarea's twelfth-century defences had been destroyed by Saladin in 1191 and 
the town had remained largely defenceless until the initial refortification efforts of 1217-
18. Louis IX later developed the town defences in 1251-52.758 Despite these efforts, the 
Mamluks took the town in a 
frontal assault on the first day of 
the siege, compelling the Frankish 
defenders to withdraw to the 
citadel.759 Al-'Ayni's assertion 
that mangonels were used against 
the town defences appears 
inaccurate; although the engines 
just prepared would have 
accompanied the army, there 
would appear to have been little 
time to use them.760 Furthermore, 
there are few indications of 
                                                 
757 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:554-55; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:69. See also Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, p. 160. 
758 Pringle, "Town Defences," pp. 89-90; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, p. 138; Müller-Wiener, Castles of the 
Crusaders, p. 74; Negev, "Caesarea," (1961), pp. 81-83; Willbrand of Oldenburg 2.2, ed. Pringle, p. 131, 
trans. Pringle, p. 86. For the town defences and citadel, see Mesqui, "L'enceinte médiévale de Césarée"; 
Faucher, Merlin and Mesqui, "Césarée," pp. 1-3; Pringle, "Town Defences," pp. 90-91; Benvenisti, The 
Crusaders, pp. 141-44; Negev, "Caesarea," (1960), pp. 264-65. See also, Conder and Kitchener, Survey of 
Western Palestine, 2:13-16, 23-26, 28. Cf. Frova, "Caesarea," 1962, pp. 150-51. 
759 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:555-56; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:70. 
760 Al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 219. 
Caesarea: town, plan (after Mesqui) 
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impact signatures along the faces of the surviving fortifications. Artillery was, however, 
erected against the citadel. 
 Baybars' mastery of logistics is revealed during the second phase of the siege: 
thousands of arrows brought from 'Ajlun were distributed while arrangements were made 
for the collection of firewood and ammunition for the artillery. Baybars evidently found 
the transportation, deployment and then operation of his trebuchets agreeable, as Ibn 'Abd 
al-Zahir states that robes of honour were given to 'Izz al-Din al-Afram, amir jandar, who 
had been responsible for preparing these engines ahead of time, and to the men who then 
worked them. But artillery did not 
breach the walls of the citadel. 
Instead, it was surrendered on 5 
March: the Franks either evacuated 
it by sea the night before or formally 
surrendered it the following 
morning. Caesarea's fortifications 
were then destroyed by the 
Mamluks.761 
                                                 
761 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:556-57; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:70-71. See also al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, pp. 219-20; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 
1:474; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and Raynaud, A and B pp. 27-28 (451-52), ed. Edbury, p. 158; 
Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 328, ed. Minervini, p. 96, trans. Crawford, p. 44; Marino Sanudo, 
Liber secretorum 3.12.7, ed. Bongars, p. 222, trans. Lock, p. 351; Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp. 160-61. 
Caesarea: eastern section of the town walls, from the south (author) 
Caesarea: citadel, from the southeast in 1887 (from 
Schiller) 
Image protected by copyright 
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 From Caesarea, Baybars travelled to 'Atlit and burnt its gardens while a secondary 
force occupied and then destroyed Haifa, which had been abandoned by its garrison.762 
Shortly after Baybars had returned to Caesarea to monitor its destruction, Sayf al-Din al-
Zayni arrived with artillery from Subayba and further war materials, possibly 
ammunition, arrived from Damascus.763 These engines were soon put to use against 
Arsuf. 
 
Arsuf: 1265 
John of Ibelin, lord of Beirut, had 
acquired Arsuf by marriage in the 
1190s. The town lay in ruins from the 
time of the Third Crusade until at least 
1211, and may not have been 
refortified until 1241, when it is 
recorded that John's son, John of 
Arsuf, strengthened the site. In 1253 
John of Joinville remarked that the 
castle was strongly fortified (moult 
estoit fort). Balian of Ibelin, son of 
John of Arsuf, sold the site to the 
Hospitallers in 1261 and the order's 
subsequent work to develop the castle 
was used by Baybars as a pretext to 
reject Frankish overtures of peace in 
1263.764 
                                                 
The citadel was taken on 5 March (15 Jumada I) according to Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir and those following him 
(such as Ibn al-Furat), 7 March according to the Templar of Tyre, and 8 March (18 Jumada I) according to 
the Edbury edition of the Annales de Terre Sainte, Yunini and those following him (such as Mufaddal). 
The Franks departed by sea in the versions provided by Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir and Yunini while Ibn al-Furat 
claims that the garrison surrendered. The Frankish sources state that the garrison went by sea to Acre but 
do not specify if this occurred after a formal surrender or not. For testimony of the town's destruction a 
century and a half later, see John Poloner, Descriptio Terrae Sanctae, trans. Stewart, p. 29. 
762 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:561; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:72; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 220. 
763 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:562; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:72. 
764 Wilbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium terrae sanctae 2.2, ed. Pringle, p. 132, trans. Pringle, p. 86; Annales 
de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and Raynaud, A and B p. 16 (440), B p. 26 (450), ed. Edbury, pp. 153, 157; 
Arsuf: town and castle, plan (after Tal) 
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 Baybars arrived at Arsuf on either 
15 or 21 March 1265.765 The Muslims 
initially attempted to fill the fosse with 
timber; however, the Franks managed to 
tunnel under this from the castle and set 
fire to the wood. The Mamluks then 
appear to have dug a parallel beyond the 
counterscarp, allowing them to take the 
town in a general assault on 26 April. The 
castle held out until 30 April; when a 
section of wall was undermined, the 
garrison surrendered. Before being led 
away into captivity, the Frankish 
prisoners were compelled to take part in demolishing Arsuf's defences.766  
                                                 
Philip of Novara, Gestes des Chiprois 220, ed. Gaston, p. 124; John of Joinville, Vie de Saint Louis 563, 
ed. and trans. Monfrin, p. 278; Eracles 34.4, RHC Oc 2, p. 446, trans. Shirley, p. 142; Templar of Tyre, 
Gestes des Chiprois 328, ed. Minervini, p. 96, trans. Crawford, p. 44; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 
3.12.6, ed. Bongars, p. 221, trans. Lock, p. 350; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. Sadeque, p. 168. See 
also Benvenisti, The Crusaders, p. 132; Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 2:18. See also the account of Ibn 
Shaddad, in Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:73. For the site of Arsuf, see Roll, 
"Introduction," 41, 44-45; Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 2:137-38. 
765 The Frankish sources provide the former date while the latter is given by Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir and Ibn 
Shaddad, as well as their followers. 
766 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:562-64, 568-72; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons 
and Lyons, 2:73-74, 76-78. See also Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 328, ed. Minervini, p. 96, trans. 
Crawford, p. 44; Eracles 34.6, RHC Oc 2, p. 450; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and Raynaud, A 
and B p. 28 (452), ed. Edbury, p. 158; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.7, ed. Bongars, p. 222, trans. 
Lock, pp. 351-52; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, pp. 220-21; Amitai, "The Conquest of Arsuf," pp. 
69-72; Roll, "Introduction," p. 17; Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp. 161-62; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, pp. 
132-33. For the tunnels found under the castle, see Roll, "Introduction," p. 17 n. 36; Amitai, "The Conquest 
of Arsuf," pp. 70-71. 
Arsuf: castle, from the south (author) 
Arsuf: castle and tunnels, plan (after Arubas) 
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 Nearly all accounts of this siege emphasise the Muslims' use of artillery. The 
engines are portrayed, in most accounts, as providing cover for the sappers and their 
extensive excavations. Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir describes men hauling on ropes in his discussion 
of these engines.767 While this could refer to the process of drawing back the main arm of 
a counterweight trebuchet, it is at least as likely to have referred to the firing of traction 
engines. In either case, Baybars had accumulated a considerable assortment of engines 
by this point in the campaign. 
 Before the siege had begun, Baybars would have had at his disposal the engines 
that were constructed ahead of the siege of Caesarea as well as those that had arrived from 
Subayba.768 The former are likely to have been no larger than those used by Saladin in 
                                                 
767 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:564, 566; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:75. 
768 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:554-55, 562; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:69, 72;  
Arsuf: piles of projectiles (author) 
Arsuf: tooled projectiles (author) 
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the 1180s, as they required a similar twenty-four hour period to prepare. The latter were 
quite possibly larger. Additionally, prefabricated engines had arrived from Damascus, 
their disassembled components having been carried to Arsuf on men's shoulders. Another 
engine, built on site by Karmun Agha, is refered to as an engine of seven arrows, 
suggesting its throwing beam consisted of seven spars. Collectively, command of these 
trebuchets fell to 'Izz al-Din al-Afram, who is again celebrated for his conduct in this 
capacity.769 The value necessarily associated with the prefabricated engines, suggests that 
they were counterweight trebuchets.770 The rapid construction of the engines that were 
                                                 
769 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:566; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:76. 
770 Following the siege they were redistributed among certain strongholds, including Kerak and 'Ajlun, Ibn 
al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:82. 
Arsuf: inner gateway, from the east (author) 
Arsuf: outer southern tower, from the southeast (author) 
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prepared before the siege of Caesarea and the impracticality of using counterweight 
trebuchets to support sapping efforts, suggest that a number of traction trebuchets 
complimented the heavier engines. The physical evidence also confirms that the majority 
of projectiles were cast by traction engines.  
 By 2005, archaeological excavations in the area of the castle had uncovered 2,747 
stone artillery projectiles, 800 of which were weighed. The average mass of the weighed 
sample is about 10 kg, with eleven stones weighing over 70 kg and almost fifty weighing 
less than 3 kg.771 The impracticality of counterweight engines throwing stones at the light 
                                                 
771 Raphael and Tepper, "The Archaeological Evidence," pp. 85, 87, see also Chart 1A. 
Arsuf: projectiles in situ, northern part of the fosse (author) 
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end of this range and traction engines 
throwing stones at the heavy end appears to 
confirm the use of both types of trebuchet. 
The vast majority of projectiles are between 
2 and 20 kg, reflecting both the use of many 
light engines as well as the rate of fire of 
such engines. 
A concentration of heavier stones, 
averaging about 25 kg (most 20-35 kg), was 
discovered just north of the castle's inner 
gate among some burnt cedar logs.772 The 
presence of these stones would suggest that 
a reasonably large engine was used to target 
a wooden shelter between the castle's inner 
and outer walls. Determining where other 
engines were positioned is more difficult. 
Projectiles found in the fosse have 
not yet been studied; however, the highest 
concentration of those discernible in the 
surface layer of fill is to the north of the castle. Similarly, the highest concentrations of 
impact signatures are found in the surviving sections of the outer northern walls. 
Together, these confirm that most projectiles were thrown against the castle from the 
north. A significant number of projectiles (1,112), 40% of those discovered within the 
castle, along with 65% of the discovered arrowheads, were found around the inner gate, 
suggesting that this was a focal point during the siege. The concentration of impact 
signatures on the northern and eastern faces of the flanking towers suggests that most 
stones were thrown from the east or northeast. Certain sections of the castle's outer 
southern wall have survived in a better state of preservation than those to the north; 
however, impact signatures on these sections reveal that the Mamluks erected at least one 
engine to the south of the castle after the town fell on 26 April. 
 The large number of projectiles recovered (and many more that could yet be 
excavated from the surrounding fosse), their size and the apparent targeting of gateways 
                                                 
772 Raphael and Tepper, "The Archaeological Evidence," p. 87. 
Arsuf: marble column sections (author) 
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and parapets, evident by the number of 
stones found inside the castle, appear to 
confirm that the majority of the Mamluk 
engines were traction trebuchets. 
Although limited, the power of these 
engines was still sufficient to warrant 
importing ammunition – almost all of 
the projectiles are limestone, most likely 
sourced from the base of the Samarian 
hills about 15 km to the east.773 
 Although most of the projectiles 
found inside the castle were probably 
thrown by the Mamluks, it is possible 
that some of these were intended for 
defensive use. It is hard to imagine that 
the garrison would have had much of its 
original stockpile left after five weeks of 
siege; however, they could have reused 
projectiles that were thrown into the 
castle or even have begun to harvest ammunition from the marble columns found within 
the castle. While it should not be concluded that all of the marble projectiles found inside 
the castle were shaped by the defenders, a number of columns display rounded ends, 
suggesting that the defenders may have begun destroying parts of their own castle to 
produce ammunition before it fell. 
 When Baybars left Arsuf on 11 May 1265, the demolition having been completed, 
Ibn al-Furat claimed that the back of Frankish power had been broken.774 Although most 
of southern Palestine had been lost by this point, Acre was still a bastion of Frankish 
influence on the coast and Safed was a clear symbol of Frankish power in Upper Galilee.  
                                                 
773 Raphael and Tepper, "The Archaeological Evidence," pp. 87-88. 
774 Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:82. 
Arsuf: large marble columns, some with 
rounded ends (author) 
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Seizure of the Strongholds of the Upper Galilee 
 
Safed: 1266 
According to Ibn al-Furat, the castle of Safed was built by the Templars in 1101-2.775 
While some modern historians have accepted this dating, believing it to have been 
commissioned by Tancred or Hugh of St Omer, others have favoured certain Frankish 
accounts, such as those of James of Vitry and Marino Sanudo,776 which credit the castle's 
construction to Fulk around 1140.777 The castle was destroyed by Mu'azzam 'Isa around 
1220 but the Templars began to refortify it when it returned to them in 1240, aided 
significantly by the efforts of Benedict (Benoit) of Alignan, archbishop of Marseilles.778 
 Hulagu died in 1265, providing Baybars with the opportunity to turn his attention 
towards Palestine. In May 1266 Baybars marched his army out of Egypt. An advance 
force, which had been sent to Homs, raided around Tripoli while contingents of the main 
body raided the coast from 
Arsuf to Tripoli and inland 
towards Montfort.779 At the 
same time, Syrian forces 
invaded eastern Galilee, 
blockading Safed and Beaufort. 
Coordinating his forces from a 
camp outside of Acre, Baybars 
                                                 
775 Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:88. 
776 James of Vitry, Historia orientalis 49, ed. Donnadieu, p. 217, trans. Stewart, p. 25; Marino Sanudo, 
Liber secretorum 3.6.18, ed. Bongars, p. 166, trans. Lock, p. 264. 
777 For the former, see Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 40; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, pp. 202-3; 
Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 2:119, 125. For the latter, see Boas, Crusader Archaeology, p. 118; Boase, 
"Military Architecture," pp. 159-60. William of Tyre first mentions the castle as the place where Baldwin 
III took refuge in 1157, while there appears to be no administrative record of the castle earlier than when it 
was granted to the Templars by Amalric in 1168, William of Tyre, Chronicon 18.13-14, ed. Huygens, 
2:828-32, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:258-62; Pringle, Churches, 2:206. 
778 De constructione castri Saphet, ed. Huygens, pp. 378-87, trans. Kennedy, 190-98; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, 
trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:88-89. For studies of the castle, see Barbé, "Zefat"; Barbé and Damati, "Le 
château de Safed," pp. 77-93; Pringle, "Reconstructing the Castle of Safad," pp. 139-49; Benvenisti, The 
Crusaders, pp. 199-204; Huygens, "Un nouveau texte," pp. 360-77; Conder and Kitchener, Survey of 
Western Palestine, 1:248-50. 
779 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:582, 584-87; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:84-87; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 221. See also Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 
346, ed. Minervini, p. 108, trans. Crawford, p. 50; Eracles 34.9, RHC Oc 2, p. 454; Marino Sanudo, Liber 
secretorum 3.12.8, ed. Bongars, p. 222, trans. Lock, p. 352; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:490; 
Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, 167-68. 
Safed: castle (J. M. Bernatz, 1837, from Schiller) 
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sent for artillery from Damascus while new 
engines were constructed in the camp. With 
the return of his coastal raiders, Baybars 
marched on Safed, where he encamped his 
army on 13 June 1266.780 
 While Baybars waited for his 
artillery, receiving envoys while doing so, 
his sappers began to work against the 
castle.781 The engines from Damascus 
reached the Jordan on 26 June and 'Izz al-
Din al-Afram was sent to help convey them 
from Jacob's Ford to Safed. The first 
trebuchets came into action on 1 July but 
the less glorious work of the miners was 
again far more productive in breaking 
down Safed's defences, ultimately forcing 
the Franks to countermine. On 19 July a 
seam appeared in the outer wall above one 
of the mines. With this wall compromised, the Franks burnt and abandoned their outer 
defences (al-sata'ir), allowing the Muslims to scale the outer wall. Mining efforts then 
commenced against the inner castle.782 The garrison surrendered on terms of safe conduct 
soon after, but were executed after exiting the castle.783 Upon gaining Safed, Baybars 
immediately used it as an armoury, storing within it the artillery that he had just used 
against the castle.784 
                                                 
780 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:587-88; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:89; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, pp. 222-23. 
781 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:588-91; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:89-91. 
782 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:591-95; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:91-93. Cf. al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 222. See also Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 
1:490. 
783 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:595-99; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:94-96. Cf. Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 346-47, ed. Minervini, pp. 108-10, trans. Crawford, pp. 
50-51; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, pp. 222-23; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:490-93. 
See also Eracles 34.9, RHC Oc 2, p. 454; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and Raynaud, B p. 28 
(452), ed. Edbury, p. 158; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.8, ed. Bongars, pp. 222-23, trans. Lock, 
p. 352; Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp. 169-70. 
784 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:600; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:96 al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 223. 
Safed: castle, plan (after Israel Antiquities 
Authority) 
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 There are conflicting indications of how large these trebuchets were. On one hand, 
the engines would appear to have been quite large: they required two weeks to be brought 
from Damascus and were not used to protect the sappers during their early efforts to 
undermine the castle's outer defences. Furthermore, their importance is emphasised as 
Baybars and his entourage are said to have taken part in dragging along the components 
that were carried by oxen. On the other hand, they are not described as inflicting any 
notable damage, and Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir claims that they were carried from Damascus on 
men's shoulders.785 The artillery that Baybars was said to have commissioned outside 
Acre is not mentioned during the early part of the siege, suggesting it consisted of light 
engines, almost certainly used to support the miners, as distinct from the heavier machines 
brought from Damascus. 
Among the artillery that came into action on 1 July, was an engine of the 
'Maghribi' type.786 To convey this engine the 13 km (as the crow flies) from Jacob's Ford 
and then render it operational appears to have taken five days. When considering that 
engines of this designation are noted at the siege of Arsuf, it seems reasonable to postulate 
that they were counterweight trebuchets that threw stones about 20-40 kg – so grand that 
only one is noted during this siege but smaller than the 'Frankish' engines, as will become 
apparent below. 
 It is hard to determine where the Mamluk artillery was positioned. Unlike at Arsuf, 
where Baybars is described as walking between his artillery and siege works, he is 
described as riding to and from his artillery at Safed. This probably reflects the distance 
between these engines and other siege works, given the much greater circumference of 
this castle, rather than an exceptional distance between the trebuchets and the castle.787 
The only indication of range comes from Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir's testimony that Baybars 
climbed up the first of the 'Maghribi' engines ready for use and ordered its crew to target 
a prominent house.788 Although the positions of the engine and house are unknown, the 
anecdote gives the impression that Baybars was relatively free to select his targets. 
                                                 
785 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:588, 591; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2: 89, 91. Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir initially claims that the engines were carried from Damascus on men’s 
shoulders, he then states that as they neared Safed they could not be carried by camel, requiring men from 
all stations to help carry them to the castle. How the oxen that were involved in moving certain components 
relate is unclear. 
786 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:591-92; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:91. See also Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:490. 
787 For example, Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:593; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons 
and Lyons, 2:92. 
788 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:592. 
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The defenders of Safed also appear to have employed artillery. This was used, 
according to the Templar of Tyre, to throw back a gift that Baybars had sent at the start 
of the siege and Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir appears to indicate that the stone which killed a certain 
emir one night was thrown in this way.789 Neither the artillery that Baybars may have 
found within the castle nor any of the engines that he had used to attack it appear to have 
been taken on his subsequent campaign into Cilicia.790 
 Baybars returned to Safed in 1267 and oversaw its development.791 Although 
some sources emphasise that Baybars focused on improving the ditch, it may have been 
at this point that construction of the massive circular keep began.792 In response to a threat 
from the Mongols, Baybars briefly left Safed for Damascus, where he is described as 
depositing artillery. It is unclear whether the engines that he left at Damascus had been 
brought from Egypt, or were simply brought back from Safed, where they had been kept 
since the previous summer. As in 1263, Baybars does not appear to have employed any 
artillery during the assaults that he made on Acre in May 1267.793 
 
Beaufort: 1268 
With new threats of a Mongol invasion of Syria, Baybars moved his army from Egypt to 
Palestine in February 1268. Baybars wrote ahead to prepare his Syrian governors and 
ordered Damascene forces to establish a blockade around Beaufort, the latter 
coincidentally arriving before a contingent of its defenders had returned from the coast.794 
As he moved north, Baybars took (on 7 March) and destroyed the citadel of Jaffa, which 
had been rebuilt by Frederick II and Louis IX.795 From Jaffa, Baybars dispatched a force 
                                                 
789 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 346, ed. Minervini, p. 108, trans. Crawford, p. 50; Ibn 'Abd al-
Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:592. 
790 See Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:600, 608-13; Bar Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth 
Zabhne, trans. Budge, 2:445-46. 
791 Abu Shama, Kitab al-Raudatain, RHC Or 5, p. 205; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 
2:622-23, 628; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:101; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 
224. He also returned to inspect the refortification efforts in 1268, between destroying Jaffa and besieging 
Beaufort, Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:641. 
792 See also Pringle, "Reconstructing the Castle of Safad," pp. 143-48; Pringle, Churches, 2:206; Pringle, 
Secular Buildings, no. 191, pp. 91-92; Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 1:250; Ibn 'Abd 
al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:630. 
793 Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and Raynaud, A and B, p. 29 (453), ed. Edbury, p. 159; Eracles 
34.10, RHC Oc 2, p. 455; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:623-24; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, 
trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:102-3. 
794 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:636-37; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:105-6. For Haitum's petition for Mongol support, see also Bar Hebraeus, trans. Budge, Makhtebhanuth 
Zabhne, 2:447. 
795 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:638-39; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:108; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:503-5 al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, pp. 225-26; 
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to begin the siege of Beaufort, as 
artillery from Safed had already 
arrived there, and he reached the 
castle himself on 3 or 4 April. 
Two trebuchets were ready for 
action the day after he arrived 
and a total of twenty-six engines 
were operational a few days 
later.796 According to Ibn 'Abd 
al-Zahir, funds contributed to 
support the Holy War by emirs who could not take part in the campaign were used to 
offset the expense of the crews working so many engines.797 
 Beaufort sits on the edge of a plateau overlooking the Litani. The site was under 
Damascene control from at least 1121 and appears to have been ceded to Fulk in 1139-
40. Following Saladin's acquisition of the castle, it was developed by Al-Adil and was 
evidently defensible in 1240, although James of Vitry claims that, along with Safed and 
Banyas, it was in ruins in 1220. Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir judged Beaufort to be one of the 
strongest castles in the region and a threat to the territory of Subayba (Banyas).798 In 1260, 
following the sack of Sidon, Julian of Sidon sold the castle to the Templars.799 
 The Templars built a second 'citadel' to the south of the castle, probably between 
60 and 170 m from the south wall, presumably to deny this area of level ground to any 
potential besieger. Unable to defend this secondary strongpoint for more than a week in 
1268, the Templars evacuated it on the night of 10-11 April, burning everything that they 
                                                 
Eracles 34.11, RHC Oc 2, p. 456; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and Raynaud, A and B p. 29 (453), 
ed. Edbury, p. 159. See also Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp. 187-8. Cf. events of 1263, Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, 
al-Rawd, trans. Sadeque, pp. 237-38. 
796 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:640-43; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:110-11. See also al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 227; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 
1:506. 
797 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:644; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:111-12. Cf. Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:635. 
798 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:227 and n. 25; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:109-10; James of Vitry, Lettres, no. 6, p. 124; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:641. 
799 Eracles 34.3, RHC Oc 2, p. 445, trans. Shirley, p. 142; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and 
Raynaud, B p. 25 (450), ed. Edbury, p. 157; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:641; Ibn 
al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:110. For studies of the castle, see Conder and Kitchener, Survey 
of Western Palestine, 1:128-32; Rey, Étude sur les monuments, pp. 127-39; Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 
2:197-208; Boase, "Military Architecture," p. 160; Pringle, Secular Buildings, no. 44, p. 31; Pringle, "Town 
Defences," p. 78; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 43, 128; Corvisier, "Les campagnes de construction," 
pp. 243-66; Yasmine, "Die Burg Beaufort," pp. 277-84. 
Beaufort: castle, from the northwest (from Deschamps) 
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could not carry out with them. The Muslims occupied this position the following morning 
and probably moved artillery in later that day. Artillery is described as bombarding the 
castle from the outer citadel from 12 April, while the Franks fired back with at least one 
engine that was mounted on a tower.800 
 Despite its proximity and relative safety within the Templar citadel, the Mamluks' 
artillery proved incapable of breaching the fortifications of Beaufort. Instead, the castle 
fell after dissent broke out among the defenders following Baybars' interception of a 
letter, which he substituted with one of his own before passing it along to the garrison. 
The castle's defenders, as many as 480 fighters, surrendered themselves into captivity on 
15 April, while the women and children were escorted to Tyre.801 After the siege, the 
external citadel, which had proven to be a liability, was destroyed while plans to develop 
other areas of the castle were implemented.802 The Mamluk army then moved against the 
Mongols' Frankish ally, Bohemond VI of Antioch-Tripoli. 
 
Antioch: 1268 
When Baybars left Beaufort on 25 April 1268, he sent his heavy baggage, which probably 
included his artillery, to Damascus while certain detachments of his army were sent out 
in various directions. Without the burden of a baggage train, Baybars moved to Baalbek 
and from there was able to take the difficult road across the mountains of Lebanon and 
surprise the Franks of Tripoli by approaching from the south.803 This allowed him to raid 
freely around the city; however, without his artillery, he declined to invest it or any of the 
nearby Frankish castles, despite having pretexts to do so.804 Instead, he travelled to 
Antioch, via Homs, Apamea and Jisr ash-Shughr. 
                                                 
800 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:643-44; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:111. 
801 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:642-45; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:210-12; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:506-7. Cf. Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and 
Raynaud, A and B p. 30 (453), ed. Edbury, p. 159; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 365, ed. Minervini, 
p. 124, trans. Crawford, p. 59; Eracles 34.11, RHC Oc 2, p. 456. 
802 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:645-46; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:112. 
803 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:646-48, 653; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:116. See also al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 227; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 
1:507; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Edbury, p. 160. 
804 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:654-56, 685-87; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons 
and Lyons, 2:116-18. Cf. Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:507. Cf. Saladin's similar move against 
Beirut in 1182 (in Chapter 3) and Nur al-Din's acquisition of Munaytira, commanding the pass between 
Baalbek and Tripoli, in 1165-66, Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:161. 
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Baybars arrived at Antioch on 15 May and baggage, from an unclear origin, 
arrived three days later. The city was stormed on 19 May and the citadel surrendered the 
following day.805 Notwithstanding Bartlett's suggestion that the Mamluks broke into the 
city through a breach, the lack of any mention of miners or siege engines along with the 
Mamluks' numbers and the extended circumference of Antioch's defences strongly 
suggest that the city was stormed in a frontal attack the day after the baggage arrived.806 
The remaining Frankish strongholds of the north fell shortly afterwards. Most 
were abandoned and only Cursat (al-Qusair), the patriarch's castle, remained in Frankish 
hands by the end of 1268. With Frankish influence in the region all but removed, many 
Armenian strongholds farther north became the next targets.807 
 Although artillery does not appear to have been used at Antioch, it is highlighted 
in the letter that Baybars sent to Bohemond soon after the city's fall, bragging of his 
success. Among the other exploits that he recounts, Baybars claims that he cut all of the 
trees in the area save those that could be used for the beams of artillery.808 Certain areas 
of Western Syria, unlike Palestine, would have supported tall coniferous trees. Although 
the wood of such is not as strong as certain hardwood types, these trees were often straight 
and thus ideal for constructing large counterweight trebuchets. While Baybars does not 
appear to have used any such trees on this occasion, his suggestion that he could is a 
reflection of his prowess: this region, effectively a farm for artillery timber, was now his. 
The association of these large trees with artillery, along with the appearance of stones 
over 50 kg at Arsuf, even if limited in number, indicates that the scale of the largest 
engines was steadily increasing through the 1260s. In the 1270s such engines would be 
employed in greater numbers. 
Upon the failure of the Ninth Crusade and death of Louis IX, Baybars marched 
his Egyptian army into Palestine in 1271. After raiding around Tripoli and taking the 
                                                 
805 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:656-58, 678; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:121-22, 125-26; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:508. See also Eracles 34.11, pp. 456-
57; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 365, ed. Minervini, p. 124, trans. Crawford, p. 59; Annales de 
Terre Sainte, ed. Edbury, p. 159; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.9, ed. Bongars, p. 223, trans. Lock, 
p. 353; Bar Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. Budge, 2:448. For the city's state of destruction in the 
fourteenth century, see Ibn Battuta, Tuhfat 1.1, trans. Gibb, p. 61. 
806 Bartlett, Islam's War, p. 247. 
807 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:678-80, 682-85; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons 
and Lyons, 2:126-27; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:514; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, 
p. 228; Eracles 34.11, RHC Oc 2, p. 457; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 365, ed. Minervini, p. 124, 
trans. Crawford, p. 59; Vahram, Chronicle, trans. Neumann, pp. 50-53. 
808 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:659, trans. Gabrieli in Arab Historians, p. 310; 
Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:510; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 230. 
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Templar castle of Chastel Blanc, he prepared to invest the most formidable Frankish 
castles of the Homs-Tripoli corridor.809 
 
 
 
Indications of Significant Power: 1271 
 
Crac des Chevaliers: 1271 
Crac des Chevaliers sits on the black basalt of Jabal Khalil, the most southerly extension 
of Jabal Ansariyya. Originally constructed by the Kurds in the eleventh century, Crac had 
fallen to the Franks by the end of the first decade of the twelfth century and had been 
acquired by the Hospitallers in the 1140s. The order may have begun to rebuild it from 
1157 with work continuing until at least the late 1250s. All that survives today appears to 
postdate the earthquakes of 1170.810 Crac was a frontier stronghold during the thirteenth 
century, as threatening to neighbouring Hama and Homs as it was threatened by them.811 
Baybars taunted the garrison at the end of January 1270, marching up to its walls without 
his baggage,812 but his intentions were different when he returned the following year. 
 The siege of 1271 can be divided into four phases as the sources agree that certain 
obstacles were taken on 4/5 March, 21 March, and 29/30 March or 7/8 April.813 However, 
                                                 
809 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:742; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:143. For the castle of Chastel Blanc, see Rey, Étude sur les monuments, pp. 85-92; Deschamps, Les 
Châteaux, 3:249-58; Piana, "Die Templerburg Chastel Blanc," 293-301. 
810 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:746-47; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:144-45; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:530; Rey, Étude sur les monuments, pp. 265-70; Boase, 
Kingdoms and Strongholds, p. 80; Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p. 60; Zimmer and Meyer, "Le 
Krak des Chevaliers," p. 360; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 145-47. For comprehensive studies of the 
Crac des Chevaliers, see Deschamps, Les Châteaux, vol. 1; Biller, et al., Der Crac des Chevaliers; Zimmer, 
Meyer and Boscardin, Krak des Chevaliers; Mesqui, "Les programmes architecturaux"; Mesqui, "La 
troisième enceinte." See also Rey, Étude sur les monuments, pp. 39-67; Boase, "Military Architecture," pp. 
153-56; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 145-63; Mesqui, "La fortification des Croisés," pp. 20-22. 
811 See Major, "Al-Malik al-Mujahid," pp. 61-75. Cf. Ibn Jubayr, Rihla, trans. Broadhurs, pp. 265, 268. 
812 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:729-30; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:139, 141. 
813 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:743-45; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:145-46; Ibn Shaddad, from Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 1:132-34 and King, "The Taking of Le Krak," pp. 
88-89; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:527-29; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 376, ed. 
Minervini, pp. 136-38, trans. Crawford, p. 66; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and Raynaud, B p. 31 
(455), ed. Edbury, p. 160; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.11, ed. Bongars, p. 224, trans. Lock, p. 
355. Al-'Ayni gives an abbreviated version of Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir's timetable but dates events a month later. 
He also provides the account of Ibn Kathir, who confirms that the Franks surrendered ten days after the 
castle was breached, al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, pp. 237-38. 
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Siege of Crac des Chevaliers, 1271 
the differing vocabulary used by the sources allows for multiple interpretations of events 
when reconciling the surviving accounts with the architectural evidence. 
 
 
 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir 
Ibn al-Furat 
Ibn Shaddad Mufaddal Annales de TS 
Templar of 
Tyre 
Marino Sanudo 
18 
February 
(6 Rajab) 
   Siege began 
21 
February 
(9 Rajab) 
Baybars arrived/ 
castle first attacked 
   
3 March 
(19 Rajab) 
 Baybars 
arrived and 
artillery 
prepared 
Artillery prepared  
4 March 
(20 Rajab) 
Rabads taken    
5 March 
(21 Rajab) 
 First bashura 
fell 
First bashura fell  
14 March 
(30 Rajab) 
A number of 
trebuchets had 
been prepared 
   
21 March 
(7 Sha'ban) 
Bashura stormed Second 
bashura fell 
Second bashura 
fell 
 
29 March 
(15 
Sha'ban) 
 Third bashura 
fell to mining 
Hospitallers 
massacred 
Third bashura fell 
Franks surrendered 
when they saw 
Baybars 
dominated their 
works 
 
30 March 
(16 
Sha'ban) 
Breaches made in 
a tower and citadel 
taken by storm 
Artillery (possibly 
two engines) 
moved into the 
citadel to assail the 
keep 
   
7 April 
(24 
Sha'ban) 
Franks came out of 
the castle after 
surrendering 
   
8 April 
(25 
Sha'ban) 
   Castle fell 
  
 Paul Deschamps understood bashura to mean a defensive work ahead of a gate – 
a barbican in the European sense. Accordingly, he concluded that the Mamluks attacked 
from the east, moving up the great ramp past its three gates. The last of these gave Baybars 
access to the inner ward and it was here that he intended to set up his artillery and bombard 
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the three inner southern towers, to which the garrison had withdrawn.814 D. J. Cathcart 
King challenged this theory and convincingly argued that the main thrust of the attack 
came from the south. For King, the triangular outwork to the south of the castle, together 
with the castle's inner and outer lines of walls, represent the three lines of defences 
identified by the sources. Accordingly, if the town beyond the castle, which Rey claims 
was walled,815 fell on 4/5 March and the outwork was taken on 21 March, the outer wall 
of the castle would have been that which fell to mining on 29/30 March. It was thus from 
the inner castle that the Franks agreed to favourable terms of surrender just over a week 
later.816 This theory explains why the outer southwest tower, which was undermined on 
29/30 March, was rebuilt immediately after the siege and provides a more likely position 
of strength from which the Franks eventually surrendered.817 
 If the timing provided by the sources is correct,818 Baybars appears to have 
initially erected his artillery to the south of the castle to play against the triangular 
outwork. Lighter engines, and possibly heavier ones, were probably then advanced on to 
or beside the outwork to support the sappers working against the outer enceinte from 21 
March, although this is not mentioned in the sources. Symptomatic of his enthusiastic 
view of artillery, Kennedy has suggested that artillery was partly responsible for 
breaching the outer walls and that it was in part the efforts to move these engines inside 
the outer trace that compelled the defenders of the inner castle to sue for terms.819 
Artillery, however, would have had little effect against the inner castle if it were erected 
between the castle's two lines of walls, given the limited space and relative elevation of 
the inner enceinte. A more practical position from which to assail the inner castle would 
have been the outwork, south of the outer wall. 
                                                 
814 Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 1:132-34. See also Hillenbrand, The Crusades, p. 538, cf. p. 525. 
815 Rey, Étude sur les monuments, p. 40. 
816 King, "The Taking of Le Krak," pp. 90-92. This theory has stood largely unchallenged, for a slight 
variant, see Mesqui, "Les programmes architecturaux," pp. 10-11. For Baybars' use of legitimate and forged 
letters to compel garrisons of the military orders to surrender their strongholds, see the sieges of Beaufort 
(1268) and Chastel Blanc (1271), Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:642-43, 732; Ibn al-
Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:110-11, 143. 
817 For different theories of the development of Crac's outer defences, see Mesqui, "Le troisième enceinte"; 
Biller, et al., Der Crac des Chevaliers, pp. 185-253, 263-70; Zimmer, Meyer and Boscardin, Krak des 
Chevaliers. 
818 Peter Thorau has observed that if attention is moved away from Ibn Shaddad and his followers towards 
Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir and Baybars al-Mansuri, who were present at the siege, the timing of events between the 
Muslim and Frankish accounts falls closely into line, Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, Appendix 5, pp. 265-66. 
819 Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 109, 150. 
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 The sources do not emphasise the use of artillery during this siege. The Muslim 
accounts agree generally that it was prepared at some point before 14 March and Ibn 'Abd 
al-Zahir adds that the Mamluks attempted to bring engines (two according to Ibn al-
Furat's subsequent rendition) forward to use against the innermost part of the castle. The 
Crac des Chevaliers: castle, plan (after Mesqui and Anus) 
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Frankish accounts of the siege are less detailed. One version of the Annales de Terre 
Sainte states simply that enginz were used in addition to mining.820 But if Ibn 'Abd al-
Zahir's timing of events is correct and notable engines were ready by 14 March (eleven 
                                                 
820 Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Edbury, p. 160. For a study of this source and its various versions, see 
Edbury, "Making Sense of the Annales de Terre Sainte." 
Crac des Chevaliers: castle, from the west of the southern outwork (Denys Pringle) 
Crac des Chevaliers: castle, from the southern outwork (Denys Pringle) 
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days after Ibn Shaddad claims that artillery preparations began), this was twenty-one days 
after the army had arrived and a week before the outwork was taken. This would have 
been sufficient time to both erect and employ machines of a significant size. 
 A number of stones, similar in size to others found inside the castle, have been 
found southwest of the stronghold and appear to be unused projectiles from 1271. Biller 
and Burger suggest that this was where Baybars placed his artillery, 250 m from both the 
triangular outwork and outer 
southwest tower.821 But Biller 
and Burger have assumed that 
thirteenth-century artillery was 
capable of ranges up to 500 m, 
though citing no evidence to 
support such a claim. Zimmer, 
Meyer and Boscardin place 
these stones 300-350 m from 
the castle and have postulated 
that Baybars' masons may have 
shaped projectiles here before 
they were brought forward to 
wherever the engines were 
positioned.822 There is little 
evidence to suggest that the 
                                                 
821 Biller, et al., Der Crac des Chevaliers, pp. 285-89. See also Biller, et al., "The Crac des Chevaliers," p. 
11 fig. 4. 
822 Zimmer, Meyer and Boscardin, Krak, p. 285, see also p. 284 figs. 5.70-71; pers. cor. Letizia Boscardin 
and Werner Meyer, Apr. 2014. 
Crac des Chevaliers: projectiles (from Zimmer, Meyer and Boscardin) 
Crac des Chevaliers: castle, plan and topography (after 
Biller) 
Images protected by copyright 
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projectiles, some weighing around 100 kg, could have been thrown at the castle from the 
position where they were found with any hopes of hitting it. 
None of the sources specifies what Baybars' artillery was targeting but the timing 
of events suggests that these engines were first used against the timber palisade or such 
other light defences that probably surrounded the southern outwork. After the outwork 
had been taken, the Mamluks would most likely have needed to advance these engines in 
order to bombard the castle itself, possibly placing them near the position where Baybars 
was said to have established himself with his crossbow. As at Beaufort three years earlier, 
the castle proper may have been assailed from an outwork that was originally constructed 
to deny that position to a besieger. 
It is hard to imagine stones weighing 100 kg being thrown against the southwest 
tower at the same time as the sappers, who eventually brought down this tower, were 
working.823 It is possible that the two strategies were alternated or that artillery was 
instead used to target the southern battlements, exposing the castle's defenders. Despite 
the likelihood that artillery was used against the outer enceinte, there is neither textual 
nor physical evidence of such: the southern walls were refaced following the siege, 
removing any blemishes, and no projectiles have been identified in the southern ditch. 
                                                 
823 This tower appears to sit on the bedrock so it is unlikely that the sappers were working underground, 
this deprived the protection that naturally accompanied a subterranean tunnel. 
Crac des Chevaliers: castle, from the southwest (Denys Pringle) 
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 It seems improbable that artillery 
was erected between the walls of Crac 
during the last phase of the siege, as 
alluded to above. Besides the challenges 
of space and elevation, the components of 
any engines would need to be moved 
through the breach and then assembled 
under fire by the defenders. Perplexingly, 
a photograph from the early twentieth 
century displays a large stone between the 
inner and outer walls at the north end of 
the castle. This suggests: that the weaker 
northern wall of the inner castle was 
besieged from inside the outer enceinte at 
very close range; that an engine fired at 
the castle from the northeast; or that at 
least one stone was subsequently moved here after the siege. The lack of discernible 
impact signatures and disadvantageous topography northeast of the castle, suggest that 
this stone may instead be associated with the Mamluk arsenal, although its position is still 
suspicious. Despite a lack of textual evidence, the large projectiles at Crac suggest that 
equally large engines were present. 
After the siege, Baybars appointed 'Izz al-Din al-Afram, along with 'Izz al-Din 
Aybak al-Salihi, to repair the castle. These men appear to have had some degree of 
Crac des Chevaliers: projectile (from 
Zimmer, Meyer and Boscardin) 
Crac des Chevaliers: castle, from the northwest (Denys Pringle) 
Image protected by copyright 
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expertise in this capacity as possession of Crac was granted to a different emir.824 Because 
Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir associates 'Izz al-Din al-Afram with Baybars' artillery more than any 
other emir, it is tempting to suggest that his selection to oversee the castle's repair may 
have been connected with the increasing power and effective use of such engines. 
However, no significant trebuchets appear to have been left with al-Afram; instead, the 
artillery that had been brought to Crac was prepared for transport and, on 29 April, was 
moved with the army to 'Akkar. 
 
'Akkar: 1271 
On the opposite side of the Homs-Tripoli corridor, 'Akkar (Gibelacar) was tucked into the 
north end of the Lebanon mountains, overlooking the Nahr al-Kabir valley. The site, 
fortified from the eleventh century, had been acquired by the Franks around the same time 
as Crac des Chevaliers. The castle was briefly taken by Nur al-Din's forces in the 1160s 
but thereafter remained under Frankish control.825  
 Baybars is said to have ridden on top of the carts that transported his artillery as 
they crossed the rough terrain between Crac and 'Akkar. Upon arriving, Baybars 
determined where to deploy his artillery while masons worked to level the ground, either 
ahead of the engines as they were brought forward or where they were to be placed. Work 
began to erect the large trebuchets on 2 May, the same day that a stone from a defensive 
engine killed a certain emir. On 11 May, the defenders asked for terms, surrendering the 
following day in exchange for their freedom.826 
This appears to be the first reference in these sources to artillery being transported 
by cart, rather than by camels, oxen or hand. Although it could be argued that this was 
the default means of transportation, it is also the first time that these sources refer to 'large' 
engines. This, coupled with the ground-levelling ahead of their deployment, indicates that 
                                                 
824 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:745; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:145-46; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:529. For 'Izz al-Din's earlier activities, see Ibn 'Abd 
al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:554-55, 557, 566, 591; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:69, 71, 76, 91. 
825 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:751-52; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:147-48; Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 93. For the castle of 'Akkar, see Fournet and Voisin, "Le 
Château de Aakkar," pp. 149-63; Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 3:307-9; Müller-Wiener, Castles of the 
Crusaders, p. 50; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 20, 67-68. 
826 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:748-49; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:148; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 242. See also Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 153. 
The martyrdom of Rukn al-Din Mankuwars al-Dawadari in this way, while praying, bears resemblance to 
that of Badr al-Din al-Aydimuri at Safed in 1266, Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:592. 
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these were significant engines. 
As no artillery appears to have 
joined the army during the siege, 
these would appear to be the 
same engines that had been used 
against Crac.  
According to Mufaddal 
ibn Abi'l-Fada'il, presumably 
making use of Ibn Shaddad's 
account, on 10 May the engine 
that faced the east gate of 'Akkar 
opened a breach in the wall, 
which was enlarged by the following morning. In this version of events, this damage and 
fear of an assault led the garrison to seek terms.827 The Frankish sources do not mention 
the Mamluks' use of artillery,828 but its significance is once again emphasised in a letter 
sent by Baybars to Bohemond after the siege. Rather than focusing on the scale of the 
engines directly, it was the difficulties 
that had been overcome dragging 
these machines up into the hills that 
were stressed this time.829 
Baybars might have planned 
to continue using these engines in 
May 1271, but was distracted by 
Prince Edward of England's arrival in 
Palestine on 9 May, leading him to 
withdraw to Damascus. It is unclear 
whether Baybars left his engines at 
Crac and 'Akkar or took them with 
him to Damascus. When he returned 
to inspect the refortification efforts at 
                                                 
827 Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:532. 
828 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 376, ed. Minervini, pp. 136-38, trans. Crawford, p. 67; Eracles 
34.14, RHC Oc 2, p. 460. 
829 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:749-51. 
Homs-Tripoli corridor: topography 
'Akkar: castle, plan and topography (after 
Fournet and Voisin) 
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Crac in 1272, he ordered the catapult stones found outside the castle to be brought inside. 
Afterwards, he went on to inspect 'Akkar, where he had the defenders fire the engines 
then within the stronghold, allowing him to examine the range of their projectiles.830 
While this clearly indicates that engines were stored at each in 1272, if they had been 
there all the while, it is unclear why these arrangements were not made when Baybars 
visited each in the autumn of 1271.831 When considering that Baybars stopped at 
Damascus and Safed after leaving 'Akkar in May 1271, where trebuchets are known to 
have been stockpiled, it is unclear whether the engines that were used that spring were 
the same as those used to besiege Montfort in June 1271. 
 
Montfort: 1271 
Montfort was the strongest castle of the Teutonic Knights in 1271. Construction had 
begun in 1226, coinciding with the fortification efforts at Jaffa, Caesarea and Sidon during 
Frederick II's visit.832 The castle sits on a spur, about 180 m above Wadi al-Qarn to the 
north and west, and one of 
its tributaries to the south.833 
The castle's eastern end is 
secured by large D-shaped 
keep and a fosse, with a 
second ditch about 50 m 
farther east. The castle was 
attacked in May 1266 by 
Badr al-Din al-Aydamuri 
and Badr al-Din Baysari 
                                                 
830 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:778. 
831 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:753-54; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:150; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:532-36. For the arrival of Edward of England, see Annales 
de Terre Sainte, ed. Edbury, pp. 160-61; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 376, ed. Minervini, p. 138, 
trans. Crawford, p. 67. For Baybars' visit in late September 1271, see Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-
Khowayter, 2:768-69. 
832 Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Edbury, p. 152; letter of Frederick II to Henry III, 17 March 1229, in Roger 
of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 4:189-93, trans. Giles, 2:522-24; Eracles 32.25, 33.7, RHC 
Oc 2, pp. 365, 372. See also Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p. 75; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, 
pp. 333-34; Pringle, "A Thirteenth-Century Hall," p. 52; Pringle, Churches, 2:40; Kennedy, Crusader 
Castles, p. 129; Mesqui, "La fortification des Croisés," p. 23. Cf. Ehrlich, "Crusaders' Castles," pp. 90-91. 
833 For the castle, see Rey, Étude sur les monuments, pp. 143-51; Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western 
Palestine, 1:186-88; Pringle, "A Thirteenth-Century Hall," pp. 54-55; Pringle, Secular Buildings, no. 156, 
pp. 73-75. Boas, Crusader Archaeology, p. 109; Mesqui, "La fortification des Croisés," pp. 10-11. See also 
Masterman, "A Visit to the Ruined Castles," p. 74. 
Montfort: castle, plan (after Pringle) 
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Siege of Montfort, 1271 
during Baybars' campaign against Safed; having failed to take it, Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir claims 
that it posed a threat to Mamluk Safed thereafter.834 
Baybars, with the force that he had with him at Damascus, moved to Safed in early 
June 1271. From here, where artillery may have been gathering beforehand, he sent his 
trebuchets ahead to Montfort. When he arrived in person, Baybars received envoys while 
he oversaw the erection of these engines, much as he had done at Safed in 1266. 
 
 
 Ibn 'Abd al-
Zahir and 
Ibn al-
Furat 
Yunini 
(Ibn Shaddad) 
Mufaddal al-'Ayni 
(Baybars 
al-
Mansuri) 
Templar 
of Tyre 
5 June 
(24 Shawwal) 
Baybars left 
Damascus 
    
6 June 
(25 Shawwal) 
 Baybars left 
Damascus 
   
9 June 
(28 Shawwal) 
 Baybars 
arrived 
Baybars 
arrived 
  
11 June 
(1 Dhu'l-Qa'da) 
Rabad taken     
12 June 
(2 Dhu'l-Qa'da) 
Bashura 
taken 
  Castle 
attacked 
Castle 
taken 
23 June 
(13 Dhu'l-
Qa'da) 
 Garrison 
surrendered 
   
3 July 
(23 Dhu'l-
Qa'da) 
  Garrison 
surrendered 
  
4 July 
(24 Dhu'l-
Qa'da) 
Destruction 
complete 
    
5 July 
(25 Dhu'l-
Qa'da) 
 Destruction 
complete 
   
6 July 
(26 Dhu'l-
Qa'da) 
  Baybars 
departed 
  
 
Yunini claims that Baybars erected his artillery upon arriving at Montfort but 
Mufaddal claims that he was initially unable to establish these engines close enough to 
the castle because of the rough terrain. Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir states that the rabad was taken 
on 11 June, and the bashura the following day, corresponding with dates given by 
Baybars al-Mansuri and the Templar of Tyre. Sapping then commenced and some damage 
                                                 
834 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:586-87, 756; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:86-87, 151; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and Raynaud, B p. 28 (452). 
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was apparently inflicted before the garrison 
agreed to terms. On 13 June,835 the garrison 
left the castle for Acre. Baybars made a rapid 
move against Acre that night, appearing 
before the city at daybreak the following 
morning, but returned to Montfort after 
finding little to be gained. According to 
Yunini and Mufaddal, Baybars then spent 
twelve days deconstructing the castle, having 
spent fifteen days besieging it.836 Although 
artillery is given relatively little attention by 
the sources, the physical evidence provides 
the first quantitative indication of the power 
of contemporary trebuchet technology. 
Excavation efforts led by Bashford Dean in 1926, discovered a number of 
spherical stones that were identified as artillery projectiles. These varied from about 25 
cm to 42 cm in diameter, averaging about 32 cm.837 One of these stones, which was 
brought back to New York and catalogued 
by the MET, has a diameter of 32 cm and a 
mass of 66 kg. Another, discovered in situ 
in 2013, was found to have a mass half as 
great.838 
The topography around Montfort 
limits the potential positions where 
attacking artillery may have been 
positioned. The spur to the east of the castle 
is fairly rough. Aside from a small position 
                                                 
835 Mufaddal appears to misdate this by ten days, in the same way that Yunini, or Ibn Shaddad, probably 
misdated Baybars' arrival at Crac des Chevaliers. 
836 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:755-57; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:151; Yunini, trans. Khamisy in "Montfort Castle"; al-Mansuri, trans. Khamisy in "Montfort Castle"; 
Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:539-43; al-'Ayni, 'Iqd al-Juman, RHC Or 2a, p. 244, trans. 
Gabrieli in Arab Historians, p. 320; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 378, ed. Minervini, p. 138, trans. 
Crawford, p. 67. See also Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 153; Eracles 34.14, RHC Oc 2, p. 460. 
837 Dean, "The Exploration of a Crusaders' Fortress," pp. 12, 23, 38. 
838 My thanks to Donald LaRocca at the MET for confirming the weight of this stone and to Adrian Boas 
and Rabei Khamisy for allowing me to weight the 2013 stone. 
Montfort: Dean projectile on display, 
New York (MET photograph) 
Montfort: 2013 projectile in situ (author) 
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about 80 m from the castle (area C on the map), there does not appear to have been a 
significant natural or artificially levelled position within 300 m of the castle. This might 
reflect Mufaddal's observation that the rough terrain initially prevented Baybars from 
positioning his artillery close enough to the castle. The only other position appears to be 
on the ridge across the southern wadi (area A on the map), approximately 220 m from the 
castle but around 30 m higher than the foundations of the keep.839 
A release velocity of at least 45 m/s would have been necessary to carry a 
projectile across the southern wadi. Although such release velocities might have been 
achieved with smaller projectiles by the end of the twelfth century and the stones found 
at Crac demonstrate that stones of the size of those found in Montfort had been used 
earlier in 1271, this is the first instance of evidence that stones this large may have been 
thrown at such speeds. Accordingly, this appears to be the earliest quantifiable evidence 
of the power of medieval artillery: an engine capable of throwing a 60 kg projectile at 45 
                                                 
839 Rabei Khamisy and Rafi Lewis have identified what they believe to be artillery projectiles in this 
position, pers. cor. Aug 2015. 
Montfort region: possible artillery positions and topography 
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m/s transfers 60,750 J to the projectile during a firing sequence. In terms of scale, the 
engine would probably require a counterweight greater than 3,000 kg and a beam around 
8 m long.840 
 The closest target to an engine positioned in area C would have been the keep. 
Built to defend the face of the castle most exposed to attack, the keep would have been a 
significant obstacle. Its walls are around 7 m thick, although there is evidence of internal 
passages in sections, and faced with hard limestone ashlars so large that Dean concluded 
that they had been cut in antiquity and which Yunini and Mufaddal claim were linked 
with iron cramps welded with lead.841 Projectiles weighing 100 kg would have posed little 
threat to such strong masonry. Although it cannot be concluded with any certainty that 
the keep was strong enough to discourage the Mamluks from bombarding it,842 and its 
destruction may have buried the projectiles thrown at it, it is possible that the weaker 
buildings to the west were deliberately targeted instead. 
 The projectiles found by Dean were concentrated to the west of the keep, between 
it and the central vaulted structure, and in the latter structure at its west end. From area C, 
a single engine, as there does not appear to have been space for a second, could have fired 
                                                 
840 For hypothetical data sets, see Appendix 3. 
841 Dean, "The Exploration of a Crusaders' Fortress," p. 6; Mufaddal, Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:542; 
Yunini, trans. Khamisy in "Montfort Castle." 
842 It is possible that the destruction of the keep buried projectiles that were thrown at this part of the 
castle during the siege. 
Montfort: castle, from area C (author) 
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stones to both locations as the slight curve of the spur would have exposed the northern 
face of the castle and sections west of the keep. While area C would have been the closest 
place to erect a sizable engine, it is possible that the castle was also bombarded from the 
ridge to the south, where Baybars appears to have positioned his headquarters.843 
Although the steep topography would have limited the value of any breach opened in the 
castle's southern curtain, the psychological impact of such large stones being thrown 
against, and perhaps into, the weaker parts of the castle was probably significant. 
 The comparative weakness of the castle's southern walls, less than 1 m thick in 
places, suggests that they were considered to be beyond the range of any significant 
artillery when they were constructed. That this front of the castle was not subsequently 
strengthened, despite evidence that construction continued through the 1260s,844 indicates 
either that the power of these engines was not appreciated by those responsible for 
fortifying the castle, suggesting that such engines had not been developed or effectively 
employed until very recently, or that such engines were still not considered to be a threat. 
The projectiles found by Dean appear to be too large for a practical defensive 
function: there are few advantages to throwing a stone 60 kg compared to throwing one 
a third as large with the same amount of force when targeting men, siege engines or 
improvised defences. When adding to this the lack of space for an engine of the necessary 
                                                 
843 Khamisy, "Montfort Castle." 
844 Pers. cor. Adrian Boas, May 2013, Aug. 2015. 
Montfort: castle, from area A (author) 
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proportions, the suggestion that these projectiles might have been part of a defensive 
stockpile can be all but discarded. The keep may have been able to support a single 
eastward-facing engine, but the value of such an engine relative to the space it denied 
other means of defence appears unjustifiable. The structure of the vaulted ranges in the 
middle of the castle and the great hall to the west would appear to have been incapable of 
supporting the dynamic forces created by a counterweight trebuchet. Although the stones 
may have been part an offensive stockpile, their positioning is hard to explain. 
 There are few other insights into the use of artillery before Baybars' death in 1277. 
Edward of England and Henry of Cyprus do not appear to have used any siege equipment 
when they attacked Qaqun in 1271,845 and there are few indications that Baybars 
employed siege engines during his successful siege of Cursat in 1275.846 A decade later, 
however, engines larger than those used by Baybars appear to have been employed by his 
successor. 
 
 
 
The Sultanate of Qalawun 
 
Margat: 1285 
Margat was acquired by the Hospitallers in 1186 and, like Crac des Chevaliers, was 
bypassed by Saladin as he moved his army up the Syrian coast in 1188.847 The castle's 
                                                 
845 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 381, ed. Minervini, p. 140, trans. Crawford, p. 68; Eracles 34.14, 
RHC Oc 2, p. 461; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:770-71. For the structure, see Pringle, 
Secular Buildings, no. 168, pp. 83-84. 
846 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:831-33; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 
2:165. For this castle, see Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 2:351-57; Boase, "Military Architecture," pp. 162-
53; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 84. 
847 Caffaro states that the castle was built before the Franks arrived in the Levant. It fell to them in 1140 
after a surprise attack, Caffaro, De liberatione, ed. Belgrano, pp. 115-16, trans. Hall and Phillips, p. 119. 
For the castle's ability to apply pressure to Saladin's army as it passed, see 'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. 
Montfort: castle, section (from Pringle) 
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double line of walls also impressed Wilbrand of Oldenburg when he passed by in the 
early thirteenth century.848 Baybars had made two abortive attacks on Margat during the 
harsh winter rains of January 1270, apparently travelling without siege equipment on both 
occasions.849 Another Mamluk attack was made in 1280/81, but this was routed in a sally 
by the garrison.850 
 In 1285, Qalawun summoned arms from Egypt and enlisted a number of siege 
experts before setting out from Damascus to besiege the castle. The artillery stored in 
Damascus, as well as that requisitioned from the surrounding strongholds, was carried on 
men's shoulders to his camp at 'Uyun al-Qasab before the army travelled by forced 
marches to Margat, arriving on 17 April. Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir specifies that "three of the 
great 'Frankish' type, three 'Qarabughas' and four 'devils' [Shaytania]" were deployed 
against the castle, while Abu'l-Fida' similarly claims that both great and small engines 
were erected. The 'Frankish' engines are noted to have destroyed the artillery of the 
                                                 
Massé pp. 125-26; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:345. Isaac Comnenus was imprisoned here in 
1191, Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:116, trans. Riley, 2:210. See also Ralph of Diceto, 
Ymagines historiarum, ed. Stubbs, p. 92. 
848 Wilbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium terrae sanctae 1.11, ed. Pringle, pp. 121-22, trans. Pringle, pp. 69-
70. For the castle and its history, see Rey, Étude sur les monuments, pp. 19-38, 255-64; Deschamps, Les 
Châteaux, 3:259-85; Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p. 58; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 78-
79, 164-79. Mesqui, "La fortification des Croisés," pp. 22-23.  
849 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:729; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Tashrif al-Malik al-Mansur, 
trans. Gabrieli in Arab Historians, p. 334; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:139, 141. See 
also Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp. 200-1. 
850 Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, RHC Or 1, p. 158; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 406, ed. Minervini, 
p. 154, trans. Crawford, p. 77; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and Raynaud, A p. 33 (457); Bar 
Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. Budge, 2:463. 
Margat: castle, from the south (Denys Pringle) 
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defenders, allowing the Muslims to advance their artillery closer to the walls. This move 
proved slightly reckless as the Franks were able to repair their engines, which then 
destroyed a number of the Muslims' trebuchets and killed some of their operators.851 
Amidst the artillery duel, Muslim sappers worked against the castle's foundations. 
After about three weeks, a mine was fired under a tower at the southern apex of 
the castle, identified as the Tower of Hope by the Templar of Tyre. The mine 
compromised a section of wall but the attackers were still forced to scale the obstruction. 
The advantage was short-lived: the remaining part of the tower collapsed around sunset, 
somehow shoring up the initial breach. The Franks, fearing the progress of the Mamluk 
miners elsewhere, sought terms a day or two later. Qalawun seized the opportunity to take 
possession of the castle without damaging it any further.852 Among the 550 men that were 
designated to defend the castle thereafter, was a group of artillery experts, suggesting that 
at least some of the engines used against the 
castle, and any left in a state of repair by the 
garrison, became a part of its arsenal.  
                                                 
851 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Tashrif al-Malik al-Mansur, trans. Gabrieli in Arab Historians, pp. 334-35; Abu'l-
Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, p. 12, RHC Or 1, p. 161. 
852 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Tashrif al-Malik al-Mansur, trans. Gabrieli in Arab Historians, pp. 335-38; Abu'l-
Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, p. 12; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 429, ed. Minervini, p. 166, 
trans. Crawford, p. 85; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.19, ed. Bongars, p. 229, trans. Lock, p. 364. 
'Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir appears to date the mine to Wednesday 17 Rabi I but the castle's fall to Friday 18 Rabi 
I; the week will be taken as correct, bringing this account in line with that of Abu'l-Fida. 
Margat: castle, section and plan (after 
Mesqui) 
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Siege of Margat, 1285  
 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir Abu'l-Fida' Templar of Tyre Marino Sanudo 
17 April 
(10 Safar) 
Qalawun arrived  Siege began  
27 April 
(20 Safar) 
   Siege began 
23 May 
(17 Rabi I) 
Mine fired    
25 May 
(19 Rabi I) 
Castle surrendered Castle 
surrendered 
  
27 May 
(21 Rabi I) 
  Castle 
surrendered 
Castle 
surrendered 
 
 The descriptions of artillery at Margat are enlightening. On one hand Qalawun 
used his engines to cover his miners and target the defenders' artillery, tactics that had 
been employed since the First Crusade. On the other, they appear to have been advanced 
closer to the walls in an attempt to effect structural damage, similar strategies to those 
which may have been attempted at Acre in 
1191 and Crac des Chevaliers in 1271. 
Although the rebuilding of the outer 
wall around the castle's southern apex has 
obscured any effects that Qalawun's artillery 
had here, impact signatures created by higher 
trajectory shots are discernible along the 
southern face of the donjon, which rises 
behind this wall. The relatively small number 
of these markings indicates that equally few 
shots hit the donjon, probably because they 
were fired by engines with a slow rate of fire. 
Despite the apparent power necessary to 
leave such impressions in the basalt masonry, 
when viewed from afar, these appear to be 
little more than cosmetic blemishes, 
especially when compared to the fissures 
created by later earthquakes. Besides the 
large slow-firing engine that created these 
impact signatures, the sources clearly indicate 
that smaller engines were also employed, 
Margat: donjon, impact signatures (Balázs 
Major) 
Images omitted 
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even if it is difficult to discern what differentiated the various types listed from one 
another. 
Qalawun had inherited Baybars' network of armouries and by the time that he set 
out for Margat he was able to summon experts in addition to engines. Following its 
capture, Margat was incorporated into this network, as Safed had been in 1266.853 While 
the impact signatures at Margat impress the relative power of late thirteenth-century 
artillery, its range is evident in Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir's account of events at Maraclea soon 
afterwards. 
 
Maraclea: 1285 
The stronghold of Maraclea (Maraqiyya) was situated on an offshore island, facing the 
settlement of the same name, and appears to have been refortified in the decade leading 
up to 1285.854 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir claims that the stronghold had sides 25.5 cubits long and 
was two bow-shots from the mainland. Modern satellite imagery shows a square structure, 
with sides about 15 m long, just under the surface of the water on a shoal about 190 m off 
the present coast of Syria. Although this appears to match Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir's general 
description, it is harder to verify his claims that the walls were 7 cubits thick (a reasonable 
thickness), that the tower was built on piles of stones held in place by ironwork, and that 
it was seven storeys tall. Critically, he states that the roof was covered with sacking and 
hemp rope, as a defence against artillery, and that a smaller structure behind the main one 
supported three defensive trebuchets.855 
Despite the suggestions that the structure was within range of contemporary 
artillery, Qalawun recognised that he could not take the strongpoint without a naval force 
superior to that of the Franks, which he did not have. Rather than bombard the fortress 
needlessly, he persuaded Bohemond VII to destroy it, sparing the Frankish lands around 
Tripoli from raids in return.856 
 The castle's padded roof indicates that it was vulnerable to high-trajectory artillery 
fire; however, that this was also sufficient to absorb the shock of an impact at this range 
is equally telling. When placed alongside the earlier events at Montfort and Margat, a 
fairly clear impression of late-thirteenth-century artillery becomes apparent. At least the 
                                                 
853 See Fulton, "Development of Prefabricated Artillery," pp. 65-70. 
854 For this castle, see Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 3:323-26; Rey, Étude sur les monuments, pp. 161-62. 
855 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Tashrif al-Malik al-Mansur, trans. Gabrieli in Arab Historians, p. 339. 
856 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Tashrif al-Malik al-Mansur, trans. Gabrieli in Arab Historians, pp. 340-41. 
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largest engines were capable of 
throwing stones about 60 kg up to 200 
m. The effect of these projectiles, 
however, was not significant by 
modern standards. Rather than seeking 
to breach fortified defences, against 
which they could inflict little more than 
superficial damage, they were 
probably used to target the battlements 
and expose the defenders of 
approachable strongholds, such as 
Crac and Margat, or as a psychological 
weapon, causing indiscriminate death 
and chaos behind the walls of more 
isolated castles such as Montfort. 
While Qalawun may have 
hoped to exploit the power of his engines by moving them forward at Margat, this may 
have been accomplished with greater success at Saone, when the castle was besieged in 
1287. As has been mentioned above, if artillery inflicted the significant damage evident 
at the north end of the outer eastern wall, it more likely occurred at this point in history. 
Although Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir mentions the use of a number of signficant trebuchets at this 
siege, it is just as likely that the damage was the result of an earthquake.857 
 
Tripoli: 1289 
The trace of Tripoli's defences at the end of the thirteenth century is unclear. At the start 
of the century, Wilbrand of Oldenburg compared the city's layout to Tyre's, complete with 
a citadel complex and two lines of town walls. Abu'l-Fida' confirms that the city was 
protected by its extension into the Mediterranean and that it was only along a narrow 
eastern front that the Mamluks could assail it.858 
                                                 
857 My thanks to Rabei Khamisy for translating this section of Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir's account, as a translation 
has not yet been published. For this siege, see also Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, p. 13, RHC Or 
1, p. 162; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 461-62, ed. Minervini, p. 186, trans. Crawford, pp. 94-95. 
For an analysis of the damage, see Fulton, "A Ridge too Far." 
858 Wilbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium terrae sanctae 1.8, ed. Pringle, p. 120, trans. Pringle, p. 67; Abu'l-
Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, p. 14. See also Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p. 42. 
Maraclea: castle foundations (Google Earth, 
images of 1 Nov 2014 and 5 May 2010) 
Images protected by copyright 
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 The siege of Tripoli began at some point in March 1289. Although it is not 
mentioned by the sources, Qalawun probably sent orders for the artillery stored in Syria 
to be prepared as he marched out of Egypt, possibly having these engines brought together 
around Damascus, where he paused on his way to Tripoli, as he had in 1285. Regardless, 
an assortment of trebuchets were firing against Tripoli by early April. The engines appear 
to have focused their fire against the Bishop's Tower and that of the Hospitallers, while 
sappers attempted to undermine the town's defences. The outer enceinte was taken first 
and then a single concerted attack carried the inner line around 26 April 1289.859 
 Abu'l-Fida' and the Templar of Tyre claim that Qalawun employed both large and 
small trebuchets. Al-Maqrizi, probably working from Ibn al-Furat – who in turn made use 
of Ibn al-Dawadari and al-Yunini – claims that Qalawun employed nineteen trebuchets, 
associating 1,500 men with their operation (seventy-nine men to each engine if evenly 
distributed).860 While six of the nineteen trebuchets are said to have been of the 'Frankish' 
type, which probably correspond with the four large engines identified in one version of 
the Annales de Terre Sainte, the majority were lighter machines. The thirteen qarabugha 
engines found in certain Muslim accounts, corresponding with the carabohas mentioned 
by the Templar of Tyre, were almost certainly traction trebuchets.861 As at Arsuf twenty-
four years earlier, increasingly heavy artillery was still outnumbered by lighter, more 
adaptable engines that could support sapping efforts. The Templar of Tyre clearly 
distinguishes the ways in which the heavy engines and archers were used: the former 
battered and damaged the two targeted towers while the latter were used against the 
Frankish crossbowmen. The city's complete destruction following the siege has rendered 
it impossible to assess the degree of damage inflicted by these engines during the two 
months that they were in action.862  
                                                 
859 Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, pp. 14-15, RHC Or 1, p. 162; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des 
Chiprois 475-77, ed. Minervini, p. 196, trans. Crawford, pp. 100-1; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 
3.12.20, ed. Bongars, p. 229, trans. Lock, p. 365; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Quatremère, 2:102-3; Annales 
de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and Raynaud, A p. 36 (460). See also Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p. 
218. Marino Sanudo blends the earlier campaign against Saone and Latakia with that against Tripoli, 
claiming that Qalawun had engines prepared at Crac on his way to the latter. 
860 If anywhere near accurate, not everyone counted in this total would have been directly involved with the 
working of these engines at any one time. See the comparable figure suggested at Lisbon in 1147 and 
associated analysis in Chapter 4. 
861 For a short evaluation of this term, see Appendix 1. 
862 The city was resettled farther inland around the castle founded by Raymond of St Gilles soon after, see 
Ibn Battuta, Tuhfat 1.1, trans. Gibb, p. 60; Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p. 42. 
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The Second Great Siege of Acre: 1291 
 
A peace that had been established between the Franks of Acre and Qalawun was violated 
in 1290, giving Qalawun the opportunity to move against Acre.863 The sultan, however, 
died in November while setting out once more from Cairo for Palestine. Before his death, 
Qalawun had arranged for the governor of Damascus to build siege equipment, including 
artillery, and for Shams al-Din al-A'sar al-Mushidd to collect timber from Wadi 
Murabbin, a valley between 'Akkar and Baalbek where trees ideal for the construction of 
trebuchets grew – stout, straight and as tall as twenty-one cubits according to al-Nuwayri. 
Although the latter emir's efforts were complicated by an early snowfall, Yunini claims 
that he was able to move a number of trees to the outskirts of Damascus by 23 December 
1290.864 
 Qalawun was succeeded by his son al-Ashraf Khalil, who set out for Palestine, 
with siege engines and technicians to assemble them, in March 1291. 'Izz al-Din Afram, 
possibly the same who had received acclaim for handling artillery under Baybars, was 
sent ahead to see to the artillery in Damascus. He was met there by the princes and emirs 
of Syria, along with their artillery and armies. There can be little doubt that the largest 
prefabricated engines were brought, as one engine, a 'great' trebuchet collected by the 
prince of Hama from Crac des Chevaliers, supposedly required a hundred cartloads. The 
forces gathered at Damascus then moved to join those that had begun to assemble outside 
Acre.865 
 
Artillery and the Siege 
Their are numerous accounts of the siege of Acre, which have been discussed and 
analysed by Donald Little and Andreas D'Souza.866 According to Sayf al-Din, an 
eyewitness of the siege, seventy-two trebuchets were set up against Acre, including those 
of the Ifranji, Shaytani, Qarabugha, and al-La'ib types. Al-'Ayni gives the same figure of 
                                                 
863 For this treaty and its violation, see Holt, "Qalawun's Treaty," pp. 802-12. 
864 Little, "The Fall of 'Akka," pp. 167-68. See also Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, p. 15. 
865 Ibn Taghribirdi, trans. Gabrieli in Arab Historians, p. 347; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Quatremère, 
2:121-24; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, p. 16; Little, "The Fall of 'Akka," pp. 168-71; D'Souza, 
"The Conquest of 'Akka," p. 239. Abu'l-Fida' vividly describes the difficulties of moving the cart assigned 
to him in the harsh winter conditions. 
866 Little, "The Fall of 'Akka," pp. 159-81; D'Souza, "The Conquest of 'Akka," pp. 234-50. 
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seventy-two engines and specifies that fifty-two were of the Shaytani type. Yunini and 
Ibn Taghribirdi distinguish fifteen large 'Frankish' trebuchets, capable of throwing stones 
weighing a Damascene qintar or more, in addition to engines of other types. Al-Maqrizi 
gives the slightly larger figure of ninety-two engines.867 
From the Frankish perspective, the Templar of Tyre claims that these engines 
were erected eight days after the first Muslim forces arrived. The Amadi account states 
that it took four days for the Muslims to prepare their siege engines, a similar period to 
that found in most of the Muslim accounts. In line with the figure provided by Yunini and 
Ibn Taghribirdi, the Annales de Terre Sainte states that fourteen large engines were used, 
while the Templar of Tyre repeats that some engines threw stones weighing a qintar. 
According to the latter source, one notable engine was positioned opposite the Templars' 
section of Acre's defences, another opposite the Hospitallers' section, a third targeted the 
Accursed Tower and a fourth opposed the Pisans' section. This last engine was called al-
Mansur, the same name as that given by Abu'l-Fida' to the engine brought from Crac des 
                                                 
867 Ibn Taghribirdi, trans. Gabrieli in Arab Historians, p. 347; Little, "The Fall of 'Akka," p. 171 and n. 72; 
D'Souza, "The Conquest of 'Akka," p. 252; al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Quatremère 2:125. 
Acre: town and deployment of Mamluks in 1291, plan (adapted from Kedar and Folda) 
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Chevaliers, suggesting that these were commissioned by Qalawun after 1277.868 In 
addition to these large engines, the Templar of Tyre, John of Villiers, grand master of the 
Hospitallers, Marino Sanudo and the Amadi account all confirm the presence of 
carabouha/corobonares/carabagas/caravachani, which are also mentioned by some of 
the Muslim sources. The Templar of Tyre describes these as rapid-firing hand-operated 
stone-throwers that posed a greater threat to Acre's defenders than did the larger engines; 
however, John of Villiers and Marino Sanudo, who do not contradict this description, 
portray them as being somewhat more powerful.869 These, as noted above, were probably 
traction trebuchets: heavier than the hand-slings but lighter than the counterweight 
trebuchets.870 
Other Christian sources are less helpful. The Excidium states that six hundred and 
sixty-six large and small engines were used, including petrarie, bibliete, perdicete and 
mangonelli. Three hundred engines are mentioned in the account of Bar Hebraeus, as 
unlikely as his claim that a thousand miners worked against each tower. Ludolph of 
Suchem places the number of engines at a more reasonable sixty but provides no further 
details.871 
With the Muslim forces assembling against them, the Franks prepared their own 
artillery and gathered stones.872 Some of these engines may have been those built under 
Odo Poilechien, on behalf of Charles of Anjou, in 1286, originally intended for use 
against Henry II of Cyprus.873 
 Attacks appear to have begun on 5 April, although artillery continued to arrive 
until 8 April. The gates of Acre remained open during this early phase as fighting took 
place outside the city's walls. The Muslims, fighting in shifts, eventually pushed their way 
                                                 
868 It is possible that these engines were one and the same; however, the engine brought from Crac would 
not have been that which was operated by the contingent from Hama, as they were positioned on the 
Muslims' extreme right, opposite the Templars, while the Pisans were positioned close to the Accursed 
Tower, which anchored Acre's northeast salient. 
869 Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. Röhricht and Raynaud, A pp. 36-37 (460-61); Templar of Tyre, Gestes des 
Chiprois 490-91, ed. Minervini, pp. 206-8, trans. Crawford, pp. 105-6; letter of John of Villiers to William 
of Villaret, in Carticulaire général des Hospitaliers, no. 4157, 3:593; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 
3.12.21, ed. Bongars, p. 230, trans. Lock, p. 367; Amadi, ed. De Mas Latrie, pp. 219-20. 
870 For different interpretations, see Chevedden, "Black Camels," pp. 251-54; Marshall, Warfare in the 
Latin East, pp. 214, 234. For the staff-sling, see Appendix 1. 
871 Excidium Aconis 2.3, ll. 123-48, ed. Huygens, pp. 67-68; Bar Hebraeus, Makhtebhanuth Zabhne, trans. 
Budge, 2:492-93; Ludolph of Suchem, De itinere Terrae sanctae liber 26, ed. Deycks, p. 43, trans. Stewart, 
p. 56. 
872 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 485, ed. Minervini, p. 204, trans. Crawford, p. 104; letter of John 
of Villiers to William of Villaret, in Carticulaire général des Hospitaliers, no. 4157, 3:593; Excidium 
Aconis 1.8, ll. 327-34, ed. Huygens, pp. 60-61. 
873 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 437-38, ed. Minervini, pp. 168-70, trans. Crawford, p. 86. 
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to the edge of the fosse. Here, they erected mantlets at the edge of the counterscarp and 
developed positions behind which the carabouhas could be placed securely. These 
traction engines provided close suppressing fire while heavier engines battered the city's 
fortifications, probably targeting the battlements 
initially, and sappers began to undermine certain 
sections of wall.874 The Frankish engines had 
little effect on the Muslims' improvised 
ramparts; however, a ship-mounted trebuchet 
applied pressure against the Muslims' right 
flank, until it was destroyed during a storm.875 It 
may have been the artillery here on the Muslims' 
extreme right, that of the contingent of Hama, 
which was targeted in a subsequent sally led by 
the Templars.876 
In the mid-twentieth century, about fifty 
medieval artillery projectiles were found around 
what had been the northwest limit of Acre's 
defences.877 These probably relate to projectiles excavated in situ roughly 100-200 m 
north of these and the same distance from the present coastline.878 Together, these 
represent where the engine(s) of the contingent of Hama was/were placed and where those 
that were thrown against the Templars' section of the city's defences ultimately came to 
rest. Both the mass of these stones and the implicit distance over which they were fired 
                                                 
874 Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, pp. 16-17; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 489, 491, ed. 
Minervini, pp. 206, 208-10, trans. Crawford, pp. 105, 106-7; letter of John of Villiers to William of Villaret, 
in Carticulaire général des Hospitaliers, no. 4157, 3:593; Thadeus, Ystoria ll. 48-60, ed. Huygens, p. 101; 
Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.21, ed. Bongars, p. 230, trans. Lock, p. 367; Amadi, ed. De Mas 
Latrie, p. 220; Ludolph of Suchem, De itinere Terrae sanctae liber 26, ed. Deycks, p. 43, trans. Stewart, p. 
56; D'Souza, "The Conquest of 'Akka," p. 241. 
875 Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, pp. 16-17; Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 491, ed. 
Minervini, p. 208, trans. Crawford, p. 106. 
876 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 491, ed. Minervini, pp. 208-10, trans. Crawford, pp. 107-8. Cf. 
Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, p. 17; Amadi, ed. De Mas Latrie, pp. 220-21. See also Templar of 
Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 492, ed. Minervini, p. 210, trans. Crawford, p. 108; Amadi, ed. De Mas Latrie, 
p. 221. 
877 For the trace of Acre's thirteenth-century walls, see Guérin, Description, 3:507; Rey, Les colonies 
Franques, pp. 452-54; Kedar, "The Outer Walls," p. 161. See also Frankel, "The North-West Corner," p. 
256. Cf. Jacoby, "Crusader Acre," p. 42 and n. 214; Jacoby, "Montmusard," p. 215. For the development 
of this trace, see Jacoby, "Montmusard," pp. 205-17. 
878 Porat, "'Akko, Dov Gruner Street." 
Acre: nineteenth-century town, plan 
(from Rey) 
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conform to trends that had been established over the previous thirty years. Similar engines 
appear to have been erected to the east of the city. 
Large projectiles were 
discovered around a wall that 
was exposed in the 1970s. 
Kedar has identified this as part 
of the city's medieval wall, near 
the St Nicholas gate. Additional 
projectiles can be found in the 
present Christian cemetery to 
the east of where the city's 
northeast salient would have 
been in the thirteenth-century.879 These, approximately 100 m from the medieval curtain 
and of varying sizes, suggest that at least one large engine, as well as smaller ones, was 
placed in this general area. 
 As in 1191, mining efforts focused on the northeast salient of the city. As the 
Muslims attempted to undermine the King's Tower, which anchored the forewall ahead 
of the Accursed Tower,880 their carabouhas were critical in providing cover for the 
sappers and forcing the Franks to countermine.881 A portion of Acre's outer wall was 
successfully undermined by the time that Henry II of Cyprus arrived on 4 May and by 8 
May the Franks abandoned the outer wall in this section. While the Franks added 
improvised defences to face this exposed salient the Muslims stepped up their 
bombardment of the town's defenders.882 
On 15 May, the King's Tower was abandoned, its outer face having fallen away 
completely. As the besiegers moved into the tower, it was then targeted by Frankish 
                                                 
879 Kedar, "The Outer Walls," pp. 174-75. This cemetery might correspond with the Frankish St Nicholas 
cemetery. 
880 For the defences along this section of wall, see Pringle, Churches, 4:11; Pringle, "Edward I," p. 53. 
881 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 491, ed. Minervini, p. 208, trans. Crawford, pp. 106-7; Marino 
Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.21, ed. Bongars, p. 230, trans. Lock, p. 367; Amadi, ed. De Mas Latrie, p. 
220. 
882 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 493, ed. Minervini, p. 212, trans. Crawford, p. 108; Marino 
Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.21, ed. Bongars, pp. 230-31, trans. Lock, pp. 367-68; Excidium Aconis 2.3, 
ll. 148-56, ed. Huygens, pp. 68-69; Ibn Taghribirdi, trans. Gabrieli in Arab Historians, p. 347; D'Souza, 
"The Conquest of 'Akka," p. 243. 
Acre: projectiles in situ (from Porat) 
Image protected by copyright 
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artillery in a failed last effort to keep it out 
of Muslim hands.883 In an anecdote about 
his own involvement, Baybars al-Mansuri 
claims that a felt screen was used to 
approach the damaged section of wall, 
sufficient to absorb the shock of incoming 
artillery fire, evidently that of traction 
trebuchets, and resist arrows. This screen 
was then used to shelter those filling the 
fosse ahead of the frontal attack which 
would be focused here.884 
 The Muslims began an assault on all 
fronts at dawn on 18 May 1291. Preventing 
the Franks from concentrating their 
manpower, the breach in the outer wall was 
quickly stormed. As the attackers passed 
through the breach they spread out along the 
northern and eastern inner walls and, as 
panic set in and the first defenders began to 
flee towards the sea, the Muslim forces 
started to scale the inner walls. A door in the 
Accursed Tower was also forced, leading 
some of the Mamluks to the churchyard of 
St Romanus and the artillery that the Pisans 
had erected there.885 While some paused to 
burn the heaviest engine, others continued 
south along the inner side of the east wall.886 
                                                 
883 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 494, ed. Minervini, pp. 212-14, trans. Crawford, p. 109; Marino 
Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.21, ed. Bongars, p. 231, trans. Lock, p. 368. See also Excidium Aconis 2.3, 
ll. 165-69, ed. Huygens, pp. 69. 
884 Little, "The Fall of 'Akka," pp. 172-73. 
885 For this structure and its location, see Pringle, Churches, no. 442, 4:158. 
886 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 496-99, ed. Minervini, pp. 214-20, trans. Crawford, pp. 110-13; 
Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.21, ed. Bongars, p. 231, trans. Lock, p. 368; letter of John of Villiers 
to William of Villaret, in Carticulaire général des Hospitaliers, no. 4,157, 3:593; Ibn Taghribirdi, trans. 
Gabrieli in Arab Historians, p. 347; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, p. 17; D'Souza, "The Conquest 
of 'Akka," p. 244. See also al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Quatremère 2:125-26; Excidium Aconis 2.4-12, ll. 
Acre: projectiles on display (author) 
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As the city was steadily overwhelmed, 
the Templars' complex in the 
southwest corner of the city, partly 
secured by the sea, hosted the 
defenders' last stand, until it too was 
undermined about ten days later. 
When the last bastion fell, al-Ashraf 
ordered Frankish Acre demolished.887 
Artillery does not reappear in 
the narrative once the Muslims broke 
into the city: none of the Mamluks' 
engines were apparently brought in to 
use against the Templar complex nor were any Frankish engines turned against them. It 
is unclear whether some of the Frankish engines were disassembled and distributed 
through Syria or if most were simply destroyed along with the rest of Acre.888 So thorough 
was the destruction that the medieval walls have all but disappeared, leaving no indication 
of the power of the engines that played against them in 1291. 
 It is notable that mining was once more responsible for breaching Acre's defences. 
Although there are indications that artillery was developing into a breaching weapon, 
possibly used as such at Tripoli and Acre, it was never successfully employed in this 
capacity before the end of the Frankish period. Like the thin south wall at Montfort, the 
walls of the thirteenth-century tower that anchored the extreme north-west end of 
Montmusard's defences were only 1 m thick.889 Thin walls like these check any drastic 
overestimations of the power of these engines, despite the large stones that have been 
discovered beyond the city's medieval walls since the seventeenth century, some more 
than 30 cm in diameter. Without any physical evidence of damage, as at Arsuf, or a 
discernible range, as at Montfort, there is little to conclusively suggest how far or 
                                                 
180-742, ed. Huygens, pp. 70-93; Thadeus, Ystoria ll. 62-77, 709-24, ed. Huygens, pp. 101-2, 127; Ludolph 
of Suchem, De itinere Terrae sanctae liber 26, ed. Deycks, pp. 43-45, trans. Stewart, pp. 56-58. 
887 For later testimony of this destruction, see Ibn Battuta, Tuhfat 1.1, trans. Gibb, pp. 57-58. 
888 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 501, ed. Minervini, pp. 220-22, trans. Crawford, p. 114; Amadi, 
ed. De Mas Latrie, p. 222; Thadeus, Ystoria ll. 252-67, ed. Huygens, pp. 109-10; Ludolph of Suchem, De 
itinere Terrae sanctae liber 26, ed. Deycks, pp. 45-46, trans. Stewart, pp. 59-60; Ibn Taghribirdi, trans. 
Gabrieli in Arab Historians, pp. 348-49; Little, "The Fall of 'Akka," p. 176; D'Souza, "The Conquest of 
'Akka," p. 246. 
889 Frankel, "The North-Western Corner," p. 256; Kedar, "The Outer Walls," pp. 60-61. 
Acre: projectiles, Hospitaller complex (author) 
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effectively such stones could have been thrown or how much the corresponding engines 
had grown since previous sieges. 
 Fittingly, it is at this final siege 
that the largest projectiles have been 
found. Although a visit to the 
Hospitaller complex, where many of 
these stones are kept, can leave the 
impression that only such large 
projectiles were thrown, similar in 
scale to fourteenth-century stones 
stockpiled elsewhere by the Mamluks, 
their number should instead reflect the 
significant number of large engines 
that were present during the siege and their continued use for more than six weeks. There 
is every indication that smaller projectiles, both easier to find and throw, would have 
greatly outnumbered these; however, their less impressive size has allowed them to avoid 
the same degree of attention over the centuries. The diversity of engine-types found in 
the sources and the emphasis placed on the use of these smaller engines at various points, 
would seem to confirm this. 
 
The Aftermath 
As fell Acre, so fell the Latin presence in the Levant. Tyre, which had never fallen from 
Frankish hands since it was taken in 1124, was surrendered to the Mamluks by those who 
had not already fled.890 The Templars considered defending Sidon but it too was 
abandoned, as was Beirut and eventually 'Atlit and Tortosa.891 The Mamluks then slighted 
all of these coastal strongholds. The speed with which these defences were abandoned 
speaks to the real strength of the Mamluks: their comparative numbers. Although these 
stoutly fortified strongholds could probably have withstood the most formidable artillery 
                                                 
890 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 504, ed. Minervini, p. 204, trans. Crawford, p. 504. Marino 
Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.22, ed. Bongars, pp. 231-32, trans. Lock, p. 369; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, 
trans. Holt, p. 17; Ibn Taghribirdi, trans. Gabrieli in Arab Historians, p. 349-50. 
891 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 509-12, ed. Minervini, pp. 226-28, trans. Crawford, pp. 118-19; 
Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 3.12.22, ed. Bongars, p. 232, trans. Lock, p. 369; Abu'l-Fida', al-
Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, p. 17. John Poloner was impressed by the ruined remains of Sidon's castles in the 
fifteenth century but Mandrell appears not to even have noticed the sea castle two hundred and fifty years 
later, John Poloner, Descriptio Terrae Sanctae, trans. Stewart, pp. 29-30, 32; Mandrell, A Journey, p. 60. 
'Ajlun: projectiles on display (author) 
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for weeks, if not months, al-Ashraf's reserves of manpower would have allowed him to 
sacrifice waves of men in frontal assaults or to impose blockades with the knowledge that 
they would face no field army to the rear. Although the Templars continued to hold the 
island of Ruad (Arwad) off the coat of Tortosa until 1302,892 and calls for crusades were 
made into the fourteenth century, the period of Frankish lordship in the Levant effectively 
ended with the loss of Acre. With this, almost two hundred years of Frankish-Muslim 
cohabitation and side-by-side artillery development in the Near East also came to an end. 
  
                                                 
892 Templar of Tyre, Gestes des Chiprois 615-23, 635-38, ed. Minervini, pp. 300-4, 308-10, trans. Crawford, 
pp. 155-58, 160-61; Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, p. 40. 
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8. Offensive Artillery and Fortification 
Design 
 
 
 
In the nineteenth century, the famed historian, architect and architectural restorer, Eugene 
Emanuel Viollet-le-Duc remarked, "We cannot doubt that the crusades, during which so 
many memorable sieges were effected, improved the means of attack, and that 
consequently important modifications were introduced into the defence of fortified 
places."893 As the means of attack and defence advanced, it is widely contested to what 
degree siege engines were a driving, rather than reciprocally developing, element of this 
process. In Viollet-le-Duc's opinion, up to the thirteenth century fortifications remained 
essentially static bulks of masonry, defended by small garrisons. Without expressly 
stating why or examining the underlying causes, he concluded that it was a direct result 
of the crusades that this type of defence was no longer sufficient and more methodically 
built fortifications, with larger, more active, garrisons were built form the late twelfth 
century. 
 Opinions such as those expressed by Viollet-le-Duc, reflect noticeable changes in 
the style and scale of fortifications built in Latin Europe and the Near East at the end of 
the twelfth century and start of the thirteenth. Because the crusades were a natural point 
of exposure between Latin Christians and Turco-Arabic Muslims, they have been 
regarded at times as a semi-mystical source of cross-cultural technological sharing and 
development. The construction of some of the most impressive strongholds of this 
perceived transition phase in and around the Frankish East has contributed to this notion. 
These impressive castles and citadels, often of a larger scale with thicker walls and a more 
concentric plan than earlier examples, are frequently viewed as the result of some acute 
need to completely replace outdated twelfth-century fortification styles with stronger and 
                                                 
893 Viollet-le-Duc, Dictionnaire, 1:341-42, trans. Macdermott, in An Essay, p. 31. 
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more 'scientific' designs. The introduction of heavy counterweight trebuchets is often 
regarded as the impetus behind this change. 
 
 
 
Theories Regarding the Influence of Artillery 
 
In the early twentieth century, Sydney Toy attributed the declining use of medieval rams 
to the superseding power of swing-beam artillery.894 Taking matters much further, Paul 
Chevedden has emerged as the champion of those arguing that the power of artillery 
during the Early and High Middle Ages has been grossly underestimated. The breadth of 
his studies is commendable and the subsequent impact of his arguments on general 
interpretations of medieval artillery cannot be understated. 
 Chevedden claims that the counterweight trebuchet was nothing less than the Big 
Bertha of the pre-modern era, used to demolish fortifications with projectiles weighing 
hundreds of kilograms.895 What began as a PhD thesis addressing al-'Adil's massive 
towers at Damascus, has developed into a broader theory explaining what he sees as a 
revolution in fortification, necessitated by a need to defend against powerful offensive 
artillery and to mount similar engines on top of towers.896 In Chevedden's own words, 
 
 The counterweight trebuchet was so far superior to any piece of artillery yet invented 
that its introduction brought about a revolution in siegecraft that rendered existing 
systems of defence obsolete. This gravity-powered siege-engine could discharge 
missiles of far greater weight than the traction or hybrid machines, and it could do 
so with remarkable accuracy. The machine was thus able to deliver devastating 
blows against the same spot of masonry time after time, and this made it potentially 
capable of demolishing the strongest fortified enclosures. The introduction of the 
counterweight trebuchet led to an increase in the scale of warfare and produced 
revolutionary changes in military architecture in order to counter the greater 
destructive power of this new artillery.897 
 
This theory was embraced by Hugh Kennedy and widely circulated in his notable work 
on crusader castles:  
                                                 
894 Toy, Castles, p. 142. 
895 Chevedden, "King James I," p. 313. 
896 See Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, pp. 283-84; Chevedden, "Fortifications," p. 36; Chevedden, 
"Invention," p. 71. 
897 Chevedden, "Invention," p. 76. 
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The development of this new and improved artillery fundamentally changed the 
balance between attack and defence. The engines became so effective that, given 
uninterrupted firing time, they would reduce any fortress to rubble. It was no use 
sitting behind castle walls and trusting in their strength: unless the defenders took 
active measures to neutralise the artillery, the fortress they had built would be 
destroyed as surely as the incoming tide washes away the children's sandcastle.898 
 
It is perhaps revealing that Chevedden's earliest and most poignant arguments focus on 
defensive artillery: the power of offensive artillery is emphasised in order to support a 
theory that defenders would have wanted to employ the same engines in defence. 
Accordingly, he suggests that the large mural towers built by al-'Adil were platforms for 
the heaviest contemporary counterweight trebuchets.899 
 Throughout his work, Chevedden attempts to place the invention of the 
counterweight trebuchet as early as possible. But by doing this, he is forced to suggest 
that the century between the invention of this type of engine, supposedly by Alexius 
Comnenus, and al-'Adil's construction campaign was one of development and 
experimentation.900 In the absence of evidence, he has relied upon a selection of isolated 
examples, pooled from Iberia to Anatolia, to support the notion that counterweight 
trebuchets were employed at this time. However, the ease with which knowledge of a 
small counterweight trebuchet allows for the construction of a much larger engine, and 
the futility of employing small counterweight trebuchets, render such a long period of 
development unlikely. Furthermore, there is very little evidence to indicate that breaching 
artillery was employed by the time of al-'Adil's death, suggesting that the design of his 
towers was influenced by other factors. 
 Looking at Frankish fortifications in the kingdom of Jerusalem, Ronnie Ellenblum 
has suggested that the construction of larger more sophisticated Frankish castles and the 
development of concentric defences in the last third of the twelfth century was a response 
                                                 
898 Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 108. 
899 See also Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 182; Nicolle, Crusader Castles, p. 44. Such arguments will be 
dealt with in Chapter 9. 
900 See Chevedden, "Invention," p. 73. Chevedden inappropriately cites a supposed delay between the 
introduction of effective siege guns and the inception of the bastion system of defence as a comparison. In 
reality, there was hardly a delay: the earliest polygonal bastions actually predate the effective use of light 
and mobile siege guns by the French during the Italian Wars from 1494. By the 1530s, polygonal 
fortifications had been built throughout the Italian peninsula, from the small forts of Nettuno and Barletta 
to elaborate urban defences of Ferrera, Lucca, Verona and Florence. See Mallett, "The Transformation of 
War, 1494-1530," pp. 3-21; Pepper, "The Face of the Siege," pp. 33-56; Black, European Warfare, 1494-
1660; Parker, "The 'Military Revolution'," pp. 196-214. 
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to the Muslims' use of heavy artillery.901 Concentricity, according to Ellenblum, was the 
only defence against this shift to heavy siege equipment.902 However, evidence to support 
this theory is less forthcoming than he would make it out to be. The castle at Jacob's Ford, 
which was captured without the aid of artillery in 1179, was one of only a few castles to 
be taken between 1160 and 1186. The walls of this stronghold appear to have been 
incomplete when it was attacked, in some areas only slightly higher than the earth piled 
up against them, probably serving as scaffolding,903 and there is no firm evidence to 
confirm that the stronghold was ever intended to have an outer wall, one was certainly 
not present in 1179. While no artillery appears to have been used at Jacob's Ford, 
Ellenblum claims that the two engines that were used against Kerak in 1170 were 
counterweight trebuchets.904 How he arrived at this conclusion is unclear, as is why he 
fails to address the subsequent sieges of 1183 and 1184, where many more stone-throwers 
were employed with greater effect. Critically, at none of these sieges is there any 
suggestion that artillery threatened the integrity of the castle's defences.905 
When examining the more general shift in the balance of power during the twelfth 
century, Ellenblum notes that Muslim sieges began to last longer as a result of the growing 
resources of Nur al-Din and Saladin. In an effort to juxtapose this with the supposedly 
drastically increased power of artillery, he suggests that the Franks took pre-emptive 
efforts to strengthen their fortifications.906 Although he discusses certain strongholds, he 
neglects any examination of the machines that he judges to be responsible for this 
supposedly drastic shift in fortification design. 
 Similarly, David Nicolle has emphasised the similarities between late Roman 
walls and those constructed by the Franks in the twelfth century. Highlighting tower 
spacing and projection as well as wall thickness, he implicitly ties these similarities to the 
                                                 
901 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, p. 237, cf. pp. 177-81. Ellenblum's presumption that many Frankish castles 
were dramatically developed during this period is largely pinned on a single passage in James of Vitry's 
history. Writing in the early thirteenth century, James of Vitry places the construction of Montreal, Kerak, 
Safed and Belvoir with the events of 1168, following Amalric's failed campaign in Egypt. Ellenblum 
suggests James of Vitry's remarks indicate that these castles were significantly developed around this time, 
acknowledging that earlier contemporary accounts confirm that most of these castles were built decades 
earlier, Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 177-81. Cf. James of Vitry, Historia orientalis 49, ed. and trans. 
Donnadieu, pp. 216-17. 
902 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, p. 284. 
903 Cf. Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, p. 269-70. 
904 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, p. 258. 
905 For discussions of the various sieges of Kerak, see Chapter 4. 
906 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, p. 237. 
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comparable power of Roman and early-twelfth-century artillery.907 Nicolle, following 
Ellenblum, interprets the Frankish fortification efforts of the 1160s and 1170s as a 
response to the effective employment of counterweight trebuchets, decades before al-
'Adil's building efforts.908 Nicolle risks contradicting this, however, when suggesting that 
this was also a period of continuity in siege warfare, as expressed by France and Marshall, 
ultimately conceding that the capabilities of counterweight trebuchets may often be 
significantly overstated.909 
 The issue with each of these theories is that they interpret the power of artillery 
purely through the hypothesis that it alone was responsible for the discernible shifts that 
may be seen in the design of fortifications in the late twelfth century. However, a number 
of other factors contributed to the construction of larger and more sophisticated castles 
around this time. Not least among these are the greater financial resources of their 
commissioners, the natural development/enlargement of existing structures and the 
opportunities for rebuilding in the latest style provided by the destruction wrought by 
earthquakes. 
 On the other side of this debate, Christopher Marshall has argued that the methods 
of attack and defence remained largely the same through the thirteenth century as they 
had been during the twelfth, suggesting that there was little technological change.910 This 
echoes sentiments expressed by Viollet-le-Duc, who asserted that even counterweight-
powered artillery could do little more than destroy crenellations, clear defenders from 
parapets and target the machines of the besieged, a view shared by Oman.911 John France 
has also supported this notion of continuity and a more obvious balance between attack 
and defence. 
 Without having studied artillery in depth, France appears to appreciate the 
limitations of this period's artillery, whether traction- or counterweight-powered, better 
than most.912 Placing these engines in a more appropriate tactical context, his conclusions 
                                                 
907 Nicolle, Crusader Castles, p. 57. Chevedden also alludes to these similarities, Chevedden, The Citadel 
of Damascus, pp. 7-8. 
908 Nicolle, Crusader Castles, p. 31. Michaudel has also accepted the influence of the counterweight 
trebuchet in driving the development of fortifications, through in a much broader and more subdued 
Ayyubid-Mamluk context, Michaudel, "Development of Islamic Military Architecture," p. 106. 
909 Nicolle, Crusader Castles, pp. 139, 142. 
910 Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p. 212. 
911 Viollet-le-Duc, Dictionnaire, 1:344, trans. Macdermott, in An Essay, p. 36; Oman, The Art of War in the 
Middle Ages, pp. 57-61; Oman, A History of the Art of War, p. 131. 
912 His acceptance that al-Zahir Ghazi's artillery breached the western bailey at Saone in 1188 is 
uncharacteristic of his otherwise critical treatment of artillery. 
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echo those expressed by Viollet-le-Duc.913 In the vast majority of instances where artillery 
is mentioned by the sources, it is not depicted as a kind of super-weapon but merely one 
of many familiar tools that could be used during a siege. 
 
 
 
Siege Length 
 
Perceived trends towards both longer and shorter sieges have been used to argue the 
increased use of heavy artillery. While Ellenblum has argued the former in the context of 
Saladin's sieges of the late twelfth century,914 the latter is often suggested in the context 
of the Mamluk period. Hugh Kennedy and Carole Hillenbrand have both viewed the 
brevity of certain Mamluk sieges as evidence of their more efficient use of artillery.915 
But such arguments rely heavily on circumstantial evidence, as neither approach takes 
into account the changing political climate and discrepancy between the resources of the 
various parties. While no Mamluk siege of a Frankish castle lasted more than six weeks, 
at no point did Saladin ever besiege a Frankish stronghold, in person, for a period of time 
any longer.916 
 Arguments focusing on the relative brevity of Mamluk sieges stem largely from a 
theory proposed by Christopher Marshall, which asserts that Muslim sieges of Latin 
strongholds in the thirteenth century lasted no more than a few weeks, while Frankish 
forces were content to besiege an objective for months.917 What is not emphasised is that 
all of these protracted Frankish sieges, save that of Damietta in 1218-19, were directed 
against the strongholds of fellow Franks.918 Although his data is somewhat skewed, 
Marshall sensibly acknowledges that the most important factor contributing to the brevity 
of most Muslim sieges of Frankish strongholds was the overwhelming manpower that the 
Muslims were able to bring against them.919 Rather than a tactical preference, the 
Muslims' more aggressive approach was a by-product of their ability to commit 
                                                 
913 France, Western Warfare, pp. 119-26.  
914 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, p. 284. 
915 Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 101; Hillenbrand, the Crusades, p. 531. 
916 The intermittent sieges of Belvoir (1187-89) and Beaufort (1189-90) are the closest to an exception. 
917 Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, pp. 241-46. 
918 When considering those between Christian powers, both the ongoing Ibelin-Imperialist and Genoese-
Venetian conflicts were tied to affairs in Europe. 
919 Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, pp. 247-48. 
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significant numbers to frontal assaults and incur high numerical losses. The cost of 
maintaining large armies in the field also contributed to some of the more aggressive siege 
strategies demonstrated by Zanki, Saladin and Baybars. The prospect of becoming 
bogged down in a lengthy siege, yielding few profits and often far from home, would also 
have encouraged opposition from the various contingents within the army. 
 When considering Frankish sieges of the twelfth century, most of the longest 
involved large contingents of crusaders, such as those of Antioch (1097-98) and Acre 
(1189-91), similar to the later siege of Damietta, while many of the prolonged sieges of 
coastal strongholds, such as Tyre (1124), involved considerable Italian naval support. The 
few that remain, such as the lengthy siege of Ascalon (1153), can be contrasted with the 
majority of Frankish sieges, which, like that of Banyas (1140), were concluded in a matter 
of weeks. 
Artillery had little effect on the length of most sieges. It remained a supporting 
weapon through the twelfth century and most of the thirteenth. Furthermore, neither the 
Franks nor the Muslims appear to have employed significantly stronger engines or built 
considerably stouter fortifications than the other. 
 
 
 
Development, Power and Resources 
 
The earthquakes of 1157, 1170 and 1202 necessitated the rebuilding of many Frankish 
and Muslim fortifications throughout greater Syria.920 While Nur al-Din's rebuilding 
efforts might be seen as stylistically 'traditional', a number of Frankish castles rebuilt at 
the same time are often viewed as radically innovative. Belvoir, built by the Hospitallers 
from around 1168 in two concentric squares, is the most exceptional. Crac des Chevaliers 
was also rebuilt by the Hospitallers from around 1170, but it was far from the mighty 
thirteenth-century castle that it would become. At the end of the twelfth century, Crac 
may have had a plan very similar to that of the contemporary Templar castle at Jacob's 
                                                 
920 For these tremors, see Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 326, 328-30, 338-40; Matthew of Edessa, 
Patmowt'iwn, trans. Dostourian, p. 267; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:87, 89, 185-86; 
Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, trans. Tritton, pp. 302-3; William of Tyre, Chronicon 20.18, ed. Huygens, 
pp. 934-36, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:370-71; letter from Geoffrey of Donjon, master of the Hospitallers, 
to Sancho VII of Navarra, and letter from Philip of Plessis, master of the Templars, to the abbot of Cîteaux, 
ed. Meyer in "Two Unpublished Letters on the Syrian Earthquake of 1202," pp. 306-10. 
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Ford.921 In Transjordan, Montreal and Kerak were spared the effects of these earthquakes: 
their impressive Frankish defences are the product of continuous development by their 
wealthy lords, while both were developed further by the Mamluks in the thirteenth 
century.922 As Belvoir would appear to be the only drastically different or considerably 
stronger Frankish castle built in a single phase in the late twelfth century, there is minimal 
evidence of a drastic architectural shift before the crisis of 1187. Most castles, like those 
elsewhere in the Near East and Europe, were the result of multiple phases of improvement 
and continual rather than one-time investment. 
 The fortifications constructed in the last third of the twelfth century would have 
been designed with contemporary artillery in mind. Likewise, those that were not 
developed by proprietors who had the means to do so were probably judged to be 
sufficiently strong. Critically, both Frankish and Muslim defences dating to this period 
display towers of a similar scale to those built much earlier in the twelfth century and 
walls of a thickness similar to preceding fortification traditions. The architecture, 
therefore, appears to support the textual evidence: artillery, even if counterweight-
powered, was not a significant threat to fortified masonry in the 1170s, nor in the 1180s 
if Saladin's defences at Cairo are considered. Not until the early thirteenth century is there 
a notable shift. 
 The military orders were responsible for an increasing proportion of the Franks' 
rural castles from the late twelfth century. Their enlargement of certain strongholds in the 
early thirteenth century must be seen in the context of their greater wealth and the 
drastically different balance of political power after the events of 1187. When assessing 
the development of any stronghold, it is necessary to analyse both the socio-political 
situation and financial resources of the commissioner as well as the potential threats to 
the stronghold's security. 
 Fortifications ultimately reflect the wealth of those who built them and the 
resources that they were prepared to invest. The greatest castles built by the baronage 
during the twelfth century were constructed by the realm's wealthiest nobles; however, 
                                                 
921 For a study of Crac as it may have stood at the end of the twelfth century, see Biller, "Die erste Burg der 
Johanniter (nach 1170)," pp. 47-77. 
922 For the foundation and development of Montreal, see Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 
2.55, ed. Hagenmeyer, pp. 592-93, trans. Ryan p. 215; Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 12.21, 
ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 856-57; Faucherre, et al., "La forteresse de Shawbak," pp. 50-64; Pringle, 
Churches, 2:304-14. For the foundation and development of Kerak, see William of Tyre, Chronicon 15.21, 
22.28, ed. Huygens, 2:692-93, 1,055-56, trans. Babcock and Krey 2:127, 499. See also Deschamps, Les 
Châteaux, 2:35-98. 
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most of the kingdom's larger castles dating to the first half of the twelfth century were 
founded and financed by the monarchy.923 Of these, most were bestowed upon the secular 
baronage and the military orders, a practice which continued up to the construction of 
Jacob's Ford. By the reign of Amalric, the nobility was increasingly reorienting its focus 
from the countryside to the coastal towns, taking advantage of both the prosperity and 
security of these regions. The wealth of the military orders permitted them to acquire a 
number of former baronial castles, which they could afford to defend and even develop 
sometimes. Most of the strongholds that Saladin failed to take or bypassed in 1187-88, 
including Chastel Blanc, Tortosa, Crac des Chevaliers and Margat, belonged to the 
military orders. The extended resistance of Templar Safed and Hospitaller Belvoir can 
also be cited. However, some castles, such as Beaufort, Saone and Kerak, remained under 
secular nobles, who could afford their upkeep, until they were lost in the aftermath of 
Hattin. 
 The loss of Frankish lands in the 1180s further encouraged the baronage to sell 
their inland properties to the military orders. The impoverished monarchy, and efforts of 
visiting crusaders, such as Richard I of England, Frederic II of Germany, Richard of 
Cornwall and Louis IX of France, focused on developing the coastal fortifications 
responsible for defending the largest Frankish populations, commerce and links with 
Europe. The Templars developed coastal 'Atlit and Tortosa for similar reasons. 
 Further inland, most territories that were reacquired during the Third Crusade or 
afterwards, were far more exposed than they had been during most of the twelfth century. 
The military orders recognised that any besieging force that invested one of their inland 
castles would almost certainly be larger than most of those encountered during the twelfth 
century while any friendly relieving force would be comparatively smaller and slower to 
muster. This meant that these strongholds might even need to hold out longer than the 
enemy could afford to besiege them. It was these factors that led to the 
construction/development of such strong Frankish castles as 'Atlit and Crac des 
Chevaliers in the early thirteenth century, not the appearance of some new or drastically 
more powerful type of artillery. 
  
                                                 
923 The vast majority of fortified structures built by the Franks during the twelfth century were small towers. 
Constructed by various landholders, these were centres of administration and even residences as much as 
defensible strongpoints. In this way, they bear certain similarities to the seventh- through eight-century 
system of land control established by the Islamic lords of the Near East, see Carver, "Transition to Islam," 
pp. 192-93. For the Frankish structures see Pringle, The Red Tower. 
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Concentricity 
 
Although there was continuity in the principles and methods of attack and defence from 
1097 to 1291, this was not a period without advance in the methods and technology of 
both defence and attack. While artillery may have improved more than any other kind of 
offensive weaponry, mining remained the most effective technique for breaching walls. 
It was mining, coupled with the numerical strength of thirteenth-century Muslim armies 
that most likely encouraged the Franks to build their defences with increasing depth. 
Utilising multiple lines of defence placed as many obstacles as possible between any 
hostile adversary and a final point of defence, from which a last stand could be made or 
terms of surrender could be negotiated. In most instances, concentricity was the product 
of progressive development rather than a single construction phase: a tendency to add 
further lines of defences around pre-existing ones.924 
When encountering any stronghold, a besieger had to calculate the strength of the 
obstacles that it presented and the expense in specie and manpower that it would take to 
overcome them. Furthermore, factors of morale had to be considered and the costs of 
assaults and blockades of varying degrees of aggression had to be weighed against the 
likelihood that the garrison would be relieved before success was achieved. Saladin's 
avoidance of certain castles in 1188, such as Crac and Margat, reflects this, as do the 
relatively passive blockades of Kerak and Montreal. 
Any stronghold could be taken provided the besieger had an endless supply of 
assault troops; however, mining was the most efficient means of breaching a defensive 
trace in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In addition to multiple lines of fortifications, 
through-columns, ditches and taluses were employed to discourage or frustrate sappers.925 
Testament to the effectiveness of this approach, the latest defences built at Acre appear 
to have been those that were undermined in 1291. Mining and frontal attacks, rather than 
artillery, were the most significant threats that encouraged the construction of these added 
lines of defence.  
                                                 
924 The addition of surrounding walls to early twelfth-century towers were some of the earliest examples of 
this. For numerous examples, see Pringle, Secular Buildings; Pringle, The Red Tower. 
925 The former is explained by Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir and Ibn al-Furat in the context of Caesarea, Ibn 'Abd al-
Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:555-56; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:70. See also 
Vitruvius, De architectura 2.8.7, ed. Krohn, p. 43, trans. Morgan, pp. 52-53. For a brief introduction to 
their use in the Levant during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see Yovitchitch, Forteresses, pp. 84-88. 
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Wall Thickness 
 
Perhaps the most definitive evidence of the limited power of this period's artillery is the 
relative continuity of wall thicknesses. Ellenblum and Raphael have argued the opposite, 
suggesting that the average thickness of fortified walls in the kingdom of Jerusalem 
increased from about 2-2.5 m in the early and mid-twelfth century to 4-5 m in the 1160s. 
Having based their conclusions on only six examples (Bethgibelin, Kerak, Belvoir, 
Jacob's Ford, 'Atlit and Caesarea), using a single measurement from each to characterise 
the strength of the entire stronghold, the fallibility of their conclusions is readily 
apparent.926 
 
'Atlit:  
When wall thickness is discussed, the 5 m thick walls of 'Atlit's two inner towers are 
frequently referenced; however, the castle's 200 m long outer wall is even thicker.927 This 
wall is 6.5 m thick and solid at the first level. A mural gallery halves the thickness of the 
wall at the second level, providing access to casemates and creating an additional fighting 
level below the parapet.928 The walls of the three mural towers mimic this: they are close 
to 6 m thick at the first level but the outward face of the second level is only 1 m thick, 
allowing for six embrasures in this wall of the southern and middle towers and four in 
that of the northern tower. The thickness of the curtain wall is also compromised at the 
second level in order to provide embrasures, each accessed via a casemate wide enough 
to accommodate two archers that extends more than 1 m into the thickness of the wall. 
Collectively, as many as seventy archers could have fired simultaneously from this level 
of the outer defences alone.929 
The designers of this line obviously felt it necessary for the walls to be extremely 
thick at their base, but were quite willing to sacrifice this at the second level in order to 
                                                 
926 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 239-40; Raphael, Muslim Fortresses, pp. 42-43. There would appear 
to be little evidence to suggest that the thickest section of Kerak's Frankish defences, the northern wall, 
which is used to 'typify' the castle's defences, dates later than the 1140s. 
927 For excavations and observations at 'Atlit, see Johns Guide to 'Atlit; Rey, Étude sur les monuments, pp. 
97-99; Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 1:293-96. 
928 Boas, Crusader Archaeology, pp. 111-12. 
929 Johns, Guide to 'Atlit, pp. 38-39; Johns, "Excavations at Pilgrims' Castle, (1932)," p. 153. This is based 
on the presumption that the spacing of the surviving casemates was continued along the ruined sections of 
the mural gallery and that the casemates, 3 m wide, were designed to incorporate two archers. 
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maximise the number of archers that could fire from within the wall, as well as on top of 
it. This suggests that mining and frontal assaults were feared most. The thin outer wall of 
the upper level of each tower 
would have been the most 
exposed to artillery fire, 
indicating that artillery was 
considered no more of a 
breaching weapon at this point 
than it had been earlier. The 
designers appear to have been 
vindicated shortly afterwards 
when, following an initial attack 
while the castle was still under 
construction, the fortress resisted 
Mu'azzam 'Isa's artillery in the 
autumn of 1220.930 If these towers 
postdate the siege of 1220, there 
can be little doubt that the 
designers believed these tower 
walls to be strong enough to resist 
just such engines.  
                                                 
930 For the sieges of 1218/19 and 1220, see Chapter 6. 
'Atlit: southern outer tower, plan, elevation and 
section (after Johns) 
'Atlit: outer defences, plan (after Johns) 
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Purpose and Inconsistency: 
Whereas Ellenblum and Raphael characterise the walls of 'Atlit as 5 m thick, they portray 
those of Kerak as 2.5 m thick. This is thicker than some of the castle's eastern and western 
walls but thinner than the important north wall. At Montfort, which they inexplicably do 
not include, certain external walls are only about 1 m thick while those of the keep are up 
to 7 m thick. Although extremely thick walls were built in certain parts of some castles 
in the early thirteenth century, this was not done consistently along all exposed fronts. 
 As at 'Atlit, many of the thickest walls appear to have been built to accommodate 
defenders within or on top of them. At Subayba, the Ayyubid wall extending north from 
tower 9, originally 1.4 m thick, was thickened considerably in 1240. This seems to have 
been done to create a broad fighting platform above, as casemates about 4 m wide were 
inserted into the bulk of the wall below. To the east of tower 9, a similar platform was 
created by adding a 0.5 m backing to the wall, allowing 
for the construction of a barrel vault between the curtain 
and the nearby reservoir.931 The thickening of Saone's 
outer eastern wall after 1188 may have been done with 
similar objectives.932 At Bourzey, the Ayyubid curtain 
and tower walls are at least as thick as the previous 
Byzantine and Frankish walls, but their casemates 
extend much farther into the masonry than earlier ones. 
Other castles, such as Crac des Chevaliers and Tortosa 
weakened otherwise much thicker walls by creating 
mural galleries to accommodate small arms fire, as was 
done at 'Atlit. 
 Walls dating to the thirteenth century are not always thicker than those built 
earlier. The thickest Ayyubid walls at Subayba are comparable to the 2.4 m thick walls 
excavated around the northwest tower at Banyas,933 while what appears to be the northern 
wall of the Frankish citadel of Tiberias is 3.4 m thick.934 Likewise, sections of twelfth-
                                                 
931 Hartal, al-Subayba, pp. 94-99, 103. 
932 Michaudel, "Le château de Saône," p. 3. See also Michaudel, "Development of Islamic Military 
Architecture," pp. 113-16. 
933 This 10.6 m by 15.7 m tower was subsequently enclosed in a larger 18.8 m by 26.0 m tower, Hartal, 
"Banyas." 
934 Stepansky, "Tiberias, the Courtyard of the Jews"; Stepansky, "The Crusader Castle of Tiberias," p. 179. 
See also Pringle, Churches, 2:352-53 and fig. 99. 
Bourzey: tower 3, plan (after 
Mesqui) 
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century Frankish masonry may be the thickest medieval walls at Beaufort, despite 
significant remodelling by both the Ayyubids and Mamluks.935 The tenth-century tower 
that anchored the northern defences of the citadel of Shayzar are just as thick as those of 
the bridge tower constructed ahead of it by the Mamluks, while the Zankid curtain running 
in between is significantly thinner than both.936 
 At smaller sites, the subsequent outer walls built around Bethgibelin, Belmont, 
Latrun and St Elias (at-Taiyiba) appear to be thinner than the walls of their earlier 
keeps.937 The same is true of the outer walls of Jubayl (Byblos) and Chastel Rouge (Qal'at 
Yahmur), although these castles might have been constructed in a single phase.938 Similar 
trends can also be seen in Europe, as at Conisbrough where the keep, built around 1170, 
has walls 4.5 m thick but the later bailey walls are significantly thinner.939 
 The walls of towers built in the kingdom of Jerusalem during the early twelfth 
century average about 2.5 m thick.940 Most fortified walls built by the Ayyubids during 
the thirteenth century are 2-3.5 m thick, similar to those built by the Franks. Although 
walls much thicker than this were built at certain sites, such exceptions are not unique to 
this period. Most classical walls were no more than about 2 m thick; however, the third-
century Roman walls of Nicaea are twice as thick as the 1.6-2 m thick forewall built 
around them by the Lascarids in the thirteenth century.941 The celebrated walls built by 
Theodosius II around Constantinople in the fifth-century are 5 m thick,942 while Anna 
Comnena claims that the walls of Durazzo were so thick that four men could ride abreast 
along them.943 The mud-brick main curtain of Raqqa, founded in the eighth century by 
                                                 
935 This is accurate so long as Corvisier's judgement that the southwest circular bastion was built by the 
Ottomans, Corvisier, "Les campagnes de construction," pp. 243-66. 
936 Tonghini and Montevecchi, "The Fortification of the Access System," pp. 219-20. 
937 For Bethgibelin, see Cohen, "The Fortification of the Fortress of Gybelin," pp. 67-75. For Belmont, see 
Harper and Pringle, Belmont Castle. For Latrun, see Pringle, Secular Buildings, no. 136, pp. 64-65; Boas, 
Archaeology of the Military Orders, p. 111. For St Elias, see Pringle, Secular Buildings, no. 215, pp. 98-
99. 
938 For Jubayl, see Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 3:203-15; Rey, Étude sur les monuments, pp. 217-19. For 
Chastel Rouge, see Mesqui, "Qal'at Yahmur"; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 73-75; Deschamps, Les 
Châteaux, 3:317-19. 
939 This castle was built by Hamelin of Warenne, grandson of Fulk of Jerusalem and uncle of Richard I of 
England. For the castle, see Brindle, "The Keep at Conisbrough Castle," pp. 61-65. 
940 Pringle, "Towers in Crusader Palestine," pp. 343-46. 
941 A. W. Lawrence, "A Skeletal History," pp. 172-73. The discrepancy here is likely attributable to the 
height of each wall, the inner wall being twice that of the thinner thirteenth-century outer wall. 
942 A. W. Lawrence, "A Skeletal History," p. 180. 
943 Anna Comnena, Alexiad 13.3, trans. Sewter, p. 403. 
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al-Mansur, is almost 6 m thick and enclosed by an outer wall 4.5 m thick.944 These are all 
dwarfed by the 6.4-7.2 m thick Iron Age walls of Jerusalem.945 
 Although there is a slight rise in the average thickness of fortified walls between 
the twelfth century and the thirteenth, this appears to have had little to do with artillery. 
In some instances thick walls were built to provide a broad fighting platform while in 
others they were structurally necessary to build towers with more impressive vaulting or 
higher walls. It is closer to the end of the thirteenth century when tower walls, built by 
the Mamluks, become consistently thicker. But even as this took place, the thickness of 
curtain walls remained largely the same. 
 
Mamluk Towers: 
There are discernible trends towards the construction of stronger towers around the start 
of the Mamluk period. At Bosra, two of the earliest Ayyubid towers, 6 and 8, were 
encased by al-Salih Ayyub in 1249 and Nasir Yusuf in 1251 respectively. Al-Salih Isma'il 
had already wrapped al-'Adil's northwest corner tower with a talus in 1240-41 and about 
a decade later this was extended around many eastern sections of the citadel. While the 
talus was almost certainly used as a defence against mining, the motives for encasing 
towers 6 and 8 are less clear.946 
 At Subayba, towers 9 and 11, located at the west end of the castle, were 
significantly enlarged when they were encased after 1260. Rather than to protect these 
towers from mining or artillery, the expansion of tower 11 seems to have been done to 
construct an opulent upper level, while the bristling defences given to tower 9 may have 
been intended to shield the gateway at the base of tower 11. At Kerak, the original 
Frankish defences at the south end of the castle have been obscured by the present 
Mamluk tower. Whatever the form of the structure that once stood here, it was replaced 
by a tower with an exterior southern wall 6.5 m thick.947 While the scale of this four-
levelled tower indicates that it was built to inspire awe, the thickness of the outer wall and 
dedicating inscription appear to defy any attempt to erect artillery on the ridge to the 
south, from which the castle would have been in range by the end of the thirteenth century. 
                                                 
944 Creswell, "Fortification in Islam," p. 108. 
945 Avigad, "Excavations in the Jewish Quarter," pp. 130-34. 
946 The smaller towers may have been enlarged to giving the citadel a more uniform appearance from 
without. 
947 Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 2:88-89. 
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 At Montreal, Mamluk towers 
E, F, I and L, as well as the less 
impressive G and H, appear to have 
been constructed around pre-existing 
Frankish towers.948 While most of 
the earlier Frankish embrasures were 
enlarged into casemates, the lower 
levels of towers F and L, and 
possibly also G and H, were 
completely enclosed and some of 
tower E's Frankish embrasures were 
not carried forward. This initial loss 
of firepower at the lowest level was 
more than compensated for above. 
As at Subayba, the reason for 
expanding these towers appears to 
have been to allow more archers to 
fire outwards from a level below the 
battlements, the thickening of the 
walls being a byproduct. Tower E, as the most exposed, deserves closer examination: if 
Montfort was within range of heavy artillery in 1271, it stands to reason that tower E 
could have been assailed from the plateau to the northwest of the castle by this period. 
Montreal's tower E displays an inscription to Husam al-Din Lajin, so would 
appear to postdate the program of destruction carried out by al-Ashraf Khalil in the early 
1290s. Similar inscriptions on towers F and I indicate that these were part of a broader 
refortification effort that took place at a time when the effects of heavy counterweight 
artillery were known. Accordingly, it seems only reasonable to assume that the designers 
of tower E, the only one that could be practically bombarded by artillery, took such 
engines into consideration. 
                                                 
948 For a recent study of the castle, see Faucherre, et al., "La forteresse de Shawbak," pp. 43-66. 
Montreal: castle, plan (after Brown) 
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 Tower E encases two 
earlier towers, stretching almost 
40 m wide but projecting less 
than 10 m. Its base is solid, built 
down the slope in advance of the 
earlier fortifications in order to 
compensate for the gradient. At 
the first level, two casemates are 
accessible from the earlier 
Frankish towers. Between the 
two earlier towers is a solid mass 
of masonry, about 8 m thick, 
which supports a line of eight, or 
possibly nine, casemates at the 
second level. The third level was 
presumably an open fighting 
platform. The tower appears to 
have been expanded in order to 
allow more archers to fire at the 
plateau to the northeast of the 
castle. The solid base and stout 
lower level would have been 
resistant to the effects of both 
mining and artillery. At the 
second level, the sides of the roughly 3.5 m wide casemates extend back the entire width 
of the solid wall below. This compartmentalisation would have restricted the spread of 
damage if a breach were opened at the end of one of the casemates, while the breach itself 
would be quite high and hard for an assailant to access. 
 Unlike contemporary towers L and I, tower E was not provided with a glacis, nor 
were embrasures created in its flanks.949 Focused solely on the northwestern plateau, and 
with no apparent means of defending the base of the tower, the tower's designers feared 
                                                 
949 The length of these two glacises, extending longer at their northern ends, possibly indicate that they were 
partly intended to obstruct passage around the base of the castle. For these defences see Faucherre, et al., 
"La forteresse de Shawbak," pp. 43-66. 
Montreal: tower E, plan and section (after Faucherre 
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neither a massed assault nor mining here. Tower 
F would appear to have been expanded for 
similar reasons: the shallow Frankish tower was 
replaced by a rounded one, providing its four 
embrasures with a better field of fire. The 
expansion of tower L also provided more 
embrasures, six of which were directed against 
the northwestern plateau, although it was 
probably out of range. The orientation of so 
many embrasures in this direction appears to 
confirm that those who reorganised the castle's 
defences at the end of the thirteenth century 
judged this plateau to be the point from which 
any assault would be organised. 
At Shayzar, the Mamluk enlargement of 
the donjon complex at the southern end of the 
citadel provided additional embrasures around 
the pre-existing Ayyubid structure but did little 
to strengthen it. Extending down the slope, as at Subayba and Montreal, the Mamluk 
builders added two southward embrasures at the level of the existing Ayyubid ones, two 
more below in a sub-level and what appear to be four more across an upper level that 
stretched across the lower 
Mamluk and Ayyubid 
structures. While this added 
more firepower, it did not 
strengthen the walls, which 
could be assailed from the 
town to the west or from the 
far side of the ditch to the 
south. The obvious attempt 
to blend the new masonry 
with that of the Ayyubids 
and the addition of an upper 
Shayzar: donjon complex, plan (after Tonghini and 
Montevecchi) 
Montreal: tower F, plan (after 
Faucherre) 
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level suggest that there were considerations 
beyond military ones inspiring this work.950 
The most obvious examples of stronger 
Mamluk towers are the solid ones at Crac 
des Chevaliers and Margat. 
There was no effort to provide lower 
firing levels in the quadrangular tower that 
was added to the outer southern wall of 
Crac. Save a narrow passage servicing a 
postern and a single internal level, which is 
more of a gallery built around a central pier, 
the tower is solid. At Margat, a much 
smaller rounded tower was built to anchor 
the outer southern wall where it had been 
undermined in 1285. Similar to that at Crac, 
the tower is solid except for an internal 
gallery, which wraps around a proportionately larger semicircular pillar, just below the 
roof. While it is possible that these towers might have been built solid in response to the 
increasing power of artillery, the impressive talus at Margat, from which the tower rises, 
suggests that mining was considered to be at least as much of a threat. These towers were 
the most solidly constructed in this region during the Frankish period, but they are also 
unique in this regard. 
In contrast to the solid towers at Crac and Margat, and those bristling with 
embrasures at Subayba and Montreal, most of the Mamluk additions to Beaufort reveal 
greater attention to ornamental and residential considerations than militaristic ones. While 
it would appear that Montreal was still considered to be on a frontier, the additions at 
Beaufort suggest that this area was quite secure when this building was undertaken. 
 While certain towers built by Qalawun may have been designed to resist more 
powerful artillery, fortifications designed under Baybars, like some of those laid out half 
a century earlier, placed far greater importance on providing liberal numbers of 
embrasures along exposed fronts. The degree to which Baybars' architects were 
influenced by the threat of another Mongol invasion of Western Syria, and massed frontal 
                                                 
950 See Tonghini and Montevecchi, "The Castle of Shayzar," pp. 137-50. 
Beaufort: castle, plan (after Corvisier) 
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assaults that might accompany this, is unclear. Although there is evidence of increasingly 
strong counterweight trebuchets from about the 1260s, it remains an important 
consideration that none of these appears to have effected a breach leading to the fall of a 
stronghold.951 These were not the bombards of the fourteenth century nor the early field 
guns of the late fifteenth. Accordingly, walls were not uniformly thickened and solid 
towers remained rare. Another indication that artillery was not yet a breaching weapon is 
the continued development of gateways. 
 
 
 
Entrances 
 
A point of fixation among many military historians of the nineteenth century and early 
twentieth, is the development of bent-entrances. As apertures, gateways were normally 
weak points in an enceinte, until certain gatehouses were developed to such a point in the 
fourteenth century that they became the strongest part of certain traces. Such elaborate 
gatehouses were then rendered superfluous in the sixteenth century with the development 
of effective siege guns. 
                                                 
951 Mufaddal ibn Abi'l-Fada'il's account of the siege of 'Akkar would appear to be an exception, Mufaddal, 
Kitab, ed. and trans. Blochet, 1:532. 
Beaufort: castle, section (from Yasmine) 
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 The concept of the bent entrance as a means 
of strengthening gateways had been advocated by 
classical authors.952 Although less popular with the 
Romans than with the Greeks, this style of gateway 
found use again in the Middle Ages. Twelfth-century 
Frankish examples of such can be found at Kerak, 
Montreal, Belvoir, Baghras and the St Stephen's Gate 
barbican at Jerusalem, while the Bab al-Barqiyya is 
just one example of Saladin's use of this type of 
entrance.953 It would be difficult to explain the 
increasing sophistication of gateways during this 
period if it was, as some have suggested, one 
dominated by the development of curtain-breaching 
artillery. Instead, the continued development of 
gateways is another indication that artillery was not 
as powerful as certain literal readings of the sources might suggest. 
                                                 
952 For example, Vitruvius, De architectura 1.5.2, ed. Krohn, p. 18, trans. Morgan, p. 22. 
953 For a discussion of the rediscovery of this means of defence, see Creswell, "Fortification in Islam," pp. 
101-8. The barbican of St Stephen's Gate is the hardest of these bent-entrances to discern today, for a study 
of the gate, see Wightman, "The Damascus Gate," 45-60. For gateways and their development in this region 
more generally, see Yovitchitch, Forteresses du Proche-Orient, pp.217-59. 
Aleppo: citadel gatehouse, plan 
(after Herzfeld) 
Cairo: Bab al-Barqiyya, LIDAR scan (after CyArk) 
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 The addition of a bent entrance was one of the first alterations made to 'Ajlun 
following its original construction,954 while other Ayyubid examples can be found at 
Damascus, Baalbek, Bosra, Harim, Apamea, Bourzey, Subayba, Shayzar, Qal'at Najm 
and Qal'at al-Mudiq. Frankish examples from the early to mid-thirteenth century can be 
found at 'Atlit, Margat, Caesarea and Tortosa. However, the two most famous entrances 
from this period are probably the thirteenth-century Hospitaller/Mamluk entrance ramp 
at Crac des Chevalier and al-Zahir Ghazi's great gatehouse at Aleppo, each forcing anyone 
attempting to enter to make a number of 90 or 180 turns, totalling 540 in the case of 
Aleppo. The continued development of gateways by the Mamluks, as at Crac, Beaufort, 
Safed and Shayzar, confirms the limitations of even the heaviest trebuchets.955 
 
 
 
Dressing 
 
While it was wealth that led thirteenth-
century fortifications to be built larger and 
taller, artillery may have had a more subtle 
influence on design. Some historians have 
suggested that bossed masonry, which was 
employed heavily through the twelfth 
century and early thirteenth, had a defensive 
purpose.956 Such arguments assert that by 
leaving the centre of each block to protrude, 
it would prevent any incoming projectiles 
from striking the wall squarely, thus 
diminishing the percussive force transferred 
upon collision. If effective, why did this style 
                                                 
954 Yovitchitch, "The Tower of Aybak," p. 228. 
955 Mamluk examples of gateway development can be seen at castles such as Crac de Chevaliers, Beaufort, 
Safed and Shayzar. 
956 For example, Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, p. 274; Nicolle, Crusader Castles, p. 52. For bossed 
masonry generally, see Viollet-le-Duc, Dictionnaire, 2:216-18. Studies of masonry dressing began as 
attempts to date standing architecture in the nineteenth century, Clermont-Ganneau, Archaeological 
Researches, 1:3-46; Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 3:448. For further thoughts on this 
topic, see Boase, "Military Architecture," p. 143; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, p. 384. 
'Ajlun: northeast tower, from the north 
(author) 
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of masonry, widely employed by 
Frankish architects during twelfth 
century and Ayyubid builders in the 
early thirteenth, decline in 
popularity during the thirteenth 
century as artillery grew stronger? 
 The theory falls apart when 
examined more closely. To begin 
with, most examples of such 
masonry have relatively flat bosses. 
This can be seen in cases where 
small blocks were used, as at Saone, 
Jubayl, Cursat, Shayzar and 
Ayyubid Subayba, as well as where 
mammoth blocks were employed, 
as at 'Atlit, Montfort, Mamluk 
Subayba and the Tower of David.957 
More rounded bosses, as can be 
found in certain areas at 'Ajlun, are 
rather rare by comparison. The 
effect of even these would have 
been negligible when considering 
that the walls of which they were the final extension were over 2 m thick. Small rounded 
bosses could have deflected the force of relatively light projectiles but these would have 
posed little threat the thick walls behind. While it might be suggested that the bosses 
placed more mass between the point of collision and the back of the wall, this could easily 
be achieved if the margins of each block were not cut away, preserving a more natural 
plane. 
 Hopes that a smoother dressing would deflect projectiles better, given the lower 
surface friction, may have contributed to the declining use of bossed masonry by the 
                                                 
957 Similar bossed masonry can be found at a number of European castles in the Bas-Rhin, such as Ottrott 
(thirteenth-century), Dambach-la-Ville (thirteenth-century) and Wangenbourg (fourteenth-century), and 
elsewhere at Montréal in Ardèche (thirteenth-century), Chaudenay-le-Château in Côte-d'Or (early-
fourteenth-century) and the Narbonnaise gate at Carcassonne (late-thirteenth-century). 
'Atlit: northern inner tower, from the north (British 
Mandate photograph) 
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Franks in the thirteenth century. Notably, smooth masonry and rounded towers were 
frequently used together by the Hospitallers, as at Crac, Margat and possibly Arsuf.958 
The Templars continued to employ a range of masonry styles, from the smooth masonry 
at Chastel Blanc, to the rough work at Baghras, but appear to have favoured the bossed 
style found at 'Atlit, Tortosa and Sidon. 
 The use of marginally-drafted ashlar was likely inspired for reasons other than 
military necessity. Shaping stones this way was cheaper, easier and faster than smoothly 
dressing each block. The only military consideration might have been one of aesthetics: 
such rough bosses could disguise the effects of light projectiles, shielding the integrity of 
the smooth margins and an impression of faultlessness. 
 
 
 
Tower Shape 
 
The increasing use of rounded towers in the thirteenth century has also been linked to the 
increasing power of artillery. The defensive advantages of such a design had been 
recognised in antiquity: Vitruvius had extolled the virtues of round towers against mining, 
rams and other machines and Ammianus identified the weakness of rectangular towers in 
his account of Julian's siege of the Assyrian town of Pirisabora.959 Some modern scholars 
have amended these sentiments and suggested that the greater use of round towers in the 
thirteenth century was influenced by their ability to deflect artillery fire. 
 In attempting to explain the shift towards rounded towers, Kennedy has suggested 
that the weakness of quadrangular towers was two-fold: the susceptibility of their corners 
to mining, and the shelter that they provided at the base of their outward face, which 
allowed sappers to work in relative safety.960 While the former would appear to have been 
inspired by our classical commentators, the latter is suited better to the Early Modern 
period and systems of polygonal defences. Although both have merit, neither is sufficient 
                                                 
958 It is possible that the defences of Arsuf predate the castle's acquisition by the Hospitallers; however, 
they would appear to postdate 1240, see Ewart, et al., "Dundonald Castle Excavations," pp. 130-41. 
959 Vitruvius, De architectura 1.5.5, ed. Krohn, p. 19, trans. Morgan, p. 23; Ammianus, Res gestae 24.2.9-
12, ed. Eyssenhardt, pp. 298-99, trans. Younge, pp. 351-52. 
960 Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 114. 
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to explain why beaked or pentagonal towers, which were simpler to construct, were not 
adopted instead.961 
 Rounded towers had been used frequently by the Romans and continued to be a 
fixture in Byzantine architecture. They were subsequently adopted in Muslim building at 
a time when the construction of stone fortifications experienced a hiatus in much of 
Europe. Before the First Crusade, rounded towers were built by the Armenians in Cilicia 
and were used to flank the eleventh-century Bab al-Futuh in Cairo.962 The earliest 
examples of rounded towers at a Frankish castle appear to be those along the eastern wall 
of Saone, although these may rest on earlier foundations, and are virtually the only 
examples of such until the early thirteenth century.963 Throughout the twelfth century, 
most Frankish towers were quadrangular, similar to those built in Latin Europe.964 
Quadrangular towers were simple to construct and provided a convenient internal space 
to inhabit. Although more complicated to build, rounded towers provided a better field of 
view and distributed structural weight more evenly. Rounded towers became increasingly 
popular during the thirteenth century but did not replace quadrangular towers completely. 
The latter were regularly built by the Templars and were used exclusively at Caesarea by 
Louis IX, despite his use of round towers elsewhere, as at Aigues-Mortes. 
Al-'Adil experimented with large-angular plans at Harran in the late twelfth 
century but abandoned these for more simple quadrangular layouts in the early thirteenth. 
Although the Mamluks appear to have preferred quadrangular towers in most cases, 
rounded towers were built at Subayba, Safed, Crac and Margat. The continued and 
frequent use of quadrangular towers through the thirteenth century, especially in Muslim 
                                                 
961 Towers of this shape have precedent in antiquity, such as those at Salona, and were adopted to a degree 
by Frederick II in Italy. 
962 For the most comprehensive study of Armenian fortifications in Cilicia, see Edwards, The Fortifications 
of Armenian Cilicia. For the Armenian-built gates of Cairo, see Creswell, "Fortification in Islam," pp. 113-
19. 
963 The rounded towers at Baghras may be another rare example of twelfth-century rounded towers built by 
the Franks; however, the dating of these towers is unclear and it cannot be said with certainty that they were 
not built after 1188, either by the Armenians or by the Templars. 
964 Anglo-French examples of circular or near-circular large-angular towers include the keeps of Arundel, 
Windsor, Cardiff, Carisbrooke, Tonbridge, Tickhill, Chilham, Odiham, and Château-sur-Epte as well as the 
enclosure around the keep of Farnham. More developed circular keep-towers date from the reign of Henry 
III in England and Philip II in France. For some of these early towers, see Colvin, ed., The History of King's 
Works, 1:75-78. Experimentation with rounded forms can be found at Provins, Houdan, Etampes and Gisors 
in France as well as Orford, Conisbrough and Longtown in England. By the thirteenth century, notable 
circular keeps were built at Coucy, Pembroke, Bothwell, Dourdan, Villeneuve-sur-Yonne, Aigues-Mortes 
and Flint, some similar to the large keep tower built by Baybars at Safed. 
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architecture, is a strong indicator that the threat of artillery was not a significant incentive 
to build round towers. 
 Hugh Kennedy has suggested that the more widespread adoption of round towers 
in Europe, at least in England and northern France, was in part linked with the crusades.965 
 
[I]t is likely that the use of trebuchets and possibly mining were originally learned 
during the Crusader wars. Certainly Richard I used men from the Crusader states 
among his artillery men. It is not surprising therefore, that the architects of defensive 
works adopted some similar designs to thwart these new methods of assault.966 
 
However, mining had been undertaken by the Franks at Nicaea in 1097, their first siege 
in the Near East, and the artillery that Richard I employed at Acre in 1191, which he had 
prepared ahead of time on Cyprus, appears to have been at least as powerful as that of 
Saladin. Furthermore, there is no dramatic change in the way that the chroniclers deal 
with the artillery used by these men in Europe when they returned.967 Lastly, rounded 
towers had been built by both Richard I and Philip II in Europe before they went on 
crusade, while rounded towers survived in certain town walls dating to the Roman period. 
 There is little to support a direct link between the increased use of round towers 
and the emergence of counterweight artillery, despite the chronological correlation. At 
best there are circumstantial indications that some rounded towers might have been 
designed with artillery in mind. The southern faces of the three towers at the south end of 
the inner defences of Crac are rounded, while their interior levels, except the topmost of 
the western tower, are quadrangular. The towers rise from the glacis so considerations 
other than mining or rams would have inspired the shape of these towers. Similarly, the 
interior of the circular donjon at Margat is laid out in a rectangle. It may have been hoped 
that the rounded exteriors of these towers would deflect any incoming projectiles and that 
the flat outward face inside, aligned perpendicularly to where artillery would most likely 
be positioned, would maximise the thickness of the wall. On the other hand, the exterior 
                                                 
965 In general, rounded towers became the preference of both Philip II and Richard I by the end of the 
twelfth century and by the close of the thirteenth most mural towers financed by the French and English 
crowns, as well as those in Italy by the Holy Roman Emperor, were rounded. 
966 Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 186-87. 
967 Although William the Breton's account of Philip's siege of Chateau Gaillard in 1203-4 is often referenced 
to support the use of new heavy artillery, the poetic style of the account and lack of corroborating evidence 
provided by contemporary sources leaves this in doubt, William the Breton, Philippide 7, pp. 179-208. Cf. 
Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 1:317-18, 2:8, trans. Giles, 2:207-8, 213; Rigord, 
Gesta Philippi Augusti 141, p. 159. 
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plan might have been inspired for other reasons, such as aesthetics, while the 
quadrangular interior allowed for the use of simple barrel vaults. 
 
It is hard to claim that any architectural shifts of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were 
a direct result of considerations relating to heavier offensive artillery. Although there is 
circumstantial evidence of such, most that predates the 1280s is unpersuasive. But another 
shift in tower-design has not yet been discussed: the appearance of extremely large 
quadrangular towers in the opening decades of the thirteenth century. Among the 
explanations for the design of these towers, Paul Chevedden has argued that many of 
them were not only meant to resist the heaviest counterweight trebuchets but also to 
support them.
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9. Defensive Artillery and Artillery Towers 
 
 
 
Throughout the crusades, it appears that artillery was used as frequently by defending 
forces as it was by attackers. Latin forces encountered defensive artillery from the time 
of the First Crusade; however, both Franks and Muslims were almost certainly well aware 
of the value of utilising artillery in this way before the crusaders set out. In 1102, Robert 
of Bellême is said to have strengthened his castles against Henry I by supplying them 
with machinae, possibly traction trebuchets.968 In the same year, the defenders of Isfahan 
(in modern Iran) prepared artillery ahead of Sultan Barkyaruq's siege of that place.969 In 
the following decades the effective use of defensive artillery is highlighted by the sources 
on a number of occasions. It was used by the Muslim defenders of Beirut in 1110,970 the 
Franks defending Jaffa in 1115,971 and at the Muslim defence of Tyre in 1124.972 Such 
engines remained important weapons for defenders throughout the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. 
 In the early twentieth century, Hamilton Thompson, commenting on medieval 
England, concluded that against the great offensive artillery, the besieged were all but 
powerless as it was impractical to employ the same type of engines in a defensive role. 
 
The use of such machines upon the walls themselves was as dangerous to the stability 
of the masonry as their use by the enemy, and hastened the chance of a breach: they 
could not be employed from the interior of the enclosure, without endangering the 
defenders on the rampart. The summit of the rectangular keep of the twelfth century 
was never constructed as a platform for artillery: here again, engineers probably 
feared the effect of the constant vibration upon a flat wooden roof, and were content 
to conceal their ridged roofs within high ramparts.973  
                                                 
968 John of Worcester, Chronica chronicarum, ed. and trans. McGurk, 3:100-1; Roger of Howden, 
Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 1:159, Walter of Coventry, Memoriale, ed. Stubbs, pp. 120-21. 
969 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:53. 
970 Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, p. 99-100. 
971 William of Tyre, Chronicon 11.24, ed. Huygens, 1:531-32, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:502-3. 
972 William of Tyre, Chronicon 13.6, ed. Huygens, 1:593-94, trans. Babcock and Krey, 2:10-11. For further 
examples, see Appendix 2. 
973 Thompson, Military Architecture, pp. 77-78. 
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Although apparently ignoring the wealth of source evidence supporting the use of 
defensive artillery, Thompson keenly identified the impracticality of mounting heavy 
artillery on top of most medieval towers, a limitation which is chronically overlooked. 
 While the utility of defensive artillery is emphasised at certain sieges, it is possible 
to overstate its significance. For example, Ibn al-Athir claims that al-Lawba (in the Biqa') 
fell to Shams al-Muluk of Damascus in 1132 because its defenders failed to erect 
defensive artillery,974 and Hugh Kennedy suggests that the defenders of Kerak suffered 
as a result of their inability to erect a defensive engine in 1183.975 It is hard to discern the 
effect that artillery might have had at al-Lawba and equally unclear how Kerak suffered 
by not having any in 1183 – Saladin appears to have been no more successful in 1183 
than when both sides employed artillery during the siege of the castle the following 
year.976 Taking matters to an extreme, David Nicolle has not only highlighted the potential 
effectiveness of tower-mounted defensive artillery, but claims that this was how the 
counterweight trebuchet was most successfully employed.977 
 Analysing the thirteenth century, Christopher Marshall has identified the 
importance of defensive pressure, including the use of ballistic engines, as Frankish 
strategies of defence evolved.978 Artillery appears to have been used relatively effectively 
at 'Atlit (1220), Beaufort (1268), 'Akkar (1271) Margat (1285) and Acre (1291), despite 
the ultimate capture of all but 'Atlit. As an important feature of both Muslim and Frankish 
defensive measures, it remains to investigate more closely these defensive engines and 
how they were used. 
  
                                                 
974 Ibn al-Athir similarly states that the Damascenes were allowed to take al-Lawba in 1132 because its 
garrison failed to erect defensive artillery in time, Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 1:296. 
975 Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 117-18. 
976 For sieges of Kerak in 1183 and 1184, see Chapter 4. 
977 Nicolle, Crusader Castles, pp. 44, 59. 
978 Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p. 238. The effectiveness of this practice was not confined to the 
East. Roger of Wendover, for example, describes how the baronial party that invested Mountsorel on behalf 
of Henry III was restrained by defensive fire from the garrison in the spring of 1217, allowing the castle to 
be relieved by Prince Louis. He also highlights the prominence of such engines during the two-week 
defence of Avignon in 1266 before the city fell to treachery, Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. 
Hewlett, 2:208-9, 211, 309-10, trans. Giles, 2:389, 391, 478-79. For further instances in which artillery was 
employed defensively, see Appendix 2. 
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Ground-mounted Artillery 
 
Most of the defensive artillery employed by the Muslims during the First Crusade may 
have been situated on the ground. References such as Fulcher of Chartres' to the garrison 
of Antioch's use of petrariae and fundabula to throw decapitated heads out of the city, 
appear to imply that these engines threw their projectiles over the town walls rather than 
from them.979 Similarly, Albert of Aachen and William of Tyre seem to distinguish 
between the positions where defensive engines were placed and where the defenders were 
positioned along the battlements during the Provençal push against Antioch's Bridge 
Gate.980 At Jerusalem, Albert of Aachen and Ralph of Caen claim that when the defenders 
moved the artillery with which they were targeting the northern siege tower, they 
encountered difficulties repositioning these engines and then firing them in the tight urban 
constraints.981 Although Albert and Ralph were not at the siege, their assertion that the 
defending engines were on the ground behind the walls may reflect eyewitness testimony 
or perhaps a practice familiar to them. William of Tyre similarly places the artillery that 
defended Jerusalem in 1099, as well as that which defended Tyre in 1124, inside the 
city.982 
 As offensive weaponry developed so too did that of defenders. If counterweight 
trebuchets were employed by attacking forces by the 1180s, even if they were quite small, 
it is possible that engines of a similar scale were used defensively. Although they fired at 
a slower rate than traction trebuchets, counterweight engines had a longer range and were 
more accurate. If placed behind a curtain wall, a counterweight trebuchet could target 
attacking artillery of a similar scale or approaching siege engines from a position of 
relative security, as appears to be shown in Fig. E1. A spotter on the parapet could 
recommend adjustments for range. It is possible that engines such as Mala Cognata/Male 
Cosine, which targeted Philip II's notable trebuchet from inside Acre in 1191, and one or 
                                                 
979 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 1.15.10, ed. Hagenmeyer, p. 221, trans. Ryan, p. 94. 
980 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 3.41, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 202-5; William of Tyre, 
Chronicon 4.15, ed. Huygens, 1:254-56, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:210-11. For the siege of Antioch in 
1097-98, see Chapter 3. 
981 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana 6.17, ed. and trans. Edgington, pp. 424-25; Ralph of Caen, 
Gesta Tancredi 123, RHC Oc 1, p. 691, trans. Bachrach and Bachrach, p. 139. For the siege of Jerusalem 
in 1099, see Chapter 3. 
982 William of Tyre, Chronicon 8.13, 13.6, ed. Huygens, 1:403-4, 593-94, trans. Babcock and Krey, 1:361-
63, 2:10-11. For the siege of Tyre in 1124, see Chapter 4. 
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more of the nine which defended Mosul in 1182 were counterweight trebuchets.983 The 
comparative exposure of offensive engines is clear in both of these examples, and is 
vividly described by Ibn al-Athir at the siege of Bourzey in 1188.984 
Baybars had the unique opportunity to assail a castle from within another 
stronghold when he besieged Beaufort in 1268. Lighter engines may have been erected 
on the towers of the Templar outwork, had there been room for them, but the heavier 
engines, much larger and more costly, were probably set up on the ground inside the 
enclosure. Heavy artillery appears to have been used by the Franks to defend Margat in 
1285 and Acre in 1291. These seem to have been well concealed as they enjoyed relative 
security throughout both sieges. This was certainly true of the Pisan engine at Acre, which 
was at some distance from the curtain near the church of St Romanus in the Gardens. 
Such examples appear to confirm that the heaviest offensive engines that were stored in 
a stronghold could be used to defend it if need be, and that such engines were generally 
placed on the ground. 
 The horizontal range gained by elevating an engine will always be less than the 
distance that the engine is raised if it fires at an angle of 45° or greater.985 By comparison, 
the horizontal distance sacrificed backing up an engine, allowing it to fire over the parapet 
from the ground, causes a greater relative loss to range than its elevation. However, it is 
important to bear in mind that accuracy decreases with range: by extending the flight 
time, environmental and mechanical discrepancies from shot to shot are amplified. 
Furthermore, the longer a projectile is in the air, the more time a mobile target has to 
avoid it.986  
  
                                                 
983 See Ambroise, Estoire 5, l. 4,746, ed. Paris, p.127, trans. Ailes, 98; Itinerarium 3.7, ed. Stubbs, p. 218, 
trans. Nicholson, pp. 208-9; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:285-87. 
984 Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:286, 350. 
985 For example, if an engine fires two shots at 45, but the second at an elevation 20 m higher than the first, 
the second shot will travel only 18.6 m farther if both are fired at a velocity of 50 m/s. If travelling at a 
velocity of 25 m/s, the second shot will land only 16 m farther. 
986 A projectiles fired at about 50 m/s might achieve a range of 250 m, but would be subject to a flight time 
of over seven seconds. 
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Comparable Trajectories: Engines on a Tower and at the Base of a Wall 
Comparative Trajectories: Engines on a Tower versus Behind a Wall 
 
 
Position Horiz. Pos. Vert. Pos. Velocity Release Angle Max. Range 
Tower 0 m 10 m 50 m/s 45° 264.7 m 
Ground 0 m 0 m 50 m/s 45° 255.1 m 
Tower 0 m 10 m 50 m/s 30° 237.1 m 
Ground 0 m 0 m 50 m/s 30° 220.9 m 
 
 
 
Position Horiz. Pos. Vert. Pos. Velocity Release Angle Max. Range 
Tower 0 m 10 m 50 m/s 45° 264.7 m 
Ground -10 m 0 m 50 m/s 45° 245.1 m 
Tower 10 m 10 m 50 m/s 30° 237.1 m 
Ground -20 m 0 m  50 m/s 30° 200.9 m 
 
Besides issues of exposure, occupying an elevated platform with a large trebuchet 
denied this position to lighter engines, archer and slingers, which were all more effective 
in an antipersonnel capacity. Even the smallest counterweight trebuchets have a 
reasonably significant footprint due to the necessity of outriggers, required to provide 
lateral support and ensure that the forces created by the swinging counterweight remained 
as two-dimensional as possible. The forces unleashed by the falling counterweight posed 
a risk to anyone standing too close if a problem were to arise, while the long beam and 
sling required space in front and behind the engine to move unobstructed. Whereas little 
performance was compromised by placing such engines on the ground behind the curtain, 
more versatile antipersonnel forces were of little use in such a position. Additionally, any 
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tower intended to carry a counterweight engine would not only have to support the weight 
of the engine, but also the dynamic forces that were created during the firing sequence. 
Accordingly, towers capable of supporting the heaviest counterweight trebuchets do not 
appear to have been built until the end of the thirteenth century. Lighter artillery, however, 
had been mounted on towers long before the First Crusade. 
 
 
 
Tower-mounted Artillery 
 
Evidence dating back to the fourth century BC suggests that some Greek towers were 
designed specifically to incorporate torsion bows.987 In the first century BC, such 
machines influenced Vitruvius's theories concerning the optimal spacing of mural 
towers.988 The engines considered by Vitruvius do not appear to have been significantly 
heavy, as the weight of defending cohorts is the largest mass that he includes when 
dealing with fortifications.989 Heavier onagers are mentioned in a defensive capacity by 
Ammianus at the Persian siege of Amida in the fourth century and by Procopius at the 
Gothic siege of Rome in the sixth.990 However, Ammianus also warns against using such 
engines on top of defensive ramparts, as the shock created when firing an onager 
(scorpio/tormentum) would threaten the masonry below.991 With this in mind, Peter 
Purton has suggested that repeated efforts to strengthen the walls of Rome up to the sixth 
                                                 
987 Ober, "Early Artillery Towers," pp. 569-604; Ober, "Towards a Typology," pp. 147-69. 
988 Vitruvius, De architectura 1.5.4, ed. Krohn, p. 18, trans. Morgan, pp. 22-23. 
989 Vitruvius, de architectura 1.5.3-8, ed. Krohn, pp. 18-20, trans. Morgan, pp. 22-24 
990 Ammianus, Res gestae 19.7.7, trans. Younge, p. 197; Procopius, Wars of Justinian 5.21, ed. and trans. 
Dewing, 3:204-7. 
991 Ammianus, Res gestae 23.4.4-7, ed. Eyssenhardt, pp. 270-71, trans. Younge, pp. 322-23. 
Antioch: mural tower, plan (after Rey) Antioch: mural tower, section (from Rey) 
ARTILLERY IN AND AROUND THE LATIN EAST MICHAEL S. FULTON 
  
 
298 
century may reflect efforts to mount increasingly heavy defensive artillery, rather than 
attempts to resist more powerful offensive engines.992 If this was the case, it stands to 
reason that the rebuilding work carried out at Antioch by Justinian would have followed 
a similar model. Perhaps this is why the city's mural towers appear better suited to support 
a significant mass at their top level than the vast majority of towers built by the Franks 
and Muslims during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.993 Intended or not, this ability 
came through the solid pier in the back half of these towers, around which the internal 
staircases were wrapped. But towers capable of bearing such significant loads, as could 
have been supported by the piers in these towers, were not often necessary. 
 Although the Muslims may have placed their defensive artillery on the ground at 
the time of the First Crusade, light traction trebuchets were certainly elevated by the end 
of the century. Mounting such engines on top of towers not only augmented their range 
but also provided crews with a better field of fire and added velocity to their projectiles 
when striking targets below their initial elevation. It was likely such engines that George 
Palaeologus placed along the walls of Durazzo, according to Anna Comnena, in 
expectation of the Norman siege in 1081, and that Ibn al-Athir notes were installed on the 
walls of Jerusalem ahead of Saladin's siege in 1187.994 It has even been hypothesised that 
some of the spurs surrounding Li Vaux Moise (al-Wu'ayra) may have supported some 
type of light artillery in the twelfth century,995 although there are no indications of this in 
Ibn Muyassar's account of the eight-day Egyptian attack in 1158.996 It would have been 
similar traction trebuchets that Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir claims were erected on the walls of 
Tarsus, when it revolted in the ninth century, and that were set up by the Franks along the 
defences of Jaffa in 1266.997 So too would have been the engines prepared along the walls 
of Alexandria in 1272-73, and those that Rashid al-Din claims were erected on the walls 
of Baghdad in response to increasing Mongol pressure.998 
 A number of illustrations confirm that traction trebuchets were mounted on 
towers.999 With an eye to this, Creswell identified three indents in the platform over Bab 
                                                 
992 Purton, Early Medieval Siege, p. 16. 
993 Towers built by Justinian with a similar plan can be found along the northern and southern walls of 
Zenobia (Halabiyya), see Lauffray, Halabiyya-Zenobia, vol 1. 
994 Anna Comnena, Alexiad 4.1, trans. Sewter, p. 135; Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:330. 
995 Marino, et al., "The Crusader Settlement in Petra," pp. 8-9. 
996 Ibn Muyassar, Akhbar Misr, RHC Or 3, p. 472. 
997 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:590, 795-96. 
998 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:830; Rashid al-Din, Ta'rikh-I Ghazani, trans. Boyle, 
pp. 190, 232-33. 
999 See Figs. B2-B10, B22 and B23. 
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al-Nasir, Cairo, which he believed may 
have been created to support the legs of a 
stone-thrower, perhaps similar to those 
depicted in Peter of Eboli's 
manuscript.1000 While there is plenty of 
illustrative evidence that confirms that 
traction trebuchets were placed on towers, 
very few illustrations depict towers 
supporting counterweight trebuchets. 
 Rather than occupying such an ideal vantage point with a powerful but 
cumbersome counterweight trebuchet, a rapid-firing traction trebuchet, which could be 
yawed much more easily, would have been very effective if placed on a tower. Such 
engines could be used against faster moving targets and attacking troops. Although 
traction engines were less powerful, they proved capable of disabling siege towers if 
given enough time, as at Jerusalem (1099) and Beirut (1110); however, large immobile 
targets were better suited to a counterweight trebuchet, as may have been used at Mansura 
in early 1250. 
 
Mounting Counterweight Artillery 
It is unfortunate that no architectural study has been conducted to test the limits of how 
much additional weight most medieval towers could support. But a tower intended to 
carry a counterweight trebuchet also had to deal with dynamic forces: there was not only 
the weight of the engine to support but also the angular forces generated by the falling 
counterweight and its subsequent swinging. These stresses would have been immense. If 
the beam of Arrangement A is loaded to 135, the massive 10,000 kg counterweight will 
contain 250,000 J of potential energy and the subsequent 3.4 m fall will generate up to 
98,000 N and 333,200 kg m/s (N s) of momentum. Although the projectile and 2,000 kg 
beam, would decrease these values, this is an enormous amount of energy to be 
transferred through the course of the firing sequence; this is also a very large engine. If 
Arrangement B is considered, the counterweight holds 16,700 J of potential energy and 
                                                 
1000 Creswell, Muslim Architecture, 1:166-76. 
Cairo: Bab an-Nasr, plan (after Creswell) 
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falls with 9,800 N of potential force and 16,660 kg m/s (N s) of momentum, once again 
slightly mitigated by the masses of the projectile and beam.1001 
The masonry supporting a counterweight trebuchet is subject to considerable 
uniaxial compression, a force which is magnified as energy is shifted to restrict the fall 
of the counterweight. But as the counterweight begins to swing beneath the axle, the 
direction of force becomes two dimensional, compelling the supporting masonry to 
contend with shear stresses. Although a fixed counterweight would allay some of the extra 
downward force created by the falling mass, relative to a comparable hinged model, it 
would also amplify the subsequent swinging due to the greater inefficiency of this 
mechanical system. Despite the challenges to modelling these forces, and then to correlate 
the findings with examples of towers built with various materials and different designs, 
such a study might reveal at what point and in which regions it may have been possible 
to mount counterweight trebuchets on towers. 
Without conducting such a study, Paul Chevedden argued, in his 1986 PhD thesis, 
that the large towers built by al-'Adil at the citadel of Damascus were designed to carry 
just such engines. Although he addresses issues such as the space required by such 
engines, he fails to consider the structural strains that they would create. It has already 
been shown that the heaviest counterweight trebuchets were much less powerful at the 
start of the thirteenth century than Chevedden has suggested; however, it remains to 
investigate if there is evidence to indicate that any towers were designed to carry 
counterweight artillery. In the absence of a more quantitative architectural study, 
indications that towers were designed to withstand considerably greater forces than might 
otherwise be necessary will be examined instead. 
 
 
 
Possible Ayyubid Artillery Towers 
 
Chevedden has explained the near spontaneous appearance of large towers following 
Saladin's death, typified by those built by Saladin's brother, al-'Adil, and son, al-Zahir 
Ghazi, as the response to a need to mount heavy counterweight trebuchets on top of 
                                                 
1001 The retarding effect of the beam's mass might be sufficient to slow the end of Arrangement A's long 
arm almost 6 m/s and that of Arrangement B by over 3 m/s, if each beam rotated 90 and released its 
projectile at 45. 
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towers. This, he argues, was necessary to offset a supposedly enormous advantage held 
by offensive artillery.1002 With no evidence to indicate the introduction of an outside 
element, such as a foreign technology, Chevedden has suggested that the appearance of 
these large towers was a delayed reaction to the more general advancement of offensive 
weaponry. 
 The towers built by Saladin at Damascus and Cairo are relatively small, 
comparable to those constructed by Nur al-Din. This would appear to imply that such 
towers were judged to be sufficiently strong at a point when counterweight trebuchet 
technology was known.1003 Descriptions of the siege of Acre suggest that such engines 
may have been employed there in 1190-91, but confirm that these were neither effective 
breaching engines nor considered to be technologically new or special. The casual manner 
in which the various sources discuss the Western and Eastern artillery and their failure to 
distinguish between them indicates that neither side held a technological advantage.1004 
Collectively, this suggests that the artillery that influenced the design of al-'Adil's towers, 
was probably only marginally more powerful than that which would have been considered 
by Saladin's architects. 
 
Al-'Adil's Early Work 
In the mid-1170s, Saladin embarked on an ambitious building campaign to fortify Cairo, 
constructing a new citadel between the new and old cities. The scale of these defences 
impressed Ibn Jubayr when he viewed them in the spring of 1183, a year ahead of their 
completion.1005 The citadel was then developed by al-'Adil, who added at least three, and 
as many as six, large quadrangular towers and encased some of the round towers, notably 
Burj al-Haddad and Burj ar-Ramla, within much larger round towers. The two brothers' 
work is easily distinguishable by style and scale: Saladin's larger towers, such as Burj al-
Zafar, are comparable in scale to other large twelfth-century towers, while al-'Adil's, 
completed around 1207-8, are much larger; while the defences built by Saladin are of 
                                                 
1002 Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, esp. pp. xliii-xliv, 7-8. For a poor analogy between the supposed 
architectural response to artillery in the early thirteenth century and that at the start of the Early Modern 
period, in response to the early employment of effective siege guns, see Chevedden, "Invention," p. 73. 
1003 For illustrative proof of this knowledge by the 1180s, see Fig. C1. 
1004 For the siege of Acre in 1189-91, see Chapter 5. 
1005 Ibn Jubayr, Rihla, trans. Broadhurst, p. 43. For the dating, an inscription over the Bab al-Mudarraj dates 
it to 570 [1183-84]. Cf. Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:249. 
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smooth masonry, those of al-'Adil are much rougher.1006 These, however, were not the 
first fortifications built by al-'Adil. 
Late in Saladin's reign, al-'Adil constructed a quadrangular citadel at Harran with 
an eleven-sided tower, nearly 30 m in diameter, at each corner. Each of the three surviving 
towers has a different internal layout and evidence of what were once three internal 
                                                 
1006 Al-Maqrizi, al-Suluk, trans. Broadhurst, p. 151. Cf. Creswell, "Fortification in Islam," pp. 121-23; 
Boase, "Military Architecture," pp. 150-51. 
Cairo: citadel, plan (after Burger and Creswell) 
Cairo: Burg al-Zafar (after 
Yovitchitch and Creswell) 
Cairo: eastern towers of the citadel (from Creswell) 
ARTILLERY IN AND AROUND THE LATIN EAST MICHAEL S. FULTON 
  
 
303 
levels.1007 The scale of these towers is reminiscent of those built later at Cairo, but their 
shape is quite different and the varying internal plans may suggest that some degree of 
experimentation was taking place. The internal structures of the southern and western 
towers are the clearest. 
 Inside the southern tower, there is an eleven-sided structure laid out to mirror the 
angles of the outer wall. There is an aperture in each face of the internal structure at the 
first level and every other face at the level above. In the centre of the western tower, there 
is a central ten-sided pillar that contains a winding staircase. The outer walls of the towers 
appear to have been more than 3 m thick and the central structures would suggest that 
they were able to bear significant vertical loads; however, Hanisch has argued the 
opposite.1008 While the open space within the inner structure of the south tower was a 
weakness, Hanisch suggests that the ten-sided central pier in the west tower would have 
unevenly distributed the weight of the vaulted ceilings. Furthermore, at the first and third 
levels (ground and second floors), casemates were inserted into each of the outer faces 
while at the second level these were positioned in the tower's angles. Staggering the 
casemates would have provided a better field of fire and minimised vertical seams of 
thinner masonry, rendering the walls more cohesive and resilient to undermining. 
However, aligning the casemates would have created vertical piers of masonry that may 
have allowed the tower to support greater vertical loads. 
                                                 
1007 Hanisch, "The Works of al-Malik al-'Adil," pp. 168-74. Cf. Lloyd and Brice, "Harran," pp. 77-111. 
1008 Hanisch, "The Works of al-Malik al-'Adil," pp. 168-74. Hanisch does not relate these issues to any 
consideration of artillery. 
Harran: west citadel tower, plan with 
hendagonnal overlay (after Hanisch) 
Harran: south citadel tower, plan 
(after Hanisch) 
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By comparison, the similarly large thirteenth-
century donjon at Coucy contained twelve ribs of vaulting 
that aligned at each level. These created internal buttresses 
that supported the vaulted ceilings. The smaller outer 
towers at Coucy, which were also round but only about 18 
m in diameter, had staggered casemates.1009 Although the 
donjon was large enough to support a significant 
counterweight trebuchet, the oculus in the centre of the 
roof, as seen in Viollet-le-Duc's schematics, and vast 
internal space would have made this impractical. It seems 
that neither the towers at Coucy nor those at Harran were 
designed to support extremely heavy artillery. 
                                                 
1009 For a study of Coucy predating the castle's destruction, see Viollet-le-Duc, Description du Château de 
Coucy. 
Coucy: donjon, cutaway 
(from Viollet-le-Duc) 
Coucy: donjon, section (from Viollet-le-Duc) 
Coucy: outer tower, interior 
(from Viollet-le-Duc) 
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 The scale of the towers at Harran appears to have been influenced by a desire to 
impress onlookers rather than to mount or resist sizable counterweight trebuchets. 
Heidemann has similarly concluded that the citadel of Raqqa, also built by al-'Adil to a 
quadrangular plan in the last decade of the twelfth century but with round corner towers, 
was constructed primarily for symbolic and ceremonial purposes rather than to serve as a 
seriously defensible strongpoint.1010 But what of al-'Adil's later preference for 
quadrangular towers? 
 
Damascus 
None of al-'Adil's towers have been scrutinised more than those that he built at 
Damascus.1011 A decade after taking power in Damascus, al-'Adil essentially enclosed the 
earlier Seljuk-Zankid citadel in 
much the same way as he did 
certain towers, including Burj 
al-Haddad, at Cairo. This work 
might seem justified when 
considering that the city was 
besieged no less than five times 
in the decade immediately 
following Saladin's death in 
1193; however, the defences 
appear to have been adequate 
because on only one occasion 
was the city taken, while the 
citadel remained a bastion of 
resistance from which a 
surrender was negotiated.1012 
 Rather than a response to 
an acute military threat, the 
                                                 
1010 Heidemann, "The Citadel of al-Raqqa," pp. 136-145. 
1011 For studies of the citadel of Damascus, see Sauvaget, "La citadelle de Damas," pp. 59-90; Hartmann-
Virnich, "Les portes Ayyoubides de la citadelle de Damas," pp. 287-311; Berthier, "La Citadelle de Damas," 
pp. 151-64; Braune, "Die Stadtbefestigung von Damaskus," pp. 202-10. 
1012 See Chapter 6. 
Damascus: citadel tower 3, plan, section and elevation 
(after Burger and King) 
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style, timing, and method with which the citadel was developed suggest that the 
rebuilding was meant to convey an outward display of power while strengthening the city. 
Instead of developing the existing defences, al-'Adil had a new enceinte constructed just 
in front of the existing one, erasing any trace of his predecessors' work when viewed from 
the outside.1013 The epigraphic evidence confirms the various sections of the citadel were 
funded by the Ayyubid princes that he had subjugated and that work was completed 
between 1207 and 1217, contemporaneous with his work at Cairo.1014 This, along with 
the use of much larger towers, was an expression of his power and preeminent position 
in the Ayyubid world. 
 Towers 2 and 3, mid-wall towers measuring about 27 m wide and 13 m deep, 
display little rebuilding since they were constructed under al-'Adil. The Ayyubid 
battlements, as well as those of other towers that were rebuilt by the Mamluks, consist of 
two levels and enclose only the three outward faces of each tower. Chevedden has argued 
                                                 
1013 This is similar to the way in which Saladin surrounded certain parts of Cairo with a new wall that was 
built ahead of the earlier line. 
1014 Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, pp. 58-59; Creswell, "Fortification in Islam," p. 123. 
Damascus: citadel, plan (from Berthier) 
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that the use of such battlements and the scale of the towers were dictated by the 
determinant requirements of mounting counterweight artillery.1015 
 While the high battlements could have provided good protection and concealment, 
and the open backs could have allowed the long arm and sling of a trebuchet to rotate 
freely, such hypothetical considerations are not sufficient in themselves to prove that the 
mounting of artillery was a major factor influencing the towers' design. 
 
Citadel of Damascus: Tower and Curtain Dimensions1016 
  
                                                 
1015 Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, pp. 277-78, cf. pp. 192-93. 
1016 From Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, Appendix 2, pp. 555-58. 
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 First, the Franks had built double-level battlements earlier in the twelfth century 
at sites such as Jubayl and Saone. This was an excellent way of providing an additional 
level of firepower at minimal expense and, when coupled with machicolations, was an 
effective way of covering the base of a tower. Accordingly, the popularity of such 
battlements grew in the thirteenth century and can be found at sites such as Margat, Crac 
des Chevaliers and Baalbek. Secondly, there is little to suggest that round towers would 
have been any less effective platforms for heavy artillery.1017 The curvature of a rounded 
tower would provide an even better field of fire, if the engine could be yawed, while this 
shape would distribute the weight of a large engine more evenly. Thirdly, although the 
footprints of al-'Adil's towers were considerably larger than previous standards, their 
construction was rather traditional. The walls are thick, roughly 3.4 m, but not 
dramatically thicker than many dating to the twelfth century. When considering that the 
towers contain three internal levels, each with a single open room, and that the strength 
of the walls was compromised by at least five spacious casemates at each level, the 
thickness of the walls seems to have been a structural necessity. This is further indicated 
when considering that the sidewalls of many towers are thicker than the outward faces. 
Finally, when the northern towers of the citadel were rebuilt by the Mamluks, following 
the Mongol withdrawal from western Syria, their walls were built to a similar scale. Thus, 
despite evident improvements in artillery technology by the 1260s, the construction of 
these towers does not appear to have been significantly influenced by considerations of 
artillery. 
By the time construction started at Damascus, al-'Adil appears to have settled on 
a preference for quadrangular towers: typified by the same general plan, scale, rusticated 
masonry and use of box machicolations. Massive towers of this design were built at Cairo 
and Damascus and slightly smaller ones at Mount Tabor and Bosra. While those at Mount 
Tabor have been largely destroyed, those at Bosra remain in a relatively good state of 
preservation. 
 
Bosra and 'Ajlun 
Trajan's theatre at Bosra, like that at Caesarea, had been used as a fortress since at least 
the late eleventh century. The towers built here by al-'Adil are all smaller than those that 
he built at Damascus; however, they were built over a longer period of time and appear 
                                                 
1017 Cf. France, Western Warfare, p. 124. 
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to reveal the development of his stylistic preferences. Towers 4, 6 and 8 are relatively 
simple and only corner tower 4 was built with walls of any great thickness. Tower 10 is 
quite similar to contemporary tower 5 at Damascus, while mid-wall towers 11 and 5 
resemble compressed versions of towers 2, 3 and 4, built less than a decade earlier at 
Damascus.1018 Although the mid-wall towers are only about a third of the size of those at 
Damascus, it is hard not to be struck by the high vaulting and vastness of the open space 
within them. 
 
Citadel of Bosra: Epigraphic Dating1019 
  
                                                 
1018 For the dating of the towers at Bosra, see Yovitchitch, "La citadelle de Bosra," pp. 205-17; Yovitchitch, 
"Bosra: Eine Zitadelle," pp. 167-77. 
1019 From Yovitchitch, "La citadelle de Bosra," p. 216. 
Bosra: citadel, plan (after Yovitchitch and Bavrou) 
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 Once more a desire for opulent 
display appears to have influenced the design 
of these towers. The towers become more 
structurally open with time, so that tower 7 is 
even more spacious inside that those built by 
al-'Adil. Rather than being built stronger to 
counter the increasing power of artillery, 
structural strength was progressively 
sacrificed for interior space throughout the 
first third of the thirteenth century. It might 
be argued that the later encasing of towers 6 and 8 reflects a need for stronger towers; 
however, this may have been done, at least in part, to give the citadel a more uniform 
appearance from without, as very similar masonry was used to that employed earlier. 
 The castle of 'Ajlun was founded by Izz al-Din Usama in 1184-85. It was besieged 
by an Ayyubid army in 1211-12 and then developed by Izz al-Din Aybak. When 
comparing the work completed 
under Saladin with that carried out 
under al-'Adil, the exterior walls are 
all 2-3 m thick and there are few 
differences in respective masonry 
techniques apart from the embrasures 
and other stylistic signatures. Without 
its uppermost level it is impossible to 
rule out the possibility that the 
thirteenth-century corner tower was 
designed to be a platform to support 
heavy artillery; however, considering 
the layout of the lower levels, there is 
little to suggest that this was the 
case.1020 Instead, it may have been 
built to resemble outwardly those 
                                                 
1020 For archaeological investigations of 'Ajlun, see Johns, "Medieval 'Ajlun," pp. 21-33; Yovitchitch, "Die 
Aiyubidische Burg 'Aglun," pp. 118-25; Yovitchitch, "The Tower of Aybak," pp. 225-42. 
Bosra: citadel tower 5 (after Yovitchitch) 
'Ajlun: Aybak's Tower, from the southeast (author) 
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built by al-'Adil, though internally it is very different given the existing structure around 
which it was built.  
 
Continuity 
The scale of al-Zahir Ghazi's large gatehouse at Aleppo also appears to have been inspired 
by a desire to impress, rather than to support heavy artillery. It is perhaps not surprising 
that these large towers were built by dynastic rivals, intending their architecture to reflect 
their relative prowess.1021 Chevedden's suggestion that new artillery towers were also 
built at Beaufort, Shayzar, Baalbek and Subayba is confusing:1022 the northern tower built 
by the Ayyubids at Beaufort is similar in scale to the earlier keep built by the Franks; the 
                                                 
1021 See also Michaudel, "Development of Islamic Military Architecture," pp. 112-16; Yovitchitch, 
Forteresses du Proche-Orient, pp. 177-210. Although built independently, Aybak may have intended his 
tower to resemble those of his superior, al-'Adil, as a symbol of his support. 
1022 Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, pp. 286-88. 
'Ajlun: castle, plan (after Yovitchitch and Johns) 
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southern donjon at Shayzar seems to have been a relatively palatial structure;1023 and the 
only towers of notable scale at Baalbek and Subayba were built by the Mamluks. Besides 
the massive towers built by al-'Adil and al-Zahir Ghazi, more traditional building trends 
continued in the thirteenth century. 
 Much smaller Ayyubid towers, can be found at sites such as 'Ajlun, Subayba, 
Baalbek, Apamea, Palmyra, Harim and al-Rahba. Chevedden's arguments concerning the 
need to mount heavy artillery have permeated into studies of even such small towers.1024 
Most suggestions that counterweight trebuchets were, or were not, erected on top of 
certain towers not only lack an accompanying assessment of the utility of elevating such 
engines in this way, but also neglect any consideration of the forces that such towers 
would need to withstand. Ironically, some of the most appropriate towers to have carried 
such loads predate the battle of Hattin. 
 
 
 
Possible Frankish Artillery Towers 
 
Twelfth-century Keeps 
Probably dating to the middle of the twelfth century, the 24.5 m square tower in the centre 
of the eastern wall at Saone boasts walls 4.4-5.4 m thick.1025 A solid central pier runs 
through both internal levels, supporting four bays of groin 
vaults in each. This combination of strengths make it 
possibly the most suitable pre-Mamluk tower on which a 
counterweight trebuchet could have been mounted in or 
around the Latin East. However, from the accounts of the 
1188 siege of the castle, it seems no such heavy weaponry 
was positioned here. The effectiveness that such an engine 
would have from here is questionable: the girth of the castle's 
eastern defences protected it from any incoming artillery fire 
while small-arms and light artillery would have been the 
                                                 
1023 See Tonghini and Montevecchi, "The Castle of Shayzar: The Results," p. 145. 
1024 This is clear in Bylinski's analysis of al-Rahba, Chevedden's arguments having been considered via 
Kennedy, Bylinski, "Three Minor Fortresses," pp. 157-58, cf. n. 9. 
1025 Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 3:235-36, 239-40; Mesqui, "Saône," pp. 12-13. 
Saone: donjon, cutaway 
(from Mesqui) 
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most effective defensive weapons 
against any forces massing on the 
ridge opposite the abyss of the 
eastern fosse.1026  
 Similar to the donjon at 
Saone, the central keep of the 
twelfth-century Hospitaller castle of 
Chastel Rouge, measuring 
approximately 14 m by 16 m, is also 
built around a strong central pier. 
This tower has walls over 2 m thick 
and two internal masonry levels, 
while the upper is divided by a 
wooden floor to create a third.1027 
Although the central keep of 
Jubayl, 22 m by 18 m, has no central 
pier rising through its two levels, its 
4 m thick walls occupy almost two 
thirds of the structure's total 
footprint.1028 Saladin's apparent 
inability to destroy the keep in 1190 
speaks to its strength.1029 Although 
all three appear to have had two 
levels of battlements running around 
them, artillery seems to have been 
used to defend none of them in 1188.1030 
                                                 
1026 For Saladin's siege of Saone in 1188, see Chapter 5. 
1027 For Chastel Rouge, see Mesqui, "Qal'at Yahmur," pp. 5-6; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 74-75; 
Pringle, Red Tower, pp. 15-17; Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p. 52; Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 
3:317-19. 
1028 Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 3:210-11; Rey, Étude sur les monuments, pp. 117-20; Kennedy, Crusader 
Castles, pp. 65-66; Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p. 64. 
1029 Wilbrand of Oldenbourg, Itinerarium terrae sanctae 1.6, ed. Pringle, p. 119, trans. Pringle, p. 167. Cf. 
'Imad al-Din, al-Fath, trans. Massé, p. 231. 
1030 For Saladin's acquisition of Chastel Rouge, see 'Imad al-Din, trans. Massé, p. 122; Abu Shama, Kitab 
al-Raudatain, RHC Or 4, p. 352. Cf. Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:344; Baha' al-Din, al-
Nawadir, trans. Richards, p. 81. For Jubayl, see Chapter 5. 
Chastel Rouge: castle, cutaway (from Biller) 
Jubayl: castle, plan (after Deschamps) 
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 Another candidate is the 
Templar keep at Tortosa. The tower 
is 20 m square with walls 3.5-5m 
thick, vaulted internally by parallel 
barrel vaults supported on a cross-
wall. It seems the keep, which 
formed the nucleus of the 
thirteenth-century castle, was the 
same tower that was successfully 
defended by the Templars against 
Saladin's assault in 1188.1031 No defensive artillery is mentioned in the accounts of this 
siege.1032 
The large twelfth-century Frankish tower at Toron, commonly identified as the 
keep, was similarly planned with a cross-wall dividing its long axis but no artillery is 
mentioned in its defence in 1187.1033 Despite their potential ability to support quite 
significant loads, the lack of any source evidence to suggest that these towers were used 
as artillery platforms in the late twelfth century has allowed them to be completely 
overlooked in favour of others built in the early thirteenth. 
 
Crac des Chevaliers 
The three southern towers of Crac's inner enceinte, like most of the castle's impressive 
elements, postdate the earthquake of 1202 and appear to be the only Frankish towers 
where heavy artillery could have been positioned.1034 The circular westernmost tower is 
the smallest. Although more than 10 m in diameter, the encircling parapet would probably 
have imposed serious restrictions on the sling of even a small counterweight engine. 
Space would not have been an issue on top of the central and eastern towers because of 
their rearward extension. Structurally, the walls of the central tower are continuous from 
                                                 
1031 Given the similarities of the keep, following the addition of the talus, to Frederick II's keep at Lucera, 
built c. 1235 after the emperor returned from the Holy Land, Pospieszny has suggested that the former 
influenced the latter, dating the additions to the original structure no later than the 1220s, Pospieszny, 
"Tortosa (Syrien) und Lucera (Apulien)," pp. 243-46. 
1032 For Saladin's siege of Tortosa in 1188, see Chapter 5. 
1033 For the keep at Toron, see Piana, "The Crusader Castles of Toron," pp. 181-83. For the siege of Toron 
in 1187, see Chapter 5. 
1034 For recent studies of these defences, see Häffner, "Die Südtürme der Kernburg im 13. Jahrhundert," pp. 
142-84; Mesqui, "Les programmes architecturaux," pp. 3-7. 
Tortosa: donjon, plan (after Pospieszny and Braune) 
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Hypothetical Trajectories of Engines at Crac des Chevaliers 
their foundations to the parapet, supporting a single barrel vault along the tower's long 
axis at each level. The eastern tower is more complex as openings were left in its 
supporting walls to facilitate movement through the castle at the first and second (ground- 
and first-floor) levels. Despite this apparent weakness, the tower's northern corners and 
south face were maintained as structural piers as was a portion of the western wall. The 
tower's eastern wall thins as it rises but a pier, almost 6 m wide, sustains the full 8 m 
thickness of the wall at its base, dividing a pair of east-facing embrasures at each of the 
three internal levels. Accordingly, anything sitting on the eastern side of this tower's roof 
rests on a solid pier of masonry reaching down to the bedrock, similar in concept to the 
rear half of the much older mural towers of Antioch. Accordingly, it seems possible, albeit 
far from certain, that the eastern tower, and possibly even the central tower, may have 
been able to support the weight and stresses of mounting a counterweight trebuchet. 
 
 
 
Position Horiz. Pos. Vert. Pos. Velocity Release Angle Max. Range 
Tower 0 m 20 m 50 m/s 45° 273.7 m 
Tower 0 m 20 m 50 m/s 30° 251.4 m 
Ground 10 m 0 m 50 m/s 45° 265.1 m 
Ground 0 m 0 m 50 m/s 30° 220.9 m 
 
Crac des Chevaliers: southern defences, plan (after Mesqui and Anus) 
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 The height of these towers and the relatively confined spaces on top would have 
made it very difficult to move an engine's components and ammunition up to such 
positions and then back down to be stored under cover.1035 When considering that the 
construction of the outer wall would have removed most of the relative range 
advantage,1036 these difficulties could be avoided by erecting any heavy engines in the 
open space to the west of the berquilla, leaving the lofty and commanding towers free for 
other forces. The construction of the outer wall also provided an alternative position for 
lighter artillery, one which has thus far been overlooked by scholars. 
 Along the inside of the outer southern wall there is a structure, 68 m long, 
commonly identified as the Frankish stables.1037 The terrace roof of this structure 
effectively widens the fighting platform an additional 10 m and would have afforded an 
ideal position to mount defensive artillery. The battlements, especially if they were of two 
levels as they were during the Mamluk period, would have provided excellent cover while 
                                                 
1035 The impact of weathering on exposed wood would have made storing the engines under cover 
necessary, at the very least during the winter months, similar to the storage of sixteenth- through eighteenth-
century wooden gun carriages. 
1036 Although lower, these engines would have been farther forward, between the inner and outer walls, 
yielding comparable ranges. 
1037 For this structure, see Biller, et al., Der Crac, pp. 249-51. 
Crac des Chevaliers: outer southern wall, from the west (Denys Pringle) 
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the open space on three sides left 
nothing to obstructing the firing 
process of a trebuchet and allowed 
personnel to move freely around such 
engines. However, the vast breadth of 
the vaulting below suggests that this 
would have been an ideal position for 
traction- rather than counterweight-
powered machines. 
Although the vaulting of the 
Frankish stables was not strengthened 
after 1271, Jean Mesqui has dated the 
masonry that now blocks the eastern 
door and the staircase that provides 
access to the roof from the east to after 
the Mamluk siege.1038 This suggests 
that the value of this fighting platform 
was readily appreciated but that heavy 
artillery was at no point placed here. 
While it is possible that counterweight 
artillery might have been erected on one or two of Crac's Frankish towers, two other 
towers frequently supposed to have been designed to carry heavy artillery are found at 
'Atlit.1039 
 
'Atlit 
The thick side walls of 'Atlit's outer eastern towers appear to have allowed them to bear 
considerable loads. Although the towers have not survived to their original height, in his 
analysis, C. N. Johns speculated that the internal vaulting of the second level (first floor) 
would have projected up through the roof level, thus denying the opportunity to employ 
any kind of artillery on top of these towers. 
                                                 
1038 Mesqui, "La troisième enceinte," p. 13. 
1039 Both the southern inner towers at Crac and two inner towers at 'Atlit were noted in Chevedden's original 
study, Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, pp. 289-90. 
Crac des Chevaliers: outer southern wall, from 
the east (Denys Pringle) 
Crac des Chevaliers: interior of the Frankish 
stables, looking west (Denys Pringle) 
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 Behind the outer line of defences soared two colossal towers, the northern of 
which still survives to a height of 35 m, almost its original height. The towers were 27 m 
wide with walls approximately 5 m thick and contained three levels, the highest of which 
made up nearly half the height of each tower.1040 The towers were built using immense 
blocks, each weighing more than a ton, cut with 4 cm margins no less than 7 cm deep, 
leaving bosses that extended out up to 30 cm.1041 Although cut from the same soft stone 
found elsewhere along the Palestinian coast, the extremely hard Frankish mortar and 
rubble fill gave these walls considerable strength. 
 It is the outstanding height of these towers that tends to nominate them as pseudo 
equivalents to al-'Adil's supposed artillery towers.1042 Despite the unprecedented 
thickness of their walls, it seems unlikely that they ever supported heavy counterweight 
trebuchets. There may have been a central pier rising through the middle of the second 
and third levels, creating bays of groin vaults, but this does not appear to have been 
present at the lowest level. While the towers would have provided an impressive vantage 
point and could very well have supported traction artillery, the vast volume of internal 
space, especially at the third level, appears to have rendered them unfit to withstand the 
stresses created by the sudden drop and subsequent swinging of a sizable counterweight. 
To this can be added the difficulties of moving such an engine into position. 
 The height of these towers would have given any artillery placed on them an 
advantage in range compared to any situated on the ground just behind the outer curtain; 
however, the latter position provided greater protection and left the tower-tops free for 
archers and slingers, who required line-of-sight. Accordingly, the trabuculum that 
defended the castle in 1220 was probably positioned on the ground, behind the outermost 
curtain, regardless of whether the towers had been completed by this date.1043 It is possible 
that the two towers may have been better suited to support such an engine before the 
uppermost level was added, but the open space at the first level discourages such a 
suggestion.  
                                                 
1040 Johns, Guide to 'Atlit, pp. 36-37, 44; Johns, "Excavations at Pilgrims' Castle, (1932)," pp. 152-53; Boas, 
Crusader Archaeology, pp. 111-12; Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 1:195. 
1041 Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 1:296. In disagreement with The Survey of Western 
Palestine, T. S. R. Boase has suggested that these blocks may have been reused from an earlier Phoenician 
settlement, Boase, "Military Architecture," pp. 157-58. 
1042 For example, Nicolle, Crusader Castles, p. 67. 
1043 If the outer line was incomplete at this point in history, the outer curtain in 1220 would have been what 
is now the inner curtain between the two tall towers. 
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Margat 
At Margat, some have suggested that artillery could have been placed on the terrace along 
the eastern face of the citadel,1044 while others have looked to the roof tops of towers. 
Through his work at the castle, Balázs Major has identified the light structure of certain 
upper-level buildings, which would not be suitable for heavy artillery, but has suggested 
that the roof of the chapel might have supported an engine.1045 The chapel, however, faces 
the steep drop beyond the eastern wall of the citadel and is well withdrawn from the 
exposed southern salient, making the donjon further south a more suitable position. 
 There would have been 
plenty of space on top of the 
donjon, which is just over 20 m 
in diameter.1046 But despite its 
thick walls, the open space of 
the internal levels, each laid out 
as a single-room under a barrel 
vault, would have restricted the 
amount of vertical load and 
lateral strain that this tower 
could have supported. As at other castles, there is ample space elsewhere to erect such 
engines, sacrificing minimal range while gaining protection. 
At most, Margat's donjon, similar to the keep at Jubayl, may have supported 
lighter artillery behind its double-level battlements. Round towers of a similar scale in 
Europe, such as those at Coucy, Pembroke and Aigues Mortes, likewise do not appear to 
have been designed to support heavy artillery on their roofs. 
 
Arsuf 
Jean Mesqui has suggested that the outer walls at Arsuf may have been designed in part 
to accommodate heavy artillery.1047 Both the north and south protrusions, however, mirror 
the inner towers, leaving only the eastern lobe, directly in front of the inner gate, with 
                                                 
1044 For this example see, France, Western Warfare, p. 105; Nicolle, Crusader Castles, p. 79. 
1045 Major, "Medieval 'light construction buildings'," pp. 165-81; Major, "Medieval Cranes," pp. 1-5. 
1046 Rey, Étude sur les monuments, p. 30; Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 3:272; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, 
pp. 173-75. 
1047 Mesqui, "La fortification des Croisés," p. 8. 
Margat: southern defences, section (after Rey) 
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enough room to host an engine of any notable size. Erecting a large engine here, however, 
would restrict mobility around the castle, a cost with debatable benefit. The burnt cedar 
logs and concentration of sizable projectiles found between the north and east lobes, may 
indicate that the defenders were employing smaller engines from more restricted 
positions.1048 
 It is difficult to gauge accurately the size of the engines typically employed 
defensively by the Franks. It would appear that more thought was given to defensive 
artillery than simply using stockpiled engines otherwise intended for offence. Ibn al-Furat 
seems to suggest this when mentioning the defensive engines at Jaffa in 1266.1049 Most 
defensive engines would have been lighter traction trebuchets; however, heavier engines 
appear to have been employed defensively at Acre (1190-91), 'Atlit (1220), Margat 
(1285), and almost certainly during the Mamluk siege of Acre in 1291. Considerations 
for the employment of such engines do not appear to have influenced significantly the 
planning of fortifications during most of the thirteenth century. There are indications, 
however, that the Mamluks may have attempted to mount counterweight trebuchets on 
certain towers by the end of the century. 
 
 
 
Possible Mamluk Artillery Towers 
 
From Ibn al-Furat's account we may deduce that wall-mounted artillery was a critical 
component of Baybars' arrangements to improve the defensibility of Alexandria in 1272-
73. In a subsequent letter, the city's governor reported that around one hundred machines 
had been prepared.1050 Bearing in mind that Baybars was certainly storing heavy artillery 
in his strongholds by this point, it remains to be considered whether a desire to mount the 
heaviest engines on towers motivated any of his rebuilding efforts, or those of his 
immediate successors.  
                                                 
1048 See Raphael and Tepper, "The Archaeological Evidence," p. 87. 
1049 Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and Lyons, 2:90-91. Cf. Fig. B23. 
1050 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, al-Rawd, trans. al-Khowayter, 2:795-96; Ibn al-Furat, Tarikh, trans. Lyons and 
Lyons, 2:159. 
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Subayba 
The Mamluks developed the Ayyubid outer defences of Subayba, which had been 
slighting by the withdrawing Mongols.1051 France has casually suggested that the round 
towers built along the southern curtain (towers 2, 5, 7 and 16) may have mounted heavy 
engines.1052 The size of tower 7 and its vaulting, a 4 m wide barrel vault radiating around 
a central pier, indicate that it may have been able to support significant loads. Tower 16 
is of a similar size but lacks the support of a central pier. The castle's largest towers, 
however, are quadrangular.  
 In the centre of the western wall, tower 10 seems not to have been developed by 
the Mamluks and retains its relatively thin Ayyubid walls and open interior space. Tower 
15 may have been laid out in a similar fashion to the southern donjon at Shayzar, although 
its internal plan is now hard to confirm. Towers 11 and 9 were essentially encased. Tower 
11, originally built by al-Aziz Uthman in 1230, had substantial walls, 2.5-3.7 m thick, but 
was much smaller than those built by al-'Adil.1053 It was enlarged in 1275 using massive 
blocks, averaging 7 tons. Hartal has suggested that the scale of these building stones was 
necessary to retain the fill behind the walls, as the western wall was advanced down the 
slope, and support the two levels above, which reached an estimated height of 30 m.1054 
Although the Ayyubid tower and surrounding structure provided quite a strong base, the 
                                                 
1051 The castle was built by al-Aziz Uthman c. 1228. Despite misdating the construction of the castle to the 
Franks in the twelfth century, Deschamps' study continues to form the basis of subsequent studies, 
Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 2:145-74; Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, pp. 45-46; Benvenisti, The 
Crusaders, pp. 147-74; Ellenblum, "Who Built Qal'at al-Subayba?" pp. 103-12; Hartal, al-Subayba. 
1052 France, Western Warfare, p. 124.  
1053 Hartal, al-Subayba, pp. 3, 9, 12-14, 17. 
1054 Hartal, al-Subayba, pp. 20, 36. 
Subayba: castle, plan (after Hartal and Deschamps) 
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third level of the Mamluk tower appears to have been a single open room, limiting the 
vertical load that the vaulting could carry. In Hartal's opinion, the creation of this opulent 
hall was the impetus for the tower's expansion.1055 
 The Ayyubid walls of tower 9 were much thinner, about 1.4 m thick. Even at its 
earliest phase this tower appears to have been designed to incorporate numerous 
embrasures, allowing it to control movement around this salient of the castle. The present 
Mamluk tower has only slightly thicker walls but its construction increased the number 
of embrasures at the first level from eight 
to fourteen. The construction of two sub-
levels, necessitated by the slope of the 
ground, led to the creation of a further five 
southward, one westward and two 
eastward-facing casemates at the first of 
these and another four to the south at the 
lower level.1056 Intriguingly, the Mamluk 
extension created firing chambers, leaving 
large piers of masonry to break up what 
could otherwise have been a continuous 
gallery. These divisions increased the 
vertical load that each level could support, 
but their primary purpose appears to have 
been to add cohesive strength, perhaps 
against mining. Above the first level, traces 
of both the Ayyubid and Mamluk structure 
are clear in the northwest corner of the 
tower, revealing no less than another four 
Mamluk embrasures in what little remains. 
Traces of an Ayyubid staircase are still 
discernible, to service a third level, now 
completely obscured. 
                                                 
1055 Hartal, al-Subayba, pp. 41, 72. The picturesque views from this position and fine internal masonry 
further suggest that concerns of comfort outweighed those of defence at this upper level. 
1056 Hartal, al-Subayba, pp. 75-79, 68-90. The spiral staircases providing access to these sub-levels are 
extremely rare examples of this form of staircase built in this region during the period of the crusades. 
Subayba: tower 9, plan and section (after 
Hartal) 
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While the layout of what has survived of this tower suggests that it may have been 
able to bear a substantial and perhaps even dynamically shifting load, the structure of the 
upper levels is unclear, as are the motivations for building a tower to accommodate heavy 
artillery at a salient that is naturally difficult to approach. Instead, the tower appears to 
have been designed for small-arms fire, like the outer towers at 'Atlit and tower E at 
Montreal. 
 
Crac des Chevaliers 
The most obvious example of a tower capable of carrying immense loads is the massive 
quadrangular tower, about 20 m square, completed by Qalawun at Crac des Chevaliers 
around 1285.1057 The tower contains a single internal level at the same height as the upper 
parapet of the adjacent curtain walls. This level is essentially a gallery: eight bays of groin 
vaults arranged around a central square pillar, slightly larger than the bays themselves. 
The seven exterior bays provide access to casemate, each extending halfway through the 
external wall to service an embrasure, while the internal three bays provide access to the 
tower. The tower is solid below this 
level with the exception of a narrow 
passage connecting the Frankish 
stables with a postern in the east face 
of the tower. The roof was 
surrounded by an open-backed 
double-level parapet, similar to that 
found at Damascus.  
 The solidity of this tower and 
large central pier through its single 
internal level, would have made this 
tower capable of supporting 
immense loads and dynamic forces. 
While it cannot be ruled out that the 
tower's design was inspired to 
confound the work of sappers, this 
would have been an ideal position to 
                                                 
1057 Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 1:157 n. 2; Biller, et al., Der Crac, pp. 251-52. 
Crac des Chevaliers: outer southern defences, 
plan (after Mesqui and Anus) 
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mount a counterweight trebuchet. The tower provided both space and protection while 
there was ample room along the broad fighting platform to either side for lighter artillery 
and small-arms fire. But despite these favourable conditions, there is no direct evidence 
to prove that this tower ever carried any kind of thirteenth-century artillery. 
 Just to the west of this quadrangular tower is a slightly earlier rounded Mamluk 
tower, rebuilt over the remains of a Frankish tower after 1271.1058 This tower has a similar 
layout to tower 7 at Subayba. It contains a single internal level, arranged in an octagon 
around a central pier of the same 
shape and a diameter half the span 
of the encircling vaulting. 
Casemates were provided in each of 
the tower's four external faces. This 
tower would have been able to 
support considerable loads, unlike 
the tower just to the northwest, 
which is also rounded but was given 
an almost flat ceiling vault at the 
second level.1059 It is possible that the design of this tower, with its single internal level 
and central pier, inspired that of the more dramatic quadrangular one built next to it. 
Although the southwest tower is 16 m in diameter, this would have been reduced 
by the encroachment of the lower covered level of the parapet. When the quadrangular 
tower was added, it was given a fighting platform as wide, north to south, as that of the 
                                                 
1058 This tower is dated epigraphically, Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 1:170. 
1059 For a picture of the inside of this tower, see Biller, et al., Der Crac, p. 241 fig. 199. 
Crac des Chevaliers: interior of outer southwest 
tower (from Mesqui) 
Crac des Chevaliers: outer southern 
defences, from the southwest (from Rey) 
Crac des Chevaliers: rear of the southern 
quadrangular tower (from Rey) 
Image protected by copyright 
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Frankish stables behind the wall. It may have been a desire to mount a larger engine than 
would fit on the southwest tower that led to the construction of the quadrangular tower. 
Even with the space occupied by such an engine, there would have been plenty of room 
for archers along the two levels of the parapet, which extended the length of the southern 
front. While the raised battlements would also have shielded any lighter artillery 
positioned on the broader terrace, so too would its lower level protect any within should 
an engine misfire. The ultimate design of this front provided both strength and protection 
as well as considerable firepower. 
 
Margat 
The Mamluk rebuilding at Margat clearly 
displays which section of the castle was 
undermined in 1285. The apex of the outer 
southern wall was rebuilt with walls 8 m 
thick. Like the quadrangular southern tower 
at Crac, the design of the rounded tower is 
much more solid than earlier ones; however, 
the glacis around this salient, from which 
the tower rises, suggests that mining was 
still the greatest threat and may have been 
the sole influence behind the thickness of 
these walls. 
Margat: outer southern tower, plan (from 
Mesqui) 
Margat: outer southern tower, from the north (Denys Pringle) 
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 The tower has one internal level, servicing three embrasures and three box 
machicolations, arranged around a large semi-circular pier much thicker than the passage 
is wide. While stout, there would not appear to have been enough room on this tower to 
erect any sizable artillery: space rather than strength was the limiting factor here. The 
internal gallery provided an additional level from which archers could fire outwards but 
also kept the tower lower than it might otherwise have been. This ensured that it could be 
commanded from the keep and may have allowed sufficient clearance for defensive 
artillery to fire over it. 
 
Safed 
Space would not appear to have been an issue at the large 
circular keep built by the Mamluks at Safed, although little 
remains of this tower today. This massive tower is similar 
in some ways to the contemporary donjon built at Coucy. 
Both towers, about 35 m in diameter, appear to have 
contained a substructure, which limited the amount of 
central space spanned by their vaulting.1060 At Safed, it 
seems a heliocoidal ramp built into the bulk of the outer 
                                                 
1060 For studies of Safed, see Pringle, "Reconstructing the Castle of Safad," pp. 139-48; Barbé and Damati, 
"Le château de Safed," 77-93. For Coucy, see Viollet-le-Duc, Description du Château de Coucy. 
Safed: postulated form of 
the Mamluk donjon, section 
(after Pringle) 
Margat: castle, from the south (Denys Pringle) 
ARTILLERY IN AND AROUND THE LATIN EAST MICHAEL S. FULTON 
  
 
327 
wall ascended the tower, leaving an inner ring of masonry to support the vaulting over 
what was likely a central open space; however, no illustrative evidence that depicts the 
interior of this tower has survived.  
 Like that of Coucy,1061 the suggested structure of Safed's Mamluk donjon would 
have made it capable of carrying relatively large loads if it were not for its enormous 
scale. The probable volume of open space inside these towers suggests that they were 
designed to impress onlookers rather than to support heavy artillery. Their thick walls, 
like those of the towers at 'Atlit, were probably a structural necessity. Had the diameter 
of these towers been smaller, mounting heavy artillery on each might have been an option. 
  
 
 
   
 
                                                 
1061 Plans of Coucy that predate its destruction in 1917 reveal that a single spiral staircase provided access 
to three lofty internal levels, each with a partial mezzanine level and sheltered by rib vaulting. At the third 
level, the mezzanine became a gallery by piercing each of the twelve structural pillars, from which the ribs 
of each level sprang, leaving internal buttresses on the exterior side and solid pillars on the internal side to 
carry the third vault, which was also the tower's roof. 
Foix: fifteenth-century round tower, 
plan and section (from Mesqui) 
Ham: castle, plan (from Mesqui) 
 
Roumeli Hissar: Black Tower, 
section (from Toy) 
 
Dijon: fifteenth-century 
tower, cutaway (from 
Mesqui) 
Ham: fifteenth-century 
tower, cutaway (from 
Mesqui) 
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 When walls in excess of 5 m become more popular in the fifteenth century, towers 
tended to be smaller, such as those at Clisson, Foix, Dijon and Bourbon-l'Archambault, 
all of which were around 15 m in diameter. The exceptionally thick walls of these towers, 
as well as those of larger towers, as at Roumeli Hissar and Ham, more accurately reflect 
the growing power artillery, both the increasing strength of offensive gunpowder weapons 
as well as a desire to incorporate heavy defensive guns in internal casemates.  
 
Others 
Most other examples of large Mamluk towers built in the late thirteenth century also seem 
unlikely to have supported heavy artillery. For example, the exterior wall of the Mamluk 
donjon at Kerak is impressively thick, but the tower seems to have been only about 15 m 
deep, suggesting that it was designed to impress onlookers more than anything else.1062 
The numerous embrasures provided for archers appear to be the tower's greatest defensive 
consideration. 
 Before Chevedden, Wolfgang Müller-Wiener suggested that the large 
quadrangular tower built by Qalawun adjoining the temple of Bacchus at Baalbek may 
have been intended as an artillery platform.1063 While there is ample space for this and 
outwardly the tower resembles that at Crac, a wide cross-vault opens up the inside and 
additional chambers turn what would otherwise have been solid corners into firing 
chambers. Rather than being 
intended to support heavy 
artillery, it appears more 
likely that a desire to 
maximise the number of 
embrasures guided the layout 
of this tower, as at Subayba's 
tower 9. The construction of 
towers E and F at Montreal 
appear to be similar examples 
of this, as are the earlier outer 
towers at 'Atlit.  
                                                 
1062 See Deschamps, Les Châteaux, 2:88-89. 
1063 Müller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p. 55. 
Baalbek: southwestern area of the citadel, plan (after 
Yovitchitch and Müller Wiener) 
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Rather than any new, stronger design, 
Montreal's tower E is more like the elongated 
Ayyubid tower at Apamea than most thirteenth-
century Mamluk towers.1064 Likewise, when 
the southern complex of Shayzar was expanded 
in the thirteenth century, the addition was laid 
out more to mimic the earlier structure than to 
provide any further strength to mount or resist 
artillery. Thus while there are some examples 
of towers that might have been able to support 
heavy artillery, few appear to have been 
designed specifically to do so. When 
examining the wider use of central pillars by 
the Mamluks, Yovitchitch concluded that this 
was done to provide greater structural 
cohesion, a countermeasure against mining 
more than an effort to carry greater loads.1065 
 
 
 
Other Interpretations 
 
Structural solutions to supporting greater loads can be quite simple: adding interior 
supports, such as a crosswall, increasing wall thickness and adding buttressing all work 
to this end.1066 Most measures, however, come at a cost to internal space and aesthetic 
grandeur. While the average thickness of fortified walls increased slightly in the early 
thirteenth century, so too did vaulted spaces inside towers. Predictably, some of the 
thickest walls surround the most open internal spaces and, more generally, many of the 
most impressive structures, whether viewed from within or without, boast thicker than 
                                                 
1064 See plan in Dangles, "La refortification d'Afamiyya," p. 195. 
1065 Yovitchitch, Forteresses du Proche-Orient, pp. 208-10. 
1066 For example, as Anglo-Norman keeps grew taller and heavier through the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, cross-walls were used to divide the lower levels and provide greater stability, evident at sites 
such as Potchester, Castle Rising, Rochester, Scarborough, Trim and the White Tower. 
Apamea: tower 7, section and plan 
(after Dangles) 
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average walls. Examples range from al-'Adil's encased towers at Cairo to the Mamluk 
encasement of tower 11 at Subayba, and the great interior towers of 'Atlit to the imposing 
donjon at Kerak. Aside from monumental projects such as these, the thickness of fortified 
walls continued to average between 2 and 3.5 m. 
 Most measures undertaken to increase the defensibility of fortifications in the 
thirteenth century appear to have focused on maximising the number of embrasures while 
ensuring structural cohesion, rather than elevating heavy defensive artillery. The solid 
quadrangular tower at Crac, ideally suited to enduring the stresses associated with 
mounting such engines, appears to be the only tower both large and strong enough to have 
accommodated an engine of this type. Solid towers had been built in the Near East in the 
centuries leading up to the crusades, including those of the Umayyads at Ayla (Aqaba) 
and those of the Arabs at Minat al-Qal'a, near Ashdod, so their appearance is not proof in 
itself that they were used to support heavy artillery. The rapid ejection of the Franks from 
the Holy Land and the region's transition from frontier to hinterland, removed much of 
the incentive to invest in and develop its fortifications. It is therefore a matter of 
conjecture whether a larger number of solid towers, such as that at Crac, might have been 
built if the Frankish presence had lasted longer. 
 It was not until the fifteenth century and the refinement of chemical propellants 
that a comprehensive shift in tower design was necessitated, encouraging much thicker 
walls and solid lower levels in order both to support and to resist improving gunpowder 
weapons.1067 The sharpness of this change, relative to any in the thirteenth century, 
reveals the comparatively limited impact that artillery had on fortification design during 
the period of the crusades. 
 
Symbolism 
The scale of the largest towers was probably intended more to impress onlookers than to 
perform any particular military function. This is not to say that these buildings were not 
built to serve a military purpose, only that the size of these towers had more to do with 
image than a particular aspect of defensibility. The men who built these towers in the 
early thirteenth century, al-'Adil, al-Zahir Ghazi, the Templars and even Enguerrand III 
                                                 
1067 See Mallet, "The Transformation of War," pp. 1-17; Pepper, "The Face of the Siege," pp. 33-52; de la 
Croix, "Military Architecture," pp. 263-90. See also Black, European Warfare, esp. pp. 85-86; Parker, The 
Military Revolution, pp. 7-16, 24-32; Dechert, "The Military Architecture of Francesco di Giorgio," pp. 
161-80. 
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of Coucy,1068 used scale as a form of propaganda, desiring their towers to reflect views of 
their own grandeur. During the Mamluk period, most towers were smaller than these. The 
largest accommodate numerous embrasures; however, many still appear to have had a 
symbolic element, often being striped with inscriptions making it clear for contemporaries 
and posterity who was responsible for their construction. 
 Castles and citadels had been used as symbols of control in the Near East prior to 
the arrival of the Franks, much as they had been in Latin Europe. Although some citadels 
occupied far older tells, the political importance and medieval fortification of these sites 
predominantly date to the Seljuk period.1069 These appear to have been intended to 
reinforce notions of the social order. Ayyubid, as well as Frankish, fortification efforts 
can be regarded similarly. In Saladin's shadow, his successors struggled to secure their 
authority with more than just the sword. Alongside al-'Adil's building programme, al-
Zahir Ghazi launched a parallel construction campaign throughout his northern realm. 
His work at the citadels of Aleppo, Harim, Najm and Mudiq is very similar: each was 
built on a conical tell faced with masonry and accessed via an impressive gatehouse.1070 
Al-'Adil also employed a stylistic signature through his use of great quadrangular towers, 
most with a similar drafted masonry style.1071 
 
The unprecedented scale of the towers built in the early thirteenth century would remain 
an influential design option but did not become a new standard. Aside from his impressive 
gatehouses, al-Zahir Ghazi continued to employ relatively small mural towers, 
comparable with those constructed a century earlier. Decades later, towers built at Aleppo 
in the wake of the Mongol conquest were actually smaller than the earlier ones that they 
replaced.1072 The continued construction of towers with relatively small footprints 
contradicts the suggestions of Chevedden and Kennedy that the large towers built by al-
'Adil were a necessary response to a dramatic improvement in artillery. 
                                                 
1068 It is of little influence, but Enguerrand's father, Ralph I of Coucy, died at the siege of Acre in 1191, an 
episode which thus connects all the parties. 
1069 Rabbat, "The Militarization of Taste in Medieval Bilad al-Sham," pp. 87-92. 
1070 To a certain extent, these resemble the citadels of Hama and Homs, which were rebuilt by al-Zahir 
Ghazi's cousins. At Harim, al-Zahir Ghazi seems to have encircled the earlier defences, built by the Franks 
or Nur al-Din, similar to al-'Adil encasement of the Seljuk-Zankid citadel of Damascus. See Gelichi, "The 
Citadel of Harim," pp. 191-95. Cf. Berthier, "La Citadelle de Damas," pp. 161-63. 
1071 The large tower added at 'Ajlun may also reflect this as it was built by Izz al-Din al-Mansur Aybak, a 
Mamluk of al-'Adil's son, al-Mu'azzam 'Isa. Another theory aiming to explain the scale of the towers at 
Damascus suggests that they were built to accommodate al-'Adil's personal fighting force, the halqa, 
Hanisch, "The Works of al-Malik al-'Adil," p. 177. 
1072 Gonnella, "The Citadel of Aleppo," p. 171. 
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The development of the counterweight trebuchet seems to have had a far from 
spectacular genesis. While these engines were likely used in the late twelfth century and 
almost certainly in the early thirteenth, fortification designs may not have been 
considerably influenced by artillery until the 1270s. But even the changes that occurred 
during the Mamluk period cannot be compared with the more dramatic shift that took 
place in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
No one explanation is sufficient to explain the ways in which fortifications 
developed in and around the Latin East. However, it can be said that the noticeable 
differences between fortifications built before and after the battle of Hattin were not 
caused by an attempt to address the threat posed by a new offensive weapon, nor a desire 
to mount comparable engines on the tops of towers. The transition in Frankish castle 
building was largely a product of the wealth of the military orders, relative to the Latin 
baronage, the financial assistance provided by European leaders and the post-Hattin 
political and military conditions associated with defending inland territory. The founders 
and developers of these great strongholds were aware of the Franks' limited capacity to 
relieve a siege. Concurrently, Saladin's heirs were competing for the spoils of his empire. 
The two main figures to emerge, al-'Adil and his nephew al-Zahir Ghazi, launched 
building campaigns to project their power and influence. Although the thickness of 
fortified walls did increase somewhat from the twelfth century to the thirteenth, the use 
of noticeably thicker walls was far from universal or even consistent. In many instances, 
exceptionally thick walls appear to have been a structural necessity, often found 
supporting reciprocally vast vaulted spaces, while a fear of mining inspired the use of 
such elsewhere.
ARTILLERY IN AND AROUND THE LATIN EAST MICHAEL S. FULTON 
  
 
333 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
By investigating the use of artillery in a specific region, over a limited period of time, this 
study has avoided the temptation to rely on only the most sensational anecdotal evidence, 
and the inevitable misinterpretations that accompany such a practice. Instead, by 
diligently examining events on a case-by-case basis, the gradual development of these 
engines has become apparent as well as the method in which they were employed. 
 
 
 
Development 
 
It is clear that artillery was familiar to both Frankish and Muslim forces at the time of the 
First Crusade. These traction trebuchets were initially fairly light, but their use throughout 
the twelfth century speaks to their value. Counterweight trebuchets seem to have appeared 
in the second half of the twelfth century and were probably used by both Frankish and 
Muslim forces at certain sieges between 1187 and 1192. Initially, these comparatively 
new engines do not appear to have been significantly more powerful than certain traction 
trebuchets. However, the introduction of new terminology in the early thirteenth century, 
around the siege of Damietta (1218-20), suggests that these engines were becoming 
increasingly distinct as they became more powerful. Unlike most references to artillery 
from the mid-twelfth century, those identified with new terms, such as trebuchetum or 
manjaniq maghribi, tend to be found in limited numbers and at the most significant sieges. 
Furthermore, these engines tend to be praised for their destructive power, and references 
to structural damage inflicted by engines identified by other terms gradually disappears. 
Physical evidence confirms the increasing scale of the heaviest counterweight 
trebuchets from the siege of Ascalon (1247) onwards. In 1271, stones around 100 kg were 
used at Crac des Chevaliers and months later stones over 60 kg appear to have been 
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thrown at Montfort from at least 200 m. Although the mass of the largest projectiles 
appears to rise through the second half of the thirteenth century and such heavy stones 
appear in increasing numbers, at most sieges the projectiles thrown by counterweight 
trebuchets were vastly outnumbered by much smaller ones thrown by traction trebuchets. 
This is mirrored in the textual evidence from the Muslim side: increasingly specific 
terminology was introduced to identify new engine-types, but the lightest engines 
generally made up the majority at a given siege. Thus while counterweight trebuchets 
grew larger and more destructive through the Mamluk period, traction trebuchets, 
probably very similar to those used in the early twelfth century, remained in use as 
antipersonnel weapons. 
 
East-West Supremacy 
One readily apparent observation that can be drawn from this study is the similarity 
between the engines that were used by the various Frankish and Muslim powers. From 
the First Crusade, to the development of counterweight trebuchets, to the impressive 
power of some engines near the end of the thirteenth century, the various sources that 
describe these events, from the Latin East, Europe, Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia, at no 
point suggest there was a disparity between the artillery of the Franks and Muslims. 
In the past, certain historians have suggested that Muslim artillery was superior to 
that of their Frankish counterparts in the twelfth century. Such opinions were generally 
founded on either a belief that siege techniques developed rapidly in Europe during the 
twelfth century, a result of knowledge brought back from the crusades, or as demonstrated 
by the successes of the Zankid-Ayyubid reconquests of the second half of the twelfth 
century.1073 Gibb, operating from the Muslim perspective, challenged this by identifying 
the apparent simplicity of Muslim siege tactics in the Near and Middle East before the 
First Crusade.1074 Another popular theory has been that the Franks received an education 
in siege warfare from the Byzantines during the First Crusade. This idea was put forward 
by Oman and Runciman in much more general terms than Chevedden's more recent 
artillery-specific theory.1075 From an opposing point of view, Ronnie Ellenblum has 
argued that the Franks employed more sophisticated siege engines than did the Muslims 
                                                 
1073 See Thompson, Military Architecture, p. 66; Benvenisti, The Crusaders, p. 284; Kennedy, Crusader 
Castles, p. 102; Nicolle, Crusader Castles, p. 31. 
1074 Gibb, in Ibn al-Qalanisi, Dhail, trans. Gibb, pp. 39-40. 
1075 Oman, A History of the Art of War, p. 526; Runciman, A History of the Crusades, 1:227-28. 
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through most of the twelfth century, a sentiment shared by Lynn White Jr.1076 The work 
of John France has been critical in amending these skewed interpretations, pointing out 
that the Franks and Muslims were largely aware of the other side's technologies but 
preferred different tactics, which were suited to different technologies.1077 In his study of 
thirteenth century warfare, Christopher Marshall similarly observed that "the same basic 
weapons were used by both Muslims and Christians for defence and attack."1078 The 
present study can thus be seen as the latest instalment supporting this latter school of 
thought. 
 The Muslim invasions of southern Europe during the Early Middle Ages, the 
Reconquista in Iberia, the struggles between Latin and Greek Christians in Eastern 
Europe and continual conflicts amongst the powers of these various ethnic groups would 
have naturally spread the relatively simple mechanics of artillery technology. As any 
developments were made, their employment in conflict inadvertently shared this 
advantage with enemies and allies alike. Additionally, more distant links would have been 
made by travellers, not least those who made pilgrimages to the Levant, accelerating the 
spread of knowledge amongst the military elites. But when judging the siege technology 
used by any individual, context is imperative: the resources of the besieging force and its 
commander, the nature of the fortress to be assailed, the topography, the availability of 
local timber and even the weather were all critical factors that influenced what engines 
might be employed at any given siege. 
 
 
 
Employment 
 
Almost all previous studies of artillery have operated on the premise that artillery was 
positioned as far as possible from the intended target.1079 Although this would have been 
                                                 
1076 Ellenblum, Crusader Castles, pp. 203-30; White, "The Crusaders and the Technological Thrust of the 
West," pp. 102-3. 
1077 France, "Technology and the Success of the First Crusade," pp. 170-73. See also Rogers, Latin Siege 
Warfare, pp. 62, 244-46. 
1078 Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p. 212. 
1079 This includes both historical studies and reconstructions, for example, Payne-Gallwey, A Summary of 
the History, pp. 8-10; Chevedden, "King James I," p. 314; Rogers, Latin Siege Warfare, Appendix 3, pp. 
254-73; Vemming Hansen, "Experimental Reconstruction," pp. 189-208; Krizek, "Trebuchet 
Reconstructions," pp. 19-20. 
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ideal in certain circumstances, the evidence suggests that archers could outrange artillery 
from the start of the twelfth century until at least the middle of the thirteenth. Accordingly, 
attacking engines were probably positioned so as to optimise their offensive capabilities, 
taking into consideration factors such as topography and the nature of the besieged site. 
 
Trajectory 
Attacking traction trebuchets were probably always operated within range of defensive 
archers. Counterweight trebuchets may have been among the engines that Saladin erected 
close to the north wall of Kerak (1183 and 1184), while if counterweight trebuchets were 
employed at Acre (1189-91), these were also within range of the defenders. As 
counterweight trebuchets developed, it would have been possible to erect them beyond 
the range of the defenders. During the Mamluk period, when this option would appear to 
have been available, the engines used against the citadel of Caesarea (1265) and castle of 
Arsuf (1265) would appear to have been erected quite close, while at Safed (1266) and 
Montfort (1271) they may have been positioned beyond the defenders' range. At Beaufort 
(1268), Crac des Chevaliers (1271) and Margat (1285), certain engines may have initially 
been situated out of range but were then moved much closer in order to increase the 
percussive force of their projectiles.1080 But there would have been difficulties associated 
with the first attempts to use these engines as breaching weapons. 
In order to maximise destruction, the engine involved needs to be as powerful as 
possible, while the associated projectile should also be as heavy as possible, impact at as 
high a velocity as possible and at an angle as close to the perpendicular as possible. 
Collectively these factors required a large engine, firing a large projectile at a low velocity 
from short range. But moving a large engine is quite difficult and would almost certainly 
involve going through the time-consuming process of deconstructing the machine to 
move it closer. An engine large enough to inflict structural damage would almost certainly 
have been too heavy and cumbersome to move under fire, and it would have been 
foolhardy to go through the process of erecting such an engine so close to the enemy 
without first wearing down their defences and numbers. Although most trebuchets were 
probably fired at an angle greater than 20°, this should not be taken for granted. 
 
                                                 
1080 Cf. the engine used in the final phase of the siege of Château Gaillard in 1204, William the Breton, 
Gesta Philippi Augusti 129, ed. Delaborde, p. 219. 
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Damage 
Traction trebuchets were used in an antipersonnel capacity throughout the period of the 
crusades. When comparing the hypothetical model of an engine at Nicaea (1097), 
suggested in Chapter 3, with the evidence from the siege of Arsuf (1265), provided in 
Chapter 7, the power of these engines appears to have increased with time, but not 
considerably. Assessing the power and degree of damage that counterweight trebuchets 
were capable of inflicting at a given point in time is more difficult. 
When assessing the contemporary descriptions, it is important to bear in mind a 
sense of relativity: it is easy to undervalue the limited appreciation that such sources 
would have had of acute structural destruction, compared to modern standards. For 
example, some sites that are supposed to have been demolished were only mildly slighted. 
Richard's supposed ability to repair Acre's walls "so they were higher and better than they 
had been before they were destroyed" in only a month before moving south in 1191, 
speaks either to the limited degree to which they were 'destroyed' during the siege or an 
exaggeration of what could practically have been repaired in such a timeframe.1081 
In some instances, authors would have skewed a sense of reality to impress a 
point, while in others they may simply have been mistaken or misinformed.1082 
Estimations of an engine's scale, power and rate of fire can also be seen in this light. 
Whereas previous studies have misinterpreted the power of certain engines by relying on 
evidence from only a few sieges, often selecting vivid accounts and taking a literal reading 
of the testimony of a single source, this study has discerned more gradual trends of 
development by incorporating as many sieges and contemporary perspectives as possible. 
This approach has allowed the layers of artistic licence to be peeled away. 
Datable impact signatures and projectiles provide the most objective measure of 
the power and scale of the engines they were associated with, but these are only part of a 
more complex equation. In the absence of timber remains and reliable estimations of 
scale, the size of a given engine will remain an unknown variable on one side of the 
equation; however, a sense of this can be deduced by incorporating quantifiable values 
on the other side. For example, the minimum mechanical energy, the kinetic energy 
                                                 
1081 ...rex Ricardus muris civitatis operam dabat reparandis in altius et perfectius quam priusquam 
diruerentur. Itinerarium, ed. Stubbs, p. 240, trans. Nicholson, p. 227. Cf. letter of Richard I to the abbot of 
Clairvaux, in Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. Stubbs, 3:131, trans. Riley, 2:222. 
1082 This is similar to the often wildly inaccurate estimations of combatants at a given battle. For a 
contemporary understanding of such, see Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2:242. See also Marshall, 
Warfare in the Latin East, p. 212. 
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transferred to the projectile (EKmin), can be represented if the mass of the projectile (Mp) 
and distance of flight (R), from which the minimum velocity can be determined (Vmin), 
are known: 
 
EKmin =
Mp ∙ Vmin2
2
 
where Vmin = √
R ∙ 9.8
sin(2 ∙ 45°)
 
 
Similarly, if further investigations are able to quantify the energy required to create a 
given degree of destruction, this can be used to balance the equation in the absence of 
other variables: 
 
EKmin = destructive energy + energy lost in flight 
 
A rough sense of the necessary mechanical energy and capabilities of a particular engine 
can be used to suggest a rough sense of scale. 
Most misunderstandings of these engines are due to an inadequate understanding 
of the mechanics that govern them. This has allowed for the longstanding overestimations 
of power and range. While some have misrepresented contemporary material, others have 
looked ahead to a period where there is more evidence and simply applied this to an earlier 
context. Among those who have more studiously examined the evidence, Fino has 
provided a fairly accurate impression of the power of medieval artillery; however, his 
misunderstanding of the basic operational mechanics of these engines has led to different 
errors.1083 Unfortunately, those with the best sense of the mathematics and mechanics are 
often experts in physics or applied engineering and are not sufficiently familiar with the 
historical material to place the correct engine size in its appropriate contextual phase of 
development. In the absence of a comprehensive understanding, misconceptions have 
become accepted as fact. This has had a knock-on effect and spawned flawed theories 
                                                 
1083 Fino has suggested that the projectiles of counterweight trebuchets rarely exceeded 100 kg, but appears 
to underestimate their rate of fire and accuracy, Fino, "Machines de jet médiévales," pp. 36, 38. 
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regarding the influence of these engines, such 
as the prominence of artillery as a driving 
factor behind the development of new 
fortification styles in the early thirteenth 
century. 
 To appreciate the relative 
ineffectiveness of swing-beam artillery as a 
breaching weapon, consider that Acre was 
besieged with such engines during 1190 and 
1191 but that most damage was reportedly 
inflicted in the last month of the siege, following Richard's arrival. Even during this final 
phase, with a reported nine perieres/petrariae and two mangonels/mangunelli, 
commissioned by some of the wealthiest Latin princes, those who attacked the walls in 
the last weeks of the siege still required ladders to do so and it was mining that was the 
greatest threat to the city's walls. 
The strength of medieval walls and the effect of sappers are chronically 
underestimated. The difficulties faced by Saladin in attempting to slight the keep of 
Jubayl echo what took place four and a half centuries later, when the Parliamentarians 
turned from gunpowder to the pick in order to slight the 3-4 m thick walls of the keep at 
Raglan Castle.1084 Mining was the favoured means of breaching and slighting most 
strongholds throughout the medieval period, this was as true in 1097 as it was in 1291. 
 
Conjunctive Use 
Unlike modern artillery, the medieval artillery used in the Levant during the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries was never considered to be the most effective breaching weapon of 
the day. It was, however, used to assist the sappers who were most often responsible for 
breaching fortifications. Traction trebuchets provided antipersonnel cover while 
counterweight engines were used increasingly to affect structural damage: targeting the 
parapet and upper sections of walls to deny the defenders the use of these positions. If 
mining alone is considered, artillery can be found providing support at sieges such as 
Nicaea (1097), Kharput (1123), Jaffa (1123), Edessa (1144), Banyas (1164), Jerusalem 
                                                 
1084 Wilbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium 1.6, ed. Pringle, p. 119, trans. Pringle, p. 66. Cf. Eracles 25.2, 
RHC Oc 2, p. 140. See also Conder and Kitchener, Survey of Western Palestine, 1:303. The keep still 
displays cannonballs that were embedded in its walls during the British bombardment of the 1840s. 
Raglan: slighted keep, from the east 
(author) 
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(1187), Acre (1191), Jaffa (1192), Beirut (1231), Arsuf (1265), Safed (1266), Montfort 
(1271), Margat (1285), Tripoli (1289) and Acre (1291). Furthermore, examples of its use 
by Frankish forces support the use of siege towers and Muslim armies to provide cover 
for massed frontal assaults are equally forthcoming. Topographic conditions usually 
account for those instances in which artillery was the only type of siege engine used by 
an attacking force. Due to their range, these engines could often apply pressure against 
hilltop strongholds, which were inaccessible to siege towers and left sappers exposed. 
 The psychological impact of artillery is hard to gauge but it was probably 
considerable. The besieged had to contend with showers of lighter projectiles, which 
could be cast at the same rate as an archer could loose arrows and would kill or maim 
anyone in their way. Heavier projectiles would have sent out shockwaves as they collided 
with fortifications, destroyed internal buildings and crushed individuals like no other 
weapon could. 
 
It is important to grasp the elemental simplicity of medieval siege warfare. The additional 
resources that allowed for the construction of newer and stronger defences were the same 
which allowed traditional ones to be stormed more easily. But as defences and siege 
engines developed over time, the ladder remained the most effective siege engine 
throughout the Middle Ages. Later historians have always been influenced by the 
significance of modern siege technologies. Looking for a reflection of their significance 
in earlier periods, at times they have failed to accept or acknowledge that overwhelming 
numbers could carry any stronghold at that time. 
Although the heaviest artillery underwent a period of drastic development 
between the First Crusade and ultimate fall of Frankish Acre, these engines did not have 
the revolutionary effect that Early Modern siege guns had at the end of the fifteenth 
century. As fortifications grew stronger, largely as a result of other factors, they were 
designed under the same guiding principles. Sapping remained the preferred and most 
effective means of breaching a line of fortifications: those mining under or into masonry, 
with little more than iron hand tools, were the most significant threat. The romanticised 
notions put forward by hobbyists and imprudent historians that now characterise swing-
beam artillery as a kind of super weapon, a medieval howitzer, must be discarded. 
 It is my hope that this study has shed considerable light on the use and 
development of medieval artillery, but it leaves plenty of room for expansion. When I 
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first proposed this project, I had planned to incorporate far more physical evidence from 
Lebanon and western Syria, adding this to that which has been incorporated from Israel 
and Jordan. Many of the strongholds of what were the county of Tripoli and principality 
of Antioch are/were in a reasonable state of preservation, providing a unique opportunity 
to study the impact signatures, projectiles and rebuilding patters known to be found at 
some of these sites. The extent to which the current conflict in Syria has forever denied 
the examination of some of these facets is not yet clear, but this remains an open avenue 
for further investigation. The integration of dynamic testing stands as a second area in 
which the current parameters of this study can be expanded. Although stone fracture 
patterns are difficult to measure, let alone predict, experimental testing would 
nevertheless provide a better understanding of the immediate circumstances when a 
projectile collided with a given section of medieval masonry, as well as the longer-term 
effects of such. I believe that these are both reasonable areas into which I can expand my 
research, building on the strong textual basis that has emerged from this thesis. 
Although I have chosen the crusades as a context in which to examine artillery, 
the methodology is flexible enough to be applied to different geographic areas and time 
periods. An easy extension would be to study the use of artillery in Anatolia at the same 
time, incorporating the Greek, Arabic and Armenian sources as well as various types of 
physical evidence. Byzantine artillery has been deliberately excluded as much as possible, 
as the body of Greek material pertaining to this deserves comprehensive examination in 
its own right. The same could also be done for various European regions. The 
fundamentals are such that the period in question could be extended to include bombards 
of the Late Middle Ages and even the first effective lighter siege guns of the Early Modern 
Period, again pairing source descriptions with surviving impact signatures and guns, 
altering the mechanical models to reflect the energy produced by chemical propellants. 
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Appendix 1.                                                   
Illustrative Evidence and Technical Treatises 
 
 
 
Few illustrations of European and Near Eastern artillery dating before the twelfth century 
have survived. Although most images postdate the development of the engines that they 
depict by many decades, these illustrations serve to confirm many conclusions that have 
been drawn from the literary sources. These include the initially light nature of traction 
trebuchets in the twelfth century, the gradual integration of counterweight power systems 
around the end of the twelfth century and the development of quite sizable engines by the 
end of the thirteenth century. A number of images will be highlighted here to demonstrate 
these trends. Where possible, preference will be given to images composed in the Near 
East; however, in the interest of providing a more cohesive impression of the broader 
development of trebuchet technology, images from Europe to Persia will be included. 
When considering that individuals from these wider regions travelled to the Levant, were 
exposed to the engines that were built there, and that some even imported artillery with 
them, this broader range of images becomes necessary. 
 
 
 
Slings 
 
The staff-sling was a lighter, more adaptable and more mobile option to the traction 
trebuchet. It was, in essence, a simplified hand-held form of swing-beam artillery: it was 
operated by a single person, whose body acted like the framework of a trebuchet. Whereas 
Figs. A1 and A2 display a simple sling, those in Figs. A3-A6 enjoy the mechanical 
advantage added by the staff component. 
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Early Frankish Traction Trebuchets 
 
One of the earliest images of a traction trebuchet found west of the Indus comes from 
Piandjikent, Transoxania (Turkistan), Fig. B1.1085 The wall-painting shows the structure 
of a traction trebuchet and a team of five pullers. The engine is shown to be constructed 
of slender materials but is sizable and sturdy: the main axle is approximately twice the 
height of a man and is supported by four legs, each joined to its neighbour at three points 
below the axle. Although an early example, the engine's proportions appear to be shown 
very accurately. 
One of the earliest surviving illustrations of a traction trebuchet from Western 
Europe is Fig. B2, a simple beam balanced across the fork of a supporting pole with a 
short sling, operated by only two pullers. Notably, the engine is depicted in a defensive 
role. Illustrative evidence from around the Mediterranean becomes more plentiful from 
the end of the twelfth century. 
Peter of Eboli's work contains a number of images of traction trebuchets. Figs. 
B3-B11 display these engines at a number of sieges, shown more often in a defensive 
capacity than as employed by attacking forces. The engines are powered by crews of two 
to nine and appear to fulfil a similar function as the archers next to which they are 
frequently depicted. Each engine is structurally light and shown with an axle consisting 
of two parallel rods, fixed at their ends, between which the beam passes. The tripod bases 
of the attacking engines, clearly seen in Figs. B3, B4 and B11, confirm that these were 
light engines. In Figs. B3 and B4, as well as Figs. B16 and B18-B20, a loader is shown 
holding a projectile prior to release, both securing it in place and providing some initial 
resistance to draw further potential energy from the beam, forcing it to flex before release. 
 These Normano-Italian illustrations of Peter of Eboli are similar to those found in 
Skylitzes' contemporary Greek manuscript. Fig. B12 clearly shows the 'rake' of the short 
arm, used to secure a broad 'foot' at the end of it, which in turn allowed for the pullers, 
four in this case, to stand directly under the point where their ropes were attached to the 
short arm (also visible in Figs. B3-B6 and B11). It appears that the illustrators of the 
engines in Figs. B3 and B12, understood the range of these machines to be less than that 
                                                 
1085 For more on this wall art, see Talbot Rice, Ancient Arts of Central Asia, pp. 101-10. 
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of an archer, as attacking archers are shown behind both engines. Furthermore, shielding 
screens can be seen protecting both the attacking and defending artillery in Fig. B4. 
 Fig. B13 displays a simpler pole trebuchet, apparently what is also shown in Fig. 
B14. These images come from the same document as Fig. B12 but display engines that 
appear more like that in Fig. B2, apart from their axle arrangements. The similarity of the 
axles in Figs. B3-B13, as well as that in an Italian graffito from the early thirteenth-
century, Fig. B15, suggest that this design was common in Italy and Sicily, although it is 
possible that none of these were drawn by an ethnically Italian illustrator.1086 A number 
of illustrations from a more French context, Figs. B16-B20, reveal a similar set of 
commonalities; in this case, a simplified axle supported by a vertical upright on each side. 
Fig. B16 dates to the early thirteenth century and may represent the trebuchet that 
killed Simon of Montfort at Toulouse.1087 The beam of this engine, like those in Figs. 
B12, B15, B19 and B20, consists of a main spar supported by two others, which connect 
either end of the foot, at the end of the short arm, to the main beam beyond the axle. This 
differs from the engines in Figs. B3-B11, B17 and B18 where the supporting rake 
structure joins the short arm just in front of the main axle. The former would appear to 
have been the studier design. 
In Figs. B16, B19 and B20 the foot appears to be aligned vertically. While such 
an arrangement would minimise the stresses incurred across the foot when the pullers 
suddenly applied force, it would prevent the outer spars from absorbing some of the strain 
placed on the main beam where it joined the axle. Furthermore, by aligning the foot 
vertically, fewer pullers could stand directly below the foot, diminishing the amount of 
force that could be communicated when the ropes were pulled. It is possible that the 
illustrators skewed the design of these engines, representing an otherwise horizontal 
element vertically, in order to show details that would otherwise be hidden from a strictly 
horizontal perspective. 
Figs. B16, B19 and B20 clearly show that the pulling ropes were attached to rings 
that extended from the foot of each engine. When reconstructing his traction trebuchet, 
Tarver had originally fitted his engine with only three rings, inspired by the latter 
                                                 
1086 The Skylitzes Chronicle was illuminated in Sicily in a Greek style; Peter of Eboli, a Norman, composed 
his work in either southern Italy or Sicily; and the graffito, found in Tarquinia, mid-Italy, may have been 
drawn by a Templar, see Pringle, "A Medieval Graffito," pp. 37-46. 
1087 For the death of Simon de Montfort, see Chanson de la croisade Albigeoise 205, ed. Meyer, 1:341-42, 
trans. Shirley, p. 172; Roger of Wendover, Flores historiarum, ed. Hewlett, 2:252, trans. Giles, 2:426. 
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illustrations; however, this proved too restricting and he later added five more, two more 
than are shown in Fig. B16.1088 
 Returning to an Italian context, albeit a more northern one, Figs. B21 and B22, 
from the middle of the thirteenth century, show engines with a similar three-spar 
arrangement to those in Figs. B12, B15, B16, B19 and B20. The defensive engine in Fig. 
B22 appears to have a similar axle arrangement and structure to the southern Italian 
examples that have been addressed above; however, this assailing engine and that in Fig. 
B21 have much sturdier trestle frames. Both of these latter engines also has a substantial 
foot, with pulling ropes attached at three points. Although the foot of the attacking engine 
in Fig. B22 appears to be aligned vertically, the axle, as well as the detailed isometric 
example in Fig. B21, suggest that it has been skewed in order to display it better. The 
defensive trebuchet in Fig. B23 appears to have a similar axle to that in Fig. B22 while 
its tripod base is very similar to the attacking engines in Figs. B3, B4, B11 and B12, 
which also have similar axles. It is hard to discern this artist's influences, as Fig. B23 was 
composed in England during the middle of the thirteenth century, around the same time 
as Figs. B17-B22 were drawn. The similarities suggest that this design was a popular one 
around the early twelfth century or that this was just a common way of representing 
traction trebuchets in artistic-monastic circles. 
 Three of the earliest surviving editions of William of Tyre's history that contain 
illuminations of artillery, which were composed in the Latin East, were completed by the 
early 1280s.1089 Fig. B24, from the earliest and crudest edition, displays a traction 
trebuchet with trestle-frame in profile. Only one operator is shown but the illustrator may 
have intended that others were standing beside him, hidden from view. Figs. B25 and 
B26 display heavy traction trebuchets, each with a short sling and a particularly large 
foot. Each engine is shown with a massive projectile, far too large to be practical. These 
large stones might reflect the scale of the largest projectiles that were thrown in the late 
thirteenth century; but, as traction trebuchets, the engines themselves would have been 
used in the author's day as well as at the siege of Antioch, which is the scene depicted in 
each image. 
The engine in Fig. B25 is shown with at least seven pullers, who are positioned 
behind the main axle, like those in Fig. B16, while the pullers in Fig. B26 are well ahead 
                                                 
1088 Tarver, "The Traction Trebuchet," p. 156. 
1089 For the relationship between these manuscripts, see Folda, Crusader Manuscript Illumination, pp. 27-
36. See also Edbury, "The French Translation," pp. 77-90, 97. 
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of their engine. The beam of each machine is clearly bound. This might indicate that the 
beams were supposed to be composed of a number of spars, but could also have been 
done to provide extra strength for a single beam. Tarver found that binding the beam of 
his engine helped protect it from the metal ring at the end the sling, which had a tendency 
to swing back against the beam after firing.1090 The beam of each engine is fitted to an 
axle that is carried either by a single upright, seated in a base with multiple legs, or, more 
likely, by two vertical uprights, each with a number of these legs. The use of two solid 
uprights, rather than a trestle frame, is also found in Figs. B16 and B18-B20; however, 
the legs of the engines in Figs. B25 and B26 would have been very impractical, leaving 
these engines far less stable than even the tripod designs in Figs. B3, B4 and B23. Why 
the bases of these engines are represented in this way is unclear given the much more 
structurally sound precedent established in Fig. B24.1091 These are not the only images 
displaying engines with impractical components. 
 Fig. B27 contains a traction trebuchet with a single upright and two pullers, 
similar to Fig B2, produced almost two centuries earlier. Although the engine has been 
implausibly simplified, featuring a cup at the end of the long arm rather than a sling, it 
appears to reveal how such simple engines might have been employed even at the end of 
the thirteenth century. On the other hand, machines could be operated by as many as a 
dozen pullers by this point, as seen in Fig. B28, where, despite the added power, the use 
of shields implies that the range of these engines was still less than that of the defenders. 
But the illustrative issues with both images, the lack of a sling in Fig. B27 and obscure 
axle arrangement in Fig. B28, along with those found in other illustrations, are a warning 
against interpreting these images too literally. 
 Certain exaggerations can lead to misguided conclusions regarding the power of 
traction trebuchets. At first glance the heavy foot seen in some illustrations, such as those 
in Figs. B16, B19-B22, B25, B26 and possibly B24, appear to suggest the use of a small 
counterpoise, while it is unclear which type of trebuchet the engine in Fig. C17 represents 
most closely. Through his trials, Tarver found that his engine, built according to the 
specifications of al-Tarsusi and using the images found in the Morgan Bible (Figs. B19 
and B20), benefited from the addition of a block of wood to reinforce the foot of the 
machine. This simple addition provided both structural support to an area of high strain 
                                                 
1090 Tarver, "The Traction Trebuchet," p. 156. 
1091 For the relationship between these manuscripts, see Folda, Crusader Manuscript Illumination, pp. 27-
36. 
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and a small amount of extra mass to help balance the beam.1092 This is the extent to which 
any hybrid theory can be taken. Hypotheses that a heavier beam could be balanced by a 
proportionally greater mass and operated by correspondingly large crews ignore the 
fundamental mechanics that govern these engines.1093 
 
 
 
Muslim Traction Trebuchets 
 
Mardi ibn 'Ali al-Tarsusi, an Egyptian who may have been of Armenian heritage, provides 
the most detailed descriptions of Muslim trebuchets during the period of the crusades. 
Around 1180, he presented a book to Saladin that included a number known and proposed 
weapon designs, including five types of trebuchets. The simplest was the lu'ab, a pole 
trebuchet that could be easily aimed in different directions and used by a single operator, 
similar to those in Figs. B13 and B27. This model was so common, according to al-
Tarsusi, that it did not warrant illustration. Figs. B29, B30 and B31 are labelled as 
'Frankish', 'Turkish' and 'Arab' mangonels respectively. 
The beam of the Frankish model was less than 3 m long and had a ratio of about 
6.5:1. Supports joined the foot to the beam at a point 1/3 along its length, with all three 
spars fixed to the axle for greater stability. The beam is similar to those in Figs. B17 and 
B18 although the point at which the supports join the beam is more akin to those in Figs. 
B15, B16, B19 and B20-B22. At the end of the long arm there is a hook rather than a 
'finger', quite like to those in Figs. B3-B11, B13, B25 and B26, which has been skewed 
to one side in order to distinguish it. The sturdy trestle-structure of this engine, similar to 
those in Figs. B21 and B24, is shown in profile. Al-Tarsusi recommends that the height 
of the axle be 3/5 the length of the beam. 
The Turkish model, Fig. B30, also had a triangular structure in profile; however, 
the axle is supported independently by the larger of the two struts on each side. It is 
recommended that the axle should be 3/4 as high as the beam is long. This was the lightest 
of the engines with a trestle frame and it was praised by al-Tarsusi for its simplicity. 
                                                 
1092 Tarver, "The Traction Trebuchet," p. 156. 
1093 See Chapter 2. 
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The Arab model, Fig. B31, is slightly more complicated. Its framework was 
similar to the Frankish model and but its beam had an adjustable hook to alter the engine's 
range. The effectiveness of this innovation, shown in the illustration, is questionable: 
having a length of beam extend beyond the hook would risk it interfering with the sling. 
Al-Tarsusi states that this type of engine was also provided with some kind of a wooden 
cover to protect its pulling crew, indicating that the engine's effective range was less than 
that of the opposing defenders.1094 A sling 1 cubit (0.54 m) long appears to be 
recommended for each type of engine.1095 
 Al-Tarsusi also gives more general advice regarding the working of traction 
trebuchets: 
 
If [the loader] stands directly under the pouch [of the sling], the stone will be very 
high and [the range] will be short, and it may possibly fall on the [pulling crew]. If 
[the loader] moves out from the pouch toward the end of the beam by a distance of 
one span [of a hand, 22-24 cm], the launch will be farther. The most one should 
move out from the beam is two spans [44-48 cm], [and] no more, for, if one goes 
beyond this, the launch will be short. The longest distance which the stone can 
reach is 60 ba' [c. 120 m], and the shortest is 40 ba' [c. 80 m]. Another principle 
which determines the farness or the shortness of the distance [of the shot] is the 
flexibility or dryness of the beam. When the beam is flexible, but not excessively 
so, it has a farther range and is more effective. When it is dry, it is less so. The 
shooter should have his feet wide apart, grasp the pouch with his hands, and sit 
down while he pulls the pouch each time. The best and most proper wood to make 
the beam is cherry wood. If there is none of this kind, it must be of a closely-knotted 
wood of intermediate [quality] such as cedar or the like.1096  
 
This description provides important details to complement the illustrations, notably the 
position of the loader and a sense of range. These factors appear to support the power 
models that have been suggested above – a velocity of at least 34.5 m/s, negating air 
resistance, is necessary to yield a range of 120 m. This suggests that the engines found in 
certain images, such as Figs. B1, B3, B12, B19 and B20, are relatively proportionate to 
the men operating them. 
The suggestion that cherry wood was optimal for the beam is sensible but 
intriguing. Cherry trees rarely have straight branches or even trunks. Writing in Egypt, 
                                                 
1094 Similar protective screens appear to have been used at the siege of Thessalonica in the sixth century, 
see Miracles of St Demetrius, ed. Lemerle, p. 154. 
1095 For the Arabic, see Cahen, "Un traité d'armurerie," pp. 118-20. For an English translation, see Lewis, 
Islam, 1:219-21. 
1096 Adapted from the partial translation by Paul Chevedden of Mardi ibn al-Tarsusi, Tabsira Arbab al-
Albab (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Hunt 264), in Tarver, "The Traction Trebuchet," pp. 148-49. For 
another translation, see Lewis, Islam, 1:218-19. For the Arabic, see Cahen, "Un traité d'armurerie," p. 118. 
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al-Tarsusi probably implied that the cherry, or even cedar, wood would be imported, 
possibly from Galilee, Lebanon, western Syria, Anatolia or Cyprus, otherwise it would 
need to be scavenged on campaign. If he meant the former, most of these areas were under 
Frankish or Greek control when he was writing, speaking to the ongoing trade in materials 
of war. 
 Traction trebuchets are also shown in Figs. B32 and B33. Although composed a 
century after al-Tarsusi's work, the engines seem to be about the same size, each with 
what appear to be four pulling ropes. Both engines are shown loaded with a pot of 
incendiaries. Projectiles such as these may have been used at sieges such as Jerusalem 
(1099) and Acre (1189-91). A much later illustration of a traction trebuchet, from the late 
fourteenth or fifteenth century, can be found in Fig. G8. 
 
 
 
Al-Tarsusi's Counterweight Trebuchet 
 
Al-Tarsusi's most famous illustration is that of the 'Persian' mangonel, Fig. C1. This is 
the earliest known image of a counterweight trebuchet and it is accompanied by a 
description.1097 All of the fundamental components of the engine are shown, including 
the beam, counterweight, sling, and even a winch and a trigger. The advantage of this 
design, according to al-Tarsusi, is that it could produce as much power as a traction model 
but only required one man to operate it. He states that the power of the engine is 50 ratls; 
however, it is unclear whether the Damascene ratl (1.85 kg), Iraqi ratl (0.41 kg) or 
Egyptian ratl (0.44 kg) is intended.1098 If the Damascene measure is intended, this 
probably refers to the mass of the counterweight (92.5 kg). If the Egyptian or Iraqi 
measures were used, as might be assumed given al-Tarsusi composed his work in Egypt, 
it almost certainly refers to the mass of the projectile, since a winch or pulley system 
would not be needed to lift a mass 20-22 kg. 
                                                 
1097 For translations of the description, see Appendix 5. For the Arabic, see Cahen, "Un traité d'armurerie," 
pp. 119-20. 
1098 Bradbury's simplistic interpretation of 50 lbs is inexact at best, Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, p. 255. 
This is the same issue confronting efforts to determine the power of Tughrul's engine at Manzikert in 1054-
55, see Chapter 1. 
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 Although al-Tarsusi states that an engine of this type had been made before, the 
immaturity of the design is clear. Its scale and basic components are comparable to those 
of a traction trebuchet, if the crossbow is used as a reference. The beam is fixed at a ratio 
of 3.5:1, mechanically sensible for an engine of this size, and a small counterweight, 
reportedly suspended in netting, is shown to be connected to the end of short arm by three 
ropes. The machine's principle design flaw is its low axle. This would have prevented the 
beam from rotating more than 90 before the projectile was released and would have 
required a hole to be dug into which the counterweight could fall. The hole would need 
to be deep enough to allow the counterweight to fall as long as possible before the 
projectile was released but shallow enough so that the counterweight would hit the bottom 
before it pulled against the axle with all of the momentum it had built up. Thus, the 
counterweight would need to reach the bottom of the hole just as, or slightly before, the 
beam came into line with it, or as al-Tarsusi less precisely states, the ropes connecting the 
counterweight to the beam should be the same length as the distance between the axle and 
the bottom of the hole.1099 This design flaw was subsequently addressed by simply raising 
the height of axle. This allowed the beam to be loaded at a greater angle and the 
counterweight to swing freely above the ground after release. 
 Another issues with al-Tarsusi's design is the placement of the trigger on the back 
of the sling pouch. If the sling is vertical at the beginning of the firing sequence, the 
ultimate release velocity will be slower than if it had begun in a horizontal position, 
extending backwards beneath the beam. If the sling is arranged horizontally, the projectile 
must travel farther, and thus faster, before release. The greater distance that the projectile 
must travel and resulting higher rate of acceleration, also allow for the use of a longer 
sling, which further increases the rate of acceleration and ultimately the projectile's 
release velocity. Al-Tarsusi's use of a short sling, arranged vertically, and a horizontally 
cocked beam, probably relate to his better understanding of traction trebuchets, which 
make use of both. The trigger of this counterweight engine has simply replaced the loader 
who would otherwise hold the sling pouch of a traction trebuchet in exactly the same way 
before it was pulled out of his hands. 
 The most mysterious aspect of al-Tarsusi's design is the incorporation of the 
crossbow. The text seems to indicate that the tension of the crossbow was used to provide 
                                                 
1099 If the ropes attaching the counterweight to the beam were the same length as the distance between the 
axle and the bottom of the hole, the counterweight would always rest on the bottom of the hole. 
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extra downward force when the engine was fired;1100 however, the amount of force to be 
gained in this way would have been negligible. It is also unclear why the crossbow should 
be loaded before firing, as is stated in the text, if it is to be shot downwards. The crossbow 
is also linked with the trigger somehow, which is clearly labelled at the opposite end of 
the engine. In his translation of the accompanying text, Chevedden portrays the crossbow 
as independent of the trebuchet's firing process: after using the winch to draw back the 
beam, which also draws back the string of the crossbow, the operator could then shoot 
the crossbow before firing the engine.1101 But the crossbow may be far less significant 
than some have suggested. A considerable portion of al-Tarsusi's work is dedicated to 
archery and most of the innovative weapons that he presents are traditional weapons that 
incorporate a crossbow in their design.1102 Accordingly, the presence of the crossbow is 
possibly an extension of this exercise: it has been incorporated into an engine that would 
not otherwise require it. Although al-Tarsusi explicitly states that the engine he describes 
represents an actual historical weapon, he makes similar claims to this effect when 
discussing other unlikely weapons.1103 
 Despite the shortfalls of al-Tarsusi's design, the drawing remains the earliest 
known illustration of a counterweight trebuchet. It is noteworthy that al-Tarsusi 
emphasises the accuracy of this engine and its ability to be operated by a single man rather 
than its power. This appears to confirm that knowledge of counterweight trebuchets had 
spread through the Near East by about 1180 but that these engines may have been only 
marginally more powerful than contemporary traction trebuchets at this time. 
 
 
 
Villard of Honnecourt, Egidio Colonna and Marino Sanudo 
 
Determining the earliest European illustration of a counterweight trebuchet is difficult. 
The vertical beam of the central engine in Fig. C2 might suggest that this, and perhaps its 
neighbours, were counterweight engines; however no counterweights are shown and the 
                                                 
1100 Fino has supported this apparently literal interpretation, Fino, "Machines de jet médiévales," p. 34. 
1101 See Appendix 5. 
1102 For the archery components, see al-Tarsusi, ed. and trans. Boudot-Lamotte, Contribution à l'étude de 
l'archerie musulmane. For some of the innovative designs, see also Cahen, "Un traité d'armurerie," pp. 103-
63. 
1103 Other examples include a lance with a crossbow at the end and shield with a crossbow built into it. 
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structure of these engines is the same as the traction trebuchet in Fig. B22, which is found 
on the previous folio of the same manuscript. A drawing by Villard of Honnecourt, with 
an accompanying description, appears to be the first conclusive drawing of a 
counterweight trebuchet, even if the most essential components are missing. 
 
Villard of Honnecourt 
Among the various sketches of Villard of Honnecourt is the footprint of a counterweight 
trebuchet, Fig. C3;1104 unfortunately, the accompanying elevation has not survived. The 
description reads: 
 
If you want to make the strong engine that is called a trebuchet, pay close attention 
here. Here is the base as it rests on the ground. Here in front are the two windlasses 
and the double rope which one draws back the shaft [beam] as you can see on the 
other page. There is a great weight to pull back, for the counter-poise is very heavy, 
being a hopper full of earth which is two 'large toises' [roughly 'two fathoms' or about 
12 pieds/feet] long and nine feet across and twelve feet deep. Remember the arc of 
the arrow when discharged and take great care, because it must be placed against the 
stanchion in front.1105 
 
The size of the counterweight box has attracted considerable attention. This is the best 
indication of the size of the engine, but the lack of standardised measurements, the 
absence of a clear sense of scale and missing illustration of the counterweight box have 
left this open to interpretation. Chevedden has argued that the counterweight box would 
have had a volume of about 18 m3, allowing it to hold up to 3 tons. This, according to 
Chevedden, would allow it to throw a 100 kg projectile more than 400 m or one 250 kg 
more than 160 m; if the mass of the counterweight was halved, it would still be sufficient 
to hurl a 100 kg projectile over 200 m or one 60 kg over 350 m.1106 Fino believed that the 
counterweight box might have been able to hold 26,000 kg of earth – suggesting that this 
might correspond with a beam 10-12 m long, with a ratio of 3:1. With this in mind, he 
calculated that two treadwheels, about 4 m in diameter, with accompanying pulleys would 
                                                 
1104 The dating of this image is not clear, Paul Chevedden dates this work to between 1220 and 1240 
while Jim Bradbury and John France date it c. 1270, Chevedden, "Invention," p. 72; Bradbury, The 
Medieval Siege, p. 263; France, Western Warfare, p. 121. 
1105 Se ù voles faire le fort engieng con apiele trebucet prendes ci gard. Ves ent ci les soles si com il siet sor 
tierre. Ves la devant les .II. windas et le corde ploie a coi on ravale le verge, veir le poes en cele autre 
pagene. Il i a grant fais al ravaler, car li cõtrepoise est mlt pezans. Car il i a une huge plainne d'tierre. Ki 
.II. grans toizes a d'lonc et .VIIII. pies de le, et .VII. pies de pfont. Et al descocier de le fleke penses, et si ù 
en dones en dones gard. Car il le doit etre atenue a cel estancon la devant. Trans. adapted from those of 
Lassus, Album, p. 203 and Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 103. 
1106 Chevedden, "Invention," p. 72, see also n. 3. 
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be sufficient to lift the massive counterweight.1107 Using the modern 12 inch foot, 
Bradbury has interpreted the capacity of the counterweight box to have been an enormous 
1,296 ft3 (36.7 m3).1108 
 An engine capable of both producing and withstand the forces involved with a 
counterweight of over 25,000 kg, perhaps about 1.5m x 4 m x 4 m (rendering a total, 
rather than internal, volume of 24 m3), would have been huge. I know of no modern 
reconstructed engine with a counterweight even half this size, and when considering the 
troubles encountered by Louis-Napoleon and Harvé with their engine in the eighteenth-
century, which had a counterweight less than 20% of the size, it seems unlikely that such 
a large engine was ever built and practically employed during the thirteenth century. 
 The date of Honnecourt's work is debated. Chevedden places its production 
between 1220 and 1240, Bradbury and France date it to around 1270, and Fino attributes 
it more generally to the mid-thirteenth century.1109 Although the accompanying sketch of 
the elevation has been lost, the base plan has been the inspiration for Viollet-le-Duc's 
nineteenth-century interpretations (see Figs. H3 and H4) and many modern 
reconstructions. 
 
Egidio Colonna 
Egidio Colonna composed his De regimine principum for Philip IV of France around 
1280. Within, he describes four types of trebuchets: traction models, which are praised 
for their rate of fire but noted as being incapable of throwing heavy stones; the trabutium, 
which had a fixed counterweight and is praised for its accuracy; the biffa, which had a 
mobile counterweight and is praised for its range; and the tripantum, which had both a 
hinged and a fixed counterweight, allowing it to be more accurate than the biffa with a 
range greater than the trabutium.1110 Although Egidio Colonna correctly observed that a 
trebuchet with a hinged counterweight would have had a greater range than a similar 
engine with a fixed counterweight, neither would have enjoyed an advantage in accuracy. 
                                                 
1107 Fino, "Machines de jet médiévales," p. 34. 
1108 Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, p. 263. 
1109 Chevedden, "Invention," p. 72; Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, p. 263; France, Western Warfare, p. 
121; Fino, "Machines de jet," pp. 33-34. 
1110 Egidio Colonna, De regimine principum 3.3, ed. Samaritanium, pp. 604-6, ed. Hahn (as chap. 18), pp. 
50-52. For a French translation of this section, see Bonaparte, 2:29-30. 
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 The description of the tripantum's movable counterweight has left it open to 
interpretation.1111 Bradbury, possibly influenced by Oman, has suggested that this mass 
could be moved along the length of the short arm, so as to adjust the engine's range. Hill 
judged this instead to describe a traditional hinged box counterweight that could be 
rotated (essentially propped) to start above the end of the short arm, possibly inspired by 
Figs. F9, F11 and F23.1112 Hill acknowledged that his interpretation of a rotating 
counterweight would be impractical due to the additional stresses that such an 
arrangement would introduce. Cathcart King simply suggested that Egidio's descriptions 
were fanciful.1113 It is possible, however, that Egidio overcomplicated his description of 
what was otherwise an engine that had both a weighted short arm (fixed counterweight) 
and a hanging weight: like that of any other trebuchet with a hanging counterweight, the 
hinged component would rotate the better part of 180 around the end of the short arm 
during the course of a firing sequence. Counterweight trebuchets with a weighted short 
arm and hinged counterweight are featured in images Figs. C7, F5, F6, F27 and F34. 
Marino Sanudo's early fourteenth-century description of contemporary artillery provides 
another perspective. 
 
Marino Sanudo 
In his suggestions for how the Holy Land might be retaken for Latin Christendom, Marino 
Sanudo provides a fairly detailed description of artillery, as he understood it. He 
distinguishes between two types of engines, the common variant and a long-range model. 
He describes the former as the following: 
 
The hips of a machine ought to be as broad on the ground as the height of the machine 
at its tip and underneath the said machine ought to be open on the ground, between 
2 hips minus a third part [of its height]: that is, if the aforesaid machine is 24 feet at 
its highest point, it ought to be 16 feet on the ground. The masters divide the main 
pole of the machine from the weighted bottom to the tip into 5 or 6 parts and place 
the sow [axle] between the fifth and the sixth [part], so that if the pole is 30 feet long 
from top to bottom, that is 5 or 6 feet, and the fifth is 6 feet, and the sixth above-
mentioned as is seen will be 5 feet. Concerning which thing, the cross-bar of the 
                                                 
1111 Aliud genus machinarum habet contrapondus mobiliter adhaerens circa flagellum, vel circa virgam 
ipsius machinae, vertens se circa huiusmondi virgam. Egidio Colonna, De regimine principum 3.3, ed. 
Samaritanium, p. 605. 
1112 Bradbury, The Medieval Siege, p. 267; Oman, A History of the Art of War, pp. 543-44; Hill, 
"Trebuchets," p. 105. 
1113 King, "The Trebuchet," pp. 463-64. 
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catapult ought to be placed five and a half feet from the cross-bar of the container 
mentioned above.1114 
 
What he appears to be describing is a fixed-weight counterweight trebuchet with a beam, 
at a ratio of either 5:1 or 4:1, mounted on a trestle frame.1115 
 The long-range trebuchet is similar. It also has a beam with a ratio of 5:1, again 
given a hypothetical length of 30 feet, but it had a container attached to the end of the 
short arm rather than a fixed counterweight. The common engine thus appears to 
correspond with Egidio Colonna's trabutium and the long-range type with the biffa. 
Although Sanudo recommends that the container of the long-range model be as big as 
possible, so as to allow the engine to throw projectiles as large and as far as possible, he 
asserts that the scale of the machine determined the appropriate mass of the 
counterweight, which in turn determined the size of the projectiles. Revealing his 
familiarity with these engines, he adds that the range of an engine could be altered by 
adjusting the iron 'finger' at the end of the long arm.1116 This detail suggests that he, or 
someone close to him, understood how a counterweight trebuchet operated in practice. 
 Although Sanudo gives the impression that these engines were quite large, he 
claims that they were deployed on ships and even seems to imply that their use on land 
was secondary. This is probably influenced by the Venetian naval tradition that would 
have been prevalent around him, but also seems to confirm Abu'l-Fida's claim that an 
engine mounted on a ship assailed his forces at the siege of Acre in 1291.1117 Sanudo 
states that the counterweight would hang over the side of the vessel when the engine was 
cocked and would then swing down through a channel across the middle of the boat when 
fired.1118 The scale of such engines would necessarily have been limited, due to the 
shortage of available space on-board these vessels and the dynamic forces that 
accompanied the fall and swing of a counterweight. Marino Sanudo admits that he was 
                                                 
1114 Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 2.4.22, ed. Bongars, pp. 79-80, trans. Lock, p. 135. 
1115 If the height of the axle is meant to correspond with the height of the frame, it is impractically high 
relative to the length of the beam. With a 4:1 beam, the length of the long arm would be the same as the 
height of the axle; with a ratio of 5:1, if the engine was loaded with the tip of the long arm touching the 
ground, the beam would be at a angle of almost 164°. The added strain incurred as the counterweight was 
pulled outward, as the short arm rotated downward, and then inwards, as it continued to rotate, would make 
this engine relatively unstable. Few contemporary illustrations show trebuchets loaded beyond about 140° 
and I know of no sizable reconstructed engines that are loaded to an angle greater than this. 
1116 Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 2.4.22, ed. Bongars, p. 80, trans. Lock, pp. 135-36. 
1117 Abu'l-Fida', al-Mukhtasar, trans. Holt, pp. 16-17 
1118 Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum 2.4.22, ed. Bongars, p. 80, trans. Lock, p. 136, cf. 2.4.6, ed. Bongars, 
pp. 57-58, trans. Lock, p. 104. 
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not a military man but his descriptions, along with those of Egidio Colonna, clearly 
convey that counterweight trebuchets were far from novel by the end of the thirteenth 
century, something confirmed by the illustrative evidence from this period. 
 
 
 
Frankish Counterweight Trebuchets 
 
Returning to illustrative sources, simple counterweight trebuchets are found in Figs C4 
and C5. The frames of these engines are similar to those in Figs. B16 and B18-B20. Each 
has a beam with a ratio of about 4:1, a counterweight that resembles a barrel and a short 
sling, which is drawing the projectile out from under the engine.1119 Although the 
framework and sling of each machine appears more suited to a traction engine, the basic 
mechanics of a counterweight trebuchet are obviously known to the illustrators of these 
images. Sturdier trestle-frames and more familiar triangular counterweight boxes are 
found in Figs. C6-C8. The slings of these engines are more proportionate, although the 
trebuchet in Fig. C8 has no short arm. The beams in Figs. C6 and C8 appear to be 
composed of multiple spars and all three engines have a trough along which their 
projectiles would slide before being lifted into the air. The framework of the engine in 
Fig. C8, which was drawn in Acre only months before the city fell in 1291, is very similar 
to that of al-Tarsusi's 'Frankish' engine, Fig. B29, while that of the engine in Fig. C7 is 
very similar to some of those found in editions of Konrad Kyeser's Bellifortis, composed 
well over a century later (see Figs. F8 and F9). 
 Although one of the reconstructed trebuchets at Castelnaud has a similar scale to 
the engine in Fig. C6,1120 the engine in Fig. C9 would appear to represent more accurately 
the scale of the largest counterweight trebuchets at the end of the thirteenth century. The 
vast majority of illustrations featuring trebuchets, however, depict engines with a scale 
similar to that in Fig. C10, relative to its loader. This might indicate that most 
counterweight trebuchets had axles no more than about 3 m high in the thirteenth century, 
which would help to explain the frequency with which engines are shown with extremely 
frail frames. But this would imply that the illustrators had a fairly good sense of their 
                                                 
1119 A similar reconstructed trebuchet, notably with a barrel as a counterweight, can be found at King John's 
castle, Limerick. 
1120 For photos of this reconstructed engine, see Norris, Siege Warfare, figs. 104, 105, p. 200. 
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subjects, which may not have been the case, and does not explain references to what 
appear to have been quite substantial engines around the end of the thirteenth century, 
such as those used at Acre (1291) and Stirling (1304).1121 
 Extremely light trebuchets are found in Figs. C11-C13. The Parisian artists of 
these machines appear to be familiar with the basic concept of a counterweight trebuchet 
but not the broader mechanics, as there are no outriggers supporting the vertical struts nor 
is it clear if these are pole trebuchets or if a second strut is hidden from view due to the 
profile perspective. Figs. C14 and C15, from a contemporary Parisian manuscript, reveal 
an even poorer understanding of trebuchet technology. Images such as these remind us of 
how few monastic illustrators would have actually seen one of these engines. The 
counterweight pole trebuchets in Figs. C14 and C15 would have been completely 
impractical and the proportions of various components confirm the illustrator's ignorance. 
Similar issues can be found with the engine in Fig. C16 and even more problems can be 
seen in Figs. C17 and D18. The apparent hybrid trebuchet in Fig. C17 should not be 
considered any more historically accurate than the engines in Fig. C18: one uses a rooted 
tree as its supporting frame and the ropes of the sling and counterweight of the other are 
simply looped over either end of the beam. There are also examples of both accurate and 
inaccurate illustrations of trebuchets with fixed counterweights. 
 One of the earliest surviving European illustrations of a fixed counterweight 
trebuchet, Fig. C19, is found in an edition of William of Tyre's history that was composed 
around 1270. The illumination appears to show two pole-framed trebuchets throwing 
heads towards the defenders of Nicaea. The beams have a ratio of about 1:1 and at the 
end of the short arms there is a bulge, large enough to suggest that these are intended to 
be counterweights but small enough to leave it open to possibility that these were meant 
to be traction engines, albeit with the most important elements omitted. Whatever the 
illustrator's intentions, the image reveals his lack of understanding. By contrast, the 
tripochen in Fig. C20 reveals greater understanding of the mechanics, although it is drawn 
with a more primitive sense of perspective.1122 
                                                 
1121 For the siege of Stirling, see Peter of Langtoft, Chronicle, ed. and trans. Wright, pp. 356-59; Freeman, 
"Wall-Breakers and River-Bridgers," 13-15. Cf. Bain, ed., Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, 
nos. 1,491, 1,498-500, 1,504, 1,510, 1,519, 1,539, 1,560, 1,599, pp. 387, 388-89, 390, 395, 400, 405, 419-
20. 
1122 Cf. Marino Sanudo's description of a tripantum above and the tribok and tribracho noted respectfully 
in Cronica Reinhardsbrunnensis, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 58, and Chronica S Petri Erfordensis, ed. Holder-
Egger, p. 383. See also Chapter 1. 
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 More accurate illustrations of fixed counterweight trebuchets are found in Figs. 
C21 and C22. The two miniatures show an engine in the process of being set up and then 
complete and loaded. The engine has a sturdy trestle frame and a beam with a 2:1 ratio. 
This engine, and what appears to be a traction pole trebuchet in the background of Fig. 
C21, appears to have a scale similar to previous examples. This counterweight engine 
stands in contrast to that in Fig. C23. Unlike the reasonable beam ratio and sturdy frame 
of the former, the latter has an unrealistic beam ratio of 1:2 and a frail frame similar to 
those in Figs. C4, C5 and C10. In other examples, illustrative issues go beyond the 
structural strength of the framework and impractical beam ratios. 
 
 
 
Illustrative Confusion 
 
Neither of the engines in Figs. D1 and D2 appears to have a short arm or counterweight: 
in Fig. D1 the beam ends at the axle while in Fig. D2 the end of the beam appears to rest 
on top of the axle. Perplexingly, these engines were drawn by the same hand(s) as those 
in Figs. B25 and B26. It is unclear what the mysterious circle shown ahead of the engine 
in Fig. D1 is supposed to be: it may be a winch, although against what this would have 
drawn the long arm back is unclear; it may be a strange interpretation of a counterweight; 
or it may be some kind of a defensive screen to protect the engine. Given its numerous 
issues, it is even possible that the illustrator combined what he had read about classical 
torsion engines with a basic understanding of the framework of a swing-beam engine. 
Fig. D2 appears to postdate Fig. D1 and the illustrator has not included the mysterious 
circle. Due to the damage, it is hard to tell whether the trebuchet in Fig. D2 was meant to 
have a counterweight hanging below the axle similar to that in Fig. C8, which was also 
completed in Acre but about ten years later. A different set of peculiar engines are found 
in a slightly later manuscript of William of Tyre's chronicle. 
 Fig. D3 seems to show a traction trebuchet, similar to those in Figs. B17 and B18, 
with a beam like that in Fig. B29; however, the ropes of the pullers appear to be 
restraining the long arm, rather than being connected to the foot of the short arm. Fig. D4 
contains a very similar engine, but the team of pullers, again appearing to restrain the long 
arm, are positioned under the main axle and what appears to be a small weight has been 
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hung from one end of the foot at the end of the short arm. This weight might be seen as 
balancing the beam if it were not for the obvious efforts of the three men to pull down the 
long arm. These images appear to be another example of an illuminator combining 
elements of traction and counterweight trebuchets. In this case, the illustrator would 
appear to have drawn inspiration from images he had seen of traction trebuchets and 
mixed in what he understood or had heard about counterweight trebuchets. 
 Figs. D5-D7, completed around the same time as Figs. D3 and D4, contain 
engines similar to that in Fig. C10 but at the end of the long arm of each engine there is 
a cup rather than a sling. Although it is unlikely that engines without slings were used 
widely, if at all, from a mechanical point of view, this would have been the best 
arrangement to throw an extremely heavy projectile, relative to the mass of the 
counterweight, a short distance. While it is tempting to view these cups as another 
example of the ignorance of most illuminators, it is possible that the illustrator has 
provided a rare glimpse of a specific, if rare, engine-type, perhaps described to him by 
someone who had seen one first-hand. 
 
 
 
Defensive Counterweight Trebuchets 
 
All of the illustrations of counterweight trebuchets introduced thus far have depicted 
engines in an offensive capacity, with the possible exception of Fig. C9. If the trebuchet 
in Fig. C9 is meant to be within a fortified enceinte, rather than behind one, it is clearly 
positioned on the ground rather than on top of a tower or section of wall, similar to that 
in Fig. E1. Both of these early fourteenth-century images reveal engines that are much 
larger than most of those found in manuscript illuminations. The engines appear to be 
portrayed in proportion to the architecture around them and clearly reveal the issues 
associated with attempting to mount a counterweight trebuchet on top of a tower.1123 The 
impractically small trebuchet in Fig. E2 should not be viewed as a counterpoint. This 
image depicts the Roman siege of Jerusalem and the trebuchet found on top of the walls 
represents the classical engines that Josephus describes firing from the city's defences.1124 
                                                 
1123 For the positioning of defensive engines, see Chapter 8. 
1124 See Josephus, The Jewish Wars 5.6, trans. Whiston, pp. 810-11. 
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 A very large defensive counterweight trebuchet is shown in Fig. E3, which dates 
to the early fifteenth century. The machine appears to have been designed, or is at least 
presented, so that the struts of the engine abut the curtain, allowing the counterweight to 
hang over the wall when the beam is cocked. Although the trebuchet in Fig. E3 is 
certainly out of scale, some engines may have been designed specifically for defence. 
Whereas traction engines were well suited to be placed on top of towers, for which there 
is considerable illustrative evidence, counterweight engines are rarely depicted in 
elevated defensive positions. 
 
 
 
Late Medieval and Renaissance Illustrations 
 
European illustrations of trebuchets become more accurate, in general, from the second 
half of the fourteenth century. Fig. F1, which slightly predates this point, has a number 
of issues but nevertheless seems to show the engine to scale with the operator/observer. 
The number of mechanical and structural issues decrease with time as knowledge of these 
engines spread beyond the military elements of society and permeated deeper into artistic 
circles. Figs. F2-F6 come from various parts of Europe and although each has certain 
simplifications and slight inaccuracies, such as the chronically undersized 
counterweights, the trestle framing and general proportions of the various components 
reveal that their creators had a greater degree of understanding or perhaps even exposure. 
Furthermore, the potential scale of such engines is indicated in Figs. F2, F5 and F6. 
Although accuracy increased through the fifteenth century, certain exceptions can still be 
found. For example, Fig. F7, contains a small and simplistic trebuchet. 
 As the significance of swing-beam artillery was ebbing, broader social changes, 
greater communication and advances in mechanical science led to increasingly accurate 
images in the fifteenth century. Figs. F8-F11, from various copies of Konrad Kyeser's 
Bellifortis, epitomise this. Fig. F8 includes the measurements 46 and 8 for the long and 
short arms of the beam respectively. Chevedden has interpreted these measurements to 
be in 'workfeet', each 0.288 m, giving the beam a total length of about 15.5 m and a ratio 
of 5.75:1.1125 Despite these schematic details, the illustration has a number of significant 
                                                 
1125 Chevedden, "Invention," fig. 3. 
ARTILLERY IN AND AROUND THE LATIN EAST MICHAEL S. FULTON 
  
 
364 
errors: the trough has a lip, as in Fig. F3, and both ends of the sling appear to be fixed to 
the beam, which is not provided with a finger. A major design flaw that runs through 
Kyeser's plans is the use of a cuboid counterweight box, similar to those in Figs. F2, F3 
and F6. These require that the struts of an engine be set widely apart in order to allow the 
box to swing between them. This is exasperated by the need to minimise strain on the 
axle by limiting the space between the beam and housing on each side. The steep angling 
of the struts is evident in Kyeser's measurement of 23 (6.6 m according to Chevedden) 
between them at ground level. If the struts are vertical, the forces exerted upon them 
during the firing sequence are relatively two-dimensional while angling them introduces 
torque and increases the strain exerted through the framework. 
 Fig. F9 presents a more schematic view. The beam is increased by two units to 
produce an even ratio of 6:1 and a finger, albeit of wood, has been added. Although the 
counterweight is shown in a more familiar triangular shape, the outline makes it clear that 
this is just a cross-section of the same cuboid design shown in Fig. F8. The engine is also 
given a prop to raise the counterweight higher as the beam is rotated into a cocked 
position. This would prevent the counterweight from falling as straight during the firing 
sequence; however, the added height would provide greater power as long as the 
projectile was released before the beam reached about 30 to the vertical, at which point 
the counterweight would retard the rotation of the beam given the proportions of the short 
arm and counterweight.1126 The degree of detail found in this image, such as the 
composite beam, which is pinned and lashed together, stands in contrast to those in other 
editions of Bellifortis, such as Figs. F10 and F11. 
 Despite the apparent accuracy with which Figs. F8 and F9 were drawn, Bellifortis, 
like al-Tarsusi's treatise, contains a series of novel and impractical weapons. Although 
the trebuchet was certainly a familiar siege engine across Europe by the fourteenth 
century, Kyeser may have exaggerated the scale of his engines and added certain elements 
with the intent of improving an already familiar design. An engine, similar to Vegetius's 
tollenno,1127 is suggested in Fig. F13 as a means for crossing rivers. This engine has a 
beam almost identical to that shown in Fig. F12. This theme of experimentation can also 
                                                 
1126 For a mathematical representation of a propped counterweight, see Siano, Trebuchet Mechanics, pp. 
32-34. 
1127 Vegetius, Epitoma Rei Militaris 4.21, ed. Lang, pp. 142-43. See also Roberto Valturio, De Re Militari 
(Paris: BNF, MS lat. 7236), f. 133r; Francesco di Giorgio, Trattato (Turin, Biblioteca Reale, Cod. 148 
Saluzzo), f. 60r. 
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be seen in Fig. F16, where a counterweight trebuchet, like those in Figs. F14, F15 and 
F17, is shown among other methods of delivering incendiaries. The broader interest of 
Renaissance figures such as Mariano di Jacopo Taccola, Roberto Valturio and Francesco 
di Giorgio in practical and imagined designs of trebuchets can be seen in Figs. F14-F33. 
Although accuracy continues to increase into the late fifteenth century, some depictions 
still included simple design flaws, such as the insufficiently high axle in Kolderer's 
famous woodcut (Fig. F34).1128 
 The engines in Figs. F23-F26, from Roberto Valturio's 1463 edition of De re 
military, have formed the essential basis of our modern conceptions of the various types 
of counterweight trebuchets. There was little development technologically beyond this 
point as swing-beam artillery would be completely eclipsed by gunpowder artillery before 
the end of the century. Despite the waning importance of these weapons, even Leonardo 
da Vinci experimented with new designs, as seen in Figs. F32 and F33, presumably drawn 
during his period of service with Ludovico Maria Sforza (1483-99) or Cesare Borgia 
(1502-3). But while there is relatively plentiful illustrative evidence to trace the ways in 
which counterweight trebuchets were drawn in Western Europe from the thirteenth 
century, comparatively few Muslim images have come to light. 
 
 
 
Muslim Counterweight Trebuchets 
 
Following al-Tarsusi's illustration of a counterweight trebuchet in the late twelfth century, 
evidence from Persia confirms that trebuchet technology in the Islamic world had been 
significantly refined by the end of the thirteenth century. Figs. G1 and G2 clearly show 
counterweight trebuchets with trestle frames and beams with ratios of 10:1 and 4:1 
respectively. The counterweight of each engine appears to be a solid mass hung with 
ropes from the end of the short arm. Like the traction trebuchets in Figs. B32 and B33, 
these engines are loaded with incendiaries rather than stone projectiles. 
 More familiar container counterweights can be found in Figs. G3-G5, which date 
to the early fourteenth century. The detailed engine in Fig. G5 appears to have a slightly 
heavier framework than the other two, but all appear to be drawn extremely accurately. 
                                                 
1128 For Cathcart King's interpretation of this engine, see King, "The Trebuchet," p. 467. 
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The degree of detail may even suggest that the engines were drawn to scale with the men 
around them. If so, they would appear to have axles approximately 2.5 m high and beams 
about 3 m long. Although this seems slightly small, the scale is very similar to that in 
many of the European illustrations. Whether intended or not, the large beam ratios, 10:1 
and 7:1, and long slings of the engines in Figs. G3 and G4 would have made them 
particularly well suited to throw light projectiles considerable distances. By employing a 
short small arm, a significant counterweight is necessary, as the distance that it can fall is 
limited. Placing the counterweight close to the axle limits the strain on the beam, allowing 
the use of a slender beam. A long but light beam, when fitted with an equally long sling, 
maximises the distance that the projectile must travel before release, and thus maximises 
release velocity. These proportions are ideal so long as the projectile is very light: the 
retarding force of any mass on the opposite side of the axle from the counterweight is 
amplified in proportion to the shortness of the small arm. Accordingly, there is no issue 
with the projectile in Fig. G3 but those in Fig. G4 are far too large for the engine. 
 Similar engines can be seen in the two-page depiction of the Mongol siege of 
Baghdad in Fig. G6. Of the three counterweight trebuchets, the engine in the bottom left 
corner seems to be heavier than the other two. The framework of this trebuchet is more 
like that of the engine in Fig. G5, while the other two, with at least five outriggers 
gathering at the axle, are more like those in Figs. G3 and G4. The heavy engine also has 
a winch, like those in Figs. G3-G5, while the other two were presumably light enough 
that their beams were drawn back by hand, sacrificing power for a higher rate of fire. 
 A similar scene is displayed in Fig. G7. The two engines are again counterweight 
trebuchets but appear to be lighter than any of those in Fig. G6. These trebuchets also 
appear to be cocked by hand as the machine on the left seems to have three men pulling 
the beam back and the one on the right has a single man drawing back the beam while his 
colleague prepares to load a projectile. The wheels at the rear of each engine's trusses 
might be there to help manoeuvre the machines or they are meant to be winches, which 
the artist seems to have misunderstood when adapting them from an earlier illustration. 
While these illustrations help to confirm the widespread use of these engines, it is 
necessary to consult a fifteenth-century source for the full range of swing-beam artillery 
types. 
 Yusuf ibn Irinbugha al-Zardkash's treatise on trebuchets can, in some ways, be 
seen as a parallel to the work of Roberto Valturio in its treatment of these engines. Fig. 
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G8 shows a traction trebuchet with a single pole support and two short arms that diverge 
as they extend back from the axle. The two short arms spread the pulling ropes and 
provide more room for the pullers, similar to the raking structure of many European 
examples, while the single vertical support allows the beam to yaw and aim at different 
targets without rotating the whole machine. The engine in Fig. G9 acts on the same 
principle but makes use of counterweights rather than traction power, similar to Figs. 
F18-F20, F24, F26 and F29. The trebuchet in Fig. G10 has a more traditional trestle 
frame and a 4:1 beam ratio. Its hanging counterweight appears to be solid and is shown 
at an unnatural angle, similar to those in Figs. G1, G2 and even C8. The beams of all 
three of al-Zardkash's trebuchets, as well as that in Fig. G11, are bound in a familiar 
manner and a finger clearly extends from the end of each long arm. As the heaviest of the 
assembled engines, that in Fig. G10 appears to be fitted with a winch, shown as the circle 
at the bottom front corner of the frame, similar to that included in Fig. G11. While these 
engines are quite straightforward, those in Figs. G12 and G13 are more obscure. 
The engines in Figs. G12 and G13 appear to be imagined fixed-weight trebuchets 
designed to thrown bolts, perhaps similar to the trebuchet in Fig. F31. However, neither 
engine appears to have an axle and each has some kind of a platform on top of the 
framework – that in Fig. G12 appears to be crenelated. The degree of confusion increases 
when considering that certain component labels refer to the use of hair, suggesting that 
these were supposed to be quasi-torsion engines.1129 
 A rare example of a counterweight trebuchet being mounted on top of a tower can 
be found in Fig. G14. The presence of a traction engine and what might be a machine 
similar to those in Figs. G12 and G13 flanking the counterweight trebuchet suggest, 
however, that this is more a creative exercise than an accurate portrayal of how such an 
engine might have been practically employed.1130 A more accurate depiction of a siege 
scenario can be found in Fig. G15, featuring a single defensive traction trebuchet and a 
siege ladder.  
                                                 
1129 This has led Cheveden to conclude that the each image instead depicts a ziyar – a partly torsion-powered 
bolt-throwing engine, Chevedden, "Black Camels," pp. 237-38. 
1130 Chevedden calls the left engine in Fig. I35 a ziyar, which he believes to have been a classical two-
armed torsion catapult, Chevedden, "Black Camels," p. 237 n. 21. Ibn al-Athir mentions the use of such 
engines by al-Zahir Ghazi at Saone in 1188, Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil, trans. Richards, 2: 347-48. 
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Revisiting the Terminology 
 
Al-Zardkash, like al-Tarsusi at least two centuries earlier, clearly named the engines that 
he included in his work. This is significant when considering that earlier sources 
employed similar terms when identifying engines used during the Frankish period. The 
traction trebuchet in Fig. G8 is of the shaytani (appearing sometimes as sultani) type,1131 
a label not found amongst those used by al-Tarsusi. While the particulars of al-Zardkash's 
illustration cannot be confirmed, narrative accounts of thirteenth-century sieges appear to 
confirm that this term corresponded with a light traction trebuchet. Whether or not this 
was a trebuchet with a pole-frame, as shown by al-Zardkash, cannot be confirmed. 
 
Shaytani/Sultani1132 
Year Site Engines Source 
1218 Damietta multiple Ibn al-Dawadari 
1248-49 Homs 12 Ibn Wasil; al-Ansari 
1285 Margat 4 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir 
1291 Acre 52 al-Jazari; al-'Ayni; al-Yunini; Ibn al-Furat 
 
 Al-Zardkash identifies the familiar trestle-framed trebuchet in Fig. G10, as a 
manjaniq maghribi. The sources most commonly mention these engines at sieges in the 
1230s to 1260s, and the presence of only one at a number of sieges suggests that they 
were relatively exceptional. Chevedden, concluding that counterweight trebuchets were 
in use before the appearance of these new terms, suggests that a technological change 
accompanied the appearance of the manjaniq maghribi in the sources, postulating that 
this might correlate with the development of the hinged counterweight, supplementing 
previous fixed counterweights.1133 This theory may have been inspired by a similar one 
put forward by Fino.1134 Although a convenient explanation, it seems unlikely that the 
hinged counterweight developed so late when considering that al-Tarsusi's primitive 
design in the late twelfth-century made use of a hanging counterweight.1135 Thorau has 
suggested that maghribi in this context might be understood as European, rather than 
                                                 
1131 See Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, pp. 282-83 and ns. 65-71 (on pp. 313-14). 
1132 See Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, pp. 282-83. 
1133 Chevedden, "King James I," p. 317 and n. 10. 
1134 Fino, "Machines de jet médiévales," p. 32. 
1135 See Fig. C1. 
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'western Islamic' (or North African), and may refer to a particular design originally 
developed in Western Europe.1136 How he sees this relating to the oft-mentioned 
manjaniq ifranji is unclear. 
 
Maghribi/Gharbi1137 
Year Site Engines Source 
1218 Damietta multiple Ibn al-Dawadari 
1232-33 Shayzar 1 Ibn Wasil; Ibn al-'Adim 
1236 Harran 1 Ibn al-Muqaffa 
1236 Edessa 1 Ibn al-Muqaffa 
1248-49 Homs 1 of 14 Ibn Wasil; al-Ansari 
1265 Caesarea multiple Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir; Ibn al-Furat 
1266 Safed multiple Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir; Ibn al-Furat 
 
Al-Zardkash calls the counterweight trebuchet with a forked short arm, seen in 
Fig. G9, a manjaniq ifranji. This type of engine is comparable to the European bricola, 
featured in Figs. F18-F20, F24, F26 and F29. When the manjaniq ifranji is distinguished 
in accounts of siege during the late thirteenth century, however, it is described as being 
the heaviest or most powerful type of artillery. This is not at all an accurate portrayal of 
the type of engine presented by al-Zardkash, which necessarily sacrifices power for field 
of fire – the strength of a more complex framework is exchanged for the ability to yaw. 
 Accepting al-Zardkash's identification of the manjaniq ifranji as a trebuchet with 
a pole-frame and searching for the early use of such an engine in Europe, given its 
designation as 'Frankish', Chevedden has concluded that the first discernible use of such 
an engine dates to the Norman siege of Thessalonica in 1185. His argument rests on the 
account of Eustathius, which states that the engines that besieged the city from the west 
were of a new form.1138 Concluding that the small and large engines of a 'traditional' type 
that besieged the city from the east were traction and counterweight trebuchets 
respectively, he asserts, almost arbitrarily, that the new engines to the west were a type 
of bricola. By identifying this as the earliest known reference to a bricola, a term which 
comes into use in the thirteenth century, Chevedden is able to suggest that this type of 
engine was developed in Europe in the late twelfth century and can be equated with the 
                                                 
1136 Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, p. 160 n. 4 (on p. 179). 
1137 Chevedden, "Invention," p. 106 n. 137; Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, p. 280 and ns. 38-45 (on 
pp. 303-4). 
1138 See Eustathius, Capture of Thessalonica, trans. Melville Jones, pp. 92-105. Cf. Niketas Choniates, 
Historia, trans. Magoulias, pp. 164-65. 
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manjaniq ifranji when it appears in Muslim sources describing events of the thirteenth 
century.1139  
Contrary to Chevedden's theory, the only description of these 'new' engines 
provided by Eustathius is that they were cumbersome and ineffective.1140 These might 
have been early efforts to construct sizable counterweight trebuchets, as it is hard to 
qualify the necessarily light bricola as cumbersome. The larger of the 'traditional' engines 
to the east could have been early counterweight trebuchets or even sizable traction 
trebuchets. The bricola was the counterweight variety of the pole trebuchet. Its single 
vertical support allowed the engine to yaw but this freedom of movement came by 
sacrificing structural stability – all of the stresses incurred during the firing sequence were 
placed on the single support. Accordingly, it was not able to withstand as much strain or 
transfer as much energy as could a trestle-framed engine of comparable size. This makes 
it completely inappropriate to appear as the heaviest type of thirteenth-century Muslim 
artillery. 
It is significant that references to the manjaniq maghribi decline with the 
appearance of the manjaniq ifranji. As both appear to refer to the heaviest stone-throwing 
engines of the day, it is possible that the two terms refer to the same, or very similar, type 
of engine: maghribi ('western') being replaced with ifranji ('Frankish') during the 1260s 
and 1270s. When found together, albeit infrequently, it is hard to distinguish the 
differences between them, as at Caesarea in 1265. In this sense, there may have been a 
terminological change but not necessarily a technological one; perhaps the increasing 
scale of these engines was judged sufficient to warrant a new term while the latter faded 
from use as counterweight trebuchets grew increasingly larger. 
Writing in the late fourteenth or fifteenth-century, al-Zardkash may have used 
terms that were appropriate to the engines of his own day or, requiring two terms for two 
types of counterweight trebuchet, may even have arbitrarily assigned maghribi and ifranji 
without understanding what distinguished the two terms in the thirteenth century. It is 
perhaps noteworthy that Muslim sources rarely mention Frankish forces making use of a 
                                                 
1139 Chevedden, "King James I," p. 318. 
1140 Chevedden, "Invention," pp. 94-95, 109. For a more general argument for the equation of helepolis with 
a heavy Byzantine stone-thrower, rather than a siege tower, as the term was used to designate during the 
classical period, see Dennis, "Byzantine Heavy Artillery," pp. 99-115. For a brief introduction to the 
classical helepolis, see Campbell, Greek and Roman Siege Machinery, pp. 5-13. 
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manjaniq ifranji, although there are few instances when Latin forces would have had the 
chance to use such an engine after the vocabulary emerged. 
 
Ifranji/Firanji1141 
Year Site Engines Source 
1265 Caesarea multiple Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir; Ibn al-Furat 
1275 al-Bira 23 of 70 Ibn Shaddad; al-Yunini; Shafi' ibn 'Ali 
1285 Margat 3 of 10  Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir 
1286 Saone 4 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir 
1289 Tripoli 6 of 19 Ibn al-Dawadari; al-Yunini; Ibn al-Furat 
1291 Acre 15 of 72 al-Jazari; al-'Ayni; al-Yunini; Ibn al-Furat 
 
 Al-Zardkash's treatment of the manjaniq qarabughra/qarabugha (the 'black 
camel' or 'black bull' trebuchet)1142 is peculiar. While he might have associated this term 
with the bolt-throwing engines in Figs. G12 and G13, he may also have intended it to 
refer to something quite different. Despite being unable to find any contemporary 
evidence to suggest that the manjaniq qarabugha was a bolt-throwing engine in the 
thirteenth century, Chevedden has suggested not only that the term referred to a bolt-
throwing engine of the period, but also that it was transmitted from the Muslim world to 
Europe around this time.1143 
References to bolt-throwing trebuchets are rare and the physics involved render 
the practical use of such an engine questionable. It is hard to imagine a swing-beam 
engine capable of producing a release velocity high enough to warrant its use to throw 
bolts. If such an engine could, presumably it would be more effectively employed 
throwing much larger stone projectiles at a lower velocity, which would transfer energy 
to the projectile much more efficiently. The natural strength of the counterweight 
trebuchet is its ability to transfer the potential energy within a suspended counterweight 
to a relatively heavy projectile. Once up to speed, the mass of these projectiles makes 
them less susceptible to drag, which would otherwise significantly inhibit the range of a 
lighter arrow thrown in this way. Although a heavy arrow, perhaps one filled with 
incendiaries, could hypothetically be thrown along a parabolic path, there would appear 
to be few incentives to throw an arrow rather than a sphere, as seen in Figs. G1 and G2. 
Spheres are easier to produce and, given the necessary mass involved, lose little 
                                                 
1141 See Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, pp. 281-82; Chevedden, "Invention," p. 107 n. 9. 
1142 The translation of this term comes from Chevedden, "Black Camels," p. 235 n. 12. 
1143 See Chevedden, "Black Camels," pp. 227-77, esp. pp. 259-60. 
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comparable velocity through flight despite being less aerodynamic. Furthermore, 
throwing an arrow would require a unique type of sling rigging to balance the weight of 
the projectile and ensure that it was released along a vector aligning with the arrow's long 
axis. When considering that arrows are most effective when they are light, thrown along 
a relatively level trajectory and at a reasonably high rate of fire, it seems unlikely that a 
bolt-throwing trebuchet was ever practically employed. Illustrations of such engines 
should perhaps be viewed as little more than theoretical exercises. This appears to be the 
case with Fig. F31, drawn by a roughly contemporary European artist.1144 
When examined more closely, al-Zardkash does not appear to associate the 
manjaniq qarabugha with the illustrations of bolt-throwing engines. Instead, he includes 
the term at the end of a list of engines, perhaps intending the term to encompass all types 
of trebuchets. When examining the sources, the manjaniq qarabugha is portrayed as a 
relatively light stone-throwing engine, similar to, and frequently mentioned alongside, 
the manjaniq shaytani. It is unclear what differentiated the manjaniq qarabugha from the 
manjaniq shaytani, but both were almost certainly traction trebuchets.1145 
 
Qarabughra/Qarabugha1146 
Year Site Engines Source 
1248-49 Homs 1 Ibn Wasil 
1285 Margat 3 of 10 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir 
1289 Tripoli 13 of 19 Ibn al-Dawadari; al-Yunini; Ibn al-Furat 
1291 Acre multiple al-Jazari; al-'Ayni; al-Yunini; Ibn al-Furat 
 
 
 
 
Modern Representations and Torsion Engines 
 
Modern interpretations of trebuchets have been considerably influenced by those of 
certain Renaissance figures. Louis-Napoleon used a variety of Renaissance drawings, 
adapted from works such as those by Roberto Valturio and Paolo Santini, to illustrate 
                                                 
1144 For additional European examples, all of which date to the Renaissance period, see Mariano di Jacopo 
Taccola, De ingeneis, liber secundus (c. 1420-50), f. 68v; Francesco di Giorgio Martini, Opusculum de 
architectura (c. 1470-75), f. 40r; Francesco di Giorgio, Codicetto (c. 1470–99), f. 99v. See also Chevedden, 
"Black Camels," pp. 239-42. 
1145 See Khamisy and Fulton,  
1146 See Chevedden, "Black Camels," p. 247. 
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what he believed to be various types of medieval artillery in Fig. H1. A step forward was 
taken by Viollet-le-Duc. As a military man and architect, he injected practicality and 
precision into his drawings and Figs. H3 and H4 have formed the basis of most 
'historically accurate' reconstructed counterweight trebuchets. The footprint of these 
engines is derived from Honnecourt's plan but the superstructure is a conglomeration of 
inspiration from Renaissance examples and original imagination. His guesswork is 
revealed in Fig. H2: the counterweight, treadwheels and triggerman confirm that this is a 
counterweight engine, but a pulling team has been added to provide extra traction power. 
In reality, the efforts of the sixteen pullers would have added little force given the size of 
the counterweight and apparent necessity of treadwheels to lift it. 
Unlike images of swing-beam engines, there are very few surviving medieval 
illustrations of torsion engines. Fig. H5 is one such drawing. The clear inaccuracies reveal 
that the illustrator was unfamiliar with this type of engine. It appears to be an 
interpretation of a one-armed torsion engine, which the illustrator might have read about 
in certain classical texts. Although the coil, which provides resistance, is shown and the 
projectile is held in a cup, the beam seems better suited to a swing-beam engine and the 
second, superfluous coil, looks like the axle of a trebuchet. It is less clear what type of 
engine is meant to be depicted in Fig. H6. Illustrations such as these serve as a reminder 
that monks, most of whom lived sequestered lives in monasteries, were responsible for 
composing the vast majority of surviving images of medieval artillery. Many of these 
men may never have seen a trebuchet. In lieu of personal experience, they would have 
looked to classical texts, which may have influenced their illustrations as they did their 
vocabulary. Muslim artists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries tended to be slightly 
more worldly. They travelled and interact with different social groups to a greater degree 
than did their European counterparts and often held administrative posts. This greater 
degree of exposure probably contributed to the greater accuracy of their illustrations. 
 
The illustrative evidence confirms many of the trends that have been discerned in the 
textual evidence, including the continued use of light traction engines as well as the 
development of increasingly heavy counterweight engines. For all that it reveals, the 
illustrative evidence contributes little to explaining why it took so long for the 
counterweight trebuchet to develop. Trebuchet technology was born out of the simplistic 
lever. Literary evidence suggests that traction engines reached Europe and the Near East 
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during the Early Middle Ages and the use of such in Transoxiana is confirmed by Fig. 
B1. But even before this, the ancient shaduf had been employed for millennia to draw 
water from the Nile and the same principle is evident in Vegetius's tollenno. Although no 
counterweight trebuchets are featured in the Morgan Bible, the ominous machines used 
to hang bodies over the walls demonstrate an understanding of leverage and mechanical 
advantage.1147 Thus the illustrative evidence is hard to sum up: certain examples provide 
termini ad quem for various technological innovations but it is hard to gain an accurate 
sense of scale given the range of images and their content. Accordingly, the illustrative 
material should be regarded as just one of many facets that helps us understand these 
machines and their development. On their own, these images can be misleading, but when 
incorporated with textual and archaeological evidence, and a sounds sense of the physics 
and mechanics involve, they can add to our appreciation of these engines and their 
development.  
                                                 
1147 See Chapter 2 for these illustrations. 
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Fig. A1  c. 1200, Norman Italy: Peter of 
Eboli, Liber ad honorem Augusti (Bern, 
Burgerbibliothek, MS Cod. 120 II), f. 132r. 
Fig. A2  c. 1250-54, Acre: Arsenal Bible - 
David defeats Goliath (1 Kings 17:49) (Paris, 
Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, MS 5211), f. 120r. 
Fig. A3  c. 1050-99, Catalonia: Biblia Sancto 
Petri Rodensis (Roda Bible) - expedition of 
Holofernes (Paris, BNF, MS lat. 6), f. 134r. 
Fig. A4  c. 1196, Norman Italy: Peter of 
Eboli, Liber ad honorem Augusti - defence 
of Salerno (Bern, Burgerbibliothek, BBB Cod. 
120.II), f. 111r. 
Fig. A5  c. 1250, England: Matthew Paris, Chronica 
Maiora - siege of Damietta (Cambridge, Corpus 
Christi College Lib., MS 16, pt. 2), f. 59v. 
Fig. A6  c. 1250, England: Matthew 
Paris, Chronica Maiora - battle of 
Sandwich (Cambridge, Corpus Christi 
College Lib., MS 16, pt. 2), f. 56r. 
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Fig. B1  c. 700-99, Piandijikent: Wall-
painting from Piandijikent (St 
Petersburg, Hermitage) - taken from 
Nicolle, Arms and Armour, no. 24, 2:8. 
Fig. B2  c. 1100-25, Catalonia: Beatus of Liébana, 
Commentary on the Apocalypse - Nebuchadnezzar's 
siege of Jerusalem (Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale 
Universitaria di Torino, MS I.II.1), f. 109r. 
Fig. B3  c. 1196, Norman Italy: Peter of Eboli, Liber ad honorem Augusti - siege of Naples 
(Bern, Burgerbibliothek, BBB Cod. 120.II), f. 109r. 
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Fig. B4  c. 1196, Norman Italy: Peter of Eboli, Liber ad honorem Augusti - defence of Salerno 
(Bern, Burgerbibliothek, BBB Cod. 120.II), f. 111r. 
Fig. B5  c. 1196, Norman Italy: Peter of Eboli, 
Liber ad honorem Augusti (Bern, 
Burgerbibliothek, BBB Cod. 120.II), f. 132r. 
Fig. B6  c. 1196, Norman Italy: Peter of 
Eboli, Liber ad honorem Augusti - 
imprisonment of Roger of Andria (Bern, 
Burgerbibliothek, BBB Cod. 120.II), f. 104r. 
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Fig. B7  c. 1196, Norman Italy: Peter of Eboli, Liber ad honorem Augusti - walls of Palermo 
(Bern, Burgerbibliothek, BBB Cod. 120.II), f. 97r - taken from Kölzer and Stähli, Liber ad 
honorem Augusti, p. 43. 
Fig. B8  c. 1196, Norman 
Italy: Peter of Eboli, Liber 
ad honorem Augusti 
(Bern, Burgerbibliothek, 
BBB Cod. 120.II), f. 96r - 
taken from Kölzer and 
Stähli, Liber ad honorem 
Augusti, p. 39. 
Fig. B9  c. 1196, Norman Italy: 
Peter of Eboli, Liber ad 
honorem Augusti - castrum 
maris, Palermo (Bern, 
Burgerbibliothek, BBB Cod. 
120.II), f. 98r - taken from 
Kölzer and Stähli, Liber ad 
honorem Augusti, p. 47. 
Fig. B10  c. 1196, Norman 
Italy: Peter of Eboli, Liber 
ad honorem Augusti - Monte 
Cassino (Bern, 
Burgerbibliothek, BBB Cod. 
120.II), f. 108r - taken from 
Kölzer and Stähli, Liber ad 
honorem Augusti, p. 87. 
Fig. B11  c. 1196, Norman Italy: Peter of Eboli, Liber 
ad honorem Augusti (Bern, Burgerbibliothek, BBB Cod. 
120.II), f. 114r - taken from Kölzer and Stähli, Liber ad 
honorem Augusti, p. 111. 
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Fig. B12  12th-13th Cs, Sicily: Skylitzes Chronicle - siege of Mopsvestia (Madrid, Biblioteca 
Nacional de España, MSS Graecus Vitr. 26-2), f. 151r. 
Fig. B13  12th-13th Cs, Sicily: Skylitzes Chronicle - siege of Preslav (Madrid, Biblioteca 
Nacional de España, MSS Graecus Vitr. 26-2), f. 166r. 
Fig. B14  12th-13th Cs, Sicily: Skylitzes Chronicle - Battle of Dorustolon (Madrid, Biblioteca 
Nacional de España, MSS Graecus Vitr. 26-2), f. 169r. 
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Fig. B15  c. 1220, Corneto: Graffito in Etruscan 
tomb. (Corneto-Tarquinia) - taken from 
Pringle, "A Medieval Graffito," p. 41, fig. 3.2. 
Fig. B16  c. 1220, south France: Tomb 
of Simon de Montfort (Carcassonne, 
Church of St Nazaire). 
Fig. B17  c. 1225-50, France: Oxford-Paris-
London bible moralisée, vol. 3a (London, BL, 
Harley 1526), f. 18v. 
Fig. B18  c. 1245-48, Paris: William of Tyre, 
Histoire des Croisades - siege of Nicaea 
(Paris, BNF, MS fr. 9081), f. 26r. 
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Fig. B19  c. 1250, France: Morgan Bible - Saul's battle against the Ammonites (1 Kings 11:11) 
(New York, Pierpont Morgan Library, MS M.638), f. 23v. 
Fig. B20  c. 1250, France: Morgan Bible - siege of Able (2 Kings 20:15-22) (New York, Pierpont 
Morgan Library, MS M.638), f. 43v. 
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Fig. B21  c. 1250, Genoa (?): 
Caffaro, Annales de Genes (Paris, 
BNF, MS lat. 10136), f. 107r. 
Fig. B22  c. 1250, Genoa (?): Caffaro, Annales de 
Genes - siege of Savona (Paris, BNF, MS lat. 10136), f. 
141v. 
Fig. B23  c. 1250, England: Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora - agreement between the 
count of Brittany and al-Nasir of Kerak (Cambridge, Corpus Christi College Lib., MS 16, 
pt. 2), f. 139v. 
Fig. B24  c. 1260, c. 1280, Acre: William of Tyre, Histoire de la 
guerre sainte - siege of Tyre (Paris, BNF, MS fr. 2628), fol. 114r - 
taken from Buchthal, Miniature Painting, plate 132g. 
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Fig. B25  c. 1278, Acre: William of Tyre, History of 
Outremer, vol. 1 - siege of Antioch (St. Petersburg, 
National Library of Russia, MS fr. f v.IV.5, vol. 1), 
fol. 18v. 
Fig. B26  c. 1280, Acre: William of 
Tyre, Les Estoires d'outremer - siege of 
Antioch (Lyon, Bibliothèque Municipal, 
MS 828), f. 33r. 
Fig. B27  c. 1275-99, France: Arthurian Romances (Yale, Beinecke MS 229), f. 346r. 
Fig. B28  c. 1300-99, France (?): Roman du Chevalier au Cygne et Chanson d'Antioch (Paris, 
BNF, MS fr. 12558), f. 143v. 
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Fig. B29  c. 1180, Egypt: Al-Tarsusi, Tabsira 
arbab al-albab - Frankish mangonel (Oxford, 
Bodleian Library, MS Hunt 264), f. 133r - taken 
from Chevedden, "Artillery of King James I," 
fig. 6. 
Fig. B30  c. 1180, Egypt: Al-Tarsusi, 
Tabsira arbab al-albab - Turkish mangonel 
(Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Hunt 264), f. 
138r - taken from Chevedden, "Artillery of 
King James I," fig. 5. 
Fig. B31  c. 1180, Egypt: Al-Tarsusi, Tabsira 
arbab al-albab - Arab mangonel (Oxford, 
Bodleian Library, MS Hunt 264), f. 137r - taken 
from Chevedden, "Artillery of King James I," 
fig. 4. 
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Fig. B32  c. 1250-96, Persia: Hasan al-Rammah, Furusiya (Paris, BNF, MS arabe. 2825), f. 88v. 
Fig. B33  c. 1250-96, Persia: Hasan al-Rammah, Furusiya (Paris, BNF, MS arabe. 2825), f. 89r. 
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Fig. C1  c. 1180, Egypt: Al-Tarsusi, Tabsirah arbab al-albab - Persian mangonel (Oxford, 
Bodleian Library, MS Hunt. 264), ff. 134v-135r. 
Fig. C2  c. 1250, Genoa (?): Caffaro, Annales de Genes - siege of Savona (Paris, BNF, MS lat. 
10136), f. 142r. 
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Fig. C3  c. 1250, France (?): Villard of Honnecourt, Sketch Book - base of a trebuchet (Paris, 
BNF, MS fr. 19093), f. 30r, and facsimile copy from Lassus, Album, pl. 58. 
Fig. C4  c. 1200-99, France (?): 
Chevalier au Cygne (Paris, 
BNF, MS fr. 795), f. 220r. 
Fig. C5  c. 1275-99, France: Roman de Renart (Roman de la 
Rose) (Paris, BNF, MS fr. 1581), f. 8v. 
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Fig. C7  c. 1280, Castile: Cantigas de 
Santa Maria (Florence, Biblioteca 
Nazionale, MS Banco Rari 20), f. 8r - 
taken from Chevedden, "Artillery of 
King James I," fig. 13. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
Fig. C6  c. 1300, Maastricht: Book 
of Hours (London, BL, Stowe MS 17), 
f. 243v. 
Fig. C8  c. 1291, Acre: William of Tyre, History of Outremer - siege of Antioch (Florence, 
Biblioteca Medicea-Laurenziana, MS Plu. LXI.10), f. 42r. 
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Fig. C9  c. 1305, Flanders: Courtrai Chest - 
defeat of the French in 1302 (Oxford, New 
College). 
Fig. C10  c. 1316, England: Charter to Carlisle 
by Edward II - siege of Carlisle (Carlisle, 
Cumbria Records Office) - taken from Goodall, 
The English Castle, p. 246, fig. 185. 
Fig. C11  c. 1320-40, Paris: Bible 
Historiale Complétée (The Haag, 
Koninklijke Bibliotheek, KB 71 A), f. 201v. 
Fig. C12  c. 1337, Paris: Li rommans de Godefroy 
de Buillon (Paris, BNF, MS fr. 22495), f. 9r. 
Fig. C13  c. 1337, Paris: Li rommans de 
Godefroy de Buillon - siege of Nicaea 
(Paris, BNF, MS fr. 22495), f. 30r. 
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Fig. C14  c. 1332-50, Paris: 
Chroniques de France ou de St Denis 
(London, BL, Royal 16 G VI), f. 345v. 
Fig. C15  c. 1332-50, Paris: Chroniques de France ou 
de St Denis - siege of La Rochelle (London, BL, Royal 
16 G VI), f. 388r. 
Fig. C16  c. 1300-99: William of Tyre, Les Estoires d'outremer - siege of Jerusalem 
(Paris, BNF, MS fr. 352), f. 62r. 
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Fig. C17  c. 1340-60, France: Avis aus Roys - 
Besieging fortifications (New York, Pierpont 
Morgan Library, MS M.456), f. 127r. 
Fig. C18  c. 1340-60, France: Avis aus Roys - 
Defending against siege engines (New York, 
Pierpont Morgan Library, MS M.456), f. 131r. 
Fig. C19  c. 1270, Paris: William 
of Tyre, Les Estoires d'Outremer 
- siege of Nicaea (Paris, BNF, MS 
fr. 2630), f. 22v. 
Fig. C20  c. 1270-75, Germany: Wolfram von Eschenbach, 
Willehalm (fragments) (Munich, Bayerische 
Staatsbibliothek, MS Cod. Ger. 193 III, f. 4v. 
Figs. C21 and C22  c. 1280, Castile: Cantigas de Santa Maria (Madrid: Biblioteca el 
Escorial, MS T.j.1), f. 43r. 
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Fig. C23  c. 1308-12, London: Roman de toute chevalière (Paris, BNF, MS fr. 
24364), f. 5v. 
Fig. D1  c. 1278, Acre: William of Tyre, Les Estoires 
d'outremer, vol. 1 - siege of Tyre (St. Petersburg, National 
Library of Russia, MS fr. f v.IV.5, vol. 1), fol. 103r. 
Fig. D2  c. 1280, Acre: William of Tyre, Les Estoires 
d'outremer - siege of Tyre (Lyon, Bibliothèque Municipale, 
MS 828), f. 135v. 
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Fig. D3  c. 1300, Paris: William of Tyre, Histoire d'Outre Mer - siege 
of Tyre (Baltimore, Walters Art Gallery, MS W.142), f. 112r. 
Fig. D4  c. 1300, Paris: William of Tyre, Histoire d'Outre Mer - siege 
of Antioch (Baltimore, Walters Art Gallery, MS W.142), f. 28r. 
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Fig. D5  c. 1300, France: William of Tyre, Histoire de la guerre 
saint - siege of Nicaea (Paris, BNF, MS fr. 2824), f. 15v. 
Fig. D6  c. 1300, France: William of 
Tyre, Histoire de la guerre saint - 
siege of Jerusalem (Paris, BNF, MS 
fr. 2824), f. 45r. 
Fig. D7  c. 1300, France: William of Tyre, Histoire de 
la guerre saint - siege of Shayzar (Paris, BNF, MS fr. 
2824), f. 94v. 
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Fig. E1  c. 1320, Siena: Simone Martini, 
Guidoriccio da Fogliano (Siena, Palazzo Pubblico). 
Fig. E2  c. 1325-50, London (?): Book of 
Hours (Neville of Hornby Hours) - siege 
of Jerusalem (London, BL, MS Egerton 
2781), f. 190v. 
Fig. E3  c. 1410, Paris: Des cad des nobles hommes et femmes 
(Geneva, Bibliothèque de Genève, MS fr. 190-1), f. 163r. 
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Fig. F1  c. 1326, London: Walter of Milemete, De nobilitatibus, sapientiis et prudentiis 
regum (Oxford, Christ Church, MS 92), f. 67r. 
 
Fig. F2  c. 1360, Regensburg: Weltchronik (New York, Pierpont Morgan Library, MS M.769), f. 
193r. 
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Fig. F3  c. 1375-85, Swabia: History Bible - siege of Ai by Joshua (New York, Pierpont Morgan 
Library, MS M.268), f. 11v. 
Fig. F4  c. 1384-1400, Paris: Fleurs des chroniques (Besançon, Bibliothèque Municipale, MS 
677), f. 45r. 
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Fig. F5  c. 1368-1424, Lucca: Croniche di Giovanni Sercambi - siege of Nocera (Lucca, 
Archivio di Stato, MS 107), f. 113v. 
Fig. F6  c. 1435, Rottweil: Ordnung des Hofgerichts zu Rottweil - Lothar III besieges Conrad III 
(Stuttgart: Württembergische Landesbibliothek, HB VI 110), f. ir. 
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Fig. F7  c. 1400, England: Alexander and Dindimus (Oxford, Bodleian 
Library, MS 264), f. 255r. 
Fig. F8  c. 1405, Germany: Konrad Kyeser, Bellifortis (Göttingen, Niedersächsische Staats- 
und Universitätsbibliothek, Cod. philos. 63), f. 30r. 
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Fig. F9  German (?): Konrad Kyeser, Bellifortis (Innsbruck, Tiroler Landesmuseum 
Ferdinandeum, Cod. FB 32009 (olim 16.0.7), f. 21r. 
Fig. F10  c. 1405, Germany: Konrad Kyeser, 
Bellifortis (Munich, Bayerische 
Staatsbibliothek, Clm 30150), tafel 2, f. 2v. 
Fig. F11  c. 1459, Germany (?): Konrad 
Kyeser, Bellifortis, in Talhoffer, Fechtuch 
(Copenhagen, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, MS 
Thott. 290.2), f. 16v. 
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Fig. F13  c. 1459, Germany (?): Konrad Kyeser, Bellifortis, in 
Talhoffer, Fechtuch (Copenhagen, Det Kongelige Bibliotek, MS 
Thott. 290.2), 14v. 
Fig. F14  c. 1419-50, Italy: 
Mariano di Jacopo Taccola, 
De ingeneis, liber secundus 
(Munich, Bayerische 
Staatsbibliothek, Cod. lat. 
Monacensis 197), f. 40v. 
Fig. F15  c. 1474-82, Italy: Francesco 
di Giorgio, Opusculum de 
architectura (London, British 
Museum, Cod. 197.b.21 - MS Harley 
3281), f. 3v. 
Fig. F16  c. 1419-49, 
Italy: Mariano di Jacopo 
Taccola, De machinis - 
trabocco, for throwing 
incendiaries (Paris, BNF, 
MS lat. 7239), f. 22v. 
Fig. F12  c. 1459, 
Germany (?): Konrad 
Kyeser, Bellifortis, in 
Talhoffer, Fechtuch 
(Copenhagen, Det 
Kongelige Bibliotek, MS 
Thott. 290.2), 32r. 
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Fig. F17  c. 1433, Italy: Mariano di Jacopo Taccola, De ingeneis ac edifitiis non usitatis, liber 
tertius - Manganum (Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Cod. Palatino 766), ff. 66v-67r - 
taken from Prager and Scaglia, Mariano Taccola, pl. 93, p. 142. 
Fig. F18  c. 1433, Italy: Mariano di Jacopo Taccola, De ingeneis ac edifitiis non usitatis, liber 
tertius - Brichola (Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Cod. Palatino 766), ff. 67v-68r - 
taken from Prager and Scaglia, Mariano Taccola, pl. 95, p. 143. 
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Fig. F19  c. 1419-50, Italy: Mariano di 
Jacopo Taccola, De ingeneis, liber secundus 
(Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. 
lat. Monacensis 197), f. 39v. 
Fig. F20  Italy (?): Anonymous (Siena, 
Biblioteca Comunale, Cod. S.IV.5), f. 25r. 
Fig. F21  c. 1419-50, Italy: Mariano di 
Jacopo Taccola, De ingeneis, liber secundus 
(Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. 
lat. Monacensis 197), f. 95r. 
Fig. F22  Italy (?): Anonymous (Sienna, 
Biblioteca Comunale, Cod. S.IV.5), f. 57v. 
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Fig. F23  c. 1463, Italy: Roberto Valturio, De 
re militari libri duodecim (Paris, BNF, MS lat. 
7236), f. 148v. 
Fig. F24  c. 1463, Italy: Roberto Valturio, De 
re militari libri duodecim (Paris, BNF, MS 
lat. 7236), f. 149r. 
Fig. F25  c. 1463, Italy: Roberto Valturio, De 
re militari libri duodecim (Paris, BNF, MS lat. 
7236), f. 149v. 
Fig. F26  c. 1463, Italy: Roberto Valturio, De 
re militari libri duodecim (Paris, BNF, MS 
lat. 7236), f. 150r. 
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Fig. F27  c. 1470-75, Hungary (?): Paolo Santini, Tractatus (Paris, 
BNF, MS lat. 7239), f. 109r. 
Fig. F28  c. 1480-99, Italy: Francesco di 
Giorgio, Trattato - trebuchet (Turin, 
Biblioteca Reale, Cod. 148 Saluzzo), f. 60r - 
taken from Corrado Maltese, ed., Trattati, 
tav. 111.  
Fig. F29  c. 1480-99, Italy: Francesco di 
Giorgio, Trattato - bricola (Turin, Biblioteca 
Reale, Cod. 148 Saluzzo), f. 60r - taken 
from Corrado Maltese, ed., Trattati, tav. 
111.  
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Fig. F30  c. 1480-99, Italy: Francesco di Giorgio, Trattato (Turin, 
Biblioteca Reale, Cod. 148 Saluzzo), f. 62r - taken from Corrado 
Maltese, ed., Trattati, tav. 115. 
Fig. F31  c. 1480-99, Italy: Francesco di Giorgio, Trattato (Turin, 
Biblioteca Reale, Cod. 148 Saluzzo), f. 61v. 
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Fig. F32  c. 1478-1519, Italy: 
Leonardo da Vinci, Codex Atlanticus 
- rotary trebuchet (Milan, Biblioteca 
Ambrosiana), f. 57. 
Fig. F33  c. 1478-1519, Italy: Leonardo da Vinci, 
Codex Atlanticus - tension catapult (Milan, Biblioteca 
Ambrosiana), f. 50v. 
Fig. F34  c. 1507, Germany: Jörg Kölderer (woodcut). 
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Fig. G1  c. 1285, Syria/Persia: Hasan al-Rammah, Furusiya (Paris, BNF, MS arabe. 2825), f. 
87v. 
Fig. G2  c. 1285, Syria/Persia: Hasan al-Rammah, Furusiya (Paris, BNF, MS arabe. 2825), 
f. 90r. 
Image protected by copyright 
Image protected by copyright 
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Fig. G3  c. 1306-18, Tabriz: Rashid al-Din, Jami' al-tawarikh (Edinburgh, University of 
Edinburgh Library, Or. MS 20), f. 130v. 
 
Fig. G4  c. 1306-18, Tabriz: Rashid al-Din, Jami' al-tawarikh (Edinburgh, University of 
Edinburgh Library, Or. MS 20), f. 124v. 
 
Fig. G5  c. 1306-18, Tabriz: Rashid al-Din, Jami' al-tawarikh (Edinburgh, University of 
Edinburgh Library, Or. MS 20), f. 3v. 
Image protected by copyright 
Image protected by copyright 
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Fig. G6  c. 1306-18, Tabriz: Rashid al-Din, Jami' al-tawarikh - siege of Baghdad (Berlin, 
Staatsbibliothek, Orientabteilung, Diez A), f. 70, S. 7 and S. 4. 
Fig. G7  c. 1430, Herat: Rashid al-Din, Jami' al-tawarikh (Paris, BNF, MS pers. 1113), f. 180v-
181r. 
Image protected by copyright 
Image protected by copyright 
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Fig. G8  c. 1373-1462, Syria/Persia: Al-
Zardkash, Kitab al-Aniq fi'l-Manjaniq - 
manjaniq sultano/shaytani (Istanbul, Topkapi 
Museum Library, MS Ahmad III 3469), f. 31r. 
Fig. G9  c. 1373-1462, Syria/Persia: Al-
Zardkash, Kitab al-Aniq fi'l-Manjaniq - 
manjaniq ifranji (Istanbul, Topkapi Museum 
Library, MS Ahmad III 3469), f. 20r. 
 
Fig. G10  c. 1373-1462, Syria/Persia: Al-Zardkash, 
Kitab al-Aniq fi'l-Manjaniq - manjaniq maghribi 
(Istanbul, Topkapi Museum Library, MS Ahmad III 
3469), f. 30v. 
 
Fig. G11  c. 1373-1462, Syria/Persia: 
Al-Zardkash, Kitab al-Aniq fi'l-
Manjaniq (Istanbul, Topkapi Museum 
Library, MS Ahmad III 3469), f. 25v. 
 
Image protected by copyright Image protected by copyright 
Image protected by copyright Image protected by copyright 
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Fig. G12  c. 1373-1462, Syria/Persia: Al-
Zardkash, Kitab al-Aniq fi'l-Manjaniq - 
manjaniq qarabughra (Istanbul, Topkapi 
Museum Library, MS Ahmad III 3469), f. 32r. 
 
Fig. G13  c. 1373-1462, Syria/Persia: Al-
Zardkash, Kitab al-Aniq fi'l-Manjaniq 
(Istanbul, Topkapi Museum Library, MS 
Ahmad III 3469), f. 34r. 
 
Fig. G14  c. 1373-1462, Syria/Persia: 
Al-Zardkash, Kitab al-Aniq fi'l-Manjaniq 
(Istanbul, Topkapi Museum Library, MS 
Ahmad III 3469), f. 33r. 
 
Fig. G15  c. 1373-1462, Syria/Persia: Al-
Zardkash, Kitab al-Aniq fi'l-Manjaniq (Istanbul, 
Topkapi Museum Library, MS Ahmad III 3469), f. 
44r. 
 
Image protected by copyright Image protected by copyright 
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Fig. H1  c. 1851, France: Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, Études sur le passé et l'avenir de 
l'artillerie, vol. 2, plate 1 (after p. 26). 
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Fig. H2  c. 1860, France: Viollet-le-Duc, Dictionnaire, 5:237, fig. 14. 
Fig. H3  c. 1860, France: Viollet-le-Duc, 
Dictionnaire, 5:227, fig. 9. 
Fig. H4  c. 1860, France: Viollet-le-Duc, 
Dictionnaire, 5:228, fig. 10. 
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Fig. H5  c. 1326, London: Walter of 
Milemete, De nobilitatibus, 
sapientiis et prudentiis regum 
(Oxford, Christ Church College, MS 
92), f. 78v. 
 
Fig. H6  c. 1340, Paris: Historia de Proeliis (La 
vraie ystoire dou bon roi Alixandre) - siege of 
Saianfu (London, BL, Royal D I), f. 111.  
Fig. H7  c. 1801, England: Francis Grose, 
Military Antiquities, vol. 1, facing p. 381. 
 
Fig. H8  c. 1903, England: Ralph Payne-Gallwey, 
The Crossbow, Appendix 1: The Catapult and the 
Balista, p. 10 fig. 1. 
Image protected by copyright Image protected by copyright 
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Appendix 2.                                                
Mentions of Artillery 
 
 
 
Artillery in Narrative Sources (1099-1250)1148 
 
Date Site & Use (Christian/Muslim) Employer(s) Source(s) 
Fall of Jerusalem 
1099 Arsuf offensive Godfrey of Bouillon AA 
1100 Haifa offensive Tancred AA 
1101 Caesarea offensive Baldwin I FC, AA, WT 
1102 Acre offensive Raymond of St Gilles IA 
1103 Acre offensive Baldwin I AA 
1104 Acre offensive Baldwin I FC, AA, WT 
1106 Apamea offensive Tancred AA 
1106 Malatya offensive Kilij Arslan MS, BH 
1106/7 Arnaldi offensive Egyptians AA 
1108 Sidon offensive Baldwin I AA 
1109 Tripoli offensive Bertrand of Tripoli AA, IQ 
1110 Baalbek offensive Tughtakin IQ 
1110 Beirut offensive Baldwin I AA, WT 
defensive garrison IQ 
1110 Sidon offensive Baldwin I, Magnus of Norway AA 
defensive garrison AA 
1110 al-Atharib offensive Tancred AA 
1111 Vetula offensive Tancred AA 
1111-12 Tyre offensive Baldwin I AA, IQ, IA 
defensive garrison AA 
1115 Kafartab defensive garrison US 
1115 Jaffa defensive garrison WT 
1121 Jerash offensive Baldwin II FC 
1123 Kharput offensive Balak ME, MS, AC, 
BH 
1123 Jaffa offensive Egyptians FC 
1124 Tyre offensive Franks, Venetians FC, ME, WT, 
AC 
                                                 
1148 Chronicles and histories that span several decades have been selected, rather than more specific 
accounts, with hopes of revealing broader trends. Less specific Latin and Arabic references to 'machines' 
and 'siege engines' have been omitted unless these are explicitly described as throwing stones larger than 
those that a slinger might.  
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defensive garrison WT 
1124 Manbij offensive Balak ME 
1125 'Azaz offensive Bursuqi, Tughtakin FC, ME, WT, 
AC 
1126 Raffaniya offensive Baldwin II, Pons of Tripoli FC, WT 
1132 Baalbek offensive Tughtakin IQ 
1137 Antioch offensive John Comnenus WT 
1137 Montferrand offensive Zanki WT 
1138 Shayzar offensive John Comnenus IQ, US, WT, IA, 
MS, BH, AF 
1138 Buza'a offensive John Comnenus IQ, IA 
1139 Baalbek offensive Zanki IQ, IA, AC, AF 
1140 Banyas offensive Mu'in al-Din Unar, Franks IQ, WT 
1144 Li Vaux Moise offensive Baldwin III WT 
1144 Edessa offensive Zanki IQ, WT, AC, 
BH 
1145 al-Bira offensive Zanki AC 
1145 In Homs for Damascus prepared Zanki IQ 
1146 In Damascus for 
Baalbek 
prepared Mu'in al-Din Unar IQ 
1146 Edessa offensive Joscelyn of Courtenay AC 
1147 In Damascus for 
Sarkhad, Bosra 
prepared Mu'in al-Din Unar IQ 
1150/51 Tell Bashir offensive Mas'ud ME  
1151 Jerusalem offensive Baldwin III WT 
defensive Melisende (garrison) WT 
1151 In Damascus for Bosra prepared summoned by Nur al-Din IQ 
1152 In Damascus for Bosra prepared summoned by Mujir al-Din IQ 
1153 Ascalon offensive Baldwin III WT, AC, BH 
1157 In Damascus for 
Banyas 
prepared summoned by Nur al-Din IQ 
1157 Banyas offensive Nur al-Din IQ, WT 
1157 Shayzar offensive Baldwin III, Thierry of Flanders WT 
1157-58 Casalia* offensive Baldwin III, Thierry of Flanders WT 
1158 Harim offensive Baldwin III, Thierry of Flanders IQ 
1164 Harim offensive Nur al-Din WT, IA, AC 
1167 Alexandria offensive Amalric WT 
1169 Damietta offensive Amalric, Byzantines WT, BD, MQ 
1170 Kerak offensive Nur al-Din ID, IA 
1170 Sinjar offensive Nur al-Din IA 
1174 Alexandria offensive William II of Sicily ID, BD, IA, MQ 
1175 Homs offensive Saladin MQ 
1175 Montferrand offensive Saladin IA 
1175 Sinjar offensive Sayf al-Din Ghazi II BD 
1176 A'zaz offensive Saladin IA 
1176 Masyaf offensive Saladin IA, MQ 
1177-78 Harim offensive Philip of Flanders, North Franks WT, IA, AC 
1179 Jacob's Ford offensive Saladin ID, IA 
1182 In Egypt for Syria prepared Saladin MQ 
1183 Amid offensive Saladin IA 
1183 Tell Khalid offensive Saladin IA 
1183 Kerak offensive Saladin WT, IA 
1184 Kerak offensive Saladin ID, BD, IA, BH, 
MQ 
1185 Mayyafariqin offensive Saladin BD, IA 
Battle of Hattin 
1187 Toron offensive Saladin ID, BD 
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1187 Ascalon offensive Saladin ID, BD, IA, MQ 
1187 Jerusalem offensive Saladin ID, BD, IA, BH, 
MQ 
defensive Balian of Ibelin (garrison) IA 
1187 Tyre offensive Saladin ID, BD, IA, BH, 
MQ 
1188 Saone offensive Saladin ID, BD, IA 
1188 Ash-Shughr offensive Saladin ID, BD, IA 
1188 Bourzey offensive Saladin ID, BD, IA 
defensive garrison IA 
1188 Trapessac offensive Saladin ID, BD, IA 
1188 Baghras offensive Saladin ID, IA 
1188 Safed offensive Saladin ID, BD, IA 
1188 Belvoir offensive Saladin ID, IA 
1190 Acre offensive Henry of Champagne ID, BD, IA 
defensive garrison ID, IA 
1190 Acre defensive garrison ID, BD 
1191 Acre offensive Richard I, Philip II, et al. ID, BD, IA, 
MQ, BH 
defensive garrison BD 
1192 Jaffa offensive Saladin BD 
1199 Montferrand offensive al-Mansur Nasir al-Din AF 
1207 Tripoli offensive al'Adil AF 
1217 Mount Tabor offensive Crsuaders IA 
1218 Tower of the Chain offensive Crusaders ER 
1218 Damietta offensive Crusaders ER 
1218 Damietta (in the field) offensive Crusaders IA 
1220 Caesarea offensive Mu'azzam Isa ER 
1221 Mansura (in the field) offensive Crusaders IA, MQ 
1229 Tell Khilid offensive Jalal al-Din Khwarizim BH, MQ 
1231-32 Beirut offensive Imperialists ER 
1232 Amid offensive al-Kamil MQ 
1239 Jerusalem offensive al-Nasir Da'ud MQ 
1245 Damascus offensive al-Nasir Da'ud MQ 
1247 Ascalon offensive Egyptians ER 
1248-49 Homs offensive al-Salih Najm AF, MQ 
1249 Mansura offensive Loius IX MQ 
 
* this may be Harim, although William identifies Harim by its proper name elsewhere (Casalia seems 
otherwise unknown) 
 
 
 
  
Abr. Source Range 
AA Albert of Aachen (1100-1119) 
AC Annonyms Chronicle (1100-1234) 
AF Abu'l-Fida (1100-1250) 
BD Baha' al-Din (1163-1193) 
BH Bar Hebraeus (1100-1250) 
ER Eracles (1184-1250) 
FC Fulcher of Chartres (1100-1127) 
IA Ibn al-Athir (1100-1239) 
ID 'Imad al-Din (1174-1193) 
IQ Ibn al-Qalanisi (1100-1160) 
ME Matthew of Edessa (1100-1137) 
MQ al-Maqrizi (1174-1250) 
MS Michael the Syrian (1100-1200) 
US Usama ibn Munqidh (1100-1183) 
WT William of Tyre (1100-1184) 
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Types of Thirteenth-Century Artillery, as Specified by Muslim Sources1149 
 
Year Site Term Number Source 
1218 Damietta shaytani 
gharbiya 
 Ibn al-Dawadari 
Ibn al-Dawadari 
1229 Baalbek maghribi  al-Ansari 
1232-33 Shayzar maghribi  1 Ibn Wasil; Ibn al-'Adim 
1236 Harran maghribi 1 Ibn al-Muqaffa 
1236 Edessa maghribi 1 Ibn al-Muqaffa 
1248-49 Homs shaytani  
maghribi  
qarabugha 
12 
1 of 14 
1 of 14 
Ibn Wasil; al-Ansari 
Ibn Wasil; al-Ansari 
Ibn Wasil 
1265 Caesarea ifranji 
maghribi 
4? Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir; Ibn al-Furat 
Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir; Ibn al-Furat 
1266 Safed maghribi >1 Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir; Ibn al-Furat 
1275 al-Bira ifranji 23 of 70 Ibn Shaddad; al-Yunini; Shafi' ibn 'Ali 
1285 Margat shaytani 
ifranji 
qarabugha  
4 of 10 
3 of 10 
3 of 10 
Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir 
Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir  
Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir 
1286 Saone ifranji 3 offensive, 
1 defensive 
Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir 
1289 Tripoli ifranji 
qarabugha 
6 of 19 
13 of 19 
Ibn al-Dawadari; al-Yunini; Ibn al-Furat 
Ibn al-Dawadari; al-Yunini; Ibn al-Furat 
1291 Acre shaytani 
ifranji 
qarabugha 
52 of 72 
15 of 72 
(5?) of 72 
al-Jazari; al-'Ayni; al-Yunini; Ibn al-Furat 
al-Jazari; al-'Ayni; al-Yunini; Ibn al-Furat 
al-Jazari; al-'Ayni; al-Yunini; Ibn al-Furat 
 
 
 
Baybars' Use of Artillery, According to Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir 
 
Date Site Intention Use Description (if provided) 
1265 al-Bira defensive prepared  
1265 Caesarea offensive prepared, used maghribi and ifranji, 4 large, small 
1265 Arsuf offensive used  
1266 Safed offensive prepared, used 1 maghribi, others 
1266?   prepared  
1268 Beaufort offensive prepared, used 26 
1271 Crac offensive used  
1271 Akkar offensive prepared some large 
1272 'Akkar defensive prepared  
1272-73 Alexandria defensive prepared  
 
                                                 
1149
 Adapted primarily from Chevedden, "Artillery of King James I," pp. 61-63 nn. 33-36. 
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Appendix 3.                                                   
Mathematical Scenarios 
 
 
 
The following data sets have been calculated by Mark Denny using variables 
recommended to him based on the findings of this study. The formula that he has 
developed calculates the ideal mechanical ratios for given masses and beam dimensions, 
as well as sling lengths (Ls) and the corresponding release velocities (V) and angles of 
release (), in order to effect a maximum horizontal range (Rh).1150 Beam lengths (Lb) 
have been selected between 4 m and 10 m, counterweight masses (Mcw) up to 4,000 kg 
and projectile masses (Mp) between 10 kg and 70 kg. For each scenario the load angle of 
the beam () is 135, a reasonable balance between maximising the effective distance that 
the counterweight can fall and a practical axle height relative to the other components of 
the engine. A trough for the projectiles to slide on horizontally before being lifted has 
been factored in. The small beam ratios, between 2:1 and 3.4:1, reflect the reasonable 
beam lengths and counterweight masses. The beam in each case has a density of 750 
kg/m3 and an originally circular cross-section, 0.5 m in diameter, but which has had the 
left and right sides shaved down so the beam is no more than 0.3 m wide, shedding mass 
but retaining its vertical thickness and strength. The mass of the beam significantly 
decreases velocity when coupled with a relatively light counterweight, hence a beam no 
longer than 6 m has been paired with a counterweight of 1,000 kg. These mathematically 
determined figures should then be compared with those generated by reconstructed 
engines. 
 
  
                                                 
1150 See Denny, "Siege Engine Dynamics," pp. 563-76; Denny, Ingenium, pp. 70-90. 
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70 kg Projectiles 
Mcw Mp Lb Lla Lsa Ls V ~ Rh 
4,000 kg 70 kg 10 m 7.1 m 2.9 m 6.4 m 51.7 m/s 45 250 m 
4,000 kg 70 kg 8 m 5.7 m 2.3 m 5.1 m 48.7 m/s 45 220 m 
4,000 kg 70 kg 6 m 4.3 m 1.7 m 3.9 m 44.4 m/s 45 190 m 
4,000 kg 70 kg 4 m 2.9 m 1.1 m 2.6 m 38.0 m/s 45 140 m 
3,000 kg 70 kg 10 m 6.9 m 3.1 m 6.1 m 43.7 m/s 45 180 m 
3,000 kg 70 kg 8 m 5.6 m 2.4 m 5.0 m 41.5 m/s 45 170 m 
3,000 kg 70 kg 6 m 4.2 m 1.8 m 3.7 m 38.2 m/s 45 140 m 
3,000 kg 70 kg 4 m 2.8 m 1.2 m 2.5 m 33.0 m/s 45 105 m 
2,000 kg 70 kg 10 m 6.7 m 3.3 m 5.6 m 32.7 m/s 45 105 m 
2,000 kg 70 kg 8 m 5.4 m 2.6 m 4.6 m 31.9 m/s 45 100 m 
2,000 kg 70 kg 6 m 4.1 m 1.9 m 3.5 m 29.9 m/s 45 90 m 
2,000 kg 70 kg 4 m 2.7 m 1.3 m 2.4 m 26.4 m/s 45 70 m 
 
50 kg Projectiles 
Mcw Mp Lb Lla Lsa Ls V ~ Rh 
4,000 kg 50 kg 10 m 7.2 m 2.9 m 6.5 m 56.3 m/s 45 290 m 
4,000 kg 50 kg 8 m 5.8 m 2.3 m 5.2 m 53.9 m/s 45 270 m 
4,000 kg 50 kg 6 m 4.4 m 1.7 m 4.0 m 49.6 m/s 45 235 m 
4,000 kg 50 kg 4 m 2.9 m 1.1 m 2.6 m 43.1 m/s 45 180 m 
3,000 kg 50 kg 10 m 7.0 m 3.0 m 6.2 m 48.0 m/s 45 220 m 
3,000 kg 50 kg 8 m 5.7 m 2.3 m 5.1 m 46.0 m/s 45 200 m 
3,000 kg 50 kg 6 m 4.3 m 1.7 m 3.9 m 42.8 m/s 45 175 m 
3,000 kg 50 kg 4 m 2.9 m 1.1 m 2.5 m 37.4 m/s 45 135 m 
2,000 kg 50 kg 10 m 6.7 m 3.3 m 5.7 m 36.7 m/s 45 130 m 
2,000 kg 50 kg 8 m 5.5 m 2.5 m 4.8 m 36.0 m/s 45 125 m 
2,000 kg 50 kg 6 m 4.2 m 1.8 m 3.7 m 34.0 m/s 45 115 m 
2,000 kg 50 kg 4 m 2.8 m 1.2 m 2.5 m 30.4 m/s 45 95 m 
 
30 kg Projectiles 
Mcw Mp Lb Lla Lsa Ls V ~ Rh 
4,000 kg 30 kg 10 m 7.3 m 2.7 m 6.6 m 62.5 m/s 40 345 m 
4,000 kg 30 kg 8 m 5.9 m 2.1 m 5.3 m 60.2 m/s 40 330 m 
4,000 kg 30 kg 6 m 4.5 m 1.5 m 4.1 m 56.4 m/s 40 290 m 
4,000 kg 30 kg 4 m 3.0 m 1.0 m 2.7 m 50.1 m/s 40 230 m 
3,000 kg 30 kg 10 m 7.0 m 3.0 m 6.2 m 53.4 m/s 40 260 m 
3,000 kg 30 kg 8 m 5.8 m 2.2 m 5.2 m 52.1 m/s 40 250 m 
3,000 kg 30 kg 6 m 4.4 m 1.6 m 4.0 m 49.2 m/s 40 130 m 
3,000 kg 30 kg 4 m 2.9 m 1.1 m 2.6 m 43.9 m/s 40 180 m 
2,000 kg 30 kg 10 m 6.8 m 3.2 m 5.9 m 41.6 m/s 40 160 m 
2,000 kg 30 kg 8 m 5.5 m 2.5 m 4.9 m 41.2 m/s 40 160 m 
2,000 kg 30 kg 6 m 4.3 m 1.7 m 3.9 m 39.7 m/s 40 150 m 
2,000 kg 30 kg 4 m 2.9 m 1.1 m 2.6 m 36.2 m/s 40 130 m 
 
10 kg Projectiles 
Mcw Mp Lb Lla Lsa Ls V ~ Rh 
3,000 kg 10 kg 10 m 7.2 m 2.8 m 6.5 m 59.5 m/s 40 320 m 
3,000 kg 10 kg 8 m 5.9 m 2.1 m 5.4 m 59.5 m/s 40 320 m 
3,000 kg 10 kg 6 m 4.5 m 1.5 m 4.1 m 57.8 m/s 40 300 m 
3,000 kg 10 kg 4 m 3.1 m 0.9 m 2.8 m 54.1 m/s 40 270 m 
2,000 kg 10 kg 10 m 7.0 m 3.0 m 6.2 m 47.0 m/s 45 210 m 
2,000 kg 10 kg 8 m 5.7 m 2.3 m 5.1 m 47.4 m/s 45 210 m 
2,000 kg 10 kg 6 m 4.4 m 1.6 m 4.0 m 46.9 m/s 45 210 m 
2,000 kg 10 kg 4 m 3.0 m 1.0 m 2.7 m 44.7 m/s 45 190 m 
1,000 kg 10 kg 6 m 4.1 m 1.9 m 3.5 m 30.7 m/s 45 90 m 
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Appendix 4.                                           
Reconstructed Trebuchets 
 
 
 
Most reconstructed trebuchets are of the counterweight type. The majority of those built 
to be 'historically accurate' use Honnecourt's illustration (Fig. C3) as a plan for the base, 
while Viollet-le-Duc's nineteenth century hypothetical drawings (Figs. H3 and H4) have 
influenced the superstructures of many. Among those drawing inspiration from these 
sources include those built by Favé at Vincennes, Radim Zepletal in Czechoslovakia, 
Peter Vemming Hansen in Denmark, the engines at Cardiff and Caerphilly in Wales and 
Beffeyte's hinged engine built at Urquhart Castle on Loch Ness, Scotland. Tarver's 
traction trebuchet is largely based on the illustrations and descriptions of al-Tarsusi, 
supplemented by the illuminations in the Morgan Bible (Figs. B19 and B20). The much 
heavier Danish traction trebuchet was inspired by the engines found in BNF MS 10136 
(Figs. B21 and B22). 
 
Abbreviations 
  
Mcw Mass of the counterweight (kg) 
Mp Mass of the projectile (kg) 
Mb Mass of the Beam (kg) 
Lb Length of the beam (m) 
Lla Length of the long arm (m) 
Lsa Length of the short arm (m) 
Ls Length of the sling (m) 
Lcw Length of the counterweight's centre of mass from the beam (m) 
Lax Height of the main axle (m) 
Rmax Maximum theoretical horizontal range (m) 
Rh Horizontal range (m) 
V True velocity of the projectile at release (m/s) 
 Angle of the short arm to the vertical below the beam 
 Angle of release to the horizontal 
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Reconstructed Counterweight Trebuchets 
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Tarver B - Trials1151 Reconstructed Traction Trebuchets 
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1151 Tarver, "Traction Trebuchet," p. 162. 
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Fig. I1  Tower of London: traction trebuchet 
Fig. I4  Caerphilly Castle: counterweight 
trebuchet (loading) 
Fig. I2  Caerphilly Castle: traction 
trebuchet 
 
Fig. I3  Caerphilly Castle: traction 
trebuchet (loading) 
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Fig. I5  Caerphilly Castle: counterweight 
trebuchet 
Fig. I6  Cardiff Castle: counterweight 
trebuchet 
Fig. I7  Cardiff Castle: counterweight 
trebuchet (counterweight detail) 
Fig. I8  Cardiff Castle: counterweight 
trebuchet (counterweight detail) 
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Fig. I9  Cardiff Castle: counterweight trebuchet 
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Appendix 5.                                                              
Al-Tarsusi's Persian Mangonel 
 
 
 
I know of three translations of the text surrounding al-Tarsusi's Persian Mangonel (Fig. 
C1).1152 The first was composed by Claude Cahen, who apparently translated each folio 
of the split-page text independently.1153 Bernard Lewis's English translation of Cahen's 
edition has been provided.1154 The second is by Paul Chevedden and was included as part 
of his 1986 PhD thesis, The Citadel of Damascus.1155 The third is by Shihab al-Sarraf and 
is found in David Nicolle's chapter in La Fortification au Temps des Croisades, but is 
otherwise unpublished.1156 All three have been included here to highlight certain 
interpretive differences, notably surrounding the role of the crossbow in the firing 
sequence. All three, however, confirm how primitive this engine was, or at least the 
author's understanding of it. 
 
Bernard Lewis's Translation: 
Description of a Persian Mangonel, Made for Me by Shaykh Abu'l-Hasan ibn al-
Abraqi al-Iskandarani, with a Throwing Power of Fifty Pounds, More or Less  
 
Its base is a crossbow (jarkh), and it is operated by a single man who makes the 
launch. When the man pulls the shaft, the hemp cords, which stretch the bowstring, 
reach its bolt; then the man catches the cup in a ring fixed to a strut which holds the 
shaft. Then he takes the bow and shoots and releases the shaft so that the stone is 
thrown. 
 
Take a Persian mangonel and set it up to make a launch. Dig a hole by the side of 
the pole, to a depth equal to the length of the hemp cords on the shaft. Then take a 
close-meshed hemp net and place at its ends three strong hemp ropes, long enough 
to reach from the top of the shaft, where the axle is, to the bottom of the hole; at the 
                                                 
1152 For the original, see al-Tarsusi Tabsirah Arbab al-Albab (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Hunt. 264), 
ff. 134v-135r. 
1153 Claude Cahen, "Un traité d'armurerie," pp. 119-20, 142-43. 
1154 Lewis, Islam, 1:221-22. 
1155 Chevedden, The Citadel of Damascus, p. 278 n. 26 (on pp. 299-300). 
1156 Nicolle, "Early Trebuchet," pp. 275-76. 
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end of the shaft there should be an iron ring, to which the ropes attached to the net 
are tied; and in the net stones should be placed in a quantity corresponding to the 
strength of the men who pull the shaft. At the end of the shaft, by the cup rope, there 
should be two nails placed on a windlass hanging from the shaft. When the man pulls 
this shaft, after having placed the stone in the cup and tied the cup rope to the hook 
placed at the top of the shaft, he...the cup with an iron hook placed at its end in a ring 
fixed to a strut which supports the action of the net...its cord with the ropes which 
raise the net in a hook fixed to the ropes, and when the ropes rise with the net...the 
arrow in its course. He shoots and then immediately returns to the cup and releases 
it according to his judgement. There are various ways of pulling it. Here is a picture 
of it. One may pull the net by pulling the top of the shaft, since it swings back like a 
steelyard and can be pulled and caught. The crossbow should be placed at the bottom 
of the strut of the mangonel, on two iron hooks which hold it. One draws the bow 
string and pulls it toward the bolt on its course. When the man catches the cup in the 
strut, he takes the bow and holds it so that the net pulls the shaft. He brings it back 
to its position. This traction is stronger than that of men, since the net draws 
according to its proportion.  
 
Paul Chevedden's Translation: 
A Description of a Persian Trebuchet (manjaniq farsi), Made for Me by Shaykh Abu 
al-Hasan b, al-Abraqi al-Iskandarani, with a Throwing Power of Fifty Ratl (c. 200 
lbs.), More or Less: At the base of its upright is a jarkh (crossbow/arbalest). All of 
that is pulled by a single man and he makes the launch. When the man pulls the 
beam, the hemp cords, which pull/stretch the bow-string, reach its bold/latch. Then 
the man fits the sling into a ring which is fixed to a base/pedestal which holds the 
beam. Then he takes the bow and shoot it; the beam is released and so the stone is 
thrown. 
 
Take a Persian mangonel and set it up to make a launch. Dig a hole next to its upright 
to a depth equal to the length of the hemp ropes on the beam. Then take a net of 
close-meshed hemp and place at its ends three strong hemp ropes, long enough to 
reach from the top of the beam, where the fulcrum is, to the bottom of the hole. At 
the end of the beam there should be an iron ring to which the ropes, which are 
attached to the net, are tied. Stones should be placed in the net to a quantity equal to 
the force of the men who would [usually have to] pull the beam [of a traction 
trebuchet]. At the end of the beam, next to the rope of the sling, there should be a 
mikhan (hook?) placed on a pulley which hangs from the beam. The man pulls it (the 
beam) and after he places a stone in the sling and attaches the rope of the sling to the 
hook placed at the top of the beam. The man is able to pull the net (counterweight) 
by pulling the top of the beam, since it returns/swings back like the steelyard. After 
he pulls it (the beam), he attaches the sling to an iron hook placed at its (the beam’s) 
lower end, [and put the sling] in a ring fixed to a base which holds the power/force 
(i.e. weight) of the net (i.e. counterweight). The crossbow is placed at the bottom of 
the base of the manjaniq in two iron hooks which hold it. The bowstring, with the 
ropes which raise the net, is put in a hook fixed to the ropes. When the ropes rise 
with the net, the ropes pull the bow string and convey it to the bolt on its course. 
After the man attaches the sling on the base, he takes the bow and places the arrow 
on its course and shoots it. Then he returns immediately to the sling and releases it 
according to his judgement. When the net (counterweight) pulls the beam, it brings 
it back to its [original] position; and [this] is stronger than the pulling (traction) of 
men, because it (the net/counterweight) pulls it (the beam) with a constant force, 
whereas men differ in their pulling force. And this is a picture of it. 
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Shihab al-Sarraf's Translation: 
A description of the Farsi type of manjaniq like that which I know was made by 
Shaykh Abu'l-Hasan Ibn al-Ibraqi al-Iskandari. It will have pulling (throwing) power 
of approximately fifty artal (92.5 kg if using the Syrian rutl, 20 kg if using an Iraqi 
rutl) and in the base of its support-frame there is a jarkh (crossbow). The entire 
operation is carried out by the (same man) who shoots it. Thus the man pulls the 
saham (literally "arrow" but also habitually used for the arm of beam-sling of the 
mangonel) by its hemp-ropes, and the string of the bow is in its lock and (the same 
man) attaches the kaffah (pouch of the sling) to a ring which is already fastened to 
the foundation (of the supporting frame) to secure the arm of the manjaniq. Take the 
bow (of the crossbow) and shoot it, which releases the arm of the manjaniq and thus 
throws the stone (missile). So take a Persian manjaniq but do not shoot with it (at 
once). Instead dig within the base of its frame a hole (in the ground) whose depth is 
equal to the length of the (pulling) ropes of the arm of the (ordinary) manjaniq. Then 
take a net of close interlaced ropes which has three cables of strong hemp rope from 
its upper part; their length being (the same as) that from the head of the sahem (the 
arm of the manjaniq) where the khinzirah (axle or fulcrum; literally female pig or 
'sow') would be, to the bottom of the hole. There is an iron ring attached to the very 
end of the saham (beam-sling) of the manjaniq, so fasten the ropes from the net to 
this. Place in the net rocks (whose weight is) equal to the strength of the men who 
(would otherwise normally) pull the arm of the manjaniq. In the far end of the saham 
of the manjaniq, next to the rope of the pouch, there is a mithan (probably meaning 
loop) which is already put into a bakrah (reel or pulley) hanging from the saham of 
the manjaniq. The man pulls this after he places the rocks in the pouch (of the sling) 
and has attached its rope to the hook positioned in the head of the arm of the 
manjaniq. Thus the man has power (control) over the pull of the net and the pull of 
the head of the [page break] saham of the manjaniq equally, like the two arms of a 
balance (pair of scales). When it takes the strain, attach the iron hook which is in the 
lowest part of the pouch to the ring of 'that which makes it jump up' (the trigger) in 
the base (of the frame) to hold the weight of the net (containing the counterweight 
rocks). The bow of the jarkh (crossbow) is already placed in the lowest part of the 
frame of the manganiq, held in place by a pair of iron hooks. Attach its bowstring to 
the rope, which has lifted the net, by a hook fastened firmly to the ropes. That which 
has raised up the ropes of the net is thus pulled tight to the string of the bow which, 
as a result, is in the lock of the majra (the stock of the crossbow). Then the man holds 
the pouch (more likely meaning the net) down to the frame until it reaches the bow. 
Now place the nablah (arrow) in its groove (the crossbow stock) and shoot it. This 
releases the pouch which is consequently pulled up by the pull of the net (containing 
the counterweight) on the arm of the manjaniq. This will be more powerful than the 
comparable power of men pulling all at once because the men do not pull consistently
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